I investigate firm financial management when the CFO is given greater authority by being on the board of directors to see if CFO board membership reflects a greater focus on firm financial management and, likewise, if CFO board membership matters in firm financial policy decisions. First, I find that firms are more likely to have their CFO on the board when firm-specific financial management is of greater strategic importance, when firms face greater external governance and when the board lacks other financial expertise, either in the CEO or in outside directors. Second, I employ a self-selection treatment model to account for the endogenous decision to have the CFO on the board and examine an array of firm financial policies. I find that firms with their CFO on the board, after controlling for endogenous selection, are associated with higher leverage, lower cash holdings, greater payout activity and improved operating performance. Moreover, these firms also exhibit faster adjustment toward their optimal capital structure following shocks and are less financially constrained. In addition, I find shareholders react more favorable to the announcement of the CFO’s board appointment when firms are engaging in more active financing, indicating a greater emphasis on firm financial strategy, and when agency concerns are low. The evidence suggests that being a director further enhances CFO influence and reveals important differences between internal and external financial expertise on corporate boards.