Luck Egalitarianism Research Articles

Carl Knight, Luck Egalitarianism. Equality, Responsibility, and Justice

Las reseñas no incluyen resumen.

Can Luck Egalitarianism Serve as a Basis for Distributive Justice? A Critique of Kok-Chor Tan’s Institutional Luck Egalitarianism

This paper examines whether Kok-Chor Tan’s institutional luck egalitarianism is successful as a pluralist luck egalitarian theory of justice and morality. In recent years, pluralist luck egalitarianism has become a salient theory of justice. Tan’s pluralist proposal for institutional luck egalitarianism is attractive because it seems to refute the metaphysical and practical challenges against luck egalitarianism. This paper demonstrates that, although Tan’s institutional luck egalitarianism is indeed a most sophisticated systematic pluralist theory of justice and morality, his argument fails because the application of luck egalitarianism to the domain of distributive justice and to the basic institutions of society is not justified from the luck egalitarian point of view. This paper concludes that Tan’s institutional luck egalitarianism does not succeed in demonstrating that his theory is an outstanding achievement of luck egalitarianism.

Solidarity, justice and unconditional access to healthcare

Luck egalitarianism provides a reason to object to conditionality in health incentive programmes in some cases when conditionality undermines political values such as solidarity or inclusiveness. This is the case...

Thomas Piketty and the Justice of Education

Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century is best known for its documentation of increasing social inequality, but it also has a notable normative aspect. Although Piketty is far less clear on the normative level than on the empirical, his view of justice can be summarised as meritocratic luck egalitarianism. This leads him to condemn as unjust the fact that inheritance is once again becoming more important than education for determining social position. In this paper, I discuss whether Piketty's normative conception can justify this condemnation. My main thesis will be that Piketty ends up in a dilemma that he cannot resolve with the normative resources he has at his disposal. The horns of this dilemma are defined by whether or not we accept what Susan Hurley calls ‘the regression requirement’, and in both cases the normative distinction between inheritance and education as ways to achieve social positions disappears. Toward the end, I shall suggest an alternative justification for the moral superiority of education over inheritance, which makes use of one of Piketty's key empirical arguments.

La prioridad del Igualitarismo Democrático

In this paper, I will show that strict versions of Luck Egalitarianism and Democratic Egalitarianism are implausible since both claim that the object of egalitarian justice should single out one and only one value. On the contrary, weak versions are acceptable since they allow a plural composition of the egalitarian justice object. This plural understanding of the object of egalitarian justice demands the justification of normative priorities since each conception would justify conflictive demands. In this article I will make three arguments to justify the normative priority of Democratic Egalitarianism over Luck Egalitarianism: a purely instrumentalone, another concerning expressive meaning of public policies and one last argument will show why we need a division of egalitarian moral work.

Preserving fairness: Williams against Cohen on just inequality

The view that the choices people make affect what it is fair for them to receive has widespread appeal. This very general thought has found particular and acute expression in the context of distributive justice in the form of the influential view that has become known as luck egalitarianism. In a surprising development, one of luck egalitarianism’s foremost advocates – G.A. Cohen – appeared, in one of his final papers, to reject the commitment to the fairness of chosen inequalities that defines luck egalitarianism. In opposition to the luck egalitarian view, Cohen suggests that choice merely deprives the disadvantaged of a complaint against being worse off, rather than rendering such inequality fair. Against Cohen’s revised view, Andrew Williams has argued that Cohen’s move underestimates an account of equality under which what individuals choose to do with their equal allocation affects what it is to treat them fairly. Here, I seek to show how the Williams response fails to undermine Cohen’s claims about the relation between fairness and choice. I draw on this analysis to show how the disagreement between Williams and Cohen on this issue illuminates a broader methodological divergence over how to approach questions of justice and fairness.

Issues on Luck Egalitarianism, Responsibility, and Intercultural Healthcare Policies.

This article analyzes the criteria for the distribution of healthcare services through different justice theories such as utilitarianism and liberalism, pointing out the problems that arise when providing services to a culturally diverse population. The international epidemiological setting is a favorable one for discussing personal responsibility and luck egalitarianism; however, some provisions have to be made so that healthcare institutions do not treat ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic minorities unfairly. The article concludes by proposing that accommodations and culturally sensible attention should be provided when possible, without affecting the equal opportunity of others to access these services.

Hikers in Flip‐Flops: Luck Egalitarianism, Democratic Equality and the Distribuenda of Justice

AbstractThe article has two aims. First, to show that a version of luck egalitarianism that includes relational goods amongst its distribuenda can, as a matter of internal logic, account for one of the core beliefs of relational egalitarianism. Therefore, there will be important extensional overlap, at the level of domestic justice, between luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism. This is an important consideration in assessing the merits of and relationship between the two rival views. Second, to provide some support for including relational goods, including those advocated by relational egalitarianism, on the distribuenda of justice and therefore to put in a good word for the overall plausibility of this conception of justice. I show why relational egalitarians, too, have reason to sympathise with this proposal.

Luck Egalitarianism, Responsibility, and Political Liberalism

Luck egalitarians argue that distributive justice should be understood in terms of our capacity to be responsible for our choices. Both proponents and critics assume that the theory must rely on a comprehensive conception of responsibility. I respond to luck egalitarianism’s critics by developing a political conception of responsibility that remains agnostic on the metaphysics of free choice. I construct this political conception by developing a novel reading of John Rawls’ distinction between the political and the comprehensive. A surprising consequence is that many responsibility-based objections to luck egalitarianism turn out to be objections to Rawls’ political liberalism as well.

Inequalities, responsibility and rational capacities: A defence of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism

ABSTRACTThis article aims to defend responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism by arguing for the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility as a plausible conception of an agent's responsibility for inequalities caused by his or her choice in responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. I show that the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility is not only philosophically defensible as a conception of genuine choice, but also promising enough to ward off two common worries which cast doubt on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism (qua luck egalitarianism): first, the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility allows the assignment of differential degrees of responsibility to rational agents in proportional terms, which may make it echo the adverse effects of their childhood environments. Second, its proportional construal essentially allows that nobody possesses a full degree of rational capacities. This enables responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism to refute the harshness objection.

Does luck egalitarianism lose its appeal in the face of genetic engineering?

It has been suggested that the era of genetic interventions will sound the death knell for luck egalitarianism, as it will blur the line between chance and choice, on which theories of distributive justice often rest. By examining the threats posed to these theories, a crucial assumption is exposed; it is assumed that a commitment to the neutralisation of the effects of luck implies the endorsement of even the most morally controversial enhancements. In antithesis, I argue that an attractive theory of luck egalitarianism, Dworkinian liberal equality, enables us to deduce plausible implications for genetic engineering. By focusing on the abstract moral commitments at the heart of Dworkin’s theory, a twofold purpose is served. First, they reveal in what ways the criticisms misfire, thereby safeguarding luck egalitarianism. Second, Dworkinian luck egalitarianism is further strengthened, as it produces plausible guidelines for public policy on genetic engineering in liberal societies.

Luck egalitarianism and what valuing responsibility requires

Luck egalitarianism originated in an attempt to respond to the conservative objection that egalitarianism fails to respect the value of responsibility. In response, luck egalitarians have introduced a distinction between choice and circumstances and recommend redistribution only when inequalities are not the result of choice. I will argue, however, that this standard formulation of the luck egalitarian aim is problematic, and ought to be revised. Valuing responsibility requires more than redistribution – it requires giving priority to ensuring equality of opportunity for advantages at the level of institutions. Preventing unfairness has normative priority over efforts to alleviate it. Compensation’s role is secondary to the prior normative importance of ensuring that people are responsible for the advantages they have.

El igualitarismo de la suerte

El igualitarismo de la suerte comprende un conjunto de concepciones liberal igualitarias de la justicia que consideran justas aquellas desigualdades originadas por las elecciones voluntarias de los individuos e injustas las que son fruto de la suerte. Este trabajo analiza los aspectos básicos de esta posición y las principales controversias que ha generado. La sección primera introduce el contexto y motivación que dan lugar a las concepciones igualitaristas de la suerte. La sección segunda plantea tres formas de reconstruir el debate entre los igualitaristas de la suerte y Rawls. La sección tercera examina el núcleo duro del igualitarismo de la suerte, a saber: (i) la idea de responsabilidad; (ii) la distinción entre suerte bruta y suerte opcional; (iii) la cuestión de la métrica. La sección cuarta analiza las dos principales objeciones que ha recibido este enfoque. Finalmente, la sección quinta concluye evaluando el lugar del igualitarismo de la suerte en el debate contemporáneo sobre la justicia distributiva.

Luck, Justice and Systemic Financial Risk

AbstractSystemic financial risk is one of the most significant collective action problems facing societies. The Great Recession brought attention to a tragedy of the commons in capital markets, in which market participants, from the first‐time homebuyer to Wall Street financiers, acted in ways beneficial to themselves individually, but which together caused substantial collective harm. Two kinds of risk are at play in complex chains of transactions in financial markets: ordinary market risk and systemic risk. Two moral questions are relevant in such cases. First, from the standpoint of interactional morality, does a person have a moral duty to avoid risk of harm to others if their financial transactions contribute in some way, however small, to the loss or harm? This article identifies the conditions in which persons are morally responsible in such cases. Second, from the standpoint of institutional morality, how should society distribute the risk of harm associated with massively complex financial markets? This question is considered in the context of the home mortgage credit market. Luck egalitarianism, in particular a Dworkinian insurance scheme to allocate risks and resources relating to mortgage credit and private home ownership, offers substantial promise.

How Interesting is the “Boring Problem” for Luck Egalitarianism?

Imagine a two‐person distributive case in which Ernest's choices yield X and Bertie's choices yield X + Y, producing an income gap between them of Y. Neither Ernest nor Bertie is responsible for this gap of Y, since neither of them has any control over what the other agent chooses. This is what Susan Hurley calls the “Boring Problem” for luck egalitarianism. Contrary to Hurley's relatively dismissive treatment of it, it is contended that the Boring Problem poses a deep problem for standard luck egalitarianism. To counter it, luck egalitarianism needs to be recast as a baseline‐relative theory. This new version of luck egalitarianism is then put to work against some significant problems that have been encountered by luck egalitarianism: Saul Smilansky's “Paradox of the Baseline,” the “Partiality Worry,” and the “Pluralism Worry.” But baseline‐relative luck egalitarianism is not without problems of its own.

How to be a Responsibility-Sensitive Egalitarian: From Metaphysics to Social Practice

There is something attractive about combining the values of equality and responsibility, even though the view most commonly associated with doing so, of luck egalitarianism, is beset with objections. This article hence proposes an alternative approach to being a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian: one grounded on our valuable social practices of responsibility, rather than on a desire to mitigate the influence of luck on people’s prospects. First, I argue that this practice-based approach better captures the very reasons that responsibility is significant for justice than does the prevalent approach among luck egalitarians: namely, the values of fairness, choice and respect. Second, I show that the remaining motivation of the luck egalitarian approach, of being ‘anti-luck’, is impoverished. I conclude by suggesting that this practice-based approach is better motivated and more palatable than existing forms of luck egalitarianism, even for those relational egalitarians who standardly criticise making egalitarianism responsibility-sensitive.

Luck Egalitarianism, Individual Responsibility and Health.

Luck Egalitarianism has frequently been discussed in the recent literature because of the potential impact of this theory on health financing. Luck Egalitarianism puts forth a theory of distributive justice which says that the fundamental aim of equality is to compensate people for undeserved bad luck such as being born with poor native endowments, having difficult family circumstances or suffering from accidents and illness. On the other hand, if individuals face ill health because of faults of their own, then society has no duty to supply health services to them. Many arguments for and against this theory have been raised since it was first introduced. The proponents of Luck Egalitarianism focus on the concepts that free choice and respecting the autonomy of the individual determine whether health services are deserved. The criticisms against the concept of Luck Egalitarianism are that it is harsh to the needy and abandons the wretched, discriminates against the disabled, is against basic humanitarian principles, is incompatible with human dignity, and is in dissonance with real life. We agree with the basic proposition of Luck Egalitarian theory, which states that "inequalities deriving from unchosen features of people's circumstances are unjust and therefore should be compensated for". Our agreement leads us to an opposite conclusion. We propose that the "unchosen features of people's circumstances" include more than personal disadvantages. The social features to be included in the context of inequalities deriving from unchosen features of peoples circumstances are, socioeconomic status (SES), access to social determinants of health, and the ethnic, cultural and religious identity of individuals. Our other propositions are the mutable character of choices which makes individual responsibility of preferences implausible; the problematic causal relationship between responsibility and ill-health; the disregard of the motives behind decisions; problems with implementation in real health service circumstances; and the contradictory nature of Luck Egalitarianism for principles of medical ethics. These arguments draw attention to possible ethical and practical consequences of implementation of health policies arising from Luck Egalitarian view for patients and for health care providers. In this paper, we will first define Luck Egalitarianism. Then, we will discuss arguments for and against the theory in the literature. Our final task is to suggest additional criticisms of the theory and justify them.

Luck Egalitarianism, Universal Health Care, and Non-Responsibility-Based Reasons for Responsibilization

In recent literature, there has been much debate about whether and how luck egalitarianism, given its focus on personal responsibility, can justify universal health care. In this paper we argue that, whether or not this is so, and in fact whether or not egalitarianism should be sensitive to responsibility at all, the question of personal responsibilization for health is not settled. This is the case because whether or not individuals are responsible for their own health condition is not all that is relevant when considering whether we should somehow hold them responsible for their own health condition, e.g. cost-wise. There may also be efficiency-based reasons to hold them responsible, and there may even be egalitarian reasons. Defining universal health care as an insurance system where everyone’s deductible and premium is 0, we will argue that efficiency-based reasons for cost-responsibilization are not convincing, but that there are egalitarian reasons for cost-responsibilization. Luck egalitarianism, therefore, cannot, at least not on its own term, justify universal health care.

Abandoning the Abandonment Objection: Luck Egalitarian Arguments for Public Insurance

Critics of luck egalitarianism have claimed that, far from providing a justification for the public insurance functions of a welfare state as its proponents claim, the view objectionably abandons those who are deemed responsible for their dire straits. This article considers seven arguments that can be made in response to this ‘abandonment objection’. Four of these arguments are found wanting, with a recurrent problem being their reliance on a dubious sufficientarian or quasi-sufficientarian commitment to provide a threshold of goods unconditionally. Three arguments succeed, showing that luck egalitarians have good reasons for assisting ‘negligent victims’ on account of changes that may occur in an individual between the time of their choice and their subsequent disadvantage, bad option luck, and doubts about free will and responsibility. Luck egalitarianism is therefore shown to offer strong support for public insurance.

Tough luck and tough choices: applying luck egalitarianism to oral health.

Luck egalitarianism is often taken to task for its alleged harsh implications. For example, it may seem to imply a policy of nonassistance toward uninsured reckless drivers who suffer injuries. Luck egalitarians respond to such objections partly by pointing to a number of factors pertaining to the cases being debated, which suggests that their stance is less inattentive to the plight of the victims than it might seem at first. However, the strategy leaves some cases in which the attribution of individual responsibility is appropriate (and so, it seems, is asking people to pick up the tab for their choices). One such case is oral health or significant aspects of this. It is appropriate, the paper argues, to hold people responsible for a number of factors that affect their oral health. A luck egalitarian approach inspired by John Roemer can assess whether people have acted responsibly by comparing their choices to those of their peers. A luck egalitarian approach to oral health would recommend prioritizing scarce resources in a responsibility-weighted queuing system and include copayment and general taxation among its measures of financing.