Lower Dividend Payout Research Articles

Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance dan Investment Opportunity Set terhadap Kebijakan Dividen

Good Corporate Governance (GCG) is a guarantee that comes from the control system in a company which can be seen from the procedures of the independent board of commissioners (DKI), institutional ownership (KI), managerial ownership (KM), and audit committee (KA). Good governance can indicate that the company is able to ensure good management of the company's finances. Investment Opportunity Set is the value of the company which depends on the costs set by management for the future. If a company has many profitable investment opportunities, this will likely lead to a low dividend payout ratio. The population of this study was 84 food and beverage companies registered on the IDX. The sampling technique used was purposive sampling. The analysis technique used in this research is multiple linear regression. The results of this research show that managerial ownership, institutional ownership, audit committee, and investment opportunity set have a positive effect on dividend policy. Meanwhile, the board of commissioners has a negative influence on dividend policy. Further research can develop this research by using other variables which theoretically have an influence on dividend policy

The Life Cycle And Dividend Premium Toward Dividend-Paying Behavior In Manufacturing Sector Companies

This study aims to determine the independent variables that are able to predict dividend payment behavior and prove the occurrence of dividend catering theory in manufacturing companies that are in the growth phase. In determining the research sample, the researcher used purposive sampling. The number of samples in this study were 7 manufacturing companies with a total of 92 observations during 2015 – 2019. This study uses multinomial logistic regression analysis on SPSS 25. The results show that the dividend premium and profitability variables get positive and significant values in the high dividend payout model. as well as low dividend payout models. While the firm size variable gets a positive and significant value in the high dividend payout model, it does not get a significant value in the low dividend payout model. This means that in the high dividend payout model, the variables of premium dividends, profitability, and firm size are able to predict the behavior of dividend payments in manufacturing companies that are in the growth phase. However, in the low dividend payout model, only the dividend premium and profitability variables are able to predict the behavior of dividend payments in manufacturing companies that are in the growth phase. The results also prove that the dividend catering theory is proven to occur in manufacturing companies that are in the growth phase of 2015 – 2019.

Investment in the context of financial constraints: A case of Vietnamese listed firms

To consider investment in the context of financial constraints, this study focuses on analysing the sensitivity of investment to internal funds (cash flow) to examine the impact of financial constraints on investment by Vietnamese enterprises as well as supporting evidence that the financial market is imperfect. Using data from financial statements and market data of 306 enterprises listed on the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange, the authors find that Vietnamese listed firms have to face with many financial constraints due to investment dependence on the availability of internal finance. In particular, the firms with low dividend payout and high KZ (Kaplan & Zingales) index do exhibit higher sensitivity coefficients of investment to internal funds than those with high dividend payout firms and low KZ index. The findings imply that the sensitivity of investment to internal funds varies across the degree of financial constraints of firms, and financial constraints are considered a barrier to investment of the Vietnamese enterprises.

The effect of skilled labor intensity on corporate dividend payouts

AbstractThis study shows that skilled labor‐intensive firms have lower dividend payouts. A one standard deviation increase in skilled labor intensity on average results in a 0.74 percentage point decline in the propensity to pay dividends and a 0.72 percentage point decrease in the dividend payout ratio. Our evidence suggests that greater labor adjustment costs (LACs) of skilled labor increase future cash flow uncertainty, which discourages managers from paying dividends. Consistently, we find that an exogenous increase (decrease) in LACs following the shock of 2017 H‐1B policy changes (the shock of 2005 Hurricane Katrina) leads treated firms to lower (heighten) their dividend payouts. Collectively, these findings indicate a strong dampening effect of LACs on corporate dividend payouts.

Does strengthening large shareholders’ cash flow rights reduce their expropriation motivation? Evidence from China’s dividend tax reforms

According to classic corporate governance theory, strengthening large shareholders’ cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders. However, due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China, large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends. They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights. An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’ cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase. However, when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder, expropriation activities ease significantly.

Dividend policy and religion: International evidence from firms with Islamic Label

This paper builds on prior research and argues that religion, as an informal cultural institution, may impose constraints on corporations. The framework of Shariah-compliant firms presents a unique opportunity to investigate this assertion and checks whether firms with Islamic label pay out more or less dividend. Since Islamic Law narrows the investment opportunity sets for Shariah-compliant firms, one would expect Shariah-compliant firms to pay out more dividends to shareholders (investment constraint hypothesis). On the other hand, the prohibition of interest-bearing financing, make of retained earnings an appealing alternative to finance projects, hence resulting in lower dividend payouts (financing constraint hypothesis). Tests on a sample of 13,249 firm-year observations from 17 Islamic countries support the investment constraint hypothesis: Shariah-compliant firms pay out more dividends than non-Shariah compliant ones. Our results are robust to various specifications and after controlling for different variables and addressing potential endogeneity concerns.

The Impact of Minority Shareholder Protection and Atomization of Shareholder Base on the Nonoperating Activities of Firms

In the presence of strong minority shareholder protection mechanisms, shareholders may become placid and even inattentive with regards to their firms’ nonoperating activities in the hope that those mechanisms serve to assure agents’ incentive compatibility. Relying on a cross-country panel database, the paper evidences that a stronger minority shareholder protection at the country level is associated with larger firm-level long-term nonoperating investments, higher share of nonoperating investment incomes in the firms’ bottom line, and relatively larger acquisitions. At the company level, the implementation of stronger minority shareholder protection mechanisms, like internal policies favoring shareholder engagement and equality of voting rights, is documented to result in higher reliance on nonoperating incomes, larger acquisitions, higher cash reserves and lower dividend payouts. At the same time, the atomization of shareholder base appears to reduce the effectiveness of nonoperating activities as the firms with a larger shareholder base tend to hold more long-term investments while concomitantly recording lower investment incomes. In contrast, higher shareholder diversification is shown to be associated with lower cash holdings and higher dividend payouts. Overall, while being attentive to cash management and dividend policies, minority shareholders seem to be excessively forbearing with regards to the use of the bulk of nonoperating assets.

Growth Opportunities, Capital Structure and Dividend Policy in Emerging Market: Indonesia Case Study

The objective of the study is to investigate the effect of growth opportunities on capital structure and dividend policy in Indonesia. The study employs panel data of companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange that distribute dividends from 2007 to 2017. Fixed and random effect regression models are used. Findings based on growth opportunities on capital structure and dividend policy in Indonesia are in line with the existing theory (i.e., contracting theory). Growth opportunities have a significant negative correlation with debt ratio and dividend yield, which suggests that firms with high growth opportunities are discouraged to generate debt to resolve underinvestment and asset-substitution problem. Firms with more investment opportunities tend to adopt a low dividend payout policy because the cash flows will be used up for investment. The positive impact of firm size on leverage is due to the low bankruptcy risk and cost of a large company. Profitability has a positive impact on the dividend policy because profitable companies can reserve larger free cash flows and, thus, pay higher dividends. The positive influence of ownership on leverage is interpreted by the unwillingness of majority stockholders to commit to equity financing in order to avoid reducing the ownership and preserve control of the company.

Apathy of Malawian Indigenous Citizens on Capital Markets

Capital markets are catalysts for economic growth and wealth creation for both investors and investees. Vibrancy of capital markets comes in when demand and supply of capital is high. That is, investors’ returns are attractive and the investees’ objectives of accessing cheaper capital are met. The free-market economy principles should therefore be basis of capital markets to dictate both and equity and debt instruments. Malawi’s capital market is still at an infancy stage despite being operational for about twenty five years. Critical evaluation reveals that this could be attributed to the fact that it is wholly owned by government and the central bank continues to roll out policies which might not be in line with the demand and supply tenets. The results of this study indicate that equity instruments market is not ideal for indigenous citizens in view of the low dividend payouts, meager capital gains and weak laws to protect insignificant numerous minority shareholders. On the other hand, the debt instruments market despite being inactive with weak secondary market, provides meaningful returns to investors and could be a good source for long-term cheap capital for companies and government agencies such as state owned entities, local authorities and other quasi bodies. There is need provide civic education to indigenous people to invest in municipal bonds for capital projects such as roads, schools, hospitals rather than borrow from development partners and other lenders.

DIVIDEND PAYOUTS: MAJORITY CONTROL AND RENT EXTRACTION

In Eurasia, Turkey has a “crony” capitalist system with majority control and business groups (BGs) in the hands of a few families. These business groups are often organised around a holding company. We analyse the dividend payouts of family controlled Borsa Istanbul companies, which are affiliated to holding and non-holding BGs. We investigate and quantify the effects of several control-enhancing mechanisms (CEMs) on dividend payouts. We use precise quantitative proxies for CEMs to measure the divergence between control and ownership rights. Supporting the rent extraction hypothesis, holding business group companies have lower dividend payouts as the divergence between control and ownership rights widens and the pyramid wedge increases. However, controlling foreign-family coalitions in holding business group companies curb the rent extraction problem by having a positive effect on the dividend payouts. Overall, for family controlled holding BG companies, the effects of company-specific financial control variables on dividend payouts are stronger than the effects of CEMs. For family controlled non-holding BG companies, there is no empirical support for either the rent extraction or the reputation building hypotheses. The company-specific financial control variables are the main determinants of dividend payouts for family controlled non-holding BG companies.

The Role Of Cash Holdings, Working Capital, Dividend Payout On Capital Investment

An objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between firms' capital investment spending, cash holdings, and working capital in an expanding Asian financial market. A sample of publicly traded manufacturing firms on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange was examined during the period 2005-2014. The empirical results provide strong and statistically significant evidence on the effect of cash flow on investment. Working capital also exhibits significant relationship with capital investment spending, though the relationship is not as strong and significant as that with cash flow and cash holding. Firms with low dividend payout policy over the sample period depended heavily on cash flow, changes in cash flow and, to a lesser extent, on working capital to finance spending on fixed plant and equipment. These results suggest that the effect of capital investment spending financed by internal cash flow on firm value may depend on a firm's dividend payout.

The mediating effect of dividend payout on the relationship between internal governance and free cash flow

PurposeThis paper aims to examine the mediating effect of dividend payout on the relationship between internal governance mechanisms (board of directors and ownership structure) and the free cash flow level.Design/methodology/approachLinear regression models are used to investigate such relationships applying data from a sample of 207 non-financial firms listed on the Gulf Cooperation Council countries’ stock markets between 2009 and 2016. To test the significance of mediating effect, the author uses the Sobel test.FindingsThe author finds a partial mediation effect of dividend on the relationship between both board independence and managerial ownership and the level of free cash flow. The results confirm the major role of outside directors in corporate governance. This governance mechanism contributes to the protection of shareholders’ interests through a generous dividend policy. However, the author finds that large managerial shareholdings increase the level of free cash flow through lower dividend payouts. This result suggests that powerful managers follow their preference of retaining excess cash to their own interests.Practical implicationsThis paper offers insights to policy-makers of emerging economies interested in the development of the corporate governance. This study provides guidance for firms in the construction and implementation of their own corporate governance policies.Originality/valueThe main contribution of the present paper is to examine the dividend payout as a potential mediating variable between internal governance mechanisms and free cash flow. Moreover, it highlights the issue of efficient management of substantial funds in Sharia-compliant and non-Sharia-compliant firms.

Ownership Concentration, Dividend Payout and Firm Performance: The Case of Malaysia

This study examines how ownership concentration affects dividend payout, and ultimately firm performance. Regression analyses are performed on a dataset spanning 11 years (2005-2015) among Malaysian publicly listed firms. The results show that shareholders with concentrated ownership play an important role in determining dividend payout and driving firm performance. Specifically, ownership concentration is associated with low dividend payout, but it improves firm performance. Overall, this study suggests that ownership concentration may also be an effective monitoring mechanism.

Are Family Firms Good Employers?

Family firms employ about 60 percent of the global workforce. While it is widely assumed that they are good employers, data about their conduct is mixed. In this study, we extend stewardship and agency theories to test competing propositions about the impact of family on employment practices using data from 14,961 private Belgian firms over a 19-year period. Higher investments, lower dividend payout, and higher risk tolerance indicate that family firms are better financial stewards of their companies than nonfamily firms. However, family firms are worse organizational stewards than nonfamily firms: They offer lower compensation, invest less in employee training, and exhibit higher voluntary turnover and lower labor productivity. Further, and contrary to earlier research, we find that financial practices in private family firms do not change over time, and that the deleterious influence of family on employment practices rises with both firm age and with heightened family involvement. Together, our findings suggest that a more nuanced understanding of stewardship and agency theory is needed to understand the impact of family on the governance of private firms.

Managerial decision horizon and real estate investment trusts (REITs)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of managerial decision horizon (MDH) on real estate investment trust (REIT) behavior and performance.Design/methodology/approachIn this study, the authors expand the number of proxies and measure managerial horizon by CEO age, CEO tenure, cash compensation relative to total compensation, and the amount of vested equity-based compensation to total compensation. To avoid potential measurement error, the authors compute the average ranking score of the four individual measures to determine the overall MDH of a CEO. Cross-sectional time series regressions are then performed on the effects of CEO MDH on REIT policies and performance. The authors also examine if the effect of myopic MDH can be mitigated by good corporate governance. For robustness purpose, the authors also compare the effects of age-related MDH and compensation-related MDH.FindingsThe results show that REITs managed by CEOs with short MDHs have lower levels of asset growth and a lower standard deviation of return on assets. These REITs also have lower debt levels, lower dividend payouts, and hold more cash. The results suggest that short-horizon CEOs have incentives to lower investment risk, default risk, and liquidity risk at the firm level in order to protect personal benefits. CEOs with a short horizon also have a negative impact on REIT performance. The results also show that CEO compensation-related horizon problems are mitigated by corporate governance, but CEO age-related horizon problems are significant and persistent. The results suggest that age-related behavioral biases of the CEO are important determinants of corporate decisions.Practical implicationsThe results of this study suggest that the managerial behavioral biases should be considered in understanding firm behavior.Originality/valueThis is the first study that examines the effects of MDH on REIT behavior and performance. The unique regulatory environment of REITs makes them less susceptible to agency problems of free cash flow and thus provides a clearer picture of the effect of MDH. Prior studies focus on the effect of managerial horizon on firm investment activity, this study expands the scope to examine the effects on investment and financial policies. In addition, this study adds to the literature by showing that the effect of age-related horizon problems may not be mitigated by good corporate governance.

Do Co-Opted Directors Influence Dividend Policy?

We explore how co-opted directors affect dividend policy. Co-opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office. Our results show that co-opted directors lead to a weaker propensity to pay dividends and, for dividend-paying firms, significantly lower dividend payouts. We also show that board co-option has more explanatory power for dividend policy than does the traditional measure of board effectiveness, that is, board independence. Exploiting the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a natural experiment, we show that the effect of board co-option on dividend policy is more likely causal, rather than merely an association.

MUATAN INFORMASI (INFORMATION CONTENTS) DARI KEBIJAKAN DIVIDEN

This article has objective to describe information content of dividend policy, especially to foretell earnings growth. It has been oberved that an increase in the price of a stock, while a dividend cut generally leads to a stock price decline. However, many market observers point to the very high fraction of earnings retained (or low dividend payout ratio) as a sign that future earnings growth will be well above historical norm. In the real world, many complications exist that could confound the expected inverse relationship between current payouts and future earnings growth.Keywords: dividend policy, earnings growth, payout ratio

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Profiles, Stock Returns, and Financial Policy: Australian Evidence

AbstractThis study investigates the independent effects of environmental (E), social (S), corporate governance (G), and the composite ESG ratings on stock returns and corporate financing decisions of the largest stocks in the Australian equity market. Firms with high composite ESG ratings tend to increase their leverage. For the individual ratings, we find different inferences: firms with low E and high G ratings tend to raise less debt. Firms with high G ratings hold less cash, while those with low G ratings have lower dividend payouts. S ratings have no impact on corporate financing decisions. There appears to be no significant difference in risk‐adjusted returns for portfolios based on ESG ratings, effectively indicating that there is no cost of ESG investment.

Banks and capital requirements: Channels of adjustment

Bank capital ratios have increased steadily since the financial crisis. For a sample of 101 large banks from advanced and emerging economies, retained earnings account for the bulk of their higher risk-weighted capital ratios, with reductions in risk weights playing a lesser role. On average, banks continued to expand their lending in real terms, though lending contracted among European banks. Lower dividend payouts and (for advanced economy banks) wider lending spreads have contributed to banks’ ability to use retained earnings to build capital. Banks that came out of the crisis with higher capital ratios and stronger profitability were able to expand lending more.

Shareholder Protection, Ownership, and Dividends: Russian Evidence

ABSTRACTThis article investigates the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and dividend policy in Russian firms. Using a sample of Russian listed firms over the period 1998–2003, we estimate models for dividend pay probability and payout size. We find that there has been a significant increase in dividend payout levels which coincide with improvements in legal shareholder protection. State controlled firms are more frequent dividend payers as compared to other majority owned firms. We also find that dual share firms, in which corporate charters protect minority interests, have a higher dividend pay probability; while firms reporting according to US GAAP, which may be less likely to manipulate earnings, have a lower dividend payout.