Major Terrorist Attacks Research Articles

Winning the Right War

Winning the Right War

Emergency Lawmaking After 9/11 and 7/7

This essay offers case studies of three emergency statutes, all dealing with terrorism and all enacted within less than a year after a major terrorist attack: the September 14, 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force; the USA PATRIOT Act; and the U.K. Terrorism Act 2006. A standard worry about such cases is that the circumstances of emergency lawmaking produce blank-check delegations to the executive. The fog of uncertainty, emotions such as urgency and visceral fear, and the tendency of legislators and the public to rally 'round the flag, all cause legislators to vote the executive massive new powers, regardless of whether those powers are rationally justifiable. This view is descriptively and theoretically flawed. Descriptively, executives in all three episodes lost control of the political dynamics, faced bipartisan resistance or rebellion in the legislature, and ended up obtaining far less than they asked for or desired. Theoretically, emergency conditions have cross-cutting political effects on legislators. The mechanisms and forces operative during emergency lawmaking cut both ways, constraining as well as empowering the executive, with unpredictable net results in particular cases. Although executives usually receive new powers in emergencies, there is no reason to think that they systematically tend to receive more new authority than a rational legislature would provide.

Improving Terrorism Preparedness for Hospitals: Toward Better Interorganizational Communication

This paper provides insights on the main cure for improving terrorism preparedness for hospitals: better interorganizational communication between hospitals and other agencies. Despite considerable progress in dealing with the impact of a major terrorist attack, most U.S. hospitals so far do not seem to be fully capable to manage mass casualties and face a large-scale influx of patients. Yet, hospitals play a critical role in both identifying and responding to any potential terrorist attack. For this reason, this study explains proper collaboration methods that should be implemented, how they can lead to more rapid communication thanks to the use of electronic equipment (i.e., hospital-to-hospital Internet-based communication), how risk communication and the media play an important role as well, and how interdisciplinary research and funding are needed. As such, specific interorganizational measures are described in order to help health communication scholars and public health officials understand that hospitals and other agencies must be well trained and properly equipped to ensure maximal communication and cooperation during terrorist events.

Terrorism Threats and Preparedness in Canada: The Perspective of the Canadian Public

Although Canada has not experienced a major terrorist attack, an increased global pending threat has put preparedness at the top of the Canadian government's agenda. Given its strong multicultural community and close proximity to the recently targeted United States, the Canadian experience is unique. However, minimal research exists on the public's reactions to terrorism threats and related preparedness strategies. In order for response initiatives to be optimally effective, it is important that the public's opinions regarding terrorism and preparedness be considered. This qualitative study examined perceptions of terrorism threats among Canadians living in Central and Eastern Canada (N = 75) in the fall of 2004. Conceptualizations of terrorism threat, psychosocial impacts, and sense of preparedness were explored in a series of qualitative interviews. Findings revealed that the majority of Canadians did not feel overly threatened by terrorist attacks, due in part to a perception of terrorist threats as related to global sociopolitical events and a positive Canadian identity. In addition, while most respondents did not feel they were individually affected by the threat of terrorism, there was some concern regarding larger societal impacts, such as increased paranoia, discrimination, and threats to civil liberties. Participants' views on preparedness focused largely on the utility of emergency preparedness strategies and the factors that could mitigate or inhibit preparedness at the individual and institutional levels, with a specific focus on education. Finally, the significant relevance of these findings in shaping terrorism preparedness, both in Canada and generally, is discussed.

From Marx to Confucius: Changing Discourses on China's Political Future

In the United States, the political future is constrained, for better or worse, by constitutional arrangements that have been in place for more than two centuries. Barring dramatic developments, such as nuclear war or major terrorist attacks, it is unlikely that the political system will change much over the next few decades. In China, by contrast, the political future is wide open. According to the formulation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the current system is the "primary stage of socialism," meaning that it's a transitional phase to a higher and superior form of socialism. The economic foundation, along with the legal and political superstructure, will change in the future. For independent intellectuals, the only remotely plausible justification for the current system of economic liberalization combined with tight political control is that it is a temporary necessity given the need to provide social order during the disruptive period of economic development (and many would reject this claim). Nobody argues that the current political system should remain in place once the economy is developed.

Liquid Sulfur Mustard Exposure

A 35-year-old active duty service member sustained a 6.5% body surface area burn as a result of exposure to the chemical warfare agent sulfur mustard, which is the most severe mustard exposure of a U.S. military member since World War II that is known to us. New techniques were used to demonstrate the detectable persistence of mustard metabolites in the patient's blood for at least 41 days after exposure, validating these techniques for the first time for a human mustard patient; they were also used for the first time with human mustard blister fluid. The techniques extend eightfold the period of time that mustard exposure can be definitively diagnosed, compared with previous techniques. Although this patient's lesions were never life-threatening, he required 2 weeks of intensive burn care. He has been left with ongoing posttraumatic stress disorder and has had an incomplete dermatological recovery. In a major terrorist attack involving many patients exposed to sulfur mustard, care resources would be depleted quickly.

Terrorism Insurance: Rethinking the Government's Role

Following a major terrorist attack, private providers of terrorism insurance often cease providing this coverage. As a result, the governments in developed countries around the world now provide some form of support to their terrorism insurance markets. This paper considers several questions regarding the private market failure and the resulting government intervention: Why do private markets for terrorism insurance fail? Given the failure, what is the optimal form of government intervention? And, what would be the likely economic ramifications if a government chose not to intervene? The paper’s discussion of these questions focuses on the 9/11 attacks on the United States, and on the 2002 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) and its 2005 extension (TRIAE). The paper argues that government support for the terrorism insurance market should be priced based on the expected cost of the support provided. The paper also argues that such support should generally be temporary, with a sunset as the private market recovers. A specific proposal is that the government intervention take the form of loans to the affected insurance companies, similar to the manner that central banks provide loans to banks facing temporary liquidity crises.

Chechen Female Suicide Bombers: Who and why

No accessJournal of Human SecurityOther Journal Article01 January 2007Chechen Female Suicide Bombers: Who and why Authors: Tatyana Dronzina; Vadim V Astashin Authors: Tatyana Dronzina Department of Political Science, St Kliment Ohridski University of Sofia (Bulgaria) Google Scholar More articles by this author ; Vadim V Astashin Volgograd State University (Volgograd, Russia) Google Scholar More articles by this author SectionsAboutPDF/EPUBExport CitationsAdd to FavouriteAdd to FavouriteCreate a New ListNameCancelCreate ToolsTrack CitationsCreate Clip ShareFacebookTwitterLinkedInEmail Abstract It is commonly accepted that Chechen women acting as suicide bombers are part of the rebel movement in the Caucasus. They kill themselves voluntarily or for revenge. What are the motivating factors for such suicide missions? What kind of connection exists between Islamic suicide terrorism in the Middle East and in Chechnya? Is the Chechen phenomenon unique? Who recruits Chechen women for suicide terrorist attacks? Does a typical portrait of these women exist? Data were drawn from open security service sources, newspapers, news agencies, interviews, and special investigations by Russian and foreign journalists. They provide answers based on the life-stories of most women who acted as suicide bombers, imbedded in a chronology of the major terrorist attack in the Russian Federation, and its consequences. Full Text DOI Previous article Next article RelatedDetails View PUBLICATION DETAILSDate of Publication:January 2007Journal:Journal of Human SecurityISSN:1835-3800Volume:3Issue:1Page Range:30-44First Page:30Last Page:44Source:Journal of Human Security, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2007: 30-44Date Last Modified:05 September 2018 12:24Date Last Revised:06 October 2012Geographic LocationRussia (Federation)Russia (Federation)--Chechni?a?SubjectTerrorismHistoryCivil War (Chechnia : 1994-)Women suicide bombers METRICS Downloaded 0 times Copyright© Human Security Institute, 2007Download PDFLoading ...

The Political Costs of Failure in the Katrina and Rita Disasters

The Katrina and Rita disasters have raised serious questions about the capabilities of the national emergency management system to handle catastrophic disasters. The system is broken and must be repaired before the next major hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, terrorist attack, or pandemic. The poor disaster responses may have serious political costs for those officials who failed to manage the hazards along the Gulf and/or failed to respond adequately to the storms—or simply appeared to be ineffectual in very dire circumstances. There have already been political casualties among the administrators responsible for managing the responses, and there may well be casualties among the politicians when voters go to the polls. The recommendation to give the military a lead responsibility in catastrophic disaster responses has been met with strong opposition; the issue may broaden the rift between governors’ offices and the White House over homeland security and emergency management and broaden the gap between local emergency management imperatives and federal policies.

Emergency Managers' Views on Improving Defense Support/Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (DSCA/MACA) Education Programs

The purpose of the Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) (formerly titled Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, or MACA) process is to provide local and State civil authorities with access to federal military assets in response to major terrorist attacks or natural disasters. Local civilian emergency managers (EMs) play an important role in effective DSCA processes.This paper reports the results of an exploratory study of local EMs' views of the education they have received on the DSCA process and their suggestions on how the process can be improved. The survey and interviews indicate that a majority of EMs do not believe that they have received effective DSCA education and that interpersonal methods (course/training involving federal or civil authorities) were most positively related to having received effective DSCA education. It was recommended that future education on DSCA should be provided in a more clear and concise manner and focuses on topics such as the organizations and process involved in DSCA, types of assistance and time required by the military in their response, and how EMs can better articulate their needs in DSCA requests. A number of recommendations on future research directions on DSCA are also provided.

Code Orange Simulator - Innovation in Emergency Preparedness Training for Health-care Providers

The Code Orange simulation is based within an Urban Hospital and presents the trainees with myriad crises there. The ranges of crises are everything from transit accidents, school shootings, hostage situations, chemical-biological attacks, to a major terrorist attack. The trainees are physicians, nurses, security, and hospital administrators who are required to practice their disaster management skill sets during a virtual crisis before they have to react in an actual MCI. Graphic look: The simulation has a three-quarters top-down view which allows the player to see the environment from multiple angles. The trainees control their character and through the character avatar interacts with other people and the environment. Training: The simulation requires the trainee to do the tasks that they would do during a crisis situation, e.g., evaluating the injuries of arriving patients, ordering tests, calling for a specialist, admitting a patient, and decontaminating a person or location. The player has to balance the needs of patients while projecting ahead to prepare for the scope and nature of the crisis. Players have to interact with the patients, the environment, and their co-workers in the simulation scenarios just as they would in an actual MCI. In addition, these scenarios are randomized as to the scope, magnitude, and timing of the MCI so that each time the trainee is presented with a specific crisis he must be prepared to be flexible in how he interacts with it. Number of players: The simulation is multi-player capable and playable over the Internet. The simulation is playable stand-alone with results saved to a file for later input to the system. Many trainees are able to play the simulation across a local area network and over the Internet; interacting with each other and with AI controlled characters.FigureTime: Simulations is between 45 minutes and 1.5 hours. The time scale is adjustable to represent real-time at the slowest speed and 1/8 time at the fastest speed. This allows scenarios of up to 12 hours of simulation time which correspond to a max hospital shift. Scoring system: At the end of each scenario trainees are graded on their performance according to how efficiently they adhered to the proper protocols. Virtually every action the trainee performs in the simulation results in some positive or negative change to his points score. The score is used only to measure the level of the trainee’s success, relative to his standing vis a vis other trainees or himself. The protocols and scoring system are based on the work of subject matter experts in order to provide as objective and realistic a scoring system as possible. The scoring system interfaces with a Learning Management System (LMS) which allows follow-ups of the trainees’ level as well as institutions and regional level of competency. An additional benefit of a seamless LMS is the ability of policy makers in the field of MCI management to evaluate gaps in their plan and based on gap analysis to improve their institution preparedness. Conflict of Interest: Authors indicated they have nothing to disclose.

The Economic Effects of Federal Participation in Terrorism Risk

AbstractThe catastrophic terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 caused unprecedented insured losses. While the insurance industry covered these losses, it also took swift steps to limit its exposure to such risks in the future. In response to ensuing market dislocations, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) was passed in 2002. The law temporarily requires primary insurers to offer terrorism coverage and creates a federal “backstop” to limit losses on such coverage. In anticipation of the program's scheduled expiration, and to inform debate on its possible extension, this article analyzes market developments in the wake of 9/11 and the passage of TRIA. We find that to date, TRIA has facilitated private sector participation in the market for terrorism insurance by lending structure to an otherwise ill‐defined risk. While alternative terrorism risk bearing mechanisms are evolving, none appear ready to replace federal involvement presently. We conclude that a continuation of TRIA for a period of time would enhance U.S. economic performance in the near term. Failing to extend TRIA in the near term would result in decreased economic performance absent another major terrorist attack and greater instability, job loss, and bankruptcy in the event of another attack.

Hurricane Katrina and US homeland security

The anticipatory and first-response inadequacies that the US Department of Homeland Security exhibited in its handling of Hurricane Katrina indicate that the substantial investment in and reorganisation of the US homeland security infrastructure since 9/11 have not produced sufficient returns. They have raised concerns about the country’s readiness to handle a major terrorist attack on US territory – particularly one involving weapons of mass destruction.

Southeast Asian Press Coverage of Terrorism and the Bali Bombing

The war against terrorism is being carried out not only in Afghanistan where it was first declared but also in the media around the world. Southeast Asia became a focus of international attention after the U.S. administration identified the region as the second front in the fight against terrorism following the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. The perception that the region is a cradle for terrorism was reinforced by the Bali bombing in October 2002. The event was the first major terrorist attack after 11 September, and the worst act of violence against foreigners in Indonesia, a country that has been under continuous international pressure to be decisive in the fight against terrorism. Although the media can function as the source of people's information, it can provide interpretations of the social construction of ideas and images. Like the media in all parts of the world, the media in Southeast Asia function within some form of governmental, societal, and economic constraints. Journalists are encouraged to support their governments' efforts to develop the nation and instil a sense of national identity. In such a setting journalists, consciously or not, end up not only reflecting but also spreading the dominant view of the society's elite. This transnational comparative study involving three mainstream English-language newspapers from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore examines the reportage of the Bali bombing.

The United Kingdom's “War Against Terrorism”

This article examines the United Kingdom's current response to international terrorism and argues that the response has been driven by heightened concerns of major terrorist attacks. From the enactment of emergency legislation to major structural changes within the intelligence community, the article surveys a range of measures that have been introduced since 11 September in an effort to reduce the vulnerability of the UK to a major terrorist attack. It conclueds with the observation that although, to date, the UK has avoided terrorist attacks at home, it is unrealistic to expect total security.

Foreign Policy Challenges for Paul Martin

Irrespective of his field of study, the strategist, who is today's somewhat more scientific counterpart of the sorcerer and soothsayer of yesteryear, should in time be able to recognize at what point and to what extent the dynamics of a system shifts from a familiar earlier world to a relatively unknown new world.-Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann(1)CANADIAN PROBLEMS WITH AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY are unlikely to fade, even in the improbable event that the Democrats unseat the president in November 2004. Global political-strategic relationships are in the midst of a profound transformation that will end in either an essentially democratic, environmentally sustainable global community by the middle of this century, or a hell on earth, as a beleaguered, affluent, mostly white minority fight to protect their privileged, apartheid-like existence. George W. Bush's imperial, hegemonic, and primacy-seeking America is currently attempting to take charge of the core security issues of this process by demanding that the United States be given the primary legitimate authority to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and the continuing threat of international terrorism. It is far from clear that Bush's foreign policy will be politically sustainable in the US. His administration's conduct of the Iraq war is not popular at home and deeply distrusted abroad. Bush has defined his task to include the democratization of Iraq, which is almost certainly beyond his army's abilities, given their too small numbers, lack of cultural familiarity with Iraq and inexperience in peacebuilding.(2) A few thousand more war dead and the transparent failure of Iraqi-ization might damage Bush so badly that reelection will be impossible. A precipitate American withdrawal from Iraq coupled, perhaps, with another major terrorist attack against the US--one far worse than 9/11 involving a WMD--could pave the way for an era of neo-isolationism in American foreign policy.A neo-isolationist America would be just as, if not even more, consequential to the outcome of the global transformation process. A critical debate has been occurring within the American national security policy community involving the most fundamental choices about US for over a decade. Canadians will be powerfully affected by the outcome, and have more than a little interest in promoting a moderate, multilaterally inclined result--the selection of an American geopolitical strategy that does not entail a quest for permanent military superiority over all potential peer competitors.(3) It is one thing to end up after an evolutionary historical process with military dominance, but it is quite another to set about as a matter of declared national policy to perpetuate that dominance indefinitely. Such hubris has already inspired fear among allies and rivals, and if continued will lead to balancing behaviour from other major powers and future crisis instability.(4)Largely because of Canada's 15-year-long extraction of a deficit-fighting peace dividend from the Canadian Forces, Ottawa's ability to influence American grand strategy choices is minimal to nil. Canadian international security policy challenges, at their most basic, derive from the severe fiscal myopia of the national political elite, as well as Canadians' wilful ignorance of global geostrategic relationships. In effect, Canada's self-imposed disarmament has said no to the Bush team's appeal for help in Iraq far more effectively than dino Chretien's skeptical insistence on a legitimating UN framework as the sine qua non for Ottawa's direct involvement. Chretien's careful underreaction and studied avoidance of the language of crisis was part of a broader foreign policy approach that eschewed military involvement--and by implication rejected the American call for an international policy on counterproliferation. If Canadians were to fight for reasons of alliance solidarity (i. …

Providing Compensation for Harm Caused by Terrorism: Lessons Learned in the Israeli Experience

Terrorism has existed in Israel in various manifestations and degrees for several decades now. This paper is being written as Israel is experiencing one of the most severe waves of terrorism in its history, killing hundreds of civilians, leaving behind thousands of wounded, and causing significant damage to much of the business community and to the economy. Israel has devised comprehensive legislative responses to two of the primary issues arising in the context of compensation for harm caused by terrorism: first, the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 1970 provides compensation for bodily injuries suffered in terrorist attacks, as well as compensating family members of deceased victims. Second, the Property Tax and Compensation Fund Law, 1961 provides compensation for property damage caused by terrorism. The resulting Israeli system of compensation has now reached stability, following several major modifications. The resulting system is unfortunately the product of significant experience in administration, both in terms of the time period involved and the number of events and victims. The main difference between the compensation scheme devised in the United States following the events of September 11, 2001 and the Israeli system is that the Israeli scheme is a permanent system, continually in place, the result of extensive and lengthy consultation, rather than an ad-hoc quick fix arrived at under severe time constraints in the emotional aftermath of major terrorist attacks, and causing multiple issues of inequity. The paper offers an analysis of the U.S. 9/11 compensation scheme using comparisons to the permanent Israeli system. Part I of the paper describes and analyses the compensation for bodily injuries and the compensation to family members of deceased victims offered by the Israeli government. Part II of the paper describes and analyses the compensation for property damage caused by terrorism. In the first two sections, I have provided a rather comprehensive account of the Israeli compensation schemes, primarily in the footnotes, for those readers who may be interested in the details. Part III of the paper provides observations on the advantages and disadvantages of a permanent compensation scheme such as the Israeli scheme as compared with the compensation scheme devised in the United States for the victims of the 9/11 tragedy.

Perceptions of Japanese students on terrorism and other security problems: Initial results from a pilot study

This paper is part of an international collaborative research project involving researchers from India, England, Japan and the United States. International terrorism has emerged as a major human concern after September 11, 2001 and an understanding of this against the backdrop of related security problems has emerged as a priority research area. This paper presents preliminary findings of an exploratory pilot study. In the spring semester of 2002, undergraduate students in q Japanese college were surveyed about their views following the two major terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (New York and Washington) and December 13, 2001 (Indian Parliament). A total of 75 undergraduate students completed a self‐administered questionnaire.

Providing Compensation for Harm Caused by Terrorism: Lessons Learned in the Israeli Experience

Terrorism has existed in Israel in various manifestations and degrees for several decades now. This paper is being written as Israel is experiencing one of the most severe waves of terrorism in its history, killing hundreds of civilians, leaving behind thousands of wounded, and causing significant damage to much of the business community and to the economy. Israel has devised comprehensive legislative responses to two of the primary issues arising in the context of compensation for harm caused by terrorism: first, the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 1970 provides compensation for bodily injuries suffered in terrorist attacks, as well as compensating family members of deceased victims. Second, the Property Tax and Compensation Fund Law, 1961 provides compensation for property damage caused by terrorism. The resulting Israeli system of compensation has now reached stability, following several major modifications. The resulting system is unfortunately the product of significant experience in administration, both in terms of the time period involved and the number of events and victims. The main difference between the compensation scheme devised in the United States following the events of September 11, 2001 and the Israeli system is that the Israeli scheme is a permanent system, continually in place, the result of extensive and lengthy consultation, rather than an ad-hoc quick fix arrived at under severe time constraints in the emotional aftermath of major terrorist attacks, and causing multiple issues of inequity. The paper offers an analysis of the U.S. 9/11 compensation scheme using comparisons to the permanent Israeli system. Part I of the paper describes and analyses the compensation for bodily injuries and the compensation to family members of deceased victims offered by the Israeli government. Part II of the paper describes and analyses the compensation for property damage caused by terrorism. In the first two sections, I have provided a rather comprehensive account of the Israeli compensation schemes, primarily in the footnotes, for those readers who may be interested in the details. Part III of the paper provides observations on the advantages and disadvantages of a permanent compensation scheme such as the Israeli scheme as compared with the compensation scheme devised in the United States for the victims of the 9/11 tragedy.

Biological Terrorism

The threat of terrorists using biological warfare agents has received increased attention in recent years. Despite the hope that, with the right mix of policies, security measures, and intelligence gathering, a major biological warfare terrorist attack can be prevented, the history of conventional terrorism indicates otherwise. The greatest payoff in combating biological terrorism lies in focusing on how best to respond to a terrorist attack. The medical and emergency service communities will play the most important role in that process. Ensuring that they are trained to recognize the symptoms of diseases caused by biological warfare agents and have Critical Incident Stress Debriefing teams available to help them cope with the emotional aspects of treating exposed survivors should be part of contingency planning. By improving our readiness to respond to biological terrorism, many lives can be saved and terrorists denied their goal of creating panic and crisis throughout the country.