A couple of years ago, a physician involved in Ashley case launched a presentation about it at a bioethics conference by dismissing one of stupider objections, as he saw it, to interventions Ashley's parents had requested. Ashley is a profoundly cognitively disabled child; her parents sought and obtained interventions, both surgical and pharmacological, that effectively stalled her physical development at a prepubescent stage. The dismissed objection had this form: These interventions are nature, and therefore The presenter did analyze objection; he just said he didn't buy it. I don't either. On other hand, I do find myself swayed by a concern of some sort about what beings do to nature, including to nature. I think it's better to leave great old trees standing than pointlessly to chop them down, better to leave a patch of prairie than to pave it over, better to let species carry on than to bring about their extinction. I take a fairly dim view of breast augmentation, nose jobs, Botox, skin bleaching, and drug-enhanced muscle building. What stops me from saying that those things are against nature, and therefore wrong, is an assortment of complexities that require a much more nuanced and qualified comment. First, a conceptual complexity. To say that an action is against implies that one has a clear understanding of what the is and of how and when action is counter to it, but mostly we lack that. In fact, we use word natural in ways that are sometimes starkly inconsistent with each other. In one use (suggested by examples like felling forests and paving prairies), action is always counter to nature: it always changes world. But we might also hold that action is always it always conforms to laws of nature. In another use, natural refers to how we change world, and whether a given activity is appropriately called natural depends on context in which activity is considered. Chopping down trees looks to be at odds with goals of a preserve, but it might be quite compatible with organic agriculture. This is a looser way of using word natural: calling a state of affairs natural indicates that intervention into it is constrained or absent, but allows that difference between natural and unnatural is a matter of convention, informed by what we know about world and needs, and understood in ways specific to particular contexts--environmental management, agriculture, child-rearing, reproduction, sex, athletic performance, and so on. Lacking any one clear definition of natural, we would have to explain concept by looking at examples, and while some cases might provide touchstones, there might be many cases where terms are underdetermined. Understanding nature and human along these lines means that these concepts do have all baggage of essentialism; there is no thought that in grasping concept we have grasped ultimate truth about a discrete category of things in cosmos--that we know what it really means to be human, or what separates from everything else in universe. There is nothing eternal, immutable, or rationally necessary about them. Indeed, line between natural and not will be fundamentally contestable. People will disagree about many in-between cases, with no definitive resolution in sight. Given these limits, calling an intervention against sounds wrong. For starters, it seems to point to a much more rigid conception of nature. It's also just too cocksure. It does recognize contestability of this concept. The conceptual complexity strikes me as a difficulty even in making sense of a moral concern about nature, but it is chief problem with formulating that concern by saying bluntly, That's nature, and therefore wrong. …