Main Opposition Party Research Articles

The MDC-T's (Un)Seeing Eye in Zimbabwe's 2013 Harmonised Elections: A Technical Knockout

Zimbabwe's main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) led by Morgan Richard Tsvangirai, launched its campaign for the 31 July 2013 harmonised elections in Marondera, a small ...

Brazil’s Health in Black and White

Brazil’s Health in Black and White

Making Democracy Work?: Quasi-Public Entities and the Drama of Elections in Ghana

Since Ghana made the transition to multiparty democracy in the early 1990s there has been a progressive improvement in electoral management and the acceptance by the political players of election results. Six successive elections have been held so far, with two crucial power alternations between two hostile political parties in 2001 and 2009. The 2012 elections presented an opportunity for the country to continue along the path of democratic consolidation. However, the outcome of the elections was vigorously disputed and contested in court by the main opposition party, nearly bringing the country to the brink of violence. This article makes a contribution to ongoing debates about why some elections pass peacefully and results are accepted, while others do not. Various studies have focused on the role of formal institutions in ensuring credible and fair elections. This article, however, emphasises the importance of informal institutions in explaining variations in electoral outcomes and legitimacy in Ghana.

The EU Policy of the Republican People's Party under Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: A New Wine in an Old Wine Cellar

This article scrutinizes the determinants of the European Union (EU) policy of the Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition party in Turkey under the leadership of Kılıçdaroğlu. Critically discussing the role of party ideology concerning attitudes toward EU accession, the article examines whether the CHP's ideology changed after Kılıçdaroğlu and if so, how this ideological shift affected the party's euroskeptic stance. The article overall argues that the leadership change enabled the party to withdraw its nationalistic stance and embrace a social democratic rhetoric. However, the article contends that such transformation had little effect on its euroskepticism due to the persisting endogenous (the Justice and Development Party's authoritarianism) and exogenous factors (the EU's additional conditionality) that constrain the new CHP's EU-enthusiasm.

Politics of Memory, Decentralisation and Recentralisation in Mozambique

This article explores the contradictory processes that arise from projects of democratic decentralisation in the contexts of those post-civil war, emergent pluralistic democracies and ruling elites that typically strive to officially maintain essentialist forms of national unity, identity and commemorations. These contradictions significantly shape projects of democratisation and decentralisation in post-conflict countries, even though they have not been thoroughly accounted for in the expert literature. In Mozambique, these contradictions were analysed through the unrelenting attempts by the main Mozambican opposition party, Renamo, to inscribe officially in the country's landscape their own version of the post-independence civil war (1976–1992). Taking advantage of the Law 2/97, known as the Juridical Framework for the Implantation of Local Autarchies, Renamo built a square with a sculpture to honour André Matsangaíssa, Renamo's first commander killed in combat during the war. The inauguration of Matsangaíssa Square was the focal point of serious elite factional contestation and debates in the media and in the streets about the appropriate memories to give a new sense to national unity, identity and decentralisation. The Frelimo government both appealed to the Administrative Court and recentralised some aspects of the decentralisation law. Although the elites' representations of the meaning of decentralisation and recentralisation shape the public's views, the positions of the ordinary people signal that the dynamics of decentralisation and national identity are far more complex than the elite partisan discourses which are also at times incoherent. The overall analyses demonstrate how conflicts over memories of violence paradoxically hamper and constitute political pluralism, democratisation and decentralisation in post-civil war Mozambique.

"Eu vou pra Maracangalha, eu vou...": JK e a Distopia Brasiliæ na música popular e nas charges da revista Careta (1956-1960)

Análise da relação entre música popular e charges satíricas sobre a fundação de Brasília, publicadas na revista humorística Careta. A iniciativa de construção da nova capital pelo governo de Juscelino Kubitschek foi objeto de acesa polêmica, dividindo a opinião pública, além de ser contestada pela União Democrática Nacional – UDN (principal partido de oposição). Inicialmente, investigam-se os usos sociais e apropriações da música popular para fazer a crítica ao projeto de JK. Depois, examinam-se as afinidades entre a revista de humor e a grande imprensa, compartilhando a oposição ao governo federal, bem como a defesa da cultura política liberal. Em seguida, analisa-se a polêmica musical de Brasília, envolvendo diferentes sujeitos, gêneros e práticas sociais. Por fim, através da avaliação da série iconográfica, estudam-se as disputas pelo imaginário social da nova cidade, reinventada como utopia negativa, a distopia Brasiliæ.

The Madrid Bombings and Negotiations With ETA: A Case Study of the Impact of Terrorism on Spanish Politics

This article analyzes the impact that two terrorism-related matters had on Spanish politics and electoral processes in the country. First, the article analyzes the terrorist attacks perpetrated by jihadists on March 11, 2004, three days before Spain's general election. The indiscriminate, lethal attacks caused a state of shock in the country, brought the election campaign to a sudden end, and led to the defeat of the party in power. Second, the article analyzes the negotiations entered into with the ETA terrorist organization by the new government during its first term, from 2004 to 2008. This controversial step, upheld by the Spanish government despite massive opposition by civil society and the main opposition party, failed to bring about the end of ETA. Both the Madrid attacks and the negotiations with ETA were responsible for the breakdown of the consensus in regard to terrorism that had existed among the main Spanish political parties. The article analyzes how both events generated an unprecedented level of polarization and tension among political parties and society from 2004 to 2008, and how each event had a different impact on the general elections held during that period. The period under examination provides an example of adversarial politics; terrorism was highly influenced by the management of both events by the main political players.

Europe needs a new social balance

Sigmar Gabriel, the leader of Germany's main opposition party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), argues that the EU finds itself in the deepest crisis of its history. To speed up its emergence, it needs reforms that boost growth and increase social justice, rather than focusing solely on austerity measures.

JULIE THORPE. Pan-Germanism and the Austrofascist State, 1933-38.

Austrofascism has long been a puzzle. Between 1933 and 1938, a one-party “Fatherland Front” modeled on Italian fascism ruled Austria. The Socialist Party, for decades the main opposition party, was banned and many of its leaders imprisoned, forced into exile, or reduced to silence. At the same time, many Austrians were enthusiastic about the Nazi regime to the north: the Anschluss, symbolized by the image of jubilant Austrians cheering Adolf Hitler in March 1938 on Vienna's Heldenplatz, has cast a long shadow over interwar Austrian history. For this reason, some historians have had no problem labeling Austria in these years as fascist or “clerico-fascist.” Yet the “state of estates,” as the 1930s Austrian regime was often called, resisted annexation by Germany to the end, trying, albeit with only partial success, to create an Austrian state identity. Moreover, Austria was a haven for German Catholic émigrés, who contributed to a Catholic critique of totalitarianism emerging in journals supported by the Austrian state. For this reason, other historians have preferred to put “Austrofascism” in quotes or simply avoided the term altogether in favor of labels like “authoritarian.” What sort of state was Austria between 1933 and 1938? In this splendid book, Julie Thorpe revisits the topic. Rather than rehashing typological debates about what fascism is and how to classify it, she argues, with Robert O. Paxton, Michael Mann, and others, that fascism is best understood as a process rather than a static concept. In her analysis, Austrofascism was a process of remaking civic boundaries and political formations. By 1938, she concludes, “Austria was already a fascist state” (p. 232).

Electoral Consequences of Municipal Mergers

The dominance of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was long buttressed by the existence of a strong political support base in the rural areas led by local politicians who worked on behalf of national LDP politicians seeking reelection. In recent years, municipal mergers have drastically weakened the LDP's support base by reducing the number of local politicians and redrawing electoral district boundaries. Surprisingly, the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), could not take full advantage of these new institutional arrangements. Instead, local politicians have become more independent of both major parties. As a result, at a time of increasing numbers of floating voters, neither of Japan's two major parties has a reliable local base across the country. To succeed, both parties must pay attention to the changing needs of the increasingly independent—and very often still rural—localities.

The CHP: From the Single Party to the Permanent Main Opposition Party

The CHP is the oldest party in Republican Turkey. After transitioning to a multiparty political system, the party has positioned itself in center-left in the 1960s after holding power in the single-party period. The party was closed in 1981 and reopened in 1992, but it has not been in power ever since. It has been the main opposition party since 2002. In the 2011 elections, the party recorded its best result since 1980, with 25.9 percent of the vote. However, this rate did not satisfy CHP sympathizers. In fact, the party has attempted to enlarge its voting base and reinforce its vision and ideology.

Spatial Voting in Spain

This work evaluates the receptivity of the Spanish electorate to policy positions that are distant from the status quo. To that end, two spatial voting models are considered: the proximity and the directional model. The analysis also evaluates the econometric consequences of employing subsidiary measures of the status quo in policy spaces. The result suggests that the majority of the Spanish electorate adjusts to a hybrid model of spatial voting, where proximity dominates. Only the supporters of the main opposition party are receptive to non-moderate policy declarations. Altogether, this work helps unravel the microfoundations of party competition in Spain.

How Do Spanish Independents Vote? Ideology vs. Performance

We claim that independent voters use performance as their main heuristic: if the incumbent fares well, independents reward it; if it fares poorly, they switch to the main opposition party. To make the switch easier, independents place themselves in the centre of the ideological dimension. Using Spanish data, our results confirm that independents rely more on performance than partisan voters, net of ideological proximity. Two implications also hold: voters ideologically equidistant between the Partido Socialista Obrero Español and Partido Popular are overwhelmingly independents, valuing the incumbent's performance more than non-equidistant voters; and independents rarely switch to smaller parties when the incumbent's performance is bad.

The 1996 Mahakali Treaty: Whither the “Rashtriya Sankalpas/National Strictures” of Nepalese Parliament?

Despite the ratification by the Joint Session of Nepal’s two Houses of Parliament with an overwhelming majority on September 20, 1996 and despite the exchange of instruments of ratification by the two countries on June 5, 1997, the Pancheshwar Detailed Project Report (DPR) has yet to see the light of day even after the lapse of 16 years. It was believed that Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba’s government with the concurrence of the main opposition party, Communist Party of Nepal- United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), had ratified the Mahakali Treaty with four ‘rashtriya sankalpas/national strictures’. It was also believed that an all party Parliamentary Monitoring Joint Committee headed by the Speaker of the Lower House was constituted to guide the Nepalese side in the preparation of the detailed project report of Pancheshwar. That Monitoring Joint Committee in a span of four years held 28 meetings. Now the very legality of those four ‘rashtriya sankalpas/national strictures’ is being questioned. In 2009 the Secretary level Nepal-India Joint Committee on Water Resources constituted the Pancheshwar Development Authority (PDA) that was given the crucial mandate to ‘finalize’ the vital much-awaited Pancheshwar DPR. As institutions have no memory and public memory is extremely short, this article attempts to recapitulate the commitments made at treaty ratification time by the Deuba government in concurrence with the then largest party, CPN-UML. The article argues against the mandate given to the bureaucrat-led PDA to finalize the Pancheshwar DPR and strongly recommends formation of an all party mechanism akin to the previous Parliamentary Monitoring Joint Committee to guide the government during this critical Interim period.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/hn.v11i0.7155 Hydro Nepal Vol.11 2011 pp.12-17

Understanding Recent Political Changes in Myanmar

On 30 March 2011, Myanmar's ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), handed power to a new government led by President Thein Sein that had come into being in the wake of elections held in November 2010. Because all administrative and legislative bodies--both at the central and local levels--were controlled by members of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), political activists and Myanmar watchers did not expect more than superficial changes under the new government. Although President Thein Sein mentioned his plan to introduce administrative and economic reforms and to launch an anti-corruption campaign in his inaugural speech doubts remained that the president would actually be able to deliver on his promises. However, on 19 August 2011, to the surprise of many people, President Thein Sein met Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), at his official residence. Two days earlier, the President had invited exiled activists to return to the country. Aung San Suu Kyi publicly stated that she was very encouraged by her meeting with Thein Sein and that she had trust in his determination to bring about positive political change to the country. (1) The United States and some members of the European Union (EU) welcomed the meeting. On the other hand, several exiled activists had reservations about the sincerity of the President, with some going so far as to say that what Thein Sein had done was little more than a publicity stunt and that there was little difference between the new government and its predecessor. This article, drawing on interviews with serving and retired government officials, and political activists including leading NLD members, argues that since the new government has taken office a new era of political openness has begun in Myanmar. It goes on to illustrate that in order to understand recent political changes, one should pay attention to shifts in the internal power structure of the government. However, it is not a given that Myanmar will become a full-fledged democracy any time soon. Indeed this article suggests that the country is at a critical juncture, and that the expansion of political openness in the country will depend on whether liberals within the government and those from the pro-democracy movement can work together to further political changes without prompting the country's armed forces, the tatmadaw, to stage a coup. The Power Structure and Political Change in the SLORC/SPDC Government The military government that ruled Myanmar between late 1988 and early 2011 was formed in response to the nation-wide pro-democracy movement against the military-dominated socialist government led by General Ne Win. Although the junta, which was initially known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and later renamed the SPDC, held multi-party elections in 1990, it refused to transfer power to the NLD even after the latter had won a landslide victory. Instead, the junta convened a decade long National Convention (NC) to adopt guidelines for a new constitution. Although opposition groups and the international community called for the transfer of power to the NLD, the SLORC ignored these calls. In fact, after the 1990 elections Myanmar's military leaders decided to defer political change for as long as possible. Political activists, on the other hand, continued to campaign for swift political change. As Huntington and many others have pointed out, democratization under an authoritarian regime might take place under the following conditions: when the regime is toppled by a social movement or seriously weakened by a crisis; when reformers from within the regime and liberals from the movement find a way to work together; or when the regime feels that it cannot survive without initiating political reform. (2) Some activists had hoped for a split in the government and tried to identify liberal officials they could work with. …

The Dynamics of Competitor Party Behaviour

We present an argument concerning the temporal dynamics of the policy positions of the main opposition parties in a legislative body; what we label competitor parties. In the article we ask how competitor parties react when losing an election, and what happens if they continue to lose election upon election. It is argued that competitor parties from the outset are trying to maximise both policy- and office-seeking preferences. We posit that this is best achieved by moving away from the median towards the party base. Yet in the event that electoral success continues to elude the competitor party a process of self-reflection, or learning, will set in within the party because the policy position of the competitor party is clearly unacceptable to pivotal voter groups. In this event, the competitor party will move strongly towards the policy position of the incumbent party, thereby neutralising any advantage the incumbent party may previously have had in terms of policy position. By giving up on its policy preferences, the competitor party maximises total utility because then, if nothing else, it becomes more likely to win office. If the competitor party continues to lose, a new cycle of divergence and convergence will set in, generating a wave-like pattern. The argument is illuminated using two well-known examples from the United States and the United Kingdom and tested employing a unique large-N data set from Danish municipalities. We show that the temporal dynamics of competitor parties are as expected.

The 2011 Presidential Election in Benin: Explaining the Success of One of Two Firsts

Since 1991 Benin has been considered a model of democratisation in Africa. Indeed, since its first multiparty elections in the post-Cold War era, held in March 1991, three different heads of state have alternated at the helm of the country, each coming and leaving according to the prevailing constitutional norms. All of them have been 'independent' candidates, not supported by a specific political party. Each of the presidential elections has gone into a run-off poll and the main opposition parties have failed to coalesce behind one of theirs in an attempt to win the presidency. But for the 2011 election, the main political parties formed an alliance, in the hope of defeating the incumbent candidate, who nevertheless won in the first round. It was the first time the opposition had formed such a formidable coalition and the first time, too, that a presidential candidate won without a run-off. This article attempts to explain this apparent 'anomaly' in Beninese politics and, in doing so, sheds some light on the main candidates in the 2011 election, the stakes involved and how the poll compared to previous ones. It concludes that incumbent president Boni Yayi may have won fairly on election day, but that a rigged voters' roll played a role in his victory.

Relations Between Politics and Constitutional Review in Turkey with Special Reference to the Referrals of Republican Peoples Party: 2002-2010 Period

In this work, relations between constitutional review and politics will be assessed in the framework of referrals of RPP as a main opposition party to the TCC. Getting a good grasp of this issue seems to be of importance since there have been some debates taking place around the boundaries of constitutional review in Turkey. Within this framework, firstly, judiciary-politics relations will be examined in the context of judicialization of politics. Then, the content of referrals of RPP to the Constitutional Court will be analyzed.

Citizenship and citizenship education: a critical discourse analysis of the Zimbabwe Presidential Commission Report

Educational discourse, like other fields, is not neutral. Through policy documents it has ideological functions of transmitting dominant cultures and serving certain sectional interest groups. In Zimbabwe 1998 was characterized by radical political discontent as witnessed by a rise in student activism and the formation of the main political opposition party. It is during this same year that a government appointed commission recommended a citizenship education that would ‘mould’ young people so that they ‘conform’ to expectations of the ‘adult society’. This article examines possibilities for other underlying ideological motives in the recommendation for citizenship education in the curriculum. It does so through a critical discourse analysis of a chapter on citizenship education in the commission’s report. The article concludes that there are possibilities for other underlying motives in the recommendation for a citizenship education regarded as a cure for the perceived anti-social behaviour among young people.

The Potential Impact of the Turnout Rate on Election Outcomes in Turkey

Using province and individual level data, this note presents empirical evidence on the relationship between turnout rates and the electoral success of Turkey’s major parties. Regression results reveal that the province level turnout rate is positively associated with the vote share of the center-left main opposition party, after controlling for the effect of average levels of schooling. Examination of the characteristics of non-voters who took part in a 2007 survey also suggest that they are – on average – the type of people who are more likely to vote for the opposition if they were somehow convinced to go to the polls.