Long-run Growth Rate Research Articles

Thoughts on balance-of-payments-constrained growth after 40 years

This paper considers how Thirlwall's balance-of-payments-constrained growth model has fared over the preceding 40 years. Issues dealt with include how the model fits into Harrod's closed-economy dynamic model; whether the model is a tautology; the role of the exchange rate and terms of trade in influencing the long-run growth rate, and whether capital inflows make any difference to the long-run predictions of the model. The conclusion is that it is mainly the structure of production and trade that determines the long-run growth rate of countries, within a balance-of-payments equilibrium framework, as determinants of the income elasticities of demand for exports and imports.

The PRC's long-run growth through the lens of the export-led growth model

We explain China's remarkable growth performance over the last three decades through an export-led growth (ELG) model, where countries need to export to pay for their imports. We show that China's actual long-run growth rate is well approximated by its balance-of-payments equilibrium (BOPE) growth rate, defined as the long-run growth rate consistent with current account equilibrium. This growth rate is given by the ratio of the growth rate of exports to the income elasticity of imports. We estimate the latter using the Kalman filter, which allows us to obtain a time-varying estimate of China's BOPE growth rate. We find that the average value of China's BOPE growth rate during 1981–2016 was about 11 percent but fluctuated significantly over time and declined notably after 2007. It is estimated to be 5.9 percent in 2015. We then discuss the determinants of China's BOPE growth rate and of the income elasticity of imports, with the help of the Bayesian Model Averaging technique. The analysis highlights the role of the composition of aggregate demand as the main driving force, both for its direct effects on the income elasticity of imports, and for the indirect effects on export growth via capital accumulation, in particular fixed asset investment. Our analysis has important implications to understand China's transition to a “New Normal” of a lower growth rate and the effects of the external and internal rebalancing strategy pursued from the early 2000s.

Optimists and Pessimists in (In)Complete Markets

We study the effects of market incompleteness on speculation, investor survival, and asset pricing moments when investors disagree about the likelihood of jumps and have recursive preferences. We consider two models. In a model with jumps in aggregate consumption, incompleteness barely matters because the consumption claim resembles an insurance product against jump risk and effectively reproduces approximate spanning. In a long-run risk model with jumps in the long-run growth rate, market incompleteness affects speculation and investor survival. Jump and diffusive risks are more balanced regarding their importance, and therefore the consumption claim cannot reproduce approximate spanning.

Growth cycles and business cycles of the Chinese economy through the lens of the unobserved components model

We build upon the most recent development in the literature and estimate a comprehensive set of univariate and bivariate Unobserved Components models to study the varying long-run growth rate and output gap of the Chinese economy for the period of 1952–2017. We find that the long-run growth rate varied substantially, and thus the growth cycles played an important role in the Chinese economy. Specifically, the long run growth rate accelerated since the late 70s, peaked in the early 90s, and since then has continuously declined except for several years right after China's entrance into the WTO. We also find that although the recent 4-trillion-Yuan economic stimulus package helped to sustain the economic growth temporarily it appeared to have accelerated the decline of the long run growth rate. We also find that the potential growth rate is estimated to be slightly above 8% as in 2017, but the output gap has become negative since 2015 and this recession at the business cycle frequency continuously deepened until the end of the sample.

Public Debt in a Descriptive Endogenous Growth Model

In this paper we analyze a descriptive endogenous growth model with public debt. The government can run into debt, but, the primary surplus is a positive function of the debt to GDP ratio such that the debt ratio becomes a mean-reverting process. We show that a balanced budget scenario yields a higher long-run growth rate than a scenario with permanent deficits if and only if the public deficit exceeds the net saving out of government bonds. As regards the dynamics, the analysis shows that multiple balanced growth paths can arise. Further, reducing the reaction of the primary surplus to a higher public debt can generate endogenous cycles via a Hopf bifurcation and, for a sufficiently low reaction coefficient, the economy becomes unstable.

Monetary impacts and overshooting of energy prices: the case of the U.S. coal prices

The objective of this paper is to analyze the impacts of monetary policy on determination and dynamics of coal prices in a closed economy setting in the USA. Economic theory tells us that if a change in macroeconomic policy has raised (lowered) the real interest rate above (below) its long-run equilibrium level, then coal prices should fall below (rise above) their long-run equilibrium path. Likewise, an unanticipated increase in the expected long-run rate of money growth increases the coal prices in the long-run equilibrium path and in turn the current coal price. Finally, when there is a change in the level of money supply, the price of coal initially overshoots its long-run equilibrium. Empirical time-series analysis confirms that coal prices react to monetary policy in the long run, i.e., monetary policy has a non-neutral impact on coal prices. Long-term adjustment is more pronounced for coal prices than for manufactured goods and services. In the short run, the degree of immediate adjustment or overshooting for coal prices in response to monetary policy shocks is, surprisingly, lesser than for manufactured goods and services.

On the empirics of reserve requirements and economic growth

Reserve requirements, as a tool of macroprudential policy, have been increasingly employed since the outbreak of the great financial crisis. We conduct an analysis of the effect of reserve requirements in tranquil and crisis times on long-run growth rates of GDP per capita and credit (%GDP) making use of Bayesian model averaging methods. Regulation has on average a negative effect on GDP in tranquil times, which is only partly offset by a positive (but not robust effect) in crisis times. Credit over GDP is positively affected by higher requirements in the longer run.

Is capital taxation always harmful for economic growth?

We investigate theoretically and empirically the relationship between capital taxation and economic growth. Using a long cross-country panel data set going back to 1965 and employing a variety of econometric techniques, we document that greater reliance on capital taxation, measured in different ways, is not negatively associated with growth rates. Exploring potential heterogeneity in this relationship across countries, we find that capital taxation and growth rates tend to be positively related for developed countries, but for developing countries the relationship is in most cases statistically insignificant. To rationalize these empirical findings we propose a multi-country innovation-based growth model where innovations spill over from leading to lagging economies. In the context of this model we demonstrate that positive rates of capital taxation can increase the long-run growth rate in leading economies where the engine of growth is domestic innovation activity. However, this is not the case in lagging economies where growth is driven by imitation of existing innovations from the technology frontier.

IS BUSINESS CYCLE ASYMMETRY INTRINSIC IN INDUSTRIALIZED ECONOMIES?

We consider a model-averaged forecast-based estimate of the output gap to measure economic slack in 10 industrialized economies. Our measure takes changes in the long-run growth rate into account and, by addressing model uncertainty using equal weights on different forecast-based estimates, is robust to different assumptions about the underlying structure of the economy. For all 10 countries in the sample, we find that the estimated output gap has much larger negative movements during recessions than positive movements in expansions, suggesting business cycle asymmetry is an intrinsic characteristic of industrialized economies. Furthermore, the estimated output gap is always strongly negatively correlated with future output growth and unemployment and positively correlated with capacity utilization. It also implies a convex Phillips Curve in many cases. The model-averaged output gap is reliable in real time in the sense of being subject to relatively small revisions.

Capital accumulation, economic growth and the balance-of-payments constraint: The case of Mexico, 1951-2014

After a critical assessment of both Thirlwall’s long-run growth model and Clavijo’s and Ros’s (2015) model where capital accumulation determines output growth, this paper displays an alternative model in which capital accumulation and the growth rate of capital productivity determine the long-run growth rate of output which is consistent with a constant position of the balance of payments as a percentage of GDP. Then, the latter is applied to inquire the causes accounting for Mexico’s low economic growth rate during 1982-2014. We conclude, on empirical grounds, that the sharp decline in the internal demand for domestic goods and both the rates of net capital accumulation and productivity played a major role in the slowdown of the Mexican economy. The income elasticities of the demand for exports and imports also played a role, albeit to a lesser extent.

Demand drives growth all the way: Goodwin, Kaldor, Pasinetti and the Steady State

AbstractA demand-driven alternative to the conventional Solow–Swan growth model is analysed. Its medium run is built around Marx–Goodwin cycles of demand and distribution. Long-run income and wealth distributions follow rules of accumulation stated by Pasinetti in combination with a technical progress function for labour productivity growth incorporating a Kaldor effect and induced innovation. An explicit steady state solution is presented along with analysis of dynamics. When wage income of capitalist households is introduced, the Samuelson–Modigliani steady state ‘dual’ to Pasinetti’s cannot be stable. Numerical simulation loosely based on US data suggests that the long-run growth rate is around 2% per year and that the capitalist share of wealth may rise from about 40 to 70% due to positive medium-term feedback of higher wealth inequality into its own growth.

The Pillars of Potential Growth and the Role of Policy: A Panel Data Approach

Potential output growth generally decelerated after the global financial crisis during 2008–2009. This paper examines the possible determinants of potential output growth using Bayesian Model Averaging and assesses how the determinants can be used to increase the growth of potential output. It finds that the long-term growth of working-age population, the tertiary level gross enrollment ratio, the technology gap with the United States (US), labor market rigidity, trade openness, financial integration and the quality of institutions robustly affect potential output growth. Using Harrod’s definition of potential output growth as the sum of the long-run growth rates of the labor force and labor productivity, we find that the trend growth rate of working-age population is a good proxy variable for long-run labor force growth. Under this definition, the other determinants affect potential output growth through their impact on the growth of labor productivity. The paper finds support for the hypotheses that tertiary enrollment and trade openness affects potential output growth nonlinearly. It also finds that trade openness and tertiary enrollment have nonlinear effects on potential output growth, and that the technology gap with the US and financial integration have statistically significant interaction effects on potential output growth. Results suggest that reforms aimed at reducing the technology gap with the US and increasing the extent of financial integration have lower impact on countries with high-quality institutions.

Approximations of population growth in a noisy environment: on the dichotomy of non-age and age structure

By simulations of population growth exposed to environmental noise, we compared realised long-run growth rate of age structured populations of four different life histories, with four approximations. One approximation used a non-structured population model, including specific population growth rates for each time step, determined by actual vital rates, while the other three used age-structured data to estimate a ‘mean’ growth rate, then applicable for all time steps. In general, approximations were reasonable accurate. Yet some were completely erroneous and inaccurate enough to move stationary populations to become species on the red list as an endangered species according to International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUNC). The inaccuracies depended, in the following decreasing order, on: life history, what part of the demography the noise was acting on, and noise colour. The non-structured growth approximation had smaller errors with red noise while the three age-structured approximations had their largest errors with red noise. Since it is generally understood that the most common noise in nature is red noise, we conclude that the non-structured approximation will be the best predictor of population growth in most cases. We also conclude that evenness in distribution over age classes is a possible predictor for the sensitivity of long-run growth rate to type of approximation and therefore a promising object for further studies. Finally, our results indicate that in general, more focus ought to be on reducing the error in the data collection on population densities, especially for studies over longer time periods, than of collecting age-specific data.

TREND INFLATION, RIGIDITIES, AND HUMAN CAPITAL GROWTH

A wage setting process defined in terms of wage per hour is the key factor for obtaining negative optimal trend inflation in a closed economy. However, this inflation will be zero if the process is established on the wage per unit of human capital. The origin of both results is a dynamic mechanism that, with some differences, makes possible the attainment of a situation equivalent to wage flexibility. Finally, while the effect of trend inflation on the long-run growth rate is tiny in the first case, it is much more important in the second, highlighting the relevance of this approach.

Killing two birds with one currency: Income and fiscal policies in a growth model of a currency union

Building on a two-country Kaleckian model of a currency union, we examine the consequences of balance-of-payments adjustment policies, focusing on the interdependence between the long-run growth paths of member countries. The model separates the short-run from the long-run dynamic, comparing price and wage dynamics in each country in the light of Thirlwall’s balance-of-payments-constrained growth model. We show that by shifting the burden of adjustment to the less competitive country, austerity and wage moderation policies lead to long-term recessionary effects. Only expansionary policies in the more competitive country can achieve the two goals of reducing external imbalances and increasing the long-run growth rate in both member countries.

Inflation and health in a Schumpeterian growth model: Theory and evidence

Researchers have found many benefits of good health. However, health investment may be subject to borrowing constraints. In this study, we incorporate endogenous health investment in a scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth model. We find the following. When the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint does not apply to medical expenditures, long-run growth does not depend on the nominal interest rate. In contrast, when the CIA constraint does apply to medical expenditures, an increase in the nominal interest rate leads to a decrease in both R&D and health investment, which in turn reduce the long-run growth rates of technology and output. Nevertheless, welfare is always a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate, and the welfare loss is greater under the CIA constraint on medical expenditures. As an empirical test, we build panel data for 61 countries during the years 1995–2014. We find a significant, negative effect of inflation on out-of-pocket health expenditure (% of total expenditure on health) of the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, which provides support for our theory. The policy implication is that government financing of health care for the poor can offset this effect.

Bubbles, growth and imperfection of credit market in a two-country model

This study extends Hirano and Yanagawa (Rev Econ Stud 84(1):406–443, 2017) to an asymmetric two-country model and examines bubbles effects on each country’s long-run economic growth rate. This study also provides numerical examples with respect to the relationship between each country’s growth rate and their financial frictions in the balanced growth equilibria with bubbles and without bubbles. It shows that foreign bubbles have positive and negative effects on both countries’ growth rates, and which effect dominates depends on the level of financial development in both countries. In this study, the positive effect of bubbles tends to dominate when the total level of financial frictions in both countries is relatively low. When the total effect of bubbles on the growth rate is positive, the burst of foreign bubbles leads to a decrease in the growth rate in both countries. This implies that there is a positive correlation between foreign bubbles and the domestic as well as the foreign country’s growth rate.

The strong increase of Austrian government debt in the Kreisky era: Austro-Keynesianism or just stubborn forecast errors?

In the Kreisky era (1970–1983), Austrian government debts increased strongly. Historically, the attitude of Kreisky and the Social Democrats towards Keynesian fiscal policy measures to fight unemployment during the oil crises has been held to be responsible for the successive budget deficits. Kreisky’s ideological debt policy has become a narrative that has strongly influenced Austrian fiscal policy until today. While this explanation for the strong increase in public debt during the Kreisky era is widely accepted, it is not necessarily true. In this paper, we assess a different explanation: the deficits might simply have resulted from forecast errors of GDP growth in those turbulent times. We find that about one-third of the increase in the debt-over-GDP ratio is directly explained by short-run forecast errors, i.e., the difference between the approved and the realized budget, and an additional one-fifth is the lower bound of forecast error regarding the long-run growth rate.

Economic Growth with Institutional Saving and Investment

ABSTRACTThis article develops a two-sector growth model in which institutional investors play a significant role. A necessary and sufficient condition is established under which these investors own the entire capital stock in the long run. The dependence of the long-run growth rate on the behaviour of such investors and the effects of a productivity increase are analysed.

Income Shares, Secular Stagnation, and the Long-Run Distribution of Wealth

Four alarming stylized facts have recently emerged in the United States: (i) a decline in the labor share of income; (ii) a decline in labor productivity; (iii) an increase in the top 1% wealth share, and (iv) an increase in the capital-income ratio. In Capital in the XXI Century, Thomas Piketty’s argument is that the r > g inequality determines an increase in the capital-income ratio; if the elasticity of substitution in production is above one, the profit share rises. We provide a contrasting explanation that draws from the Post Keynesian approach to differential saving propensities between classes and the Classical-Marxian theory of induced technical change. In a simple model of ‘capitalists’ and ‘workers,’ we show that institutional changes that lower the labor share—declining unionization, increasing monopsony power in the labor market, the global ‘race to the bottom’ in unit labor costs, or the exhaustion of path-breaking scientific discoveries—can reduce labor productivity growth because of the lessened incentives to innovate to save on labor costs. A falling labor share reduces workers’ total savings, and wealth concentrates in the capitalists’ hands. A higher profit share and wealth share both put pressure on accumulation: but the long-run growth rate, which is anchored to labor productivity growth, has fallen. To restore balanced growth, the capital-income ratio must rise, independent of the elasticity of substitution. These tendencies are not inevitable: taxation can be used to implement any wealth distribution targeted by policymakers; while worker-crushing institutional arrangements can also in principle be reversed through policy. Neither change appears likely given the current institutional and global policy climate.