Major Hazard Facilities Research Articles

New dog old tricks – process safety for the energy transition

The energy transition is gathering pace and it’s apparent there is not one solution to replace our traditional means of sourcing energy from fossil fuels. The energy transition embraces renewable power generation, whether in the form of solar, wind, hydro or using waste materials and plant feedstocks such as biomass to produce fuels of the future. There is a colourful range of hydrogen solutions in grey, blue or green available, with blue requiring a carbon capture and storage solution. The solutions being considered for the energy landscape are on a scale not seen before. All of these new energy solutions have one thing in common, they present known hazards, but the application and simple scale of their use is significantly greater than when they are produced or consumed today. When we discuss renewable energy, it is perceived that generally it is safer than sourcing and processing conventional energy forms. Conventional fuels have a long history of process safety and have been well regulated for more than 20 years as major hazard facilities. The expectations of communities and regulators are that renewable energy will be delivered reliably and safely and to the same standard as conventional energy forms. We call this process safety equivalency. We will examine a few areas as examples of some of the early problems being addressed and solved today.

Major Hazard Competent Person Profession in Malaysia: A document analysis of trends and demands

Introduction: The Malaysian Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazard (CIMAH) Regulations introduced in 1996 resulted in the creation ‘Major Hazard Competent Person’ (MHCP) profession. However, after two decades of its establishment, there has been limited study conducted on this specific profession. The objectives of this study are to analyze 1) the trend of application and passing rates of MHCP registrations; and 2) the trend of Major Hazard Installations (MHI) registrations, and its relationship with the available supply of registered MHCP. Methods: The study used a document review approach, involving the extraction, examination, and interpretation of data from both published and unpublished documents by the Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH), the regulatory body responsible for overseeing both MHCP and MHI registration status in Malaysia. The study looks into data from 1996 (beginning of 1996 CIMAH Regulation) to 2023, though the available data found and analyzed were from 1998 to 2021. Results: The study reveals a concerning lack of growth in the number of professionals being certified as MHCP, despite an increase in the number of MHIs over the past two decades. Potential causes of this shortage identified include a demanding certification process, limited availability of MHCP competency courses, and a lack of clear career paths and growth opportunities in the profession. Conclusion: The inadequate supply of MHCPs could potentially undermine their ability to provide sufficient coverage for MHIs, indirectly jeopardizing the quality of risk management in major hazard facilities. Therefore, there is merit in periodically reviewing the regulations and reforming the MHCP profession in response to changing trends.

Improving process safety for the operation of Major Hazard Facilities

The discipline of process safety management has proven to be a valuable tool for assisting operators of Major Hazard Facilities (MHF) in focussing on the critically important ‘few’, with a heightened level of scrutiny than that of the ‘many’ lesser critical yet still important elements of a process system. This discipline attracts much oversight, discussion, and enthusiasm from many areas within and outside asset operations teams. Major Accident Hazards may vary in severity and probability throughout the life cycle of existing assets, it is, therefore, important to review these periodically. Clear purpose and definition of Safety Critical Elements (SCE), and in some cases Integrity Critical Elements (ICE), along with intelligent rationalisation of these to reflect the items of legitimate criticality, will allow higher precision and clarity, leading to higher confidence and an improved ability to manage genuine process safety risk. Further improvements can be made through real-time and near-time reporting through risk visualisation bowtie diagrams to ensure hazards can be managed to As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and their status made visible to enable the most effective prioritisation of work which prioritises restoration of the most compromised threat and consequence barriers first.

Do safety cases demonstrate risks have been reduced so far as is reasonably practicable? an Australian study examining the methods of presenting safety cases

Australian major hazard facilities (MHF) are regulated through a ‘safety case’ regime requiring operators to submit a safety report to the regulator demonstrating all risks have been reduced so far as is ‘reasonably practicable’. The Work Health and Safety Act (2019) has codified the definition of what is reasonably practicable, requiring consideration of five matters: the likelihood of the risk; degree of harm; what is known about the risk; availability and suitability of risk control measures; and the cost of the control measures.Thirteen interviews with MHF regulators were conducted across Australia to understand how they regulated safety cases and applied the concept of reasonably practicable. The regulators revealed they relied on the operator to provide the safety case to demonstrate how the facility had reduced risks so far as is reasonably practicable. The regulators stated that the four most common tools used to demonstrate reasonable practicability were: quantitative risk assessment, layer of protection analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and risk matrices. These tools were examined against the five considerations of reasonable practicability. None of these tools addressed all five considerations.Four suggestions are provided to improve the safety case process: 1. Safety case should demonstrate how the risk is acceptable. 2. Safety case should outline how the operator has met their legal obligations. 3. Safety case should place greater emphasis on the use of consequence-based analysis. 4. Regulators should be granted additional powers to enforce their interpretation of what is reasonably practicable.

The efficacy of earplugs at a major hazard facility.

At a major hazard facility, cases of occupational noise-induced hearing loss have occurred despite the use of hearing protection devices. Preliminary measurements of personal attenuation ratings (PAR) suggested that earplugs may not achieve the attenuation implied by their Australian SLC80 Class designation in field-use conditions. We examined the relationship between PAR and the SLC80 classification for earplugs, as a good understanding of the attenuation provided by earplugs under normal field-use conditions, rather than in laboratory settings, is vital to their effective use as a control measure for noise exposure. A cross-sectional study was performed with 65 volunteers. Participants were recruited from Operations and Maintenance Technicians at the major hazard facility. The participants had their PARs checked with different earplug types using the 3M™ E-A-Rfit™ system. We examined the PARs measured and also assigned a 'pass' or 'fail' rating depending on whether the earplug achieved 22dB attenuation. 22dB attenuation for 80% of users is the minimum to meet the definition for Australian SLC80 Class 4 hearing protection. None of the earplug types achieved 22dB attenuation for 80% of users when tested in field-use conditions. There were statistically significant differences in the frequency of achieving a 'Pass', and in PAR, depending on earplug type. Roll-down foam earplugs may provide superior attenuation compared to pre-moulded earplugs. Earplugs are unlikely to achieve the attenuation found in laboratory conditions during field-use. Personalised selection of hearing protection devices based on fit-testing results should be encouraged.

A Screening Methodology for the Identification of Critical Units in Major-Hazard Facilities Under Seismic Loading

The complexity of process industry and the consequences that Na-Tech events could produce in terms of damage to equipment, release of dangerous substances (flammable, toxic, or explosive), and environmental consequences have prompted the scientific community to focus on the development of efficient methodologies for Quantitative Seismic Risk Analysis (QsRA) of process plants. Several analytical and numerical methods have been proposed and validated through representative case studies. Nevertheless, the complexity of this matter makes their applicability difficult, especially when a rapid identification of the critical components of a plant is required, which may induce hazardous material release and thus severe consequences for the environment and the community. Accordingly, in this paper, a screening methodology is proposed for rapid identification of the most critical components of a major-hazard plant under seismic loading. It is based on a closed-form assessment of the probability of damage for all components, derived by using analytical representations of the seismic hazard curve and the fragility functions of the equipment involved. For this purpose, fragility curves currently available in the literature or derived by using low-fidelity models could be used for simplicity, whereas the parameters of the seismic hazard curve are estimated based on the regional seismicity. The representative damage states (DS) for each equipment typology are selected based on specific damage states/loss of containment (DS/LOC) matrices, which are used to individuate the most probable LOC events. The risk is then assessed based on the potential consequences of a LOC event, using a classical consequence analysis, typically adopted in risk analysis of hazardous plants. For this purpose, specific probability classes will be used. Finally, by associating the Probability Class Index (PI) with Consequence Index (CI), a Global Risk Index (GRI) is derived, which provides the severity of the scenario. This allows us to build a ranking of the most hazardous components of a process plant by using a proper risk matrix. The applicability of the method is shown through a representative case study.

Analysis of the impact of a pandemic on the control of the process safety risk in major hazards industries using a Fault Tree Analysis approach

The control of the risks associated with major hazard events is critical to the safe and continuous operation of the process industry. Over the last decades, the process industry has been successful at establishing and implementing robust Process Safety Management (PSM) systems to prevent and mitigate the consequences of such major hazard events. While there exist some industry guidelines developed relatively recently for events initiated by natural disasters and security-related threats, for initiating events like outbreaks of pathogens and pandemics, there is currently a clear lack of understanding of the impact of the restrictions and disruption caused by a pandemic on the ability of companies operating major hazard facilities to keep controlling the risks associated to their hazardous operations. Moreover, there is no industry guideline on how to account for such an impact in PSM systems for process safety hazards. The recent COVID-19 outbreak caused serious disruptions to normal operations that have challenged industry in their ability to control risks.The objective of this paper is to perform an analysis of the impact of a pandemic situation on the implementation of selected elements of PSM systems related to the identification and evaluation of the risks of a major hazard and their control. The approach chosen involves the analysis of the root causes of the failure of the selected PSM elements using a Fault Tree Analysis method. The findings provide the first steps in the establishment of recommendations for the upgrade of PSM systems to face events such as pandemics.

Safety case process in Cuba: Transition from theory to practice

Cuban Major Hazard/Safety Case regulations require that Facility Operators produce Operational Safety Cases with the aim of demonstrating that they can manage their risks of major accidents during facility operation to a level that is As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).The production of a good quality, fit-for-purpose Safety Case is a complex issue and must be cautiously approached by Facility Operators. Lessons from the Victoria Safety Case implementation and the Nimrod Review highlighted the need to ensure that a robust Safety Case process is in place before starting the work. This is of paramount importance in ensuring the process of production of the Operational Safety Cases delivers a final product – the documented Safety Case - that is Succinct, Home-grown, Accessible, Proportionate, Easy-to-understand and Document-lite (SHAPED).This paper provides insights into the manner in which the Safety Case production process is carried out by Facility Operators in accordance with a Safety Case Preparation Plan, which must previously be accepted by the Regulator. The Plan must be written in a way that defines the Safety Case process, emphasizes ownership and leadership of the process by the Facility Operator, maximizes workforce involvement in the production of the Safety Case deliverables and demonstrates and facilitates accessibility and usability of the final product – the documented Safety Case.The paper also provides information on the ‘Pilot’ Safety Case strategy which is a step-by-step, case-by-case process, currently being implemented by the Regulator, to lessen the burden of compliance with Safety Case requirements stated in the Regulations. According to this strategy, the entry of Major Hazard Facilities (MHFs) into the new regime will take place gradually and will not be linked to any specific licensing process.

The digital worker: how technology is enhancing safety and productivity in the field

The Australian workplace is currently in a state of evolution, from the physical space workers occupy to a way of working and interacting in which we are constantly connected. Technology is becoming cost-effective, making it more affordable at all workforce levels; businesses are investing in enterprise-grade solutions that are transforming both daily activities and long-term asset management strategies. To continue to drive the safety, productivity and cost improvements that our globally competitive market demands, we need to constantly assess technology solutions from outside the industry and adapt them to enhance our service delivery within the oil and gas industry. One such opportunity is the development and use of smartwatches within major hazard facilities. Through in-field trials, work crews are equipped with smartwatches that monitor health and well-being, alerting the worker if their risk of injury becomes elevated. These wearables also provide employees with efficient and effective accounting of personnel with their location in the case of emergency and provide opportunities for improved communication and productivity outcomes. Billions of dollars have been spent developing Australia’s oil and gas infrastructure. Ongoing operations and maintenance of these assets (and possible future expansions) remain labour intensive. With Australia’s comparatively high labour costs and the remoteness of both offshore and onshore resources, we cannot afford to hold back investment in our human assets, to gain deeper insights and optimise health and performance, as we have done in the case of our operating assets and equipment.

Layout - A Cost Effective and Powerful Design Step in Risk Management

Management of risk to personnel and the environment in a major accident hazard (MAH) facility like offshore oil and gas production is a well acknowledged priority. Identification of the hazards, evaluating the potential for harm, analysis and implementation of the risk mitigation measures aCand safeguard stewardship are key for effective risk management.Facility siting and layout is arguably the most influential design feature, but it can be problematic to get due regard in risk management during later design phases. Decisions on facility siting and layout are made during early design engineering phases and such decisions have the highest impact on the inherent risk profile of a MAH facility. This paper talks through a systematic approach for effectively utilizing layout in managing risk through establishing a layout philosophy, layout reviews.This paper shares experience in utilizing technology (including enhanced QRA and 3D models) to determine engineered solutions for managing risk and risk-based decision making. It includes examples from recent oil and gas projects where concept selection and initial stages of engineering have considered risk-based approach for location selection, equipment selection, orientation and segregation, building siting and other options. The paper will demonstrate how a risk-based approach to facility siting provides an inherently safer design to minimize the reliance on add-on safety barriers.Key words: facility siting and layout, quantitative risk assessment, risk management, safeguard stewardship, inherently safer d

The varying nature of planning decisions for developments near to major hazard facilities in Victoria, Australia

This paper tells us why it is important to make wise planning decisions for areas surrounding Major Hazard Facilities (MHFs) by addressing the consequences of some selected events. It describes the virtually unregulated, complex and costly Victorian planning process which occurs in absence of defined separation distances. It cites some examples of decisions known to the author and presents a summary of explosion events which have occurred in the period 1910 to 2013. The paper concludes by suggesting what should be done to rectify the situation. MHF Safety Cases need to be fully accessible to the planning authorities and the courts, preferably also to the general public as was the intent when they were first mooted. This is now an obligation of EU member states following adoption of Directive 2012/18/EU known as Seveso III. Only by so doing, can individuals and authorities know enough about an MHF to decide how close is safe for a proposed activity type. Individuals will then be able to make rational decisions about where to live. It is recommended that appropriate buffer zones based on community safety should be incorporated in Australian planning legislation.

Setting up for success for mobilisation to major hazard facilities—a contractor's perspective

The challenges for a contractor to mobilise to a major hazard facility come from differences in expectations between stakeholders, gaps and inconsistencies between health, safety and environment (HSE) management systems, and the logistical challenges of initial training and competency verification. Differences in expectations can arise between the corporate office and site or also between various functional silos. HSE management system challenges manifest in the detailed procedures when the safety case is in operation. Training and competency assessment is an ongoing requirement, but the initial demand at first mobilisation creates a one-off logistical burden. The steps to lessen the impact of these challenges and to enable a successful outcome include: alignment workshops with customers and other stakeholders to create a shared safety culture and expectations of management systems; joint HSE management system gap analysis and risk workshops; early interface meetings with stakeholders; and, requirements having a comprehensive definition and pre-planning to deliver best practice. A successful mobilisation is characterised by the alignment of systems, improvements made during the alignment process by delivering best practice, meeting all HSE obligations for employees (including seconded personnel and sub-contractors), bridging the gap with sub-contractor management when implementing the safety case, and having all personnel trained before mobilisation. This extended abstract draws on lessons from recent real-world experience and offers a framework to overcome challenges a contractor can encounter, and sets up successful mobilisation for a major hazard facility.

Real‐time risk assessment and decision support

Managers and operators of major hazard facilities make complex decisions as a part of their daily work activity. These decisions are made against the background potential for a major accident. Such decisions may be required to account for daily changes in a large number of factors including plant condition and performance, operational status, knowledge and experience of personnel, interactions with other activities, and the effectiveness of processes. The information involved in the decision comes from multiple sources and may be difficult to assess. Technical risk assessments provide a useful picture of major accident risk but some widely accepted approaches suffer from some significant problems which limit their value as tools for operational decision making. The article describes investigations into an approach that addresses how these difficulties may be addressed in day‐to‐day assessments. It describes a method and tool in which risks can be monitored in real‐time and so enable safer decision making. The method is applicable to the assessment of a wide range of major accident hazard scenarios. The article will describe how the tool addresses problems in some alternative approaches. A significant feature of the approach is its ability to identify the most probable causes of risk. The speed of the assessment points to its potential use in real‐time detection and control systems. The method employs a Bayesian net to perform the risk assessment. Bayesian nets have been used to aid decision making in many different situations and industries, but have received relatively little attention as risk assessment and decision tools in major hazard industries. The article will include a description of the benefits offered by this technology as well as a view of its limitations. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 34: 183–190, 2015

Assessment of the impact of an unconfined vapour cloud explosion at a major hazard facility in Melbourne close to a large proposed housing development

An increasing problem in Australia is the encroachment of residential areas into former industrial zones near to operational Major Hazard Facilities (MHFs). The consequences of scenarios such as unexpected UVCE or Unconfined Vapour Cloud Deflagration (UVCD) events can be catastrophic with significant loss of life and extensive property damage. They follow from the formation of clouds of gases and vapours resulting from accidental release of flammable liquids or pressurised heavier–than–air flammable gases and their subsequent ignition. The paper describes superimposition of the published 2005 UK Buncefield accident overpressure contours on the Gellibrand Tank Farm (GTF) in Williamstown and presents the findings of a targeted CFD modelling study. The modelling was limited by absence of data for the GTF. The purpose of the work is to emphasise the need for a full and independent quantified risk assessment study to be performed as would be required in the UK, with respect to a major housing development proposed on former nearby industrial land.

A blended hazard identification methodology to support process diagnosis

A novel hazard identification methodology applied to process systems is presented in this paper. This blended hazard identification (BLHAZID) methodology blends two different types of HAZID methods: the function-driven and component-driven approach. The BLHAZID method is based on a conceptual framework called the Functional Systems Framework, which describes structure–function–goal relationships in process systems.The goals of the BLHAZID methodology are to generate outcomes that contain a high coverage of hazards, describe detailed failure causality in process systems and express this knowledge in a structured form for effective reused in subsequent applications, such as fault diagnosis, operator training, design reviews, fault and event tree construction and hazard updates to satisfy major hazard facility requirements.Both the BLHAZID methodology and the Functional Systems Framework were developed with involvement and advice from two major industrial partners. An industrial case study of a benzene saturation unit is presented to illustrate how the BLHAZID methodology operates in practice.

Near-miss management systems: A methodological comparison

A close relationship between near-miss events and major accidents has been demonstrated in major hazard facilities: a near-miss and an accident have often common causes. A near-miss could be defined as a hazardous condition where the event sequence could lead to an accident if it had not been interrupted. An effective Near-miss Management System (NMS) aims to quickly recognize signals from the operational fields in order to apply prevention strategies. As a standard reference model has not yet been developed, the NMS design represents a complex issue. The present paper proposes a critical comparison between two methodologies which could be applied for a near-miss event assessment: a matrix and an index based method. The purpose is to evaluate potentiality and pitfalls of their application as their global efficiency could influence the whole performance of the whole NMS design. An application in a test case of a chemical plant is proposed: results obtained have proved useful in supporting safety management in an effective design of a NMS.

Automated supervisory control systems for major hazard facilities

A method of constructing supervisory control systems for major hazard facilities is proposed. The hardware architecture and software based on these principles are described. An automated system for controlling the motion of trains of the Novosibirsk subway is presented.

Dimensions in safety indicators

Introduction The discussion of applications and development of safety indicators is interesting and important. The paper by Andrew Hopkins (2008) has triggered a number of reflections. Hopkins has taken major hazard facilities and the chemical industry as the field of discussion. However, the reasoning might well be valid also for other industries with a potential for large consequences such as nuclear power, and transport in the air, on rail and at sea.

Designing OSH standards: process, safety case and best practice

AbstractThis paper explores various approaches to standard-setting, with a view to identifying best practice regulation, and what sort of standards should be imposed in particular circumstances. It argues that the answer to these questions is often context-and industry-specific. Taking the Australian mining industry as an example, it examines the respective merits of prescriptive-, performance-, principles- and process-based standards, before going on to consider, in more detail, the value of a fifth type of standard, the safety case, which in the past has mainly been applied to major hazard facilities. It concludes that while there is particular value in moving towards ‘meta-regulation’ through the mechanism of a safety case, such an approach should be adopted with caution and applied only to large, complex, high risk organisations. Other forms of regulation are best suited to other types of enterprise.

Modeling emergency evacuation for major hazard industrial sites

A model providing the temporal and spatial distribution of the population under evacuation around a major hazard facility is developed. A discrete state stochastic Markov process simulates the movement of the evacuees. The area around the hazardous facility is divided into nodes connected among themselves with links representing the road system of the area. Transition from node-to-node is simulated as a random process where the probability of transition depends on the dynamically changed states of the destination and origin nodes and on the link between them. Solution of the Markov process provides the expected distribution of the evacuees in the nodes of the area as a function of time. A Monte Carlo solution of the model provides in addition a sample of actual trajectories of the evacuees. This information coupled with an accident analysis which provides the spatial and temporal distribution of the extreme phenomenon following an accident, determines a sample of the actual doses received by the evacuees. Both the average dose and the actual distribution of doses are then used as measures in evaluating alternative emergency response strategies. It is shown that in some cases the estimation of the health consequences by the average dose might be either too conservative or too non-conservative relative to the one corresponding to the distribution of the received dose and hence not a suitable measure to evaluate alternative evacuation strategies.