Luck Egalitarianism Research Articles

В защиту ролзианского эгалитаризма (Критика Р.Бельковича и С.Виноградова)

The liberal-egalitarian concept formulated by John Rawls in his book A Theory of Justice is still vehemently debated today. Critics of this concept include, among others, Rodion Belkovich and Sergei Vinogradov, according to whom Rawlsians inevitably face a dilemma: they need to reject either the difference principle or luck egalitarianism, and each of these solutions leads to the erosion of the basic foundations of Rawls’s theory. The article presents a detailed analysis of the arguments put forward by Belkovich and Vinogradov and demonstrates that the dilemma they identified is flawed for three reasons. First, it blurs the distinction between luck egalitarianism and “straight egalitarianism,” which assumes the complete equality of income and wealth in society. Luck egalitarians do not support the idea of absolute equality in distribution and consider inequality that reflects people’s responsibility for their own choices fair. Second, Rawlsian egalitarianism is essentially equated with luck egalitarianism, while they represent two clearly distinguishable approaches. Third, the kidnapper’s argument, which proves that the difference principle is incompatible with luck egalitarianism, does not provide solid reasoning against the difference principle. The argument is only applicable under limited conditions, when the difference principle is embedded as an assumption in the “argument from incentives”, which in turn is put forward by the potential beneficiaries of this incentive. According to the author’s conclusion, the above mentioned considerations clearly indicate that Rawlsians do not face any dilemma of choosing between luck egalitarianism and the difference principle, and the criticism of Rawls’s theory proposed by Belkovich and Vinogradov should be considered groundless.

Implementing Post-Pandemic Economic Parity: A Potential Restoration Through Distributive Justice

Abstract This paper explores the economic disparities created and augmented by the Pandemic and implores the state to adopt redistribution schemes based on the philosophy of distributive justice. The pandemic created and augmented gaping class inequalities, by pushing some into unemployment and poverty, while catalysing others’ prosperity. This may or may not have involved a fault element on the part of those that profited from the pandemic, which is to say, while some may have actively exploited the situation to increase their profits at the cost of general interests, others may have simply gained profits while retaining ethical practices in their conduct of business. This Paper argues that, irrespective of the fault element, States must implement a special financial scheme that necessitates companies that gained enormous profits from the pandemic to contribute towards assisting those who were financially crushed by the pandemic. The paper will build this on the philosophy of distributive justice, examining the ‘difference principle’ as well as ‘luck and responsibility egalitarianism’. Simply put, this means that States must enforce a system that neutralizes the ‘luck’ element that the pandemic induced in the society, through a financial scheme best suited for its situation. This may be achieved through levying a special tax for a period of time on particular business entities and/or by requiring companies to include a special corporate social responsibility project in line with the quantum of additional profits owing to the pandemic. Arguably, corporate houses that exploited the pandemic must not be placed at par with those that merely happened to profit from it (say, for instance, a pharmaceutical company that may have manipulated the drug market to increase prices and limit supply of an important drug, as opposed to a food/essentials delivery chain that naturally saw an increase in the number of consumers ordering deliveries online). But the obligation to carve out a part of their profits for social redistribution is not founded on whether they are at fault or not. Any fault may, of course, be used as a basis for levying a higher penalty or other legal measure, apart and distinct from the obligation that this paper builds on. The scheme that is proposed by the Paper is not to penalize but is based on the philosophy of distributive justice and thus does not require that the company was ever in violation of laws, but merely that the pandemic that devastated most people happened to be a profitable enterprise for others in contrast. It is in the State’s interests to negate the widened gap of economic disparities thus created, and this justifies that the Government would require such corporate houses to carve out a fraction of their fortunes for those who suffered severely. The Paper builds primarily on the philosophical foundations of distributive justice, urging its practical implementation in post-pandemic the economy. States must adopt creative measures to restructure patterns of privileges created or amplified by such unprecedented (at least in recent history) circumstances, as the pandemic.

Relational Egalitarianism and Intergenerational Justice: Reply to Sommers

AbstractIt is often argued that relational egalitarianism has a fundamental problem with intergenerational justice when compared to other theories of justice such as utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and luck egalitarianism. Recently, Timothy Sommers argued that there is no such comparative disadvantage for relational egalitarianism. His argument is quite modest: it merely aims to reject the claim that there could be no way to extend relational egalitarianism to intergenerational justice. This may be called the ‘No Comparative Disadvantage Thesis’. The present article challenges Sommers’s argument in two ways. First, I show that Sommers fails to provide a reasonable constraint on causal efficacy, which is crucial to his argument for our relation (not relationship) to future generations. Second, I show that the chain-relatedness problem casts a shadow over Sommers’s argument for the No Comparative Disadvantage Thesis. More specifically, compared to the other theories of justice, relational egalitarianism (as it stands) can less easily justify that present persons have duties to future others. This is because relational egalitarianism cannot appeal to a specific principle in regard to the duties in question, because its principle is sensitive to current context and practice. I conclude that the No Comparative Disadvantage Thesis does not hold much promise.

Равенство удачи: развитие эгалитарных концепций справедливости в конце XX века

Since the publication of John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, the egalitarian tradition, which associates fair institutional structure with reaching equality in one aspect or another, has started to play a central role in academic discussions of the social justice problem. The article is devoted to the analysis of the evolution of egalitarianism of luck, which by the end of the 20th century has become the main direction in the framework of this tradition. The proponents of this direction in their argument depart from Rawls’s idea about the lottery of birth, according to which a game played by a fortune, being arbitrary from the moral point of view and affecting the distribution of resources in society, is unfair, and therefore should be compensated. Rawls’s approach to minimizing the role of luck in a fair distribution did not guarantee sufficient compensation for natural inequalities, assuming at the same time excessive compensation for “expensive tastes”. Trying to solve this problem, Ronald Dworkin distinguished between brute and option luck, using the model of the “veil of ignorance”, behind which the amount of fair compensation is determined. Further development of egalitarianism of luck at the turn of the 1980—1990s is associated with the names of Richard Arneson, Gerald Cohen, John Roemer and some other authors who made a number of amendments and changes to the concept of undeserved luck and proposed their own ways to neutralize its consequences for society. The arguments of proponents of luck egalitarianism at the end of the 20th century aimed at strengthening the role of an individual’s freedom of choice and implantation of the ethics of responsibility into the theory of social justice. At the same time, the interpretation of luck as a true “currency of equality” made the question of fair distribution conditional upon the consensus on the limits of human capacity for systematic cultivation of virtues and the scope of individual responsibility for one’s own destiny.

Ethical issues arising from the government allocation of physicians to rural areas: a case study from Japan

The geographically inequitable distribution of physicians has long posed a serious social problem in Japan. The government tackled this problem by establishing and managing Jichi Medical University (JMU) and regional...

Discrimination Based on Personal Responsibility: Luck Egalitarianism and Healthcare Priority Setting.

Luck egalitarianism is a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. Its application to health and healthcare is controversial. This article addresses a novel critique of luck egalitarianism, namely, that it wrongfully discriminates against those responsible for their health disadvantage when allocating scarce healthcare resources. The philosophical literature about discrimination offers two primary reasons for what makes discrimination wrong (when it is): harm and disrespect. These two approaches are employed to analyze whether luck egalitarian healthcare prioritization should be considered wrongful discrimination. Regarding harm, it is very plausible to consider the policies harmful but much less reasonable to consider those responsible for their health disadvantages a socially salient group. Drawing on the disrespect literature, where social salience is typically not required for something to be discrimination, the policies are a form of discrimination. They are, however, not disrespectful. The upshot of this first assessment of the discrimination objection to luck egalitarianism in health is, thus, that it fails.

Luck egalitarianism and non‐overlapping generations

AbstractThis paper argues that there are good reasons to limit the scope of luck egalitarianism to co‐existing people. First, I outline reasons to be sceptical about how “luck” works intergenerationally and therefore the very grounding of luck egalitarianism between non‐overlapping generations. Second, I argue that what Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen calls the “core luck egalitarian claim” allows significant intergenerational inequality which is a problem for those who object to such inequality. Third, luck egalitarianism cannot accommodate the intuition that it might be required to leave future generations better off than we are, even if it would come at no cost to ourselves. Finally, I argue that following another, broader, version of luck egalitarianism would require us to level down future generations and possibly even ourselves, which is a problem for those persuaded by the levelling‐down objection.

Левое либертарианство и генетическая справедливость

Distributive justice is one of the central questions of contemporary moral and political phi­losophy. Discussions on this topic are often presented as a confrontation between two groups of thinkers: libertarians and luck egalitarians. The former emphasize the dependence of the existing distribution on the individual choice and personal responsibility of people, and therefore are skeptical about various redistribution programs. The latter, on the contrary, emphasize the influence of morally arbitrary luck on the economic situation of people, and therefore welcome redistributive measures to compensate for this brute luck. Left-libertarian claims to reconcile these two types of moral considerations. The classical left-libertarian point of view seeks to offset the influence of brute luck through an egalitarian distribution of the benefits of owning natural resources that are independent of anyone’s choice and respon­sibility. However, this position does not sufficiently take into account the influence of other factors of brute luck and, in particular, genetic endowments on the distribution of economic wealth. This article discusses three approaches that allow left-libertarians to take into ac­count the factor of genetic luck in interpersonal distribution. First, it is Hillel Steiner’s pro­posal to attribute genetic information to natural resources, the benefits of which are subject to egalitarian redistribution. Second, it is the concept of equal opportunity for welfare by Pe­ter Vallentyne, Michael Otsuka and Eric Roark. Thirdly, it is the universal dominance crite­rion of Philippe Van Parijs and Kasper Ossenblok. The first two approaches face a number of moral and practical difficulties, but the third approach is able to overcome them. Thus, the universal dominance criterion is the most promising way to reconcile left-libertarianism and justice in the distribution of genetic endowments.

Egalitarianism and Economic Rents in Distributional Inequalities

The concept of economic rent is a prominent theoretical anchor for many sociologists studying distributional inequalities. However, its normative assumptions and implications have been undertheorized, leaving its connection to the reasons why we might object to economic rents unclear. In this article, I scrutinize economic rents through the two dominant egalitarian frameworks in political philosophy: luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism. I find that rents as typically conceptualized—as deviations from a competitive market outcome—fail to align with either normative framework, operating in some cases orthogonally to their concerns but mostly contradictory to them. Ultimately, economic rents provide an anti-egalitarian distributional metric, the perfectly competitive market, to pursue the egalitarian aim of eliminating structural advantages. The concept thereby fails to capture the way that distributional inequalities are normatively problematic or even what constitutes inequality in the first place. I conclude by using relational egalitarianism as a starting point for better grounding the concept of economic rent.

Luck Egalitarianism and COVID-19: The Case for Compensating Children for School Closures

The Covid-19 pandemic resulted in school closures around the world, leaving lasting negative impacts on many children. Given that such closures are justified public health measures, this raises the question of compensating children for school closures. In this article I address the question of compensation from the perspective of a popular theory of justice: luck egalitarianism. In doing so, I examine a problem with applying luck egalitarianism to children, called the agency assumption. I then argue this assumption results in a dilemma for luck egalitarianism and suggest how this dilemma can be overcome. I argue that the resulting form of luck egalitarianism reveals something interesting about compensating children for school closures: luck egalitarianism requires us to address all bases of justice-relevant inequality among children—Covid-19-related and beyond. Although much of the current discussion of compensating children for such closures has focused narrowly on the need to make up for lost instruction time or to prevent reductions in educational achievement, I argue that a luck egalitarian conception of justice requires us to go beyond merely compensating children for educational losses and instead aim for radical equality in education.

The Harshness Objection is Not (too) Harsh for Luck Egalitarianism

The Harshness Objection is Not (too) Harsh for Luck Egalitarianism

Rethinking Compensation for Bad Luck

Luck egalitarianism (LE, henceforth) is a fairly prominent theory of justice. While there are many versions of LE, they all agree that, at least to some extent, it is unjust for individuals to lose the opportunity for welfare at least when that loss occurs through no fault of the individual’s own. Many writers take LE to have direct political implications; they write as if the truth of LE entails that resources should be taken from some – perhaps those who enjoy lots of unearned welfare – and delivered to those who suffer through no fault of their own. I argue that luck egalitarians should refocus their thinking on what I call a “Systemic Model” of compensation. This model holds that (a) what matters most to offsetting bad brute luck is that individuals have opportunities to make up for losses of welfare and (b) political systems should be designed to prevent some individuals from capturing resources in a manner that frustrates the ability of others to offset their own losses due to unearned bad luck and (c) political systems should aim to maximize the opportunities individuals have to make up for their own bad luck.

TWO DEMANDS UPON LUCK EGALITARIANS

AbstractI offer two objections to luck egalitarianism. The no-adequate-account objection takes note of the egalitarian insistence that the disvalue of inequality is only one of a plurality of values or disvalues that needs to be considered in arriving at a judgment about the ranking of alternative distributions of welfare. This turn to pluralism places a reasonable demand upon luck egalitarianism to provide an account of how the different sorts of values or disvalues that are supposed to attach to available distributions of welfare are to be aggregated or weighed against one another in that ranking procedure. I contend that the prospects for developing such an account are dim and that some salient responses to this objection misfire. The churlishness-envy objection against luck egalitarianism is that this doctrine countenances envy directed toward the faultless good fortune of others. This objection places a reasonable demand on luck egalitarians to formulate a version of their doctrine that does not underwrite envious responses toward those who gain through brute good luck. I contend that the most auspicious path toward satisfying the demand not to underwrite churlish envy advances a luck egalitarianism that asymmetrically affirms the badness of arbitrary disadvantage rather than the badness of both arbitrary disadvantage and arbitrary advantage. Since this is the strategy pursued in Shlomi Segall’s Why Inequality Matters, I offer critiques of Segall’s initial and revised versions of asymmetrical egalitarianism in support of my conclusion that luck egalitarianism seems unable to rebut or sidestep the churlishness-envy objection. I conclude that luck egalitarianism seems unable to satisfy either of the two reasonable demands upon it that I raise.

Sprawiedliwość społeczna jako równość szans w postaci egalitaryzmu trafu

Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland invokes the idea of social justice without specifying its understanding. The present analysis deals with the problems of characterising it as equality of opportunities (possibilities) in the form of luck egalitarianism. Based on hypothetical examples, we have attempted to show that the social justice, which consists in the enforcement of equal rights, whether they are maximalist or merely positive, faces serious theoretical obstacles. The article contains three main theses. The first thesis is that it is impossible to enforce equal rights in maximalist terms. The second thesis states that the luck egalitarian project of equalizing opportunities for the younger generation by redistributing resources seized through the liquidation of inheritances shows the incoherence of the rules of justice. The third thesis is that luck egalitarianism violates the principle of consistency. For the above reasons, such an understanding of social justice as equality of opportunity in the form of luck egalitarianism should be excluded from the interpretation of Article 2 of the Polish Constitution.

Responsibility and the recursion problem.

A considerable literature has emerged around the idea of using ‘personal responsibility’ as an allocation criterion in healthcare distribution, where a person's being suitably responsible for their health needs may justify additional conditions on receiving healthcare, and perhaps even limiting access entirely, sometimes known as ‘responsibilisation’. This discussion focuses most prominently, but not exclusively, on ‘luck egalitarianism’, the view that deviations from equality are justified only by suitably free choices. A superficially separate issue in distributive justice concerns the two–way relationship between health and other social goods: deficits in health typically undermine one's abilities to secure advantage in other areas, which in turn often have further negative effects on health. This paper outlines the degree to which this latter relationship between health and other social goods exacerbates an existing problem for proponents of responsibilisation (the ‘harshness objection’) in ways that standard responses to this objection cannot address. Placing significant conditions on healthcare access because of a person's prior responsibility risks trapping them in, or worsening, negative cycles where poor health and associated lack of opportunity reinforce one another, making further poor yet ultimately responsible choices more likely. It ends by considering three possible solutions to this problem.

Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, Verantwortung und Zufall. Die Bedeutung von Risikoakzeptanz für den Glücksegalitarismus

Luck egalitarians like Ronald Dworkin and G. A. Cohen claim that the influence of luck on the distribution of goods or welfare has to be equalized, whereas inequality must be accepted if the subjects bear responsibility for it. The paper investigates how this claim should be interpreted and if it is plausible. Analyzing several examples, I try to show that the spectrum of pertinent cases is much more limited than Dworkin and Cohen think. Sometimes it seems as if someone is responsible for being in a worse position than someone else, while in fact they didn't have equal opportunities. Fitting cases of responsibility for inequality can be found when we focus on the outcomes of calculated gambles (Dworkin: option luck). But why, and what exactly are cases in point? What distinguishes the risk-taking of someone who buys a lottery ticket from that of a peasant who cultivates a piece of land, knowing that a storm might ruin the crop? I try to demonstrate that an ethically relevant difference occurs when the attitude towards risk differs. Would the agent prefer to receive the expected utility safely, or would she rather gamble?

Experiments and egalitarianism

AbstractIn this paper, I reflect on the implications that ultimatum and dictator game experiments might have for public policy and for the debates over egalitarianism. Experiments suggest that people are more inclined to redistribute when outcomes are influenced by luck than effort. This can create difficulties for public policy when people hold contrasting views over whether luck or effort determine outcomes. The results also appear to play into forms of luck egalitarianism. However, they may also be consistent with an alternative understanding of egalitarianism as the impulse to have rules that treat people equally.

Luck, Hypothetical Insurance, and the Costs of Children

ABSTRACTA widely accepted answer to the question of who should bear the costs of children is that non‐parents have an obligation to help share some of these costs with parents. This poses a challenge to mainstream luck egalitarian theories, as they seem unable to account for this widespread parental justice view. I argue that the challenge is serious enough to turn parental justice into a test case for the plausibility of luck egalitarianism. I discuss a very promising approach that could help meet the challenge, namely the hypothetical insurance argument for parental subsidies. I argue that, despite its promise, the argument only establishes a permission to socialise the costs of children but fails to establish a distinctive requirement of justice. Finally, I show why establishing a permission is not sufficient to meet the challenge that parental justice poses to luck egalitarians.

Shlomi Segall. Why Inequality Matters: Luck Egalitarianism, Its Meaning and Value

Shlomi Segall. Why Inequality Matters: Luck Egalitarianism, Its Meaning and Value

Luck egalitarianism without moral tyranny

Luck egalitarians contend that, while each person starts out with a claim to an equal quantity of advantage, she can forfeit this claim by making certain choices. The appeal of luck egalitarianism is that it seems to satisfy what this paper calls the moral tyranny constraint. According to this constraint, any acceptable theory of justice must preclude the possibility of an agent unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably leaving others with less advantage under conditions of full compliance with the theory. This paper argues that claim forfeiture is built into luck egalitarianism specifically to preclude such moral tyranny. However, it contends that the dominant interpretation of luck egalitarianism fails to fully satisfy the moral tyranny constraint. It offers an alternative interpretation that both eliminates the possibility of moral tyranny and rescues the position from two other prominent objections that have been directed against luck egalitarianism.