Louisiana Supreme Court Research Articles

The Journey to Separate but Equal: Madame Decuir's Quest for Racial Justice in the Reconstruction Era by Jack M. Beermann

Reviewed by: The Journey to Separate but Equal: Madame Decuir's Quest for Racial Justice in the Reconstruction Era by Jack M. Beermann Stephen A. West The Journey to Separate but Equal: Madame Decuir's Quest for Racial Justice in the Reconstruction Era. By Jack M. Beermann. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2021. Pp. xviii, 238. $39.95, ISBN 978-0-7006-3183-4.) This book explores the background, legal arguments, and lasting significance of Hall v. Decuir, a unanimous 1878 decision by the United States Supreme Court holding that Louisiana lacked the power to ban racial segregation on Mississippi River steamboats. Although the case has received far less attention than the Civil Rights Cases (1883), Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), and others bearing on racial segregation, Jack M. Beermann argues that it marked "a significant milestone in the march toward Jim Crow" (p. 4). Beermann opens by providing background on the litigants and on Reconstruction in Louisiana. Before the Civil War, Josephine Decuir and her husband, Antoine Decuir, were elite members of the state's mixed-ancestry, free gens de couleur and held more than one hundred people in slavery. During Reconstruction, her brother Antoine Dubuclet served as Louisiana state treasurer, and her cousin P. G. Deslonde was secretary of state. Both were part of a biracial Republican coalition that rewrote Louisiana's constitution in 1868 to ban racial discrimination in public accommodations and followed up with an 1869 antidiscrimination statute. But in 1872, when Josephine Decuir traveled from New Orleans to Pointe Coupée, Louisiana, the captain and crew of the riverboat Governor Allen denied her entry to the first-class "ladies' cabin" and tried to consign her to the "bureau"—a derogatory name suggestive of the Freedmen's Bureau for the space accommodating Black passengers, both male and female. Decuir sued Captain John Benson, alleging that his illegal conduct caused her "much mental pain, shame, and mortification" (p. 64). Benson's attorneys replied that racial segregation was common on steamboats and essential to maintaining the patronage of white passengers; moreover, they said, Louisiana lacked the power to regulate carriers on the Mississippi River. The trial court ruled in Decuir's favor, and the state supreme court concurred. The book's final chapters explore Benson's appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court and situate the outcome in the context of Reconstruction's demise—and the Court's role in hastening it. In January 1878, the Court unanimously ruled against Decuir and for Benson's widow, Eliza Jane Hall, who continued the case after his death. The majority opinion, by Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, sidestepped arguments about civil rights and ruled instead that Louisiana's ban on racial discrimination infringed on Congress's constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce. As Beermann explains, it was one of the Court's first decisions based on the theory of a so-called dormant commerce [End Page 572] clause—that is, the view that Congressional authority is exclusive and bars states from imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce even in the absence of conflicting federal legislation. Although Decuir's journey began and ended in Louisiana, the court held that travel on the Mississippi River was unavoidably of an interstate character. Beermann, a professor of law, puts his legal expertise to good use while also enriching the story with historical sources and context. He draws on historians' work to discuss Reconstruction and the place of free people of color in Louisiana. His biographical vignettes about the litigants and lawyers are interesting, though uneven in their payoff. While it is important, for example, to know that one of Benson's attorneys, R. H. Marr, represented perpetrators of the Colfax massacre in U.S. v. Cruikshank (1875) and was later named to the Louisiana Supreme Court, less obvious is the relevance of several pages on the divorce of E. K. Washington, who represented Decuir. Beermann makes clear how the Court's ruling in Hall v. Decuir was both in line with and apart from other decisions restricting civil rights protections during and after Reconstruction. Where in other cases, the Court limited federal power under the Reconstruction Amendments, this was something different: the striking down...

The Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act: What Would the Louisiana Supreme Court Say?

The Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act: What Would the Louisiana Supreme Court Say?

Medical Licensure Questions About Mental Illness and Compliance with the Americans With Disabilities Act.

Substantial numbers of medical students and physicians live with some form of mental illness. Over the years, many medical licensure boards have asked physician medical licensure applicants with Doctor of Medicine (MD) degrees intrusive questions about whether they have any psychiatric history. This has discouraged many who need psychiatric treatment from seeking it because of fear of the questions. Gradually, court decisions and the United States Department of Justice have established that such questions violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The 2014 Louisiana Supreme Court Settlement Agreement set definite limits on law licensure mental health questions, followed by a least one licensing body revising its physician licensure questions to be consistent with ADA standards. In this article we examine the current medical licensure questions from each state and the District of Columbia about the mental health of applicants and discuss their validity under ADA standards. Our original investigation of these questions found that the majority still ask questions that are unlikely to meet ADA standards. The judicial and Department of Justice developments, however, may compel them to abandon these questions. If not, legal action will enforce ADA compliance. This change will significantly benefit applicants who need psychiatric treatment.

Sex Offender Registration When Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity

In State v. Cook , 226 So. 3d 387 (La. 2017), the Louisiana Supreme Court considered whether individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) of sex offenses should be subject to the same public registration and notification requirements as convicted sex offenders. The district court

Arbitration Clauses: The Louisiana Supreme Courtts Flawed Decision in Duhon v. Activelaf, LLC. And Why the Doctrine of Unconscionability Should Be Adopted in Louisiana

Louisiana should give credit where credit is due and recognize the doctrine of unconscionability. Louisiana is the only civil law jurisdiction in the United States. In order to preserve its unique heritage, Louisiana has been reluctant to adopt common law concepts. Because of this reluctance, some beneficial concepts have been rejected or overlooked, such as the doctrine of unconscionability. Common law states use the doctrine of unconscionability to analyze contracts of adhesion, or determine the enforceability of arbitration clauses. Louisiana, on the other hand, utilizes a four-factor test outlined in Aguillard v. Auction Management Corp. The four factors are: (1) the physical characteristics of the arbitration clause, (2) the distinguished features of the arbitration clause, (3) the mutuality of the arbitration clause, and (4) the relative bargaining strength of the parties. The Louisiana Supreme Court used these factors in its decision of Duhon v. Activelaf, LLC. The court failed to use all of the factors and conducted a faulty analysis. This Article discusses how an analysis of all four leads to the conclusion that the disputed arbitration contract is not adhesionary and is valid. This Article also discusses how the doctrine of unconscionability is quite compatible with the Louisiana Civil Code. The doctrine helps fill in the gaps of existing law, which is inadequate when dealing with mass, standard-form contracting.

Challenges in Collaborative Governance for Coastal Restoration: Lessons from the Caernarvon River Diversion in Louisiana

ABSTRACTIn an effort to restore deteriorating coastal wetlands in Breton Sound, Louisiana, a diversion of Mississippi River water into the estuarine ecosystem has been operated at Caernarvon, Louisiana, since 1991. The diversion was implemented after a relatively long collaborative planning process beginning in the 1950s. The Caernarvon Interagency Advisory Committee, an official panel of stakeholders, considers scientific aspects of the freshwater inflow and stakeholder inputs in developing an operational plan, which internalizes stakeholder conflicts, while accomplishing goals of restoring the coastal ecosystem. Even though fishery representatives are committee members, local oyster fishers filed lawsuits in federal and state courts from 1994 through 2005, claiming damages to their oyster beds. These lawsuits were initially successful in state courts but were reversed by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The federal suits were unsuccessful. Following these lawsuits, voters in Louisiana in 2000 amended the State Constitution to protect coastal restoration projects against lawsuits reflecting increase in overall statewide support. Increasing scientific knowledge has contributed significantly to diversion operation. For better collaborative governance, efforts to increase common understanding among stakeholders will be needed, and a process to compensate interests of stakeholders suffering from impacts of restoration projects at an earlier stage should be institutionalized.

The Newcomb Precedent

This case study reviews the financial dispute and legal battle between the heirs of Josephine Newcomb and Tulane University. Following Hurricane Katrina (2005), Tulane’s Board of Directors announced Newcomb College’s closure to stabilize university finances. In response, Newcomb’s heirs filed suit against the university. In 2009, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled in favor of Tulane, setting legal precedent for educational merger. Now, more than 10 years after Katrina, Newcomb alumnae continue to question whether Tulane administrators abused Newcomb’s financial intentions. This case study helps students consider the rights and interests of philanthropic donors from the perspective of different stakeholders.

Louisiana Evidence Law: The Admissibility of Suicide Notes

On April 9, 2001, Courtney Garza, a twenty-one-year-old student at Southeastern University in Hammond, committed suicide by hanging herself in her parents’ Baton Rouge home. Courtney left behind a hand-written, nine-page suicide note alleging her depression and state of mind was the result of a rape that occurred three months prior. It is clear from Courtney’s note that the alleged rape caused her to enter into a deep state of depression which resulted in her taking her own life. Without Courtney’s statements regarding the alleged rape, the line of causation is severed and the action she took ending her life becomes an independent intervening force leaving Paul Upshaw and the Delta Tau Delta Fraternity free from liability. However, analyzing Courtney’s statements as non-hearsay state of mind, inferring the negligent wrongs of the defendants caused Courtney’s mental illness resulting in an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide. Therefore, the defendants should have been held liable for her death. This ruling makes the state of the Courtney’s mind shortly before death, extremely relevant to the negligent acts of the defendants, and the suicide note admissible as evidence of that state of mind. Louisiana Supreme Court was wrong in addressing Courtney’s suicide note thoroughly under the hearsay dying declaration exception. Rather parts of the note should have been admissible under the hearsay then existing state of mind exception while other parts should have been admissible as non-hearsay because the statements in the note were being offered to prove the condition of Courtney’s state of mind at the time she took her life. It is evident that suicide notes, as a whole, should be analyzed statement by statement to determine its admissibility. Taken as a whole, or in large parts, each statement is not given the weight and significance, as it should. When correctly applied, the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and the non-hearsay state of mind area of law, determine the admissibility of statements in suicide notes. While these two concepts are often confused, a full understanding of the similarities and differences between the two will yield an accurate result when applied correctly to suicide notes.

Simple Acts of Tolerance: A Slap in the Face to Acquisitive Prescription

The Louisiana Supreme Court handed down a very controversial decision on May 5, 2015, when it decided Boudreaux v. Cummings. The Louisiana Supreme Court erred in its decision, holding that Boudreaux failed to prove a predial servitude was established by acquisitive prescription because Boudreaux failed to prove he possessed the real right in question, a right of passage. The court erred in its decision by adopting an extremely liberal subjective standard for evaluating acquisitive prescription, relying on the ideas of “neighborly accommodations” and “simple acts of tolerance.” Acquisitive prescription has had a place in Louisiana property law for many years. Its purpose was to maximize the use of immovable property and to reward those who make active, physical use of land that does not belong to them. The author examined years of Louisiana cases involving acquisitive prescription, from the first case to the most recent. The author also examined cases from French law, upon which the Louisiana Civil Law Property Code was based. The author discovered that the reasoning behind the courts’ decision has been discussed only a handful of times in Louisiana Court decisions, and has not been discussed at all in recent years. This article examines the laws of acquisitive prescription and when they apply. This article specifically deals with neighboring properties and the problems that now arise with acquisitive prescription due to this new court decision. The main idea behind acquisitive prescription is hindered as long as this decision takes precedent, which is why this article explains and recommends that the decision from the Louisiana Supreme Court must be changed.

Anxiety or Rule Against Perpetuities?: Mental Health Inquiries in Bar Admission Post-Louisiana

Despite years of litigation on whether mental health inquiries in bar admission are discriminatory and violate the ADA, courts and state bars still disagree over them. A recent settlement between the DOJ and the Louisiana Supreme Court removing these inquiries from Louisiana’s bar application has some proclaiming mental health questions are now definitively illegal. Since Louisiana had copied a standard form used by twenty-five states, the agreement could have had far-reaching consequences.However, the DOJ’s findings that invalidated mental health inquiries ignored twenty years of established federal and state case law supporting narrowly tailored questions into serious mental illnesses. Moreover, the settlement lacks legal precedential effect, and in practical terms will not influence other states to settle given the weaknesses of the DOJ’s ADA enforcement scheme in the bar admittance context. Thus, in the likely case this issue is litigated again, the settlement is unlikely to have much influence.While the DOJ’s arguments were weak, changes to mental health questioning are still necessary as a matter of policy. In contrast to scholarship calling for a unilateral ban on such inquiries, I advocate for questions into mental illnesses that may excuse prior misconduct or current ailments affecting the ability to practice law. Also, bars must clarify how they use such mental health information, particularly that treatment will only serve as a mitigating factor to excuse past misbehavior or present illnesses. Finally, although narrow inquiries into serious mental diseases are permissible, they should be removed to encourage treatment for all disorders.

Mental Incompetence: Adjusting to Modern Forms of Civility

In 2004, the Louisiana Legislature amended its Code of Criminal Procedure to alleviate its violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause. In compliance with the requirements of the Due Process Clause, the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits the state from trying a mentally incompetent defendant for a criminal offense. However, prior to the Legislature’s amending its Code of Criminal Procedure, criminal defendants whose competence would not be restored in the foreseeable future, and who were not a danger to themselves or others could be placed on supervised probation, despite the absence of a conviction, due to their incompetence. The effect of this law allowed the criminal punishment of defendants who had never been convicted of any crime. The Legislature acted in response to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s finding that this law was an unconstitutional violation of Due Process, and subsequently repealed the law altogether.Consequently, the Legislature’s solution to this problem, in repealing the law, has left an uncertainty in the law as to what will happen to these defendants once they are released due to their condition. This article traces the history of treatment of mentally incompetent defendants in the criminal justice system and the development of the law regarding mental incompetence. This change in the law will impair the efficiency of the criminal justice system, especially in the wake of the new national drug crisis concerning the use of bath salts and other synthetic drugs that have an effect on mental health. The use of these drugs will likely increase the number of defendants who are permanently incompetent and who may not present a danger to themselves or others under the current standard. This article poses a solution to the issue and suggests a revision of the current standard under which incompetent defendants are evaluated or in the alternative, turning to the option of civil involuntary outpatient commitment. Without a solution, there is no way to deter these incompetent defendants from committing criminal acts nor to provide justice for their acts.

An Impartial Right: Louisiana's Infringement of a Defendant's Constitutional Right to a Bench Trial Through the State's Constitutional Provision Limiting a Defendant's Right to Waive a Jury Trial

This note argues that, implied within the Sixth Amendment’s Impartial Jury Clause, a criminal defendant enjoys the guaranteed right to waive a jury trial in favor of a bench trial. In State v. Bazile, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not offer a criminal defendant the absolute right to a bench trial. Bazile was denied the chance to have his case heard in front of a judge because of a provision in the state’s constitution enforcing a deadline by which a criminal defendant must waive a jury trial in favor of a bench trial. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized certain circumstances in which a criminal defendant would benefit from a bench trial. In U.S. v. Singer, the Court held that if a defendant is able to show a compelling reason that a trial by jury would not render an impartial trial, the denial of his proffered waiver violates his constitutional right to an impartial trial. In the present case, Bazile is charged with the murder of his wife, and he is facing the possibility of extensive imprisonment. In a trial of this notoriety, it is reasonable to expect that potential jurors would form biased opinions before hearing the facts of the case and the prosecution’s evidence. Ultimately, Bazile was decided incorrectly because a compelling reason is inherent in Bazile’s case, and he should benefit from a trial before a judge instead of a jury if it ensures an impartial trial.

Public Policy Considerations Concerning Insurance Bad Faith and Residual Market Mechanisms

As insurance bad faith liability has evolved in the past four decades, liability for bad faith has not stopped with private insurance companies. In a number of states, state-sponsored insurance entities have been established to provide insurance coverage in residual markets where it is generally otherwise unavailable. The question of whether first-party insurance bad faith liability should be extended upon a state-run property insurer is an unresolved one in many jurisdictions. This paper contributes to the contemporary literature regarding bad faith in insurance by comprehensively analyzing the history of, the nature of the claims associated with, and public policies concerning the imposition of bad faith liability upon state-run property insurers. This paper makes its contribution by arguing that courts should not impose first-party bad faith liability on state-run property insurers who operate in the residual property insurance market.This paper begins by providing an overview of the role of residual insurance market entities of the state and federal governments. The second and third parts of the paper discuss the Oubre v. Louisiana Citizens Fair Plan case of the Louisiana Supreme Court and the Citizens Property Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Assoc., Inc. litigation in Florida and their applicability concerning the immunity issue.The final part of the paper analyzes the policies and issues surrounding the holding of bad faith liability upon state-run property insurers. The first section of the final part examines the public policy considerations of reported cases which have addressed whether a state insurance guaranty association can be held liable for insurance bad faith claims. State insurance guaranty associations provide an appropriate comparison with state-run property insurers since bad faith claims have also been proferred against them. The second section of the final part discusses the policy rationales behind the bad faith remedy and the specific issue of the relationship between bad faith awards and assessments which are typically levied on most insurers. Finally, examining the case of Florida in particular, this paper examines the arguments concerning legislative intent on the conferral of immunity.

From the Editorial Board

School vouchers and other programs that allow public funds be funneled private schools--sometimes called tax credits or opportunity scholarships--are part of national conversation on school reform. Recently, Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee, former education secretary under George H. W. Bush, introduced legislation that would use a portion of federal education funds create scholarships for low-income so they could an accredited school of their parents' choosing. According a story in The Chattanoogan (2014), Scholarships for Kids Act would reallocate $24 billion in public school funds create 11 million scholarships of $2,100 each for K-12 living in poverty. In an article in The New York Times, Alexander explained that the simplest way for [federal funds support low-income students] is just pin them blouse or shirt of a child and let it follow child school they attend (Rich, 2014, para. 3). Alexander likened his proposal other federal assistance programs, namely Pell grants and GI Bill, although he acknowledged that vouchers have not been widely accepted at K-12 level. Voucher programs vary from state state. Currently only Washington, D.C. has a federally funded school voucher program, but 16 states have adopted some form of publicly funded school choice vouchers. On February 17, 2014 North Carolina Superior Court Judge Robert Hobgood granted a preliminary injunction against state's Opportunity Scholarships program, ruling it unconstitutional. North Carolina's state constitution dictates that resources allocated public education shall be faithfully appropriated and used exclusively for establishing and maintaining a uniform system of free public (Article IX, Section 6), thereby prohibiting use of public funds for private institutions. The Louisiana Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in May 2013, ruling that statewide voucher plan violated Louisiana's state constitution. A resolution amend Alaska's constitution allow use of public monies for private schools was pulled from a floor vote in March 2014, while Tennessee, Florida, and Arizona have all introduced bills during current legislative session expand existing voucher programs. Proponents of vouchers see them as a means secure educational equity and access for low-income students, as well as those currently attending failing schools. Voucher programs provide crucial options children who too often are forced failing (Alliance for School Choice, n.d., para. 4). In some states, vouchers allow with special needs, in addition those from low-income families, private schools as a means attain improved educational opportunity. Additionally, voucher proponents believe that increasing parent choice will encourage traditional public schools improve conditions in order maintain competitiveness (Sugarman, 2013). Arizona Superintendent of Public Instruction John Huppenthal sent out an automated phone message publicizing Empowerment Scholarship Accounts (ESAs) in order to apprise parents of a unique program (Fisher, 2014, para. 7), stating that he works ensure that students are provided with excellent education opportunities (Fischer, 2014, para. 9). Opponents of vouchers claim that such programs divert funds from public schools and frequently benefit private interests (National School Boards Association, n.d.), and they are concerned that using public funds support parochial schools violates separation of church and state. Additionally, lack of accountability for private schools draws criticism, since most are not subject requisite standardized testing in public schools (Strauss, 2014). Florida's proposed voucher expansion bill was pulled by its sponsor after state senate declared that private schools utilizing vouchers would be required administer state tests their (Kennedy, 2014). …

Deep-Pocketed or Duty-Bound Defendant: The Evolution of 'Legacy Lawsuits' in Louisiana and the Impact of Acts 779 and 754

Legacy lawsuits concerning environmental damage claims have affected nearly 1,500 oil-and-gas production companies in Louisiana in the last few years. Since the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Corbello v. Iowa Production in 2003, production companies and landowners have hotly debated cleanup and remediation liability over contaminated land. After Corbello, the Louisiana Legislature passed Act 1166 to help provide additional procedural safeguards for legacy lawsuits, but the act met with criticism from landowners and oil companies alike. Later, Act 312 was passed in 2006 to help correct some of the perceived shortcomings of Act 1166. However, critics scrutinized it as well for its apparent failure to require faster litigation and quicker cleanup of the damaged land. Acts 779 and 754 were finally passed in 2012 to further correct the errors that critics found in the previous legislation. These two acts attempt to provide quicker remediation of the damaged land by allowing for a limited admission of liability and procedural safeguards such as the implementation of environmental management orders. This article outlines the history and evolution of legacy lawsuits as they developed in Louisiana over the years and further attempts to outline the substance of Act 779 and Act 754. Finally, this article discusses the key issues that this new legislation attempts to address, including quicker remediation of contaminated land and a sturdier procedural framework.

Smitko v. Gulf South Shrimp, Inc.: Another Thread Unraveling the Efficacy of Suits to Quiet Tax Titles in Louisiana

This paper discusses a recent decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Smitko v. Gulf South Shrimp, and explores the soundness of the court’s reasoning. Since the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, Louisiana courts have begun to adopt an interpretation that has led to increasing instability in the Louisiana real estate market. In an effort to protect a citizen’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights, Louisiana courts took the heavy-handed approach of applying the doctrine of absolute nullity to tax-sale proceedings that were constitutionally deficient of notice.Through this decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court has expanded the application of the doctrine of absolute nullity not only to state sale proceedings, but also to judicial proceedings confirming tax titles. The decision now provides independent grounds for overturning final and unappealable judgments obtained in confirmation proceedings. This paper traces the history of the jurisprudence relied upon in Smitko and examines whether this approach is actually mandated or necessary to remedy a purported Due Process violation.

To Pierce the Liability Veil of an LLC or Not to Pierce the Liability Veil of an LLC? That is the Question of ORX v. MBW

This article discusses the issue of piercing the liability veil of a limited liability company (LLC). There has been much controversy over whether the veil of a limited liability veil can be pierced. If so, then the next issue is which test to use in finding an individual member of an LLC personally liable. The major objective of this article is to look at these problems within the context of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal case ORX Res., Inc. v. MBW Exploration. The author examined decisions in different Louisiana circuits and the factors that different Louisiana courts deemed important. Some courts decided that fraud was an essential to the finding of personal liability of a member. On the other hand, a new progressive movement has come and implemented a totality-of-the- circumstances test, which is used for piercing the liability shield of a corporation. This new progressive test was used in ORX Res., and the single member was found to be liable for the debts of the LLC. The author found that even though there was a statutory argument that piercing the liability veil of an LLC was not allowed the totality of circumstances was the best test to determine personal liability of an LLC member. The author agrees with the court’s decision as a whole because the extraordinary circumstances of the case should have led to the individual member being personally liable. However, the author did not agree with all the points made by the court. The author felt there were some key aspects that the court left out, such asking the individual to sign a personal guarantee. In conclusion, the Louisiana Supreme Court will ultimately have to decide these pending issues surrounding personal liability of an individual member of an LLC.

S.J. v. Lafayette: Another Example of Failure to See the Forrest for the Trees

For many years parents have been leaving their children under the supervision of educators. These parents leave their children under the assumption that the school will be held liable for any harm that their children suffer while under the school’s supervision. The school is expected to provide reasonable care and is sometimes considered surrogate parents. With the Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling in S.J. v. Lafayette School Board, many parents will now be confused about where a school’s liability begins and ends. This case blurred the lines of liability when it determined that a school is not liable for a child who was raped after leaving the school’s premises although the school denied the child transportation and was told by the child’s mother to not let her walk home. Who now should be liable when incidents like this occur and the child has not yet entered into the custody of the parent?The author’s perspective is different from the court’s standpoint. The court found that the school denying C.C. a ride home, which essentially violated the statute that guaranteed students a ride home who lived more than a mile away, did not amount to an action in negligence. Taking into account all other elements that were breached, such as not being able to use the phone and letting C.C. leave the school premises alone while in the school’s care, it is the author’s position that the school breached its duty to provide reasonable care.

The Recusal of American Judges in the Post-Caperton Era: An Empirical Assessment of the Risk of Actual Bias in Decisions Involving Campaign Contributors

This article is an empirical investigation of the relation between campaign contributions and the ability of elected judges to remain impartial in their rulings. Its principal aim is to assess the risk to impartiality that unrecused rulings in favor of contributors may entail. The tense if not conflictual relationship between campaign support and judicial detachment became a national issue in 2009 when the Supreme Court ruled, for the first time, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., that a state judge’s refusal to disqualify himself after receiving extraordinary campaign support from a litigant violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The present study, building upon the approach charted in Caperton, focuses in depth upon one state supreme court’s experience with contributor cases. The study follows the voting behavior of the seven Justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court (as constituted in 2006) over a fourteen year period. The carefully checked database, consisting of more than 10,000 entries derived from 177 cases involving contributors, presents striking insights about the risks involved in unrecused voting. The entire database is included with the article. Far from undermining Caperton’s thesis, it demonstrates that far smaller contributions also create a risk of actual bias, and that the relative size of a donation, in comparison to overall campaign funds and expenditures, is not a necessary component of the risk.. The value-added of this empirical contribution to the national issue is essentially three-fold. First, it lays out a detailed factual tableau concerning the size, scope and timing of contributions. Here is a mine of vital information that may serve as a predicate for analysis and reform. . Second, in line with the ‘risk’ calculus charted in Caperton, the article presents statistical measurements and new methods of comparison to gauge the likelihood of actual bias in judicial voting behavior. The statistical calculations based on the data were verified and replicated by the Center for Empirical Research in the Law in St. Louis. Third, it carries the analysis beyond the relatively easy Caperton facts and examines the risk factor in the everyday cases before the courts. Thus it addresses the typical and more difficult questions needing to be discussed and dealt with in the future, whether by the Supreme Court in revisiting the constitutional issue or by state legislatures, state courts and professional bodies in their reform efforts.

Template for Assessing Status of COOP (Continued Operations) Planning: Louisiana District Courts

This Template was developed at the request of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Office of the Judicial Administrator, by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project at American University to provide guidance for assessing the status of COOP Planning in Louisiana's District Courts five years after the devastating destruction caused by the hurricane, Katrina.. The purpose of the template is to provide (1) a framework for assessing the degree and adequacy of COOP planning, along with training and/or technical assistance needs identified; (2) a point of reference regarding the essential elements for COOP Planning in each of the 15 functional areas addressed; and (3) an indication of areas for further training and/or technical assistance useful to enhance COOP planning efforts. The template is designed to promote a review of the court's functions in toto in order to sustain an adequate COOP planning process.. Although the template is organized around functional areas, each should be addressed comprehensively, recognizing that each of these areas is irrelated and cannot be approached in isolation. The COOP planning process is therefore intended to promote the collaborative and cooperative dialogue and relationships necessary to ensure the continuity of the judicial function and the rule of law in the event of both an emergency and the post-emergency recovery process.