Logical Positivism Research Articles

Empiricism and Realism Reconciled in Agazzi’s Conception of Scientific Objectivity

Evandro Agazzi has shown the possibility of a reconciliation between logical empiricism and realism through the proposal of his conception of scientific objectivity, which replaces the notion of entity with that of object, conceived as a structured set of properties. This conception, on the one hand, has been developed from a more empiricist perspective, according to which the reality of the object is shifted to one of its predictable properties, and on the other hand, has produced his fruitful criticism of the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics and his demand for a realist interpretation based on the introduction of new non-classical concepts.

Does Physics Need Metaphysics?

A number of thinkers both past and present have been skeptical of the role of metaphysics for science. The early modern philosopher David Hume denigrated metaphysics as an attempt to “penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding,” while the Logical Positivists saw metaphysics as meaningless, wholly useless to scientific inquiry. In contrast to these thinkers stands the early modern philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. A mathematician and scientist himself, Leibniz developed a variety of metaphysical principles entailed centrally by his Principle of Sufficient Reason. Leibniz utilized these principles to address scientific topics of his day, including, but not limited to, the relative nature of space and the heliocentric model of the universe. Drawing on Leibniz’s diverse corpus, I will reconstruct his formulations of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the Principle of Perfection, and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, providing the intellectual context for their development. I will then argue through examples that his metaphysical principles illustrate the utility of metaphysics for natural science, for they can be used to both ground the logical coherence of the discipline of physics and serve as practical methodological guides for theory development and selection.

Kant's nutshell argument for idealism

AbstractThe significance or vacuity of the statement, “Everything has just doubled in size,” attracted considerable attention last century from scientists and philosophers. Presenting his conventionalism in geometry, Poincaré insisted on the emptiness of a hypothesis that all objects have doubled in size overnight. Such expansion could have meaning, he argued, “only for those who reason as if space were absolute … it would be better to say that space being relative, nothing at all has happened.” The logical empiricists concurred, viewing the universal doubling hypothesis as illustrating the intrinsic metrical amorphousness of continuous manifolds. It is striking, therefore, to find Kant invoking a universal contraction in space and time to support his famous doctrine of transcendental idealism. In one of several completely neglected passages, he writes: “The proof that the things in space and time are mere appearances can also be grounded on the fact that the whole world could be contained in a nutshell and the entirety of elapsed time in a second without the least difference being met with.” Kant's “also” may suggest an idealist argument distinct from any proposed in published works. Here I ask: What is the meaning of Kant's Nutshell Argument for Idealism?

KUHN AND THE MYSTERY OF CONSTITUTING THOUGHT, WORD AND DEED INTO A WORLD

Ever since my first book, Social Epistemology, I have argued that Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science presupposes a version of ‘many worlds realism’. This paper continues that line of argument by situating Kuhn’s thinking about language and science in the context of shifting philosophical developments in the 1950s-1970s. Kuhn’s view is related to others exposed to the same developments, especially Willard Quine, Donald Davidson, Wolfgang Stegmüller and Karl Popper. Notably, Quine and Davidson were not tempted to go down the ‘many worlds’ route, largely due to a background commitment to a behaviorist understanding of language that precluded any role for ‘world-making’. However, Alfred Tarski’s ‘semantic’ theory of truth made a notable impression on the logical positivists and Popper, inclining the latter towards his own version of many worlds realism. As Kuhn astutely observed in his later writings, whether one adopted a monist or pluralist approach to the world depended on whether translation or meaning was the key to making sense of language. The paper ends by suggesting that the German historiographical concept of Sonderweg (‘special way’) might provide an interesting, more normatively charged understanding of the sort of many worlds realism promoted by Kuhn.

History, historiography, and stories of logical empiricism

History, historiography, and stories of logical empiricism

Communicative Philosophy of Science: Genesis and Contemporary Trends of Development

The study is dedicated to modelling the contemporary portrayal of the philosophy of science. The essence of its theses is elucidated through the following assertions: a) right from its beginning, a communicative potential was embedded within the philosophy of science; b) its origin arises from a culmination of predecessors’ accomplishments; c) the value of the communicative approach in the philosophy of science lies in its acceptance rather than opposition to the formal direction. The analysis is conducted retrospectively. The emergence of ideas within communicative philosophy of science is noticeable in its relevant relationship with the evolution of theories in logical positivism, rhetoric, pragmatism, linguistics, philosophy of language, and sociology of science. Analytical, synthetic, historical, rhetorical and structural-functional methodologies were used in the investigation. The findings of the study confirmed the hypothesis: communicative philosophy of science represents a historical combination of the field’s achievements, incorporating rhetorical, universalistic and particularistic developmental perspectives.

Understanding the Nature of Religious Language: A Philosophical Perspective

The paper explores the debate on religious language by considering several key perspectives: the logical positivists’ criterion of meaningfulness, Karl Popper's falsifiability principle, the parable of the invisible gardener, and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of language games. By examining these views, we aim to understand whether religious language can be considered meaningful or whether it fails to meet the standards set by these philosophical frameworks.

The life sciences and the history of analytic philosophy.

Comparative to the commonplace focus onto developments in mathematics and physics, the life sciences appear to have received relatively sparse attention within the early history of analytic philosophy. This paper addresses two related aspects of this phenomenon. On the one hand, it asks: to the extent that the significance of the life sciences was indeed downplayed by early analytic philosophers, why was this the case? An answer to this question may be found in Bertrand Russell's 1914 discussions of the relation between biology and philosophy. Contrary to received views of the history of analytic philosophy, Russell presented his own 'logical atomism' in opposition not only to British Idealism, but also to 'evolutionism'. On the other hand, I will question whether this purported neglect of the life sciences does indeed accurately characterise the history of analytic philosophy. In answering this, I turn first to Susan Stebbing's criticisms of Russell's overlooking of biology, her influence on J.H. Woodger, and her critical discussion of T.H. Huxley's and C.H. Waddington's application of evolutionary views to philosophical questions. I then discuss the case of Moritz Schlick, whose evolutionist philosophy has been overlooked within recent debates concerning Logical Empiricism's relation to the philosophy of biology.

G. H. von Wright on Logical Empiricism

Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003) started his studies in theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki in 1934. His teacher, Professor Eino Kaila (1890–1958), was an associate of the Vienna Circle who had changed the course of Finnish philosophy with his own version of logical empiricism. Under Kaila’s supervision, von Wright wrote his early studies on probability and defended his doctoral thesis The Logical Problem of Induction in 1941. Von Wright met Ludwig Wittgenstein in Cambridge in 1939 and 1947 and eventually became his successor there in 1948–1951. Later, von Wright characterized these two philosophers as his “father figures”: “Kaila had turned me into a logical positivist or empiricist. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, thoroughly eradicated this personality of mine.” This article studies von Wright’s changing relation to logical empiricism. The main sources include his correspondence with Kaila in 1937–1958 and his books Den logiska empirismen (in Swedish in 1943; in Finnish in 1945) and Logik, filosofi och språk (in Swedish in 1957, in Finnish in 1958). In his “Intellectual Autobiography” (1989), von Wright described the former book as “a farewell to the philosophy of my student years”. Wittgenstein’s influence can be seen in von Wright’s denial of the unity of science and his cool cultural pessimism as expressed in his critical essays. But it is also evident that logic and exact thinking continued to be central tools and ingredients of his subsequent and highly appreciated work as an analytic philosopher.

Religion and Its Position in the Society: A Critical Study on Rudolf Carnap’s Thoughts

The battle between rationalism and empiricism is a reaction arising from an attempt to have an understanding of reality. Wilhelm Dilthey’s critique of positivism gave birth to the Vienna Circle with his ideas on logical positivism or neo-positivism. This paper explains Rudolf Carnap’s, the most prominent figure, thoughts of the understanding of religious theology’s position in logical positivism. The research results state that: first, the Vienna Circle significantly contributed to the development of contemporary philosophy; second, they were based on verification-confirmation, metaphysical elimination, and combination of knowledge aspects; and third, the transcendental philosophy offered by Immanuel Kant was on which our further studies were based. Transcendental philosophy was born out of “conflict” between empiricism and rationalism.

Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Theological Method and Metaphysics

After the rise of logical positivism, even in the realm of theology, there was a trend to give up on accepting the actions of God in history as objective acts and to create an atmosphere of separating faith and reason. Wolfhart Pannenberg’s work presents a compelling integration of theology with the rational and empirical rigors of the scientific age. Through a comprehensive theological method, he aimed to establish a dialogue between faith and scientific inquiry, challenging the exclusivity of logical positivism by proposing a theological metaphysics grounded in the concept of retroactive ontology. Pannenberg’s approach is distinguished by its systematic application of hermeneutics, considering the totality of history as the context for divine revelation, and positioning the resurrection of Jesus Christ as a pivotal event that embodies God’s influence on the world. His innovative ontology, which enables one to consider divine action as objective, seeks to validate theology as a science, engaging with natural sciences to foster a mutual enrichment between faith and reason. Pannenberg’s methodological rigor and metaphysical framework offer a robust foundation for a theology that is both intellectually defensible and deeply rooted in Christian faith, advocating for a theology of nature that reconciles the divine with the empirical world.

Carnaps fråga och teologins gåta

In this text, I develop my earlier argument on the possibility of a non-confessional theological inquiry, and hence an intellectual practice devoted to the classical theological problems that begin with reason rather than faith, at secular universities in Sweden, a country with no state church and many different religions and denominations. I answer the criticism against this tentative proposal by returning to Rudolf Carnap's discussion of Friedrich Gogarten's theological tractate Die religiöse Entscheidung (1921). The logical positivist was amazed that Gogarten was so boldly staking out a new area of reality, and he wanted to know how he could see what Gogarten saw. "Gogarten can rightly say that I am blind", Carnap wrote, and "my non-seeing would not be an objection for him, but would only show that I am not (yet) one of the elect". But Carnap continued by stating that this would lead to a relativistic outcome that he could not assent to due to his "belief in reason" (Vernunftglaube). Accepting Carnap's criticism of relativism but deconstructing the difference between what he called the question (die Frage) and the puzzle or mystery (das Rätsel), I show how theological questions still emerge in the sciences and that there is a link between questions and mysteries. Insisting that Carnap's own belief in reason is a good indication of the relation between die Frage and das Rätsel, and hence between science and what the logical positivist would describe as metaphysics, I argue that systematic theology not only has a prominent and vital role at a secular university, as the science that investigates shapes and discusses theological discourses wherever they appear. It also asks (and might even give tentative answers to) the problematic question of the truth of these discourses, since I show that Carnap's, ultimately Diltheyan, attempt to differentiate understanding (verstehen) from explanation (erklären), cannot hold. Theology is, in this sense, not only an attempt to describe and explain how different religions think. It is also a critical and philosophical discussion of these thought systems' meaning and truth content. Theology thereby reminds the university of the interconnection between science and mystery, truth and meaning.

‚Wir werden wissen!‘ [...] ‚Ja, aber nicht ganz‘. Zur Vernunftkritik bei Hans Magnus Enzensberger

This interdisciplinary study closes a research gap by demonstrating the influence of Adorno’s critique of logical positivism on Hans Magnus Enzensberger. The main focus is on Enzensberger’s collection ‘The Elixirs of Science’, where Enzensberger circles around the theme of science, which he always combines dialectically with the theme of the limits of knowledge. This article shows that his approach can be assigned to the paradigm of the critique of reason and that he can even be described as a pioneer of this paradigm in German literature.

Susan Stebbing on Logical Positivism and Communication

In this paper, I look at Susan Stebbing’s articles and reviews that critically engage logical positivism. These appeared before the publication of A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic and helped shape the early British reception of logical positivism. I highlight Stebbing’s adoption of G. E. Moore’s tripartite distinction between knowing a proposition, understanding it, and giving an analysis of it and, in light of this distinction, her focus on whether the principle of verifiability can ground a plausible account of communication. Stebbing thinks not, and I reconstruct her reasons, as well as her own account of communication. In doing this, I relate her criticisms to her rejection of methodological solipsism and her dissatisfaction with the logical positivist treatment of statements about other minds and the past. I also argue that Stebbing’s work provides a bridge to later criticisms of logical positivism by ordinary language philosophers. Foregrounding Stebbing’s engagement with logical positivism, especially her focus on communication, paints a fuller picture of how the logical positivists came to be part of analytic philosophy despite having different concerns than many of the British philosophers engaging their work.

Schlick, intuition, and the history of epistemology

AbstractMaria Rosa Antognazza's work has issued a historical challenge to the thesis that the analysis of knowledge (as justified true belief) attacked by epistemologists from Gettier onwards was indeed the standard view traditionally upheld from Plato onwards. This challenge led to an ongoing reappraisal of the historical significance of intuitive knowledge, in which the knower is intimately connected to what is known. Such traditional accounts of intuition, and their accompanying claims to epistemological primacy, constituted the precise target of Moritz Schlick's critique. Schlick engages with this topic throughout his oeuvre, from some of his early epistemological writings, to his anti‐metaphysical stance as a leading Logical Empiricist. Schlick crucially distinguishes knowledge from mere acquaintance, denying that the latter has epistemic status. He therefore argues that the very notion of ‘intuitive knowledge’ is a contradictio in adjecto.

Two Critics of Logical Positivism: Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn

Criticisms of the understanding of science and philosophy put forward by logical positivism are varied. Some of them are philosophers who, with a radical objection, reject almost all the principles of positivism and claim that a philosophy that excludes metaphysics will cease to be philosophy. On the other hand, there have been philosophers who have not completely abandoned the ideal of scientific thought, but have proposed different criteria or perspectives, stating that the principles of Logical positivism are wrong. In this study, we will discuss the thoughts of Karl Popper, who offers alternative perspectives on the nature, validity and limits of scientific knowledge, and Thomas Kuhn, who criticized Popper as well as positivists, which we can include in the second group. Keywords: Logical Positivism, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Falsificationism, Paradigm Shift.

Reflecting on the Distinction between Philosophical Daoism and Religious Daoism Based on the Transmission and Transformation of the Concept of “Philosophy”

The distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism is widely influential yet highly controversial. The current popular empirical methods often overlook the vicissitude of the concepts underlying the reception history of this distinction. Therefore, this article adopts the method of intellectual history, based on the transmission and transformation of the concept of philosophy, to examine the rationales of the establishment and reception of this Daoist distinction. Here, we present that, though the Confucian tradition of ranking Daoist figures provided soil for this Daoist distinction, the establishment of the dichotomy with terminological awareness should be attributed to the cooperation between Victorian Protestant intellectuals and their late Qing Confucian collaborators. The concept of philosophy that pursues eternal wisdom and truth and traces the origin of all things has played an essential role in the establishment of this distinction. The thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi was valued and preferred in mainland China because of its deemed congruence with this Western concept of philosophy, while other more religious branches of Daoism were belittled. However, the philosophies of anti-metaphysics engender a new paradigm of thinking. On the one hand, under the influence of logical positivism and its successors, natural science has become an excellent model for other studies. In light of empirical methods, the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism becomes an erroneous and inefficient metaphysical distinction. On the other hand, inspired by continental philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida, scholars gained a new perspective on understanding the thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi. Thus, a new consensus emerges: eternal truth based on concepts and logic distorts the real world of life. According to this, the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism is only an imaginary and conceptual distinction, which does not apply to the understanding of living Daoism.

The development of the analytical philosophy of language from the problem of meaning to the theory of speech acts

The subject of the study is the development of the analytical philosophy of language in the twentieth century from the problem of meaning, which was central to the logic of G. Frege, in logical positivism and in the philosophy of B. Russell, to the theory of speech acts, that is, the development from semantics to pragmatics. The main attention is focused on such problems as the problem of the essence of language, the problem of meaning and reference, the nature of communication, and the theory of speech acts. The purpose of the study is to identify the features of the concepts of meaning in different representatives of analytical philosophy. A special place is given in this context to the ideas of L. Wittgenstein and H. Putnam's. It is also important to find out the reasons for the transition of analytical philosophy to communication problems. The specific features of the concepts of speech acts by such thinkers as D. Austin and D. Searle are also considered. The article uses such research methods as historical and philosophical analysis, socio-critical, as well as comparative methods. The novelty of the research lies in identifying how philosophers followed the path of updating and deepening the problem of meaning and reference, as well as what the specifics of each solution are. The changes that took place in the philosophy of language in the twentieth century, introduced, first of all, by L. Wittgenstein during the "linguistic turn", are considered. Significant innovations introduced into the descriptive-analytical linguistic theory of speech acts related to the names of D. Austin and D. Searle are also shown. Austin's characterized and classified speech acts, D. Searle's combined the problem of speech communication with the problem of intentionality, as a fundamental ability of human consciousness. A critical flaw in the theory of speech acts is pointed out: in fact, it does not explain the nature of dialogue, since it presents a variety of monologues.

The Difficult Struggle with Metaphysics

The article traces the crisis of intellectual and political situation in which the Vienna Circle operated. It is shown that the struggle against metaphysics was a common task of its participants. Forms and methods of metaphysical criticism are considered. The role of neo-Kantianism in the formation of logical empiricism is evaluated. The origins of the profound rift in German-speaking, and then Western philosophy as a whole, are analyzed.

Ingeborg Bachmann und der Wiener Kreis

When Ingeborg Bachmann began studying philosophy, the Vienna Circle of Logical Empiricism had long since ceased to exist. What Bachmann may have found in this regard at the University of Vienna were traces, and traces of the Vienna Circle can also be found in her dissertation. This article attempts to pursue both. Its path leads from a sketch of institutional philosophy at the University of Vienna in the years after 1945 via a concise overview of the Vienna Circle to the references to it in Bachmann's doctoral thesis.