The Gulf War has spawned both certainties and uncertainties. The political status quo in the major oil-exporting countries of the Persian/Arab Gulf area having been frozen, Western access to Arab oil is safeguarded for some years to come. This freeze did not just fortify political and economic structures of control, but also military ones. A more long-tern future, however, holds some uncertainties which, paradoxically, derive logically from that short-term stability. Tightened Western political, economic and military control will, sooner or later, backfire, and give rise to renewed instability-all this occurring precisely at a time when Middle East oil will become even more indispensible than it is now. One should not set too much store on 'conspiracy theories' suggesting that the USA has, either implicitly or explicitly, given Saddam Hussein the famous green light to march into Kuwait.1 It is beyond doubt, though, that the Gulf War offered the USA a chance opportunity to put a host of wishes on the agenda. Ever since the war expired, the US has been collecting its 'war dividend' with great zest, as dreams seem to queue up to come true. Such fantasies include direct talks between Israelis and Palestinians, which only a short time ago was considered a pipe dream. In the field of oil supplies, there is talk of a ... . once-in-a-generation opportunity to put in place the elements of a new regime governing oil trade', with Saudi Arabia and the USA serving as the main pillars of that regime.2 Others, in a less bullish frame of mind, are making rather gloomier statements, speaking in no uncertain terms of the 'recolonisation' of the Arab world.3 Both the actual establishment of a 'new international oil order' and the predictable political uncertainties to come (and the economic imbalances in their wake), will be the main theme of this article. First, after some consideration of the war's multi-causal nature, the 'oil' factor will be spotlighted by sketching the 'new international oil order'. Second, we will consider the forces mobilised by Saddam Hussein throughout the Gulf War. This effect might well exert a negative influence on one of that new order's mainstays: the presumption that the oil monarchs in the Gulf are still firmly in the saddle. Third, a series of scenarios, focusing on the likelihood of a transition from autocratic to more democratic structures will be analysed. Finally, a conclusion will reconnect to the (in)stability of the new oil order.