Logische Untersuchungen Research Articles

The Logic Question: Marx, Trendelenburg, and the Critique of Hegel

Abstract This paper provides a reconstruction and analysis of Marx’s early engagements with logic, and especially his studies of Hegel’s logic, on the one hand, and Hegel’s great if often overlooked critic Adolf Trendelenburg, on the other. It itemises the archival evidence that Marx read and planned to compose a Hegelian response to Trendelenburg’s devastating attack on dialectics in his 1840 Logische Untersuchungen – the work that arguably did more than any other single text to destroy the influence of Hegelianism among German intellectuals at the time. It argues that the young Marx was a more sophisticated reader of Hegel and of philosophy in general than is typically acknowledged. Against the backdrop of these claims, it then proposes a new reading of Marx’s work from 1839 to 1842 – one that takes the emphasis off the familiar distinction between materialism and idealism, which was as much an invention of Engels’s later interpretations of the early Marx as it was an invention of Marx himself, and places it instead on what early nineteenth-century thinkers would have understood to be the more comprehensive question of logic.

A influência husserliana na ética material de Max Scheler

This article intends to show a foundation for the possibility of the values intuition in Max Scheler’s material ethics, putting light into the influences suffered by the Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological proposal. The intentionality of consciousness, developed by Husserl in Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (1913), and the phenomenological investigations present in Logische Untersuchungen (1901) are highlighted in this article. According to Husserl, in the phenomenological relation between the consciousness and the world, the human being intuits the universal which are a priori, necessary and transcendent through the categorical intuition. This intentional consciousness is the same as that which intuits the values in the practical dimension through the schelerian emotional intuition. So, the values are a priori, universal, necessary and transcendent as well. Therefore, the discussion about the possibility of knowledge of values pervades the problem about the knowledge’s possibility of universal brought by Husserl. The development of the research takes the form of philosophical investigation in which an identifiable object is defined, the comparative study between the Husserlian and Schelerian phenomenological proposals from the approach of universals.

Obligation and Value in the Phenomenological Philosophy of Law (Edmund Husserl’s Works)

Basing upon the two fundamental works of Edmund Husserl (Logische Untersuchungen and Idee) the author presents Husserl’s concepts of obligation and value according to the phenomenological reduction and the theory of the constitution of objects. Within the context of reduction the conclusions are: as according to Husserl the substance of normative sentences in valuation, the problems of obligation may be reduced to problems of valuation. The sense (Sinn) proves to be fundamental, prior to the existence. If anything should come to being in the ontological meaning it must become a moment of intentional life of consciousness. That is why the object and value exist in the same way but are only different names of some units of sense. The difference becomes clearer on a ‘higher’ level when they are characterised as intentional objects and the intentional experience directed towards them. Contrary to objects we can be directed towards values in a perceptible way (erfassenseise). The experience of value is always a based act. These acts are analysed against the background of noesis and noema. On the stage of constitution of the world it appears however that the substance of morality may be cognised with a personalistic attitude.

Göttingen contra Husserl: The Transcendental Turn and its Discontents

In this article I attempt to deal with Husserl’s transcendental turn in connection with the reception by the Göttingen circle through three different aspects. My contribution aims to be chiefly historical, in order to provide a general picture of one of the most important events in the history of phenomenology, but also to enact possible systematic consequences related to the interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology after this event. First, I briefly recover the background within which Husserl erected with his Logische Untersuchungen, going over his development until the publication of his Ideen I, reconstructing the main points and features expounded in the latter that characterized transcendental phenomenology. Secondly, I put forward a general characterization of some of the main critiques raised by his students at the time, namely the concept of pure consciousness and world, as well as the performance of the phenomenological method. Thirdly, I attempt to expose, by means of Husserl’s later texts, some of his main responses to misunderstandings regarding his phenomenology.

A Critical Analysis of Blaustein\u2019s Polemic Against Husserl\u2019s Method

The aim of the article is to define and investigate an interpretative framework for the philosophy of Leopold Blaustein, a student of Twardowski in Lwów (Lvov, Lviv) and Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. The author defends the thesis that it is justified to refer to Blaustein’s philosophy not as phenomenology sensu stricto, but as a phenomenologically-oriented descriptive psychology related but not equivalent to the project expounded by Husserl in the first edition of Logische Untersuchungen as well as in his project of phenomenological psychology (as formulated in 1925). The article traces Blaustein’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenological methods, putting it in the historical context of the discussion with Ingarden. Next, the author juxtaposes Blaustein’s understanding of psychology with Husserl’s project of 1925, which makes it possible to identify not only the differences between the two projects, but also their similarities. The article also raises questions about the scope of descriptive-psychological analyses.

Die Rhetorik (in) der Phänomenologie

Abstract Dedicated to the interrelation between philosophy and rhetoric, this article focuses on the rhetoric of philosophy, respectively a rhetoric in the service of philosophy. Here, rhetoric is not understood as a mere art of eloquence or sophistry. Rather, the term defines: first, speech and persuasion as a spontaneous, pre-theoretical and communicative ability of humans, second, the regular and systematic use of this ability, and, finally, the technique of persuasion itself. In this article, special attention is paid to the rhetorical means that play a central role in the constitution and assertion of science and theory. In particular, the article investigates the rhetoric of phenomenology as conception and as use of language in the aversion of rhetoric in Edmund Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen and in Heidegger’s affinity for rhetoric in Sein und Zeit. Initially, it outlines the respective conceptions of language in Husserl and Heidegger and scrutinizes their mutual influences in order to reconstruct the network of transfer, continuation, and repercussion that characterizes the relation between both authors. In a second step, it focuses on Heidegger’s use of language.

Re-examining Husserl’s Non-Conceptualism in the Logical Investigations

Abstract A recent trend in Husserl scholarship takes the Logische Untersuchungen (LU) as advancing an inconsistent and confused view of the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience. Against this, I argue that there is no inconsistency about non-conceptualism in LU. Rather, LU presents a hybrid view of the conceptual nature of perceptual experience, which can easily be misread as inconsistent, since it combines a conceptualist view of perceptual content (or matter) with a non-conceptualist view of perceptual acts. I show how this hybrid view is operative in Husserl’s analyses of essentially occasional expressions and categorial intuition. And I argue that is also deployed in relation to Husserl’s analysis of the constitution of perceptual fullness, which allows it to avoid an objection raised by Walter Hopp – that the combination of Husserl’s analysis of perceptual fullness with conceptualism about perceptual content generates a vicious regress.

El método husserliano en las "Logische Untersuchungen"

Our proposal is that there exists already a method in Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen. Nevertheless, this method is operative, but not thematized. We characterize it as follows: analytic, descriptive, pure, reductive, intuitive, reflexive, variational and functional. Concerning Logische Untersuchungen, analysis of significations fulfills a strategic role of mediation between mathesis universalis’ analysis and phenomenology’s analysis. Finally, one of the leading features of Husserlian method is reflexion considered as anábasis of pneuma.

Las "Ideas" de Husserl y "Ser y Tiempo" de Heidegger

Speaking about the influence Husserl had on his early thinking Heidegger later on always referred to Husserl's 'Logische Untersuchungen' (1900/01), emphasizing the attitude of critical distance he had towards the "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie" (1913) and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology pointed out there. Nevertheless, as shown in this paper, it is evident that in 'Being an Time' Heidegger took over some essential issues from Husserl's later work (as e.g. the transcendental attitude, the claim of phenomenology to be a "productive logic" and the conception of "regional ontologies"). But it is also clear that he was also essentially changing their character.

Tres críticas de Heidegger a las bases de la fenomenología de Husserl

<p align="justify">La finalidad de este trabajo es la elucidación de los problemas de la interpretación heideggeriana que pone en relación el hombre, la lógica y la verdad y que han dado pauta a más de un pensar actual. Hemos utilizado la primera edición de las <em>Logische Untersuchungen</em> para adecuarnos a los análisis husserlianos primitivos y, paralelamente, a la lectura que Heidegger realizó de aquel texto y que anunció en más de una ocasión. Con ello, podremos vislumbrar que la lógica y la ontología luchan por colocarse como la ciencia más originaria para la elucidación final del ser. Así, nos preparamos para tomar una posición definitiva frente a la convicción actual que acepta de suyo que el teoreticismo husserliano ha sido superado por el planteamiento pragmático del <em>Dasein</em>.</p>

Cover up that phenomenon, which I can’t endure to look on. About the right to see everything (or not) in phenomenology: Husserl between Brentano and Natorp

Abstract By its very name, phenomenology seems to invoke a priority claim on phenomena. And yet it has not been necessary to wait for phenomenology in oder to have a proper account of phenomena. One need only to take a look at the history of philosophy, from Plato to Kant, as well as at the history of sciences, from physics to psychology, so as to register a wide range of uses concerning the concept of phenomenon. The understanding of what a phenomenon is, in a phenomenological sense, should therefore at least not be completely compatible with any other, if phenomenology has to exist as a discipline and as a method. That is one of the issues at stake in the debate between phenomenology and neokantianism, between Husserl, to a certain extent Brentano, and Natorp. It is on this debate that we shall draw attention, if we wish to grasp the reasons behind the phenomenological conception of the phenomenon, especially at the time of the Logische Untersuchungen.

Act Psychology and Phenomenology: Husserl on Egoic Acts

Husserl famously retracted his early portrayal, in Logische Untersuchungen, of phenomenology as empirical psychology. Previous scholarship has typically understood this transcendental turn in light of the Ideen’s revised conception of the ἐποχή, and its distinction between noesa and noemata. This essay thematizes the evolution of the concept of mental acts in Husserl’s work as a way of understanding the shift. I show how the recognition of the pure ego in Ideen I and II enabled Husserl to radically alter his conception of mental acts, coming to understand them all in terms of genuine acts (doings or performances) in a way that had been essentially precluded for descriptive psychologists (Brentano, Natorp, and the early Husserl) so long as the pure ego was denied. This reading challenges a widespread assumption in the secondary literature that “mental act” is a merely technical term or misnomer.

Philosophia fundamentalis Friedricha Adolfa Trendelenburga

Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg’s philosophia fundamentalis: Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802–1872) is an author who connects two periods. On the one hand, he attended the lectures of one of the first followers of Immanuel Kant — Karl Leonhard Reinhold, he knew personally
 and was influenced by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. On the other hand, Trendelenburg has educated a very large group of important figures within the German philosophy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (e.g., Wilhelm Dilthey, Franz Brentano and Hermann Cohen). His main work, Logische Untersuchungen (Logical investigations), was to see its release in three editions during his life. In the second edition Trendelenburg adds an introductory chapter, entitled Logik und Metaphysik als grundlegende Wissenschaft [Logic and metaphysics as a basic science]. It presents the idea of philosophy as a science and, like a lens, focuses on the most influential metaphilosophical solutions of the second half of the nineteenth century. The article in its first part presents the academic biography of Trendelenburg, while in the second it discusses the most important meta‑philosophical problems raised in Logische Untersuchungen.

Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations. Volume I. Prolegomena to Pure Logic

This is a translation from Russian to English of Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky’s review of the first Russian translation of volume one of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen (the “Prolegomena to Pure Logic”), which was translated by E. A. Berstein and published in 1909 by a Petersburgian editor. The review appeared in the Muscovite philosophical journal Pyccкaя мыcль (Russian Thought) in 1909. In this short text, Lossky expresses his agreement with Husserl’s early anti-psychologism in logic. He also manifests his stance against logical and axiological relativism and naturalism. As an ontological realist, Lossky thought he had found in the author of the Logische Untersuchungen an ally against the subjectivistic trends then still prevalent in Germany. The review is significant in intellectual history for its vanguard role in the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Husserl’s thought in Russia. (Frederic Tremblay)

Nikolai Lossky’s Reception and Criticism of Husserl

Nikolai Lossky is key to the history of the Husserl-Rezeption in Russia. He was the first to publish a review of the Russian translation of Husserl’s first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen that appeared in 1909. He also published a presentation and criticism of Husserl’s transcendental idealism in 1939. An English translation of both of Lossky’s publications is offered in this volume for the first time. The present paper, which is intended as an introduction to these documents, situates Lossky within the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Husserl in Russia and explains why he is central to it. It also explains what Lossky principally found in Husserl: he saw in the latter’s critique of psychologism support for his own ontology, epistemology, and axiology. Lossky characterizes his ontology as an ideal-realism. According to ideal-realism, both the realm of ideal beings (in Plato’s sense) and the realm of real beings (i.e., the world of becoming) are mind-independent. Per his epistemology, which he calls “intuitivism,” real beings are intuited by sensual intuition and ideal beings by intellectual intuition. The realm of ideal beings includes the subrealm of values, which is intuited by axiological intuition. This thoroughly realist conception contrasted sharply with the subjectivist tendencies of the time. So, when Lossky took cognizance of Husserl’s critique of psychologism, he thereupon found an ally in his battle against the various subjectivisms. But, when Husserl took the transcendental idealist turn, Lossky was at the forefront of the backlash against the new direction Husserl wanted to give to phenomenology.

La fenomenologia del volere: Husserl, Pfänder e Geiger

The will is one of the most consistent focuses of much of Husserl’s work beginning with the Logische Untersuchungen and continuing through his reflections in the 1930s. Any phenomenology of experience must account for the fact that every moment of our lives is marked by tension of will. Such a study, therefore, combines many important and interrelated issues, such as the problematic relationship between the voluntary and the involuntary sphere of the ego’s life. Over the history of the phenomenological movement, Husserl was not the only one to dedicate so much attention to the phenomenon of will. In addition to outlining Husserl’s phenomenology, this paper explores the phenomenological analyses of Alexander Pfander and Moritz Geiger. In the wake of the traditional philosophical concept of the will, Pfander considers the will as a dimension of pure activity and self-determination, whose peculiar trait is the so-called geistiger Schlag . Instead, Geiger points out the complexity of the voluntary dimension and advances the paradoxical hypothesis of the existence of a non-experienced will. Husserl moves deeper into this latter direction when he highlights the overall dimension of the will, which permeates the entire life of the ego even in the form of the Willenpassivitat .

Husserl’s philosophy of mathematics: its origin and relevance

This paper offers an exposition of Husserl's mature philosophy of mathematics, expounded for the first time in Logische Untersuchungen and maintained without any essential change throughout the rest of his life. It is shown that Husserl's views on mathematics were strongly influenced by Riemann, and had clear affinities with the much later Bourbaki school.

El método husserliano en las Logische Untersuchungen

Our proposal is that there exists already a method in Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen. Nevertheless, this method is operative, but not thematized. We characterize it as follows: analytic, descriptive, pure, reductive, intuitive, reflexive, variational and functional. Concerning Logische Untersuchungen , analysis of significations fulfills a strategic role of mediati on between mathesis universalis’ analysis and phenomenology’s analysis. Finally, one of the leading features of Husserlian method is reflexion considered as anabasis of pneuma .

Introduction to Enzo Paci's Presentation at the 10th Triennial

October 01 2002 Introduction to Enzo Paci's Presentation at the 10th Triennial Giovanni Anceschi Giovanni Anceschi Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Giovanni Anceschi Online Issn: 1531-4790 Print Issn: 0747-9360 © 2002 Massachusetts Institute of Technology2002 Design Issues (2002) 18 (4): 48–53. https://doi.org/10.1162/074793602320827433 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Giovanni Anceschi; Introduction to Enzo Paci's Presentation at the 10th Triennial. Design Issues 2002; 18 (4): 48–53. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/074793602320827433 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsDesign Issues Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2002 Massachusetts Institute of Technology2002 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY AND WEYL'S PREDICTIVISM

In this paper I discuss the version of predicative analysis put forward by Hermann Weyl in Das Kontinuum. I try to establish how much of the underlying motivation for Weyl's position may be due to his acceptance of a phenomenological philosophical perspective. More specifically, I analyze Weyl's philosophical ideas in connexion with the work of Husserl, in particular Logische Untersuchungen} and Ideen .