Low Nuptiality Research Articles

"Greater Numbers of Fair and Lovely Women": White Women and the Barbadian Demographic Crisis, 1673–1715

In Sugar and Slaves, Richard Dunn used the 1680 census of Barbados to depict the island as a place where stunted population growth and brittle bonds of community plagued the island's white settler society. Dunn attributed Barbados's demographic disruption to low marriage and nuptiality rates. However, by reexamining population reports from Barbados between 1673 and 1715, "Greater Numbers of Fair and Lovely Women" reveals that low nuptiality and birth rates were symptoms of a greater problem: Barbados was hemorrhaging white men. Between 1673 and 1715, the number of white women and children on Barbados remained stable, while more than four thousand men drained from the colony. This new demographic analysis of late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Barbados explores how white women came to form the foundation of their communities as white men left the island to seek new opportunities. Despite Barbados's reputation as a masculine and exploitative space largely bereft of the "civilizing" influence of white women and families, by the turn of the eighteenth century, the preservation of Barbados's settler society had fallen almost entirely to white women.

Malthus's missing women and children: demography and wages in historical perspective, England 1280-1850

Abstract Malthus believed that rising real wages encouraged earlier marriage, higher fertility and a growing population. But diminishing returns in agriculture meant that an organic economy could not keep pace. Excess labour and rising food prices drove wages down and brought population growth to a halt. Studies testing this hypothesis have focussed on the relationship between population growth and men's wages, typically overlooking women and children's economic activities and influence on demographic outcomes. New daily and annual wage series, including women and children, enable these missing actors to be incorporated into a more complete account of Malthus's hypothesis. New findings emerge: the demographic reaction to wage changes was gendered. Early-modern bachelors responded to rising male wages by marrying earlier, whereas spinsters responded to rising female wages by delaying marriage. Our evidence suggests that women played a key role in England's low-fertility demographic regime and escape from the Malthusian trap. More tentatively, we consider the demographic regime in medieval England. Although marriage was related to earnings, the size of the population was a forceful determinant of economic outcomes. While superficially similar in terms of the prevalence of late marriage and low nuptiality, this regime was consolidated by poverty and social control absent the female agency of the later era.

Residence patterns of the elderly in early eighteenth-century Iceland

In this article the 1703 Icelandic census is used to shed light on the living arrangements of the elderly during a period of harsh climatic and social conditions. The census is unique in the sense that it includes an entire population of a country at an early date. It was taken on the initiative of the authorities in Denmark with the objective of examining the dire conditions of the Icelandic population and, in particular, assessing the number of paupers and vagrants. The census therefore provides interesting possibilities to analyse the situation of the most vulnerable groups of the society. In a society with low nuptiality rates and a low sex ratio, the risk of becoming dependent on poor relief increased with age. Elderly persons who were not able to retire in the household of an offspring ran the risk of spending their last years as paupers. In the 75 and older age group, no less than 43.5% of women were in the position of a pauper. In line with other recent studies on intergenerational co-residence, this study indicates that the elderly preferred to co-reside with their offspring. Even though elderly couples preferred to remain in the position of head of household, most would co-reside with their children. As regards widowed persons, there were noticeable differences between elderly men and women. Elderly widows were thus more likely than widowers to resign from headship on entering widowhood in order to retire in the household of one of an offspring.

Fertility Determinants and Economic Uncertainty: An Assessment Using European Panel Data

This study examined the determinants of fertility, using panel data for 27 European countries. We employed panel co-integration to estimate fertility as function of demographic and economic variables. We showed that low fertility in most industrialized countries in Europe is due to low infant mortality rates, high female employment, low nuptiality rate, and high opportunity cost of having children. Using two measures of economic uncertainty, which are associated with labor market decisions—a production (an output) volatility measure and the unemployment rate—we examined to what extent economic insecurities affect fertility decisions. The empirical results showed that both measures of economic uncertainty have a significant negative impact on fertility implying that labor market insecurities might be a significant factor affecting fertility decisions.

Fertility Determinants and Economic Uncertainty: An Assessment Using European Panel Data

This paper examines the determinants of fertility, using panel data for twenty-seven European countries. We employ panel co-integration to estimate fertility as function of demographic and economic variables. We show that low fertility in most industrialized countries in Europe is due to low infant mortality rates, high female employment, low nuptiality rate and high opportunity cost of having children. Using two measures of economic uncertainty, which are associated with labor market decisions - a production (an output) volatility measure and the unemployment rate - we examine to what extent economic insecurities affect fertility decisions. The empirical results show that both measures of economic uncertainty have a significant negative impact on fertility implying that labor market insecurities might be a significant factor affecting fertility decisions.

Portuguese Fertility Transition and the Multiple Response System

This research analyzes the Portuguese fertility transition combining Davis’s multiphasic response perspective with Friedlander’s system of multiples responses. Interaction between fertility decline and traditional mechanisms of population growth control (the European marriage pattern and out-migration) is the main basis on which to explore Portuguese demography between 1920 and 1960. A geographical approach shows an association among high marital fertility, emigration, and low nuptiality; a chronological perspective reveals that migration has an increasing trend until fertility transition began and that female nuptiality remains low during this period and afterward. The multiple response perspective stresses path diversity during fertility transitions. Econometric models for regional diversity during fertility transition show migration and nuptiality importance in the Portuguese case. A comparative analysis confirms this idea for Spain, Italy, and Germany.

On the Decline of Marriage in Rural Ireland 1851–1911: The Role of Ecological Constraints and/or Developing Philopatry

The proportion of people who never married and the age at first marriage increased in rural Ireland after the famine (1845–1847). In 1851, 11% of the population were never married at 45–54 years and this percentage increased steadily over time to 34% for men and 25% for women in 1936. The period from 1851 to 1911 was marked by economic progress, and despite some bad years, production, incomes and standards of living increased steadily. Ownership of land, passing from landlord to tennant, thus fixed the population to specific geographic locations and made the rural population increasingly philopatric. The Ecological Constraints Hypotheses (E.C.H.). has been used to explain the low marriage rate. It asserts that delayed dispersal and reproduction are caused by constraints such as a lack of access to resources such as land or mates. However in rural Ireland, wealthy heads of households were more likely to be celibate than occupiers of small holdings. The low nuptiality that developed after the famine appeared first in the more prosperous parts of Ireland and was accompanied by a substantial rise in living standards. The increasingly secure tie after the famine between the rural population and its geographic location reflected a new ecological situation which facilitated a change in reproductive strategy that was characterised by delayed marriage and an increase in celibacy. This strategy is adaptive in a stable ecology without major threats to survival. The data are consistent with evidence from animals and human populations showing associations in a stable ecology between long life expectancy, low population turnover and low fecundity, yet a rate of reproduction that is sufficient to maintain the population in its environment.

Religion and Fertility in the Outer Hebrides

Estimates of fertility in Protestant Barra and Catholic Harris, islands in the Outer Hebrides, over the period 1856-1985, show that in both islands fertility declined, although marital fertility was generally greater than in Scotland as a whole, and illegitimate fertility was less. However, in Barra during 1966-75 there were pronounced rises in all the indices; illegitimate fertility showed the smallest rise. The publication of the papal encyclical Humanae Vitae may have played a part in this change in fertility, although other, probably local, factors must have been acting, as the first rise in numbers of births occurred before the publication of the encyclical. Other than this transient rise, the religious difference between Harris and Barra had little effect on changes in fertility over the whole period. Indices of proportions married showed declines until after World War 2, followed by steep increases. The marked decline in fertility in both islands may be due in part to this low nuptiality. In addition, a trend of occupation away from traditional crofting and fishing towards more skilled mercantile and professional employment may have played a role.

High fertility, high emigration, low nuptiality: adjustment processes in Scotland's demographic experience, 1861-1914, Part II.

High fertility, high emigration, low nuptiality: adjustment processes in Scotland's demographic experience, 1861-1914, Part II.

High fertility, high emigration, low nuptiality: adjustment processes in Scotland's demographic experience, 1861-1914, Part I.

This paper, which is published in two parts, explores the interrelationships between nuptiality, marital fertility, and migration in Scotland during the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In Part I the pervasiveness and persistence of the differences between demographic experiences in Scotland and England is explored. Though overall fertility was roughly the same, across most of the country nuptiality was significantly lower in Scotland than in England, and marital fertility was markedly higher. Population growth in Scotland was slower mainly because loss of population through migration was so widespread. Within Scotland, regional contrasts were very apparent and these are shown at parish level by maps of population change for 1861–1911, of population loss through migration for 1861–1871, and of I m and I g for years centred on 1881, 1901, and 1911. In Part II of the paper (to be published in the next issue), explanations are offered for these regional differences and also for the marked contrasts between the demographic experiences of England and Scotland in this period.

The British Depression and Nuptiality: 1873-1896

Variation in nuptiality levels in England and Wales between the 1870s-1890s are explained by socioeconomic variables: the unemployment rate % indoor pauperism marriage market and migration rates (R2=.64). 50% of the variance in marriage rates is explained by unemployment 12% by indoor pauperism and a much less significant amount for the marriage market. Analysis was based on cross sectional data by 578 districts on sex and marital status for selected age groups population growth and natural increase and occupational-industrial distributions for 1861 and 1971. Time series of national data were obtained on the change in the marriage rates sex ratio levels (marriage market) the change in the rate of unemployment and the change in the proportion of indoor pauperism. Unemployment data were based on trade union skilled workers. The nuptiality pattern using the Coale index Im showed a decline of almost 6%. The crude marriage rate declined by 3%. The proportion of males ever married declined by 3% and females by 4.5% and the proportion of 20-24 years total ever married declined by 25%. Marriage age increased beginning in the 1880s without an increase in marriage. The crude marriage rates between 1801-1960 and Coales nuptiality index for 1851-1960 are described. Increases opportunities for women and migration are ruled out as an explanation for marriage postponement. The changes affected only minority of women in the 1870s and 1880s. Demographic changes in age structure among most districts did change between 1871-1911 but the marriage market became more favorable. The decline in the feasibility of marriage based on sufficient financial resources is a more plausible explanation. The transition from agriculture to other economic activity that had been ongoing was offset by the Great Depression characterizing this period. In an equation which controls for changes per the Dixon model in the marriage market the contribution of the feasibility variables (county level wage estimates the change in ratio of males to females 25-29 years and occupational-industrial classifications) explains only 12.5% of the variance in all socioeconomic types. The missing variable is unemployment. The relationship between emigration and unemployment is also analyzed. It is suggested form the findings that populations alter marriage behavior very rapidly and effectively in response to socioeconomic change. The changes in age at marriage during low nuptiality may be characteristic of European demographic history.

Cultural and historical factors in the population decline of the Parsis of India.

The population decline of the Parsis of India has been the subject of a number of demographic studies. While descriptive statistical accounts provide some clues about the causes of the decline, they fail to assess systematically the cultural and historical factors that are basic for the decline. This paper identifies the relative roles of low nuptiality, low fertility, emigration, and intermarriage in that decline, and the particular aspects of Parsi cultural values and historical experiences that account for them.

The Great Conundrum

Some great historical changes can be succinctly described by a few numbers. In 1650, the population of England was 5.2 million. In 1750 it was 5.7 million. In 1850 it was 16.7 million. Population increased in most other European countries as well, though not as rapidly. The sheer growth in the number of people did as much to change society and daily life in Europe as the Industrial and French revolutions and their aftermaths. Modem population growth has been the subject of a huge literature ever since 1798, when the Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus wrote his famous pamphlet. Many of Malthus's insights and recommendations were hotly disputed in his time. And although historical demographers today have a far larger body of information at their disposal, the dispute continues unabated. Still, historical demography has arrived at some points of consensus. One is that most of the growth of English population in the century before 1850 was caused by a rise in the birth rate, not a fall in the death rate; another, that the rise in the birth rate was due mainly to a rise in the propensity to marry, which started in the middle of the eighteenth century. A third is that before the eighteenth century England's population had been held in check mostly by what Malthus called the preventive check-through low nuptiality. Wars, epidemics, famines, and other factors on the mortality side of the equation were of secondary importance in the long term. Thus the changes in marriage patterns after 1750 led to a collapse of the Malthusian equilibrium and the consequent growth of population. How and why this change in nuptiality took place is far less clear. It is particularly odd in view of the very different experiences across Europe. In France, for instance, the female age at first marriage and the proportion never married do not start dropping until the 1820s. In Scandinavia, mortality decline played a much greater role than in England. The historical conundrum, as E. A. Wrigley has called it, that now demands resolution consists of two related questions: Why did English nuptiality rates rise so suddenly, and why was no other mechanism to regulate population size activated?