Can Philosophers Be Patriots? Annette Baier (bio) Richard Rorty challenged the profession of philosophy to examine its own activities, to avoid false consciousness of what it is that we do. We are not, he claimed, scientists of the mind, nor discerners of eternal moral truths. Ours is not a view sub specie aeternitatis, but a view from a given culture at a given time. This challenge is salutary, and has been influential, but largely outside philosophy. The Princeton philosophy department is still doing the sorts of things they were doing when Rorty left and turned his back on the analytic philosophy he had practiced up until then.1 I attended a graduate seminar he gave on the philosophy of mind as a visitor in Pittsburgh shortly before he left Princeton, and I was a member of the APA board on the memorable occasion when he quarreled with his old friend Ruth Marcus and wept with the anguish of it. I myself came in for some flak from defenders of analytic philosophy for my championing of "pluralists," so felt for Rorty in this confrontation. And I, too, had raised the question of what our professional ethics were for our own profession, what made us think public moneys should support us in our intellectual games. Yet I stayed in a philosophy department, while Rorty ended with only an honorary place in Stanford's. Why did I stay? Largely because I felt that teaching ethics in the way I was doing, and teaching the history of philosophy, was increasing understanding and reflectiveness in my students. Rorty had not been an analytic moral philosopher, and it is interesting to speculate on what arc his thought might have taken had he begun, not with potentiality and the mind-body problem, but with the moral potential of American democracy, and good reasons in ethics. For he ended as a social and political philosopher, indeed as a patriot philosopher, defending the U.S. ideal of democracy, which he took to have an egalitarian component, believing in moral progress, and looking for the right version of human solidarity. He was very much a patriot, but also a globetrotter, speaking in Teheran and Beijing as well as Frankfurt and Paris. Rorty raised the question of whether any claim about what does and does not exist can be raised independently of our current cultural and social goals. We interpret what we find to be the facts in terms of their [End Page 121] bearing on our hopes and our fears. To say that we currently face dangers from climate change, and from violence from disaffected groups, is certainly to make factual claims and also to make value judgments. I see social philosophers as having a duty to think about clear and present dangers, and I think that study of such philosophers as Grotius, Hume, Kant, Hegel, and Rawls can help us to do so. At any rate I shall hope that I am doing the sort of philosophy Rorty would have approved of, in what follows, when I consider two grave dangers currently facing all of us. My tone, however, will scarcely be ironical, since I know of no alternative debunking vocabulary for describing these dangers, so I fail Rorty's criteria for an ironist.2 It is difficult to recontextualize climate change, unless we go back to Noah, and the only way I know to recontextualize terrorism is to attempt to see it from the terrorist's point of view.3 I shall be speaking as a critical citizen both of my native country, New Zealand, and of the country where I spent most of my working life, the U.S. I shall also be speaking as a committed cosmopolitan (who spent over three years in Britain, one in Berlin, and every summer for three decades in Austria), trying to advance the cause of what David Hume called "the party of humankind, against vice and disorder."4 Travel helps the would-be world citizen, and my double citizenship also gives me, I like to think, an advantage, in that I can see each of my two countries from the standpoint of the other. Just as learning another language instructs...