Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate how changes in the firm's information disclosure practices impact the way investors process macroeconomic news. Specifically, the authors examine the role of derivative instruments and hedging activities disclosure, as required by SFAS 133, in shaping invertors response to good and bad interest rate news. In addition, the authors examine whether the effect of SFAS 133 on investors' response to good and bad interest rate news varies between firms with higher and lower earnings volatility.Design/methodology/approach This study uses data on all US public firms over the period from 1990 to 2019. The authors mainly apply multivariate regression and a difference-in-difference approach to test their hypotheses.Findings The results show a significant decrease in the asymmetry of responses to good and bad interest rate news for users of interest rate derivatives following the adoption of SFAS 133. However, in contrast to this finding, the authors also find that the adoption of SFAS 133 has no impact on the asymmetry of responses to good and bad interest rate news for nonusers of interest rate derivatives. Consistent with the ambiguity theory, the finding suggests that SFAS 133 indeed decreases investors’ uncertainty (ambiguity) about the cash flow implications of changes in the interest rate. The authors also find that the decrease in the asymmetry of response to good and bad interest rate news after the adoption of SFAS 133 is greater for users of interest rate derivatives with higher than lower earnings volatility. This implies that derivatives and hedging activities disclosure, as required by SFAS 133, are more important for firms with higher than lower earnings volatility. The finding is consistent with the idea that investors demand more accounting information when underlying earnings volatility is higher. In a set of additional analyses, the authors find that the effect of SFAS 133 on investors' response to good and bad interest rate news varies depending on the level of analyst coverage and interest rate exposure. Specifically, the authors find that the decrease in the asymmetry of response to good and bad interest rate news after the adoption of SFAS 133 is greater for users of interest rate derivatives with higher interest rate exposure and lower analyst coverage.Practical implications The findings of this study help market participants including regulators and standard setters to understand the impact of mandatory disclosure practices on investors' reaction to macroeconomic news. Moreover, the findings of the study help managers to understand the influence firm-specific characteristics (e.g. earnings volatility, analyst coverage and interest rates exposure) on the effectiveness of mandatory derivative instruments and hedging activities disclosure.Originality/value To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first paper to explore how firm-specific information environment affects the way investors process macroeconomic news. This study contributes to the literature by providing the empirical evidence that derivatives instruments and hedging activities, as required by SFAS 133, affect investors' response to good and bad interest rate news. In doing so, the results provide insights about how firm-specific information environment affects the way investors process macroeconomic news. This study shows that the cross-sectional variation in earnings volatility, analysts’ coverage and interest rate exposure affects the impact of SFAS 133 on investors' response to good and bad interest rate news. The findings are not only the notable addition to the existing literature on the topic but also can aid to market participants including policy makers, regulators, standard setters and managers to understand the influence of firm-specific characteristics on the effectiveness of mandatory derivative instruments and hedging activities disclosure. Finally, the findings contribute to the general debate about the effectiveness of SFAS 133 by showing that the adoption of SFAS 133 indeed decreases information ambiguity.