To better understand stare decisis and to normatively explore our constitutional future, this article assumes that President Obama's election signifies a constitutional shift similar to the one occurring after President Nixon won in 1968. From that contentious, self-righteous era to the present day, all American Presidents selected Supreme Court nominees who were more conservative than the members of the Warren Court majority, much less that aggressively liberal duo, Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice Stevens, appointed by the moderate Republican President Gerald Ford, is arguably the most liberal member on the Court. It is impossible to predict how far the country may tack leftward. Nixon's initial electoral triumph was an uncertain beginning for modern conservatism that hardly satisfied his party's more militant wing: he was more liberal domestically than any President after Carter (whose own administration began the process of deregulation which eventually degenerated into catastrophic speculative frenzy). It is possible that Obama's administration will readjust existing norms or fail, suddenly reviving modern conservatism. If this essay's prediction is accurate, how should a gradually more progressive Court evaluate conservative triumphs over the past forty years? Should an emerging liberal majority overrule most closely contested constitutional decisions-those five-to-four and six-to-three cases won by conservatives that have been the focus of most liberal political and academic ire? Should this new bloc confine those determinations to their facts, thereby stripping supporting reasoning of vitality? Or should they let most of these constitutional sleeping dogs lie? The answers to those questions partially reside in one's attitude toward the doctrine of stare decisis, a doctrine which means, at a minimum, that new Supreme Court Justices should presumptively integrate their constitutional jurisprudence into the existing framework even though they would have decided many prior cases differently had they had been on the Court when those cases were originally argued. Ultimately, this hypothetical liberal Court should not transform constitutional law by overruling many previously contested cases and/or by construing them narrowly. Nor should it create a wide range of new rights. Aggressive use of both forms of judicial activism could undermine our nation's desperate need to address wealth inequality, environmental problems, energy independence, racism, and sexism. To support that claim, we utilize important disputed cases, won by conservatives, as exemplars of the numerous justifications for a robust conception of stare decisis. This approach creates a more complete descriptive model of stare decisis, useful even to those who will disagree with our particular substantive conclusions.