Major War Research Articles

Sources: 500 Great Military Leaders

If the title were 500 Important/Noteworthy Military Leaders, that would sound awkward, so instead we have "Great," but listing the important/noteworthy is what Tucker says in his preface he was striving to achieve. That helps explain his selections, many of whom are portrayed as capable men who played significant roles in major wars--perhaps as trainers or planners or theoreticians. Others were outstanding subordinate leaders or “great” within their times and locales.

Has the United States Lost the Ability to Fight a Major War?

Abstract: The 2015 National Military Strategy identifies war with a major power as a growing possibility. The more the United States demonstrates it is willing and able to undertake a big war, the more unlikely it is that it will have to do so. Thus, the US military should undertake analyses, wargames, and exercises focused on rapid expansion of the force, to include creating new formations. ********** After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States the focus of the American military shifted quickly and dramatically. Previously, most attention was on quick, high-tempo operations against the conventional forces of rogue states. Using advanced technology and exquisitely trained units, the US military was designed to crush state adversaries in short order. Desert Storm was the prevailing paradigm. (1) After September 11, the US intervention in Afghanistan, and the outbreak of insurgency in Iraq in 2003, the American military quickly shifted to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and man hunting. This was a deep and far-ranging change. The human domain of warfare, which had drifted into insignificance during the revolution in military affairs of the 1990s, returned with a vengeance. Conventional forces learned the importance of cultural understanding in counterinsurgency. Special operations forces moved from the periphery to the centerpiece of American military strategy. (2) The military and the intelligence communities fused together to identify opponents and neutralize them. The defense industry provided a massive array of equipment and systems optimized for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. While this was a dramatically different type of activity than anyone had expected, thought about, and prepared for, the US military adapted on the fly. While the American military was learning to fight extremists, insurgents, and terrorists, conventional war was given little thought and effort. As US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq subsided, defense officials and military leaders began redefining their focus once again. This has proved difficult. In the past, adversaries--whether the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, or the Iraqi and Afghan insurgents--drove such reorientations and provided a beacon to guide defense policymakers and military leaders. In the contemporary security environment, there is no predominant adversary. This complicates the military's ongoing reorientation since optimizing for one type of conflict or enemy results in suboptimizing for others. What is clear, though, is that the military must prepare for both irregular or state opponents. As the 2015 National Military Strategy stated: For the past decade, our military campaigns primarily have consisted of operations against violent extremist networks. But today, and into the foreseeable future, we must pay greater attention to challenges posed by state actors ... Today, the probability of US involvement in interstate war with a major power is assessed to be low but growing. (3) This is easy--and important--to say, but tough to do in an increasingly austere resource environment. A future interstate war with a major power would not reprise Desert Storm or the 2003 invasion of Iraq in which the US military overwhelmed enemy forces in lightening campaigns with limited American casualties. Chances are it would be costly and possibly long. As the two world wars showed, major powers sometimes go to war expecting a short conflict--a Franco-Prussian War--only to stumble into a long, bloody slogging match. Even though every American wants to avoid this situation, it is important to consider its possibility. Since the National Military Strategy identifies interstate war with a major power as a growing probability, Americans must ask themselves whether the United States could still fight a conflict lasting years and demanding a major expansion of the armed forces. …

Physical Education, Exercise, Fitness and Sports: Early PM&R Leaders Build a Strong Foundation

Physical Education, Exercise, Fitness and Sports: Early PM&R Leaders Build a Strong Foundation

The Liberal Illusion is Not a Complete Delusion: The WTO Helps Member States Keep the Peace Only When it Increases Trade

We use both qualitative and quantitative tools to examine whether membership in the WTO reduces the likelihood of conflict. In our qualitative analysis, we show how WTO facilitates cooperation and transparency. Then we study what policymakers say and do to use trade to promote peace. We also examine whether and how members of the WTO respond to acceding states as well as member states experiencing inter-state conflict. We find member states do little to expand trade with states in conflict. Moreover, they continue to use trade sanctions. Hence, they are sending contradictory messages about the trade/peace relationship. Next we test whether the trust engendered through daily interactions and participation in a rules based system (our membership hypothesis) reduces the likelihood of conflict or whether membership in the WTO which in turn leads to expanded trade reduces the likelihood of conflict (our membership and trade hypothesis). We find no evidence that membership alone reduces the likelihood of either major interstate war or Militarized Interstate Disputes among members. However, when states are both members of the GATT/WTO and benefit from increased trade, they are less likely to engage in Militarized Interstate Disputes. Hence, the liberal illusion is not a complete delusion.

Owning Wallace Stevens

From the outset, Wallace Stevens’s reputation has proven a vexation for even supportive critics. While the New Critics wanted his work to look more high modernist than late Romantic, “Romantic-modernists,” resenting even the possibility that Romanticism was passé, argued that modernism itself was a reaction-formation to Romanticism and that modernism itself was “late,” if not passé. The New Critic complained that the work had no ethical interest in what was going on between the two major wars that framed its composition; the Romanticists countered with Friedrich Nietzsche’s claim that morality is, at bottom, a branch of aesthetics. Moderating the battle between these competing idiolects, Charles Altieri straddles these positions and finds that Stevens himself never entirely subscribed to either.

Capac Women and the Politics of Marriage in Early Colonial Peru

During the major Inca civil wars, Atahualpa had almost exterminated Huascar’s kin. Only a few capac women, those who descended from Manco Capac, the founder of the Inca dynasty, remained alive. Atahualpa had planned to take them as his principal wives since only this type of marriage could successfully maintain the authority of the Incas over a large Andean territory. The Spanish arrival in 1532 interrupted his plans, but it did not eliminate Inca claims of sovereignty through marriage. In fact, it was through marriage that Atahualpa aimed to establish political alliances with Francisco Pizarro. While both Incas and Spaniards understood marriage on their own terms, there were many instances in which both were willing to redefine their own concepts of marriage in their struggle for power. In all of these, the women engaged in these unions were not only conscious about their political roles, but agents in the main historical events of this period.

Climate-induced conflict or Hospice Earth: the increasing importance of eco-socialism

What are the implications of global climate change for peace and human welfare in the future? The answer depends on the actual effects of climate change and how the world responds to them. Current economic and political systems are unlikely to produce the policy and institutional changes needed to reduce adequately the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions causing the problem, so some of the most dangerous effects of climate change could occur this century. Some observers posit that climate change will result in catastrophe, but specifics of this catastrophe range widely. Does climate change mean painful but manageable social disruption, requiring, for instance, populations to move and cities to be rebuilt? Or does climate change portend much worse, including major wars, the end of modern civilization or, incredibly, even the eventual extinction of humanity? If these more severe consequences are likely or possible, what kind of global society would be best able to survive, or at least cope? The answer may be found in eco-socialism and a ‘Hospice Earth’ that nurtures people and societies regardless of how bad the future becomes.

Mengapa tidak berperang? Norma Politik Luar Negeri Cina dan Konflik Laut Cina Selatan

South China Sea conflict is one of the most destabilizing factors in Southeast Asia. Despite it has occured for long time period, there has not been major wars among occupants. This puzzle challenges realist particularly ofense-defense theory stating that when perception of victory is greater than defeat, it will lead to war. China’s military capability is far greater than any contry in the region. Yet, China does not intent to attack others. Assumption that China is an offensive and hegemonic nation is not in accordance with reality. Material-based explanation cannot account for China’s foreign policy. This article seeks to explain why South China Sea conflict does not lead to war between occupants. Using constructivism in international relations, this article argues that China’s domestic norms of national security plays great role which constitute its foreign policy character. Norms of cooperative security or hezuo anquan which is rooted from Confucian culture emphasize on harmony and cooperation that generate self-restraint diplomacy. As a result, China would not employ its military power to solve South China Sea conflict. This article concludes that norms held by country constitute its interest and in turn guide state’s policy.

Small Forces and Crisis Management

ABSTRACT: Widely available precision strike platforms, increasing weapons costs and systemic constraints on major war are altering how military actors prepare for future conflict. As the costs increase and the utility of fielding massed formations decreases, actors seek speed and surprise to force decisions short of escalating into costly major wars. The character of conflict is therefore evolving to favor small, multi-domain forces, which will require new approach to crisis management. ********** Multiple US military services are experimenting with how to use smaller formations for missions ranging from crisis response to forced entry. The Unified Quest 2014 exercise, the deep futures war game run by the Army Capabilities Integration Center, featured units engaged what the new operating concept refers to as combined arms megacity. (1) Bold Alligator 2014, the annual multinational littoral warfare exercise, experimented with smaller amphibious assault formations operating from Joint High-Speed Vessels and dry cargo ships, as well as long-range raids using MV-22 Osprey. (2) The force under examination was composite, linking distributed units with fly in command echelon. Other nations are also beginning to experiment with smaller, multi-domain (i.e., air, sea, land, cyber) formations designed to fight short, intense conflicts. As part of an ongoing conventional force modernization since 2008, the Russian military is fielding modernized brigade combat team formations and smaller battalion tactical groups. (3) Based on lessons learned from the near-war with Pakistan 2001, and the ongoing challenge of balancing China, India is testing integrated battle groups and formations able to launch short-notice attacks beneath the threshold major theater war. (4) The trend extends to armed proxies. As seen Crimea 2014, and ongoing Iranian support to groups like Hezbollah, regional powers are arming their proxies with increasingly sophisticated weapon systems. Despite different core missions and mandates as well as external threats, multiple security actors are clearly signaling preferences for smaller, modernized joint forces. What do these initiatives tell us about potential changes the character of modern war? Are the reforms simply local adaptions to anticipated conflicts, or do they indicate larger pattern? This article analyzes the trend towards smaller, multi-domain force capabilities global and regional powers. It argues that the character of contemporary conflict is being changed by the proliferation of precision strike and associated command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems combined with an assumption that conflicts will be fought beneath the threshold of major war. These forces are altering how officers imagine future war. As result, military thinkers appear to be developing new concepts and forces substituting speed and multiple domain maneuver for mass on the battlefield. The end result may be new theory of victory. (5) Multiple nations are planning to use smaller, modernized combat formations to signal their capabilities and gain advantage crisis, and if necessary, fight and win short wars either directly or through proxies. Character(s) of War? Analyzing emergent trends across armed forces is an old idea military studies. Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800-1890) hypothesized the changing character of war was function of how new material conditions, from railroads to telegraphs, changed the speed of mobilization and the character of war. Reflecting on his time, Moltke observed, a change the tactics of all branches based on the fact that ... the firepower of an infantry platoon [today] surpasses the range and destructive effect of the case-shot of six-pounder cannon. (6) Despite their differences, Russian military theorists Marshal Aleksander A. …

Tears of Ishtar: women's mental health in Iraq

Iraq was the seat of culture, knowledge, and art in the ancient Arab world. In the past few decades, Iraq has dealt with a large share of violence in the region due to three major wars: first the Iraq–Iran War from 1980 to 1988, then the Gulf War in January, 1991, and most recently, the US-led invasion in March, 2003. These conflicts have had a serious effect on women in Iraq, yet mental health services are generally inadequate. According to the WHO-AIMS report1 on mental health systems in Iraq, 44% of psychiatric outpatient visits are by women, and many more women seek help from faith healers or primary care clinics for minor psychological problems.

Raslojavanje života (roman Sara Petra Sarića)

Novel Sara of Petar Sarić consists of two parts; in it are processed or present two wars, two major wars in the region of Montenegro and Herzegovina, the First and Second World War. However, it is more novel about divisions within the family and the man himself, (and infamous assault of godfather Luka on Sarah also and his murder are in that function), in the first part; and on the divisions among the people, in general, in the second part of the novel. The second part is, in fact, the image layering of life, not a symbolic one, full of hope, faith, reliance, rather than a concrete, real life, that life which is transformed into a fear of life. Separate, poetical, part of the novel, is his main character, Sara. It is no coincidence that her name novel entitled. Because she is one of most beautiful characters in the newer Serbian prose. Speech about the Sara precedes speech about her book. The book is Sara, Sara's book! Possession of book is her main feature of the exterior. Sara comes out from the Book and disappears in the book. Self contained and independent, therefore doomed to conflict with the environment. Loyal to husband and family, loyal to the truth and for justice, she ,,not hurt anything and anyone, no one is standing in the way, to anyone not wroth, nor has anyone looked wrong.' At the same time, the strange beauty, beauty that could not fit into some sort of scheme, one particular image or idea of beauty that again and again renewed, changed, remaining distant, and unmet. Strange goodness, marvelous beauty, she suffered unusual way; her life was transformed into continuous abstinence, repression, in anxiety and fear. In a word: in martirizam! Finally, in order to safe­guard children, sacrificed herself. Novel is a strong critique of society which is not able to recognize the beauty / goodness!.

The India-Pakistan Nuclear Dyad and Regional Nuclear Dynamics

Nuclear weapons in various stages-in established armories, latent capacity, or merely embryonic potential-are alive, well, and thriving in Asia. Ashley Tellis has very aptly written that given the contested geopolitics of Asia, which is defined by several enduring rivalries, many unresolved territorial disputes, significant local power transitions, and now the continent-wide anxieties provoked by the rise of China, it is not surprising that nuclear weapons have retained their critical importance.1 To put the South Asian dimension of the nuclear environment in its correct perspective, it is critical to view the disputes, rivalries, and players involved in a historical and regional context. This essay begins with a brief historical overview of the regional dimension of India-Pakistan nuclear dynamics and then looks more specifically at the perspectives and nuclear policies of India and Pakistan, as well as on China's nuclear policy vis-a-vis India. Finally, the essay concludes by asserting that the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad must be understood within the context of broader nuclear dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region.The Regional Dimension of India-Pakistan Nuclear DynamicsBefore 1947 the Indian subcontinent was surrounded by the buffer states of Afghanistan, Tibet, and Burma, and the external players in the region were Britain and Russia. Soon after independence, Pakistan fought a war with India and occupied a part of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan later joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), bringing the United States and its alliances into the subcontinent in an effort to resist the influence of the Soviet Union. Tibet was taken over by China in the 1950s, introducing China as an important actor in the South Asian geopolitical and strategic environment. In the mid to late 1950s, China also occupied Aksai Chin, a part of Jammu and Kashmir, which in 1962 led to the Sino-Indian War. Two additional wars between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 ultimately involved both the United States and Soviet Union. Then, in the late 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan met with an insurgency supported by the United States and China, among others.Consequently, while the Cold War was raging, South Asia experienced four major wars. This count excludes the wars in Afghanistan; the breakup of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh; the persistent involvement of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China on the subcontinent; and the nuclearization of China and its entry into the United Nations and the UN Security Council. Was all this due to the creation of the India-Pakistan dyad and the India-China dyad, or was it instead the product of the great game between the United States, Soviet Union, China, India, and Pakistan? Can we today forget this recent history and simply look at the subcontinent's dynamics through the lens of the Cold War binary? The Cold War superpowers possessed a deep-rooted ideological rivalry, but they had no disputed territory between them and no enduring history of armed conflict against each other. Can Cold War binary dynamics therefore apply to the India-Pakistan-China nuclear trio, which do have territorial disputes and have fought wars? For the reasons stated above, it would be a misplaced logic to apply the Cold War binary dynamics to the India-Pakistan-China triad.IndiaIndia's tryst with the atomic bomb is almost as old as the bomb itself. In 1944, Homi Bhabha submitted a report on nuclear energy, and a year later the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research was established. Early Indian leaders after independence understood the dual use of atomic energy. They established the Atomic Energy Act in April 1948 and later created the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in 1954. In 1956, India's Apsara was the first nuclear research reactor in Asia to be operationalized. At that stage, India could have opted to build its nuclear weapons program, but its leaders chose to profess nuclear disarmament, little realizing that the nuclear genie was already out of the bottle. …

The Big Question

The Big Question

ANZAC Connections: delivering and connecting real content and data online

The Australian War Memorial is currently serving an enormous public appetite for access to its data. The data, created from a decade of digitisation and indexing of the collections, are a rich vein for research and understanding the Australian experience of war. Currently, the public are unable to efficiently extract and use these data, as they are not published in an open and interoperable format. The Memorial's Research Centre regularly assists researchers by providing spreadsheets and CSV files of its data. It also handles thousands of public enquiries each month, helping people use and interpret the databases and access the collections. The Anzac Connections project is the Memorial's major First World War centenary initiative, aimed at making more effective use of its data to enable the public to discover and search the collections more independently and successfully. This will provide efficiencies in resourcing public enquiries and improve regional access to the collections. The project is also focused on unlocking and sharing these data in the web environment for broader public research and reuse. This article is not about showcasing a completed project, but demonstrates the Memorial's concept and discusses the issues, difficulties and problems overcome along the way.

Gulf War Syndrome: a review of current knowledge and understanding

The 1991 Persian Gulf War was a resounding military success for coalition forces, who liberated Kuwait following the Iraqi invasion. The medical legacy we have from the conflict is the poorly understood, yet remarkable, phenomenon of Gulf War Syndrome, which surfaced soon after. Epidemiological research has proven beyond doubt that Gulf War veterans report a wide variety of symptoms, in excess of appropriately matched control subjects, and experience worse general health. Numerous toxic environmental hazards have been suggested as causes of Gulf War Syndrome, yet exhaustive scientific study has failed to provide conclusive proof of any link. No novel or recognised disease has been found to account for the symptomatic burden of veterans, and the optimal treatment remains uncertain. This understanding can be added to from an anthropological perspective, where the narratives of those afflicted provide further insight. The nature of military life was changing at the time of the Gulf War, challenging the identity and beliefs of some veterans and causing socio-cultural distress. The symptomatic presentation of Gulf War Syndrome can be considered an articulation of this disharmony. Gulf War Syndrome can also be considered within the group of post-combat disorders such as shellshock, the like of which have occurred after major wars in the last century. With the current withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Defence Medical Services (DMS) should heed the lessons of history.

Assessing the danger of war: parallels and differences between Europe in 1914 and East Asia in 2014

The article looks at structural analogies between the strategic situation in Europe in the summer of 1914 and in East Asia today, with particular emphasis on the probability of the outbreak of a major war. The author examines analogies regarding the nature of the international system, i.e. is the international system characterized by outright anarchy or by a more or less developed and institutionalized understanding among the main actors about the way to preserve peace and to organize economic exchange? The article addresses domestic factors (nationalism, democratic, authoritarian or semi-democratic regimes) and investigates military dynamics against the backdrop of geography and the availability of military equipment and technologies. Possible routes of military escalation are also discussed. Special attention is paid to states that have isolated themselves and that dispose of military means that might promise swift victory. The article comes to the conclusion that there are very few similarities between Europe in 1914 and East Asia today, but that both the high degree of militarization of the Korean peninsula and the evolving military competition between the US and China in the region do imply the possibility of a major armed conflict in a not too distant future.

Trajectories of posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTSS) after major war among Palestinian children: Trauma, family- and child-related predictors

ObjectiveResearch shows great individual variation in changes in posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTSSs) after major traumas of terrorist attacks, military combat, and natural disasters. Earlier studies have identified specific mental health trajectories both in children and adults. This study aimed, first, to identify potential PTSS-related trajectories by using latent class growth analyses among children in a three-wave assessment after the 2008/2009 War on Gaza, Palestine. Second, it analyzed how family- and child related factors (e.g., attachment relations, posttraumatic cognitions (PTCs), guilt, and emotion regulation) associate with the trajectory class membership. MethodsThe sample consisted of 240 Palestinian children (49.4% girls and 50.6% boys) of 10–13 years of age (M=11.29, SD=0.68), who completed PTSS (CRIES) assessments at 3 (T1), 5 (T2), and 11 (T3) months after the war. Children reported their personal exposure to war trauma, attachment style, cognitive trauma processing, and emotion regulation, and their parents reported family war trauma exposure and attachment style. ResultsResults revealed a three-trajectory solution, a majority of children belonging to the Recovery trajectory (n=183), and a minority belonged either to Resistant trajectory (n=29) or to Increasing symptoms trajectory (n=28). Low levels of negative posttraumatic cognitive appraisals, feelings of guilt and emotion regulation were characteristic of children in the Resistant trajectory as compared to Increasing symptoms trajectory. Father׳s attachment security was further associated with the Resistant trajectory membership. Children׳s attachment avoidance and high parental trauma were typical to children in Recovery trajectory (as compared to the Increasing symptoms trajectory).

New Achievements in WWII Military Historical Reconstruction with GIS

Recently geoinformatics has become a well–known and widely applied discipline in different human sciences. There are several interesting examples of applying geographical information systems to manage the information of various time periods in military history and archaeology. Our research topic covers modern age military history, and so it is a very sensitive topic because of the recent dates. Therefore we always used objective data acquisition techniques and an applied engineering approach. The military historical GIS database, which was created in this way, can be handled as an objective and reliable basis for further research by scientists in object or even in event reconstructions. Firstly, we had to define a strategy, a methodology, which is suitable to achieve our aims — a uniform GIS database — considering the existing and currently accessible data sources. This methodology consists of three main parts: the reconstruction of the period’s environment, the military objects and finally the military historical events. According to this methodology we reconstructed particular sectors of the two major World War II defense lines (Attila– and Margit–line) in Hungary. Beside the GIS based reconstructions of the environment, the military objects and the events, we investigated further analytical and representational functions, which can also support these kinds of applications. The methods enable various spatial and attribute queries and animation possibilities that are also useful and sometimes necessary. The typical examples of these functions are also discussed in the paper.

Duty: memoirs of a secretary at war

Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War By Robert M. Gates New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014 618 pages $35.00 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Duty is Robert Gates' second volume of memoirs and covers his time as Secretary of Defense in the George W Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Few people are better versed in how Washington works (or doesn't work) than Gates. He spent twenty-seven years in the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council before becoming the only Secretary of Defense asked to stay in office when the White House changed hands between political parties. Because of this, the book's released caused a major stir, particularly in Washington. Gates' anger and unvarnished opinions about senior policymakers and elected officials, including some still holding office drew the most initial attention. While he respects the two presidents he served, Gates indicts Washington's hyperpartisan climate in general and Congress in particular which he describes as Uncivil, incompetent in fulfilling basic constitutional responsibilities (such as time appropriates), micromanagerial, parochial, thin-skinned, [and] often putting self (and reelection) before country. He is particularly disdainful of Senator Harry Reid, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, and Vice President Joe Biden, at times resorting to unnecessary low blows as when he sarcastically writes that Biden presumed to understand how to make CT (counterterrorism) work better than Stan (McChrystal) even though Biden was talking about policy and strategy and General McChrystal's expertise was at the operational level of Like any memoir, Duty does not weigh all sides of the story equally but concentrates on explaining Gates' position on key issues, particularly the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. One theme that will appeal to military readers was Gates' fierce dedication to the men and women in uniform, particularly those in combat zones. Time after time he excoriates the Department of Defense for its preoccupation planning, equipping, and training for future major wars with other nation-states, while assigning lesser priority to current conflicts and other forms of conflict, such as irregular or asymmetric war. At times this compelled him to take things into his own hands. He proudly recounts his efforts at forcing improvements in the care of wounded warriors and jamming through production of Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) armored fighting vehicles and increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The crush of managing two wars and the daily operations of one of the world's largest and most complex organizations left Gates little time for broad questions about American strategy. But there is also no indication in Duty that he would have done so even if given the opportunity. For all of his talents, Secretary Gates was not a strategic visionary. For instance, there is no indication that he seriously questioned the assumptions that justified US involvement in Afghanistan even during the Obama administration's major review of US strategy. …

Nerve Agents and Their Detection

Nerve agents are major chemical warfare agents with the "G series" and "V series" being the most widely known because of their lethal effect. Although not conspicuously used in major wars, the potential detrimental impact on modern society had been revealed from the sarin terror attack on Tokyo subway, which affected thousands of people. In this mini-review, major nerve agents of the "G series" and "V series" have been described along with various types of their detection methods. The physical properties and hydrolysis mechanisms of the major nerve agents are discussed since these are important factors to be considered in choosing detection methods, and specifying the procedures for sample preparations in order to enhance detection precision. Various types of extraction methods, including liquid-phase, solid-phase, gas-phase and solid-phase microextraction (SPME), are described. Recent development in the use of gas sensors for detecting nerve agents is also summarized.