Lowy Institute Research Articles

Modeling Adaptive Performance of the Academics in Selected Public Universities in Eastern Philippines during the COVID-19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 crisis has prompted the implementation of new measures aimed at containing the virus, given its potential health threats to humanity. Studies indicate that the stringency of these policies is associated with a country’s performance in managing the pandemic. However, the literature still needs more coherent evidence on the relationship between policy stringency, COVID-19 management, and corruption perception, and thus, warrants further investigation. This study used data mining on publicly available datasets from 96 countries worldwide, which include Transparency International’s corruption perception index, COVID-19 stringency measures from the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government, and COVID-19 management performance scores from the Lowy Institute. The researchers applied clustering techniques to group nations with similar characteristics and mediation analysis to explore the relationship between a country’s corruption perception and its COVID-19 stringency concerning its management performance. Findings revealed four clustered countries. Fourteen countries with less stringent policies and highly transparent tend to manage COVID-19-related indicators better. Thirty-six countries were imposing stricter policies with low scores in the corruption perception level inclined to have lower COVID-19 management performance. Forty-five countries with average stringency and corruption perception levels have average COVID-19 management performance. Meanwhile, the mediation results proposed no mediation effects of the corruption perception on the association of the policy severity and the COVID-19 management performance level of the 96 countries and all clustered countries. With these findings, this study hopes to enlighten policymakers to review the strictness of their policies, as it posits an inverse effect on the COVID-19 management performance of a country.

Bitwa o Tajwan, czyli jak mogłaby wyglądać chińska inwazja na „zbuntowaną prowincję”

The battle of Taiwan, or what a Chinese invasion of a „rogue province” could look like This article describes the possible course of the battle of Taiwan. The paper presents the Chinese policy towards Taiwan, conclusions drawn from the war games conducted by the Pentagon, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and civilian think tanks, the military potential of both sides, and the battle scenario. During the actual research, studies and articles published in Forbes, Business Insider, Taiwan News, Lowy Institute, War on the Rocks, NBC News, China Power, Military Times, Reuters, and Daily Guardian, along with reports of think tanks such as the Atlantic Council and RAND, reports of the US Congress, and reports of Military Ballance were used. The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, a book written by Ian Easton, turned out to be a particularly useful source of knowledge. According to the author of this article, a „forceful solution” for the Taiwanese issue by Beijing is possible in the future and the Western world should seriously analyze its possible course. This is evidenced by numerous statements of Chinese politicians, the desire to change the current global balance of power, the continuous growth of China’s economic power, the expansion of the PLA’s power projection capabilities in terms of an invasion of the „rogue province”, and regular war games and violations of the Taiwanese air defense identification zone. If there was a battle of Taiwan, from the point of view of the People’s Republic of China, it would be crucial to isolate the island, to quickly eliminate the enemy’s anti‑aircraft and anti‑missile defenses by means of missile and cyberattacks, to paralyze the command system, to gain air superiority, and then to land on the beaches from which operations would be then carried out inland. From the point of view of the Taiwan Armed Forces, the most important thing would be to survive the first days of massive air and missile attacks, to disperse their forces, and then to attack the enemy by exploring its weaknesses, i.e., shooting down selected planes and helicopters, sinking ships in the Taiwan Strait, interrupting supply lines, and then inflicting as much damage as possible during the ground combat.

Mediation Effect of Corruption Perception on COVID-19 Stringency and Management Performance

The COVID-19 crisis has prompted the implementation of new measures aimed at containing the virus, given its potential health threats to humanity. Studies indicate that the stringency of these policies is associated with a country’s performance in managing the pandemic. However, the literature still needs more coherent evidence on the relationship between policy stringency, COVID-19 management, and corruption perception, and thus, warrants further investigation. This study used data mining on publicly available datasets from 96 countries worldwide, which include Transparency International’s corruption perception index, COVID-19 stringency measures from the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government, and COVID-19 management performance scores from the Lowy Institute. The researchers applied clustering techniques to group nations with similar characteristics and mediation analysis to explore the relationship between a country’s corruption perception and its COVID-19 stringency concerning its management performance. Findings revealed four clustered countries. Fourteen countries with less stringent policies and highly transparent tend to manage COVID-19-related indicators better. Thirty-six countries were imposing stricter policies with low scores in the corruption perception level inclined to have lower COVID-19 management performance. Forty-five countries with average stringency and corruption perception levels have average COVID-19 management performance. Meanwhile, the mediation results proposed no mediation effects of the corruption perception on the association of the policy severity and the COVID-19 management performance level of the 96 countries and all clustered countries. With these findings, this study hopes to enlighten policymakers to review the strictness of their policies, as it posits an inverse effect on theCOVID-19 management performance of a country.

Norm erosion and Australia's challenge to the rules-based order

ABSTRACT Australian foreign policy makers increasingly place an emphasis on the importance of rules and norms. These foreign policy statements reflect concerns about China's growing assertiveness combined with the belief that a ‘thick’ anarchy is safer for middle powers. Yet while Australia has been fixated with how China poses a threat to the international order, at times, Australia has actively challenged that order itself. Such was the case when the Prime Minister gave an address on ‘negative globalism’ at the Lowy Institute in October 2019. This article advances a theoretically grounded framework for understanding how these performative challenges arise and come to cause norm erosion. The framework draws together three elements: the rule or norm in question; representational strategies; and domestic audiences. The article illustrates this framework using the example of the Prime Minister's Lowy Institute address.

Chinese Debt in the Pacific: Information from the Lowy Institute Pacific Aid Map

Chinese Debt in the Pacific: Information from the Lowy Institute Pacific Aid Map

Aid fragmentation and volatility in the Pacific.

In this article we comprehensively document aid volatility (short‐term changes in aid flows) and aid fragmentation in the Pacific. We study two types of fragmentation: fragmentation across countries and fragmentation across projects. Our research draws on a new dataset compiled by the Lowy Institute. The dataset includes aid flows to the Pacific from non‐traditional donors such as China. This allows us to undertake the first‐ever study of Pacific aid volatility and fragmentation factoring in non‐traditional donors. We contrast the Pacific with other regions, finding that while fragmentation across donors is less in the Pacific, project fragmentation is worse, as is aid volatility. We find fragmentation across donors is increasing in the Pacific. We find a similar trend for fragmentation across projects. We find no evidence that non‐traditional donors such as China are driving these trends. However, we find some evidence that non‐traditional donors give more volatile aid.

The SAIS Review Interviews Fiona Cunningham

The SAIS Review Interviews Fiona Cunningham Fiona Cunningham (bio) November 22, 2019 SAIS Review: Would you be able to provide us a brief summary of your background—as it relates to China and nuclear weapons—and how you got interested in the topic? Dr. Fiona Cunningham: I started researching China and nuclear weapons issues a long time ago when I was a research associate for the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia. At the time, President Obama had just given a speech expressing his desire for a nuclear-weapon-free world to occur at some point, which triggered a lot of interest, obviously, in the Australian government, the Japanese government, and the think tank community about how that could be achieved, particularly in Asia. I was involved in a project that was looking at the future of extended nuclear deterrence—or extended deterrence I should say—as one moved towards a world with a lesser role for, and eventually no, nuclear weapons. Over the course of the two years that that project ran, it became quite obvious that the conventional military balance in Asia was changing in ways that was going to make that a very difficult objective. Through the course of this project, I started to look at questions about the China and its nuclear weapons program—what its ambitions were in the region, what its nuclear weapons were good for, how its nuclear strategy worked—and realized that there were some unanswered questions I thought needed more interrogation, specifically about what China wanted, the nature of nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons, and what nuclear weapons could provide to different countries. It was this line of inquiry that guided my entrance into [End Page 181] graduate school. Ultimately, I ended up looking at a broader range of issues about China and strategic deterrence than what I started with. SAIS Review: In researching Chinese nuclear weapons, did you have any trouble conducting your research in China? What was it like doing your research in China? Were Chinese officials forthcoming? Dr. Fiona Cunningham: It's obviously a sensitive topic and it isn't an easy one to research. On the one hand, because nuclear weapons are one of those capabilities from which statesmen derive much more utility if they aren't used, China wants its nuclear deterrence policies to be understood. On the other hand, probing at some of the more difficult and sensitive issues can get a little tricky. My sources have consisted of interviews with members of China's expert community who weren't actually serving officials and doing a lot of documentary research with materials that are available in both the United States and in China that I was able to collect to try to understand the decision-making and the mentality behind China's approach to nuclear weapons versus other military tools of strategic leverage, including its space weapons, cyber capabilities, and conventional missile program. I will say that there is an expert community in China that is much better developed on the nuclear side than on the other tools, so it is much easier, in many ways, to research nuclear weapons than the other tools. But there are, of course, sensitive parts, and there are questions that can't be asked in interviews that have to be answered in other ways. But I would say just generally speaking, that China's expert community welcomes the opportunity to exchange and to understand what Western analysts find surprising and concerning about China's nuclear strategy, as well as the opportunity to help China's policies to be a little better understood abroad. SAIS Review: The American nuclear process—how it launches nuclear weapons with the president and the "nuclear football," the American nuclear apparatus—is fairly well known by the public and is relatively easy to research and learn about. What is the process in China, in terms of how they launch nuclear weapons? What is the political and military structure governing a Chinese nuclear weapons launch? How many checks and balances are there? And is there a debate about whether these kinds of processes should be reformed? Dr. Fiona Cunningham: These are really hard topics...

Power in Australian foreign policy

ABSTRACTThe 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper emphasises the importance of ‘maximising’ Australia’s power and influence. However, the White Paper and much of the commentary on Australian foreign policy do not clearly conceptualise ‘power’ or indicate how it ought to be increased. The Lowy Institute’s recent Asia Power Index implies one possible strategy via its resource-based approach to measuring power. We outline a different approach and argue that power should be conceptualised and evaluated as a specific relationship causing behavioural change, rather than as a general attribute of its wielder. To complement the Lowy Institute’s carefully catalogued database, and facilitate a more focused conversation about maximising power and influence in Australian foreign policy, we offer a typology identifying five pathways through which states can translate their material and non-material resources into outcomes that serve the national interest.

Travelling responsibly, but further to go: Australia’s new consular diplomacy

ABSTRACTThis article considers the transformations taking place in the consular landscape and the resulting pressures on departments of foreign affairs both in Australia and elsewhere. For Australia, the challenges are particularly compelling. As the Lowy Institute has observed in successive reports, Australia’s anaemic overseas representation renders the growing consular load an even more formidable problem. When crises strike, resources are diverted both within government and within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, skewing other priorities. The second part of the article analyses government responses to these challenges. It examines the new focus on consular diplomacy and the government’s first formal consular strategy. It assesses the recent modest expansion of Australia’s overseas diplomatic network, together with the steps taken to enhance international cooperation on consular issues. The article concludes that while the problems facing Australia’s consular service remain pressing, some progress has been made.

The threat of autocracy diffusion in consolidated democracies? The case of China, Singapore and Australia

ABSTRACTThe majority of today’s authoritarian regimes have little hope of promoting autocracy beyond their own borders, let alone to consolidated democratic countries. However, China and Singapore are two prominent examples of non-democratic countries whose soft power arsenals have given them some global appeal beyond that enjoyed by most authoritarian regimes. But to what extent has China’s and Singapore’s power of example influenced consolidated democracies in terms that the latter wanting to replicate some political practices or even norms in these non-democratic regimes? In this article, we engage recent works to examine this question in relation to how Australians perceive the political example offered by China and Singapore. Focusing our analysis on several prominent polls conducted recently by the Lowy Institute for International Policy, we suggest that at present there is little evidence of a causal impact of the rise of authoritarian powerhouses such as China and Singapore on how Australians view democracy at home. Through these case studies, this article sheds some light on the theoretical as well as practical questions about the inherent impediments of authoritarian diffusion in consolidated democracies.

Condemned to Crisis? By Ken Ward

Condemned to Crisis? By Ken Ward. Sydney: Penguin Books and Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2015. Hardcover: 152pp. Condemned to Crisis? could not have come at a better time. While Indonesia--Australia bilateral relations have often been subject to ups and downs, roller coaster ride seems to have grown erratic in recent years. Indeed, lunging from crisis to crisis has seemingly become the new normal in how Jakarta and Canberra deal with one another, even as Australian observers maintain that a warm with is invaluable. Ken Ward, however, provides a sobering and lucidly written assessment of why this is mistaken. His message is clear: Australia needs to be more realistic about its bilateral and should not adopt wildly ambitious goals vis-a-vis Indonesia (p. 24). Ward claims that describing Australia's with as most important regional strategic relationship (p. 47) neither enhances Canberra's negotiating strength nor elicits appreciation from Indonesia. Instead, Ward calls on Australian political elite to adopt a measured approach, improve political communication and avoid using as a domestic partisan political football. The book examines how Indonesia's history has shaped its foreign policy, how Indonesia-Australia has been entangled by domestic politics of both countries, and role of political communication and culture. Throughout, Ward provides thought-provoking analyses as he debunks a few prevailing myths in bilateral relationship. He correctly debunks, for example, a long-held myth that bilateral relations are difficult due to cultural differences (pp. 56-61). He claims that such a view conflates a certain variant of Javanese culture with Indonesian culture as a whole, and that cultural accounts fail to offer a reliable guide on how Indonesian leaders may react in crisis situations with Australia. Overall, book is a refreshing and important addition to ongoing debate over management of this bilateral relationship. Written for Australian public in mind, it has rightfully fostered numerous debates in Australian media and elsewhere. However, rather than rehashing these debates, I will closely examine book's analyses of Indonesia, which underpin its policy recommendations. Here, unfortunately, it falls short of providing a thorough, balanced and nuanced understanding of Indonesia. At times, analyses are crowded out by cherry-picked quotes, contradictions and unnecessary innuendos. Ward's thesis--Canberra should avoid big dreams and focus on building a stable of weathering storms --contradicts his own claim that past crises that engulfed only had a limited impact on investment and trade, educational exchanges or tourism (pp. 26-27). If status quo is already capable of weathering bilateral storms, why aim for something better? This confusion may be due to an absence of a clear framework to assess evolution in this bilateral relationship. Ward suggests that we compare Indonesia-Australia relations with Indonesia-Singapore and Indonesia-Malaysia relations (pp. 34-50), but he does not persuasively explain why those comparisons are pertinent. Singling out distance as a variable seems like an odd choice since has eight neighbors--and a cursory citing of Stephen Walt's Origins of Alliances to justify this focus on neighbourly threats is not a substitute for case selection analysis. Furthermore, lack of substantive evidence for some of his claims exacerbates such analytical concerns. He points out, for example, that Sukarno's view of world--that it is dominated by exploitative forces--has endured in one form or another ... [and] underlies continuing suspicion of foreign investment and striving for self-sufficiency (pp. 31-32). But he offers no evidence to show whether and how it endures. …

The rise of China and the decline of democracy in Australia?

Over the years, the Lowy Institute's annual poll has uncovered a number of unexpected and concerning trends about Australian attitudes. However, one of the most alarming findings during the last de...

The Group of 20 transnational policy community: governance networks, policy analysis and think tanks

The G20 is an evolving international institution. Aided by both advances in information technology and support from home governments, a number of knowledge actors and networks seek to influence global economic governance with policy analysis and advice. This article assesses the international G20 think tank network called Think20 and the policy advocacy of private research institutes (such the Lowy Institute in Australia and the Centre for International Governance and Innovation in Canada) which are in the orbit of the G20 policy community. Think20 assists the global economic governance processes of the G20 by developing ‘coordinative discourses’ for policy development and implementation. Points for practitioners Ideas matter but ideas that imply major policy reform and innovation need to be made to matter if they are to direct government action. Networks provide one mechanism to broadcast and disseminate ‘communicative discourses’ to many different publics – local as well as global – and the infrastructure to crystalize and amplify ‘coordinative discourses’ underpinning the policy blueprints and reform proposals of governments that must motivate their own bureaucracies as well as collaborate with foreign government. This article discusses some of the network tools and practices for consensus building in ‘transnational policy communities’ that cultivate global policy coordination.

Polynesia in Review: Issues and Events, 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014

Polynesia in Review:Issues and Events, 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 Christina Newport (bio) Reviews of American Sāmoa, Hawai‘i, Niue, Sāmoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Wallis and Futuna are not included in this issue. Cook Islands As the 49th year of Cook Islands “self-governing” in free association with New Zealand, the period under review has been characterized by a number of political ups and downs, culminating in a snap election with contested results and court action set to determine the outcome. The results highlight the need for reform to address the disparity of the value of a vote across the country. As 2014 is also the International Year of Small Islands Developing States, international and local attention is focused on the country’s development partnerships as it prepares to celebrate its unique form of sovereignty in 2015. Other issues this year revolved around a rollout of tax reforms, marine resources, and the management of the climate change–related drought in the southern group islands. The Cook Islands continues to place priority on climate change and climate-related disaster risks, with a number of southern group islands “dealing with drought-like conditions after months without decent rainfall” (cin, 16 Dec 2013). On Atiu, groundwater supplies were at critically low levels. These problems were further compounded with increased demands expected over the Christmas period and the drought conditions forecast to extend the dry season (cin, 16 Dec 2013). With two water treatment plants and a desalination machine dispatched from Rarotonga, the New Zealand High Commission added its support by supplying one of the solar-powered water-treatment plants as part of a nz$225,000 grant to support the Cook Islands drought response strategy. The strategy includes equipment, training, awareness raising, and water level monitoring and reporting (cin, 31 Jan 2014). On a much larger scale, the nz$60 million Cook Islands Water Partnership, or Te Mato Vai, linked to climate change, is intended to improve water supply and quality on Rarotonga. The initiative will refurbish water intakes, increase water storage and treatment, and replace ring mains and piping (cin, 19 Oct 2013). Funding for the project has been raised, with nz$22 million from the Cook Islands government, a nz$15 million grant from New Zealand, and a nz$23 million concessional loan from the People’s Republic of China. This jointly funded partnership has drawn international attention and is “believed to be a first for the emerging Asian country which has traditionally been known to deliver aid unilaterally” (cin, 12 Sept 2013). Visiting researcher Philippa Brant of the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Australia suggested that because the Pacific faced no current military conflict, the Cook Islands was ideal for Beijing [End Page 251] to test out its new aid strategy while avoiding accusations of self-interest by allowing the Cook Islands and New Zealand to drive the project (cin, 12 Sept 2013). Locally the project also drew attention through public meetings and consultations on the Water Master Plan. With construction due to start on 14 April 2014, a petition with over two thousand signatures was delivered to Parliament seeking to put a stop to the project “until misgivings and shortcomings on the project can be identified and investigated and other options explored,” said James Thomson, spokesman for the Te Mato Vai Petition Committee (cin, 5 April 2014). It was agreed that a Parliamentary Select Committee would be established; however, the project still proceeded. Since the 2011 establishment of the Climate Change Division in the Office of the Prime Minister, a number of initiatives have commenced. A us$5 million Adaptation Fund project facilitated the development of a national climate-change policy. In November 2013, the Kaveinga Tapapa: Climate and Disaster Compatible Development Policy 2013–2016 was launched. In taking an integrated approach, the policy is focused on low-carbon, climate-change–and disaster-resilient development. Prime Minister Henry Puna’s introductory statement notes that the policy, by integrating with existing policy instruments and planning tools, “builds on our existing structures and draws on our capability to lift our game” and its “fundamental message is to prepare today for tomorrow...

G20 and Development

In May 2014, Griffith University and the Lowy Institute for International Policy jointly organized the conference ‘G20 and Development’. This conference brought together academics, policymakers, representatives of the civil society and other development stakeholders to discuss the role of the G20 as a development actor. Four key themes were addressed: ( i) the G20 as a global steering committee: performance and challenges, ( ii) the G20 as a development actor: governance, agenda and accountability, ( iii) mainstreaming development in the G20 agenda and ( iv) G20’s contribution in other development policy areas. This article provides an overview of the discussion around these four themes. JEL Classification: F53, F55, O10

Developing a social psychology of climate change

Pennsylvania State University, USADespite overwhelming consensus among scientists about thereality of anthropogenic climate change (Bray, 2010; Oreskes,2004), there remains significant reluctance on the part ofcitizens and politicians to take the action needed to addressit. This resistance has been repeatedly identified in socialresearch (Leiserowitz & Maibach, 2010; Leviston, Leitch,Greenhill, Leonard, & Walker, 2011; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon,2006; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Reser, Bradley, Glendon,Ellul, & Callaghan, 2012) and is mirrored by the lack of prog-ress made by salient political summits (Rogelj et al., 2010).Perhaps as a response to this, scholarly journals and articlesthat are focused on climate change are growing. Naturalscientists tell us that we know what needs to be done to avertdangerous climate change (IPCC, 2014), and economists tellus that delaying action in the short term will lead to muchgreater costs in the long term (Stern, 2007). Understandingpublic responses to climate change and developing solutionsto catalyse action is a critical challenge for the social sciences,and we propose that the development and elaboration of asocial psychology of climate change would be a cornerstoneof such an approach.We do not make the claim that social psychology has all theanswers but rather that the theories, models and researchmethods of social psychology can provide a powerful arsenalto complement the approaches of other disciplines. Re-searchers have already begun to apply social psychologicaltheory and methods to the issue of climate change, and wehighlight in the following sections examples of the insightsthat have flowed from this. We cannot assume, though, thatour theories and findings will automatically generalise to theclimate change context. As Moser (2010) has noted, thereare unique dimensions to climate change that make it distinctfrom other environmental, risk and health issues: The causesof climate change are invisible to humans, the impacts are dis-tal and it is complex and riddled with uncertainties. Modernurban humans are to some extent insulated from their physicalenvironment, and the lags between the climate and social sys-tems make it difficult for people to understand their role ininfluencing climate.These factors suggest the importance of developing a socialpsychology of climate change, empirically testing, integratingand refining existing theories and models to develop newframeworks. The notion that psychology can play a role inunderstanding and addressing climate change is not a newone. The American Psychological Association’s Task Forceon the interface between psychology and global climatechange comprehensively detailed the ways in which psycho-logical research can help to understand people’s perceptionsof the risks of climate change, the contribution of human be-haviour to climate change, the psychosocial impacts of climatechange, the ways in which people can adapt and cope withclimate change and the psychological barriers that could limitclimate change action (Swim et al., 2009, 2011).It is also not a new idea that social psychology can play animportant role in understanding and addressing environmentalproblems and solutions (Clayton & Brook, 2005). Social psy-chology, specifically, has a long tradition oftheory andresearchthat is relevant to addressing key climate change questions.Attitudes, social cognition, persuasion and attitude change, so-cial influence, and intragroup and intergroup behaviour, forinstance, are fundamental foci for social psychology and havedirect relevance for understanding the human and social dimen-sionsofclimatechange.Thetimeisripetounderstandtherangeof research that has been developing in social psychology onattitudes, beliefs and actions, to build upon these insights, andintegrate them with knowledge from other sciences to developmodels and theories indigenous to the climate change context.In the following section, we provide a brief overview of re-cent social psychological research that addresses three broadthemes relevant to understanding and responding to climatechange. These themes are as follows: (i) social psychologicalinfluences on climate change attitudes and beliefs; (ii) facilita-tors and barriers to climate change action; and (iii) changingclimate change attitudes and behaviour. Although there issome overlap in these themes, as an organising principle theyintuitively map on to key questions that arise in relation to cli-mate change. Our aim is to highlight recent examples of socialpsychological research that provide interesting and importantinsights in relation to these themes. Swim, Markowitz, andBloodhart (2012) have noted that much of the social psycho-logical research on climate change has emerged since 2006;we focus in on the most recent of this research that has beenpublished since 2010. We also outline how the studies in thespecial issue relate to these themes. We recognise that theseare not the only areas where social psychological researchand theory can make important contributions but they never-theless relate to key questions that need to be addressed. Weconclude the introduction by proposing considerations thatsocial psychologists could take into account in their futureresearch on climate change.European Journal of Social Psychology, Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 413–420 (2014)

Indonesia. The roots of terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah. By Solahudin, translated by Dave McRae. Sydney: UNSW Press and Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013. Pp. xx + 236. Notes, Index.

The roots of terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah By SOLAHUDIN, translated by DAVE MCRAE Sydney: UNSW Press and Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013. Pp. xx + 236. Notes, Index. doi: 10.1017/S0022463413000696 This is a valuable book by a well-informed author, translated well and presented in a style that non-specialists and specialists alike will find accessible. Solahudin is a senior journalist who has researched Indonesia's violent terrorist movements since the Bali bombings of 2002. His book was originally published in Indonesian in 2011. The translator, Dave McRae, is now with the Lowy Institute; he holds a Ph.D. from the Australian National University and spent several years in Indonesia with the International Crisis Group and World Bank. His own book on interreligious violence in Poso (A few poorly organised men) has just been published. Solahudin's principal contribution is to set out the ideological and family lines that lead from and link independent Indonesia's first Islamist terrorist movement--the Darul Islam of the 1940s-early '60s--to the extremist groups that have become more prominent since the end of the Soeharto regime in 1998. It is, as the author says, 'a history of the jihadi movement in Indonesia, from Darul Islam through to Jema'ah Islamiyah'. While these links are familiar to specialist scholars, there is, I think, no other book-scale discussion that sets them out as clearly as Solahudin does here. By following both the people and the ideas, Solahudin fills a gap in the literature. The book seeks the deeper roots of Salafism and jihadism in Islamic tradition, reaching back to Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328). In Indonesia, the story begins with the Padri movement in West Sumatra over two centuries ago, from which Solahudin quickly moves to the reformist movements of the early twentieth century. This earlier history is a small part of the book, but an important one, for it reminds readers that the ideas that motivate extremists are not something recent, that they have roots in religious thinking which is validated by a long history--as, of course, are the contending Islamic traditions that reject such interpretations. There are inherent risks in writing about such a topic, for this is a field plagued by secrecy, misinformation, and disinformation. Solahudin relies on a wide range of sources, including interrogations of captured individuals and interviews with major players. The book is about clandestine, violent movements that engage in criminality and mayhem, whose enemies include repressive governments and their agents (who sometimes infiltrate or befriend terrorist groups if it suits them)--including police of legendary levels of corruption and brutality--the records of whose interrogations are subject to grave doubts about their veracity and the likelihood of whose interviews being candid and reliable must be doubtful. …

Prague as the Nonproliferation Pivot

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Paul Bracken, “The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age,” Orbis 47, no. 3 (Summer 2003): pages 399–413. 2. Paul Bracken, “The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age,” Orbis 47, no. 3 (Summer 2003): pages 399–413. 3. See for example, Harald Muller, “Between Power and Justice: Current Problems and Perspectives of the NPT Regime,” Strategic Analysis 34, no. 2 (2010), pp. 189–201, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700160903542740; K. Subrahmanyam, “Elimination or Irrelevance”, Arms Control Today, June 2008, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2936; Alexander Nikitin, ed., Lessons to be Learned from Non-proliferation Failures and Successes (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009); Tanya Ogilvie-White and David Santoro, eds., Slaying the Nuclear Dragon: Disarmament Dynamics in the Twenty-First Century (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2012). 4. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” (Prague, April 5, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered. 5. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.htmlShare. 6. Josef Joffe and James W. Davis, “Less Than Zero: Bursting the New Disarmament Bubble,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 1 (January/February 2011): page 8; for a considered and agnostic view on the linkage, see Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation: Examining the Linkage Argument,” International Security 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012-13): pages 92–132. 7. See the text of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton in May 1998 after India conducted nuclear tests; “Indian's Letter to Clinton on the Nuclear Testing,” New York Times, May 13, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/nuclear-anxiety-indian-s-letter-to-clinton-on-the-nuclear-testing.html. 8. For a comprehensive American essay on this issue, and responses from the nonaligned world, see Steven E. Miller, Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2012). 9. For early and critical insights, see Steven E. Miller, “Skepticism Triumphant: The Bush Administration and the Waning of Arms Control,” La Revue Internationale et Strategique, (May 2003), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/miller_paris.pdf. 10. For further discussion, see Robert Ayson, “Arms control in Asia: yesterday's concept for today's region,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 67, no. 1, (2013), pp. 1–17; Lavina Lee, “Beyond Symbolism: The U.S. Nuclear Disarmament Agenda and its Implications for Chinese and Indian Nuclear Policy,” CATO Policy Briefing, No. 91 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, February 2011); Andrew O'Neil, “Extended Nuclear Deterrence in East Asia: Redundant or Resurgent?” International Affairs 87, no. 6 (November 2011), pp. 1439–1457. 11. John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism From Hiroshima to al Qaeda, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 12. Robert H. Johnson, Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After, (New York: St. Mrtin's Press, 1994). 13. Francis J. Gavin, “Same as it ever was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation and the Cold War,” International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/2010): page 9. 14. President Barack Obama, “Inaugural Address,” (speech, Washington, D.C., January 20, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address. 15. For a discussion see David E. Hoffman, “Is nuclear arms control dead?” Foreign Policy, January 22, 2013, http://hoffman.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/22/is_nuclear_arms_control_dead. 16. Rory Medcalf and Fiona Cunningham, eds, Disarming Doubt: The Future of Extended Deterrence in East Asia, (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2012): page 13. Additional informationNotes on contributorsC. Raja MohanC. Raja Mohan heads the Strategic Studies Program at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, is adjunct professor at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, and is a non-resident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. He is also a member of TWQ's editorial board

Lebanon: The Chimera of a Shi'a ‘Third Way’

50 *Rodger Shanahan is a non-resident fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy and the author of Clans, Parties and Clerics: the Shi‘a of Lebanon. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXXVI, No.3 Spring 2013 Lebanon: The Chimera of a Shi’a ‘Third Way’ Rodger Shanahan* As the wave of popular protests and armed uprisings in the Arab world reshapes regional politics, Iran’s influence in the Levant is coming under enormous pressure as the Assad regime looks increasingly unable to better the armed opposition. But those who see a post-Ba‘athist Damascus as the prelude to the isolation, if not demise of Hizbullah, will be disappointed. Both Lebanese domestic politics and Hizbullah’s role within it are complex, and thoughts of a sudden shifting of support away from the Shi‘a Muslim party by its base because of greater regional demands for political plurality misreads the domestic context within which the Party of God operates. Of course, a post-Assad world is of concern to Hizbullah for several reasons. Syria has provided key logistic resupply routes and the diplomatic, and intelligence and security resources that only a friendly neighboring state can bring to bear. That having been said, the porous Lebanon/Syria border and Hizbullah influence over Rafiq Hariri airport’s security apparatus mean that a great deal of the logistic support could continue although the heavier weaponry would be more difficult to move. Assad’s fall could also reduce Hizbullah’s decisive martial edge over its political rivals. External training and logistic support from a Sunni-aligned Syrian government to the March 14 bloc or independent Sunni groups, or even the tacit acceptance of its conduct on Syrian soil could markedly improve the opposition’s militia capability. A situation which has something resembling military parity between political groupings could destabilize the country, but a Hizbullah less sure of the cost to itself of armed action may also result in a party more likely to countenance negotiated settlements than is currently the case. Finally, the removal of Syrian ‘Alawite support to Hizbullah could embolden Sunni and Christian political opponents of Hizbullah to act more 51 coherently and decisively as a means of pressuring the party into making concessions. This pressure could include courting Hizbullah’s political allies who may sense the winds of opportunity blowing away from Hizbullah, providing more public support to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in its prosecution of Hizbullah members for their alleged parts in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, or forcing a cabinet confrontation with the Hizbullah-aligned government in order to make their tenure completely ineffective, in much the same way that Hizbullah did the Siniora government. But the reality of Hizbullah becoming marginalized in a post-Assad world should not be overestimated, given that Hizbullah’s unique position makes it less susceptible to outside forces than many give it credit for. Its key strengths remain impressive—strong domestic communal support and lack of any communal alternative, and ideological and financial links with Iran that are deeper, and of more importance to its long-term survival than its mutually supportive relationship with the Assad regime. The party remains popular with large sections of the Lebanese Shi‘a community, particularly in the south, the southern suburbs of Beirut and the Biqa‘. Hizbullah’s core supporters are appreciative of the role the Party of God has played in moving the Shi‘a community from the periphery to the center of Lebanese political power. The manner in which this political rise has been achieved however has meant that attitudes towards the party have become increasingly polarized amongst and between Lebanon’s complex myriad of sectarian communities. There is a growing feeling amongst many non-Shi‘a (along with some Shi‘a) Lebanese, that Hizbullah regards itself as being beyond the rules of domestic political or legal accountability and too willing to resort to force, or the threat of it, to protect or advance its own interests. Their takeover of west Beirut in 2008, as well as threats against those involved in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon indictments, are cases in point. For all the concerns about the power...

China as a rising world power: Chinese press discourses

Surveys conducted by the BBC World Service, the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Australia, and the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada have revealed that China is perceived as an increasin...