Logical Pluralism Research Articles

The normative problem for logical pluralism

It is commonly thought that logic, whatever it may be, is normative. While accounting for the normativity of logic is a challenge for any view of logic, in this paper I argue that it is particularly problematic for certain types of logical pluralists, due to what I call the normative problem for logical pluralism (NPLP). I introduce the NPLP, distinguish it from other problems that logical pluralists may face, and show that it is unsolvable for one prominent type of logical pluralism.

Value Pluralism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy: Waldron and Berlin in Debate

AbstractJeremy Waldron claims that Isaiah Berlin wrongly neglects, and is hostile to, constitutional and democratic institutions. I argue that although Berlin offers no extended discussion of constitutionalism or democracy, he is not hostile to them. Moreover, the logic of Berlin's value pluralism is strongly supportive of these ideas—for example, it fits well with constitutionalist notions such as the separation of powers and checks and balances. On the other hand, Waldron's rejection of judicial review on the ground of democracy is questionable in these same pluralist terms. Here I argue that Berlinian pluralism supports democracy as long as this is inclusive in its outcomes. But contemporary democracy cannot be relied upon to be sufficiently inclusive, in part because of the effects of the war on terror and the rise of populism. Under these conditions it is unwise for pluralists to dispense with judicial review.

Variations on intra-theoretical logical pluralism: internal versus external consequence

Intra-theoretical logical pluralism is a form of meaning-invariant pluralism about logic, articulated recently by Hjortland (Australas J Philos 91(2):355–373, 2013). This version of pluralism relies on it being possible to define several distinct notions of provability relative to the same logical calculus. The present paper picks up and explores this theme: How can a single logical calculus express several different consequence relations? The main hypothesis articulated here is that the divide between the internal and external consequence relations in Gentzen systems generates a form of intra-theoretical logical pluralism.

Implicit and Explicit Stances in Logic

We identify a pervasive contrast between implicit and explicit stances in logical analysis and system design. Implicit systems change received meanings of logical constants and sometimes also the notion of consequence, while explicit systems conservatively extend classical systems with new vocabulary. We illustrate the contrast for intuitionistic and epistemic logic, then take it further to information dynamics, default reasoning, and other areas, to show its wide scope. This gives a working understanding of the contrast, though we stop short of a formal definition, and acknowledge limitations and borderline cases. Throughout we show how awareness of the two stances suggests new logical systems and new issues about translations between implicit and explicit systems, linking up with foundational concerns about identity of logical systems. But we also show how a practical facility with these complementary working styles has philosophical consequences, as it throws doubt on strong philosophical claims made by just taking one design stance and ignoring alternative ones. We will illustrate the latter benefit for the case of logical pluralism and hyper-intensional semantics.

Extensionality for fusions and pluralities

One of the more persistent debates in mereology is whether distinct wholes can have the same parts. Extensional mereologists hold that if there is no part that makes the difference, then there is nothing to distinguish the wholes, so sameness of parts implies identity. Non-extensionalists, however, do think there are cases where distinct wholes share all their parts. This paper argues that the kind of argument non-extensionalists employ can also be levelled against a widely accepted extensionality principle of plural logic. Non-extensionalists thus face a dilemma: either give up the argument for non-extensional mereology, or deny both the extensionality principle of mereology and the analogous principle for plural logic.

Movimientos sociales y cambio social. ¿Una lógica o varias lógicas de acción colectiva?

Este trabajo pone en cuestión el supuesto, muy extendido en la teoría sociológica, de que los movimientos sociales son los agentes por excelencia del cambio social. Aquí se propone una reformulación conceptual en el campo del estudio de la acción colectiva (y en particular de la acción colectiva informal, campo donde se insertan los movimientos). Para ello, se da, en primer lugar, entrada a la noción de "acción colectiva de masas", como alternativa más precisa conceptualmente, y también valorativamente más neutra, que la de "turba" (mob) o "muchedumbre" (crowd) utilizada por historiadores sociales y sociólogos de la historia. En segundo lugar, se hace un balance de lo que la teoría sociológica postolsoniana de la acción ha aportado al conocimiento del fenómeno de la acción colectiva. El trabajo pretende mostrar que esta aportación es ya, hoy, sustantiva, y que, contrariamente a supuestos heredados, permite concluir inequívocamente que no hay una lógica unitaria, sino plural de la acción colectiva.

PARADOXES AND STRUCTURAL RULES FROM A DIALOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

AbstractIn recent years, substructural approaches to paradoxes have become quite popular. But whatever restrictions on structural rules we may want to enforce, it is highly desirable that such restrictions be accompanied by independent philosophical motivation, not directly related to paradoxes. Indeed, while these recent developments have shed new light on a number of issues pertaining to paradoxes, it seems that we now have even more open questions than before, in particular two very pressing ones: what (independent) motivations do we have (if any) for restrictions on structural rules, and what to make of the plurality of new logics emerging from these restrictions, i.e. how to ‘choose’ among the different options. In this paper, we address these two questions from the perspective of a dialogical conception of logic that we've been advocating in recent years. We will argue that dialogical interpretations of structural rules, that is, as rules determining specific properties of the dialogues in question, provide a conveniently neutral framework to adjudicate between the different substructural proposals that have been made in the literature on paradoxes.

Logical pluralism without the normativity

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one logic. Logical normativism is the view that logic is normative. These positions have often been assumed to go hand-in-hand, but we show that one can be a logical pluralist without being a logical normativist. We begin by arguing directly against logical normativism. Then we reformulate one popular version of pluralism—due to Beall and Restall—to avoid a normativist commitment. We give three non-normativist pluralist views, the most promising of which depends not on logic’s normativity but on epistemic goals.

Quantifier Variance Dissolved

AbstractQuantifier variance faces a number of difficulties. In this paper we first formulate the view as holding that the meanings of the quantifiers may vary, and that languages using different quantifiers may be charitably translated into each other. We then object to the view on the basis of four claims: (i) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning extensionally by changing the domain of quantification; (ii) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning intensionally without collapsing into logical pluralism; (iii) quantifier variance is not an ontological doctrine; (iv) quantifier variance is not compatible with charitable translation and as such is internally inconsistent. In light of these troubles, we recommend the dissolution of quantifier variance and suggest that the view be laid to rest.

Perspective and Logical Pluralism in Hegel

AbstractIn this paper, I consider the role of perspective in Hegel’s metaphysics, and in particular the role that multiple perspectives play within the ultimate structure in Hegel’s metaphysics, which Hegel calls ‘the idea [die Idee]’. My (somewhat anachronistic) way into this topic will be to inquire about Hegel’s stance on what Adrian Moore has called ‘absolute representations’. I argue for the claim that perspective is maintained, even in the absolute idea, which generates the task of understanding the nature of that perspective and its compatibility with absoluteness. I attempt to accomplish this task by asking what a logical perspective could be, and how it might be related to visual perspective. Then I inquire into the relation that perspectives have to each other, i.e., to the system of perspectives. I construe those relations in reciprocal and dynamic terms, so that absoluteness takes the form of a structured round of perspectives rather than a relation to reality ‘once and for all’.

Mereological Composition and Plural Quantifier Semantics

Mereological universalists and nihilists disagree on the conditions for composition. In this paper, we show how this debate is a function of one’s chosen semantics for plural quantifiers. Debating mereologists have failed to appreciate this point because of the complexity of the debate and extraneous theoretical commitments. We eliminate this by framing the debate between universalists and nihilists in a formal model where these two theses about composition are contradictory. The examination of the two theories in the model brings clarity to a debate in which opponents frequently talk past one another. With the two views stated precisely, our investigation reveals the dependence of the mereologists’ ontological commitments on the semantics of plural quantifiers. Though we discuss the debate with respect to a simplified and idealized model, the insights provided will make more complex debates on composition more productive and deflationist criticisms of the debate less substantial.

Plural-Marking Strategies in Äiwoo

This paper describes the range of strategies found in Aiwoo (a language of the Temotu subgroup of Oceanic) to mark a noun as having plural reference. Aiwoo lacks an inflectional plural, and most of the strategies typically used in Oceanic languages to indicate plurality, such as articles, reduplication, and number distinctions in demonstratives, are not found in the language. Nevertheless, Aiwoo shows a large number of strategies for marking plurality on nouns. The paper describes these strategies and their affinities with other structural aspects of the language, such as verbal pronominal marking and bound noun roots, and argues that several of their properties appear unusual both from a comparative Oceanic and a general typological perspective. Thus, it expands our understanding of what plural marking in Oceanic languages may look like, as well as adding to the typological picture of plural marking as a linguistic category and of the grammaticalization pathways through which plural forms can arise.

Remade in France: Anglicisms in the Lexicon and Morphology of French by Valérie Saugera

Reviewed by: Remade in France: Anglicisms in the Lexicon and Morphology of French by Valérie Saugera Michael D. Picone Saugera, Valérie. Remade in France: Anglicisms in the Lexicon and Morphology of French. Oxford UP, 2017. ISBN 9780190625542. Pp. xv + 205. Based on its frequent appearance on products in France—and, figuratively, in French media and advertising—the international Anglicism made in, conjoined with USA / France / Europe / Moscou / space / tricot ad infinitum, lends itself to an apt riff for a book title prefiguring two of the unifying themes of this study. First, the profusion of uninflected Anglicisms in French (citing journalistic examples culled from an exhaustive online search of all issues of the neologically-friendly daily Libération in 2010) does not announce the impending collapse of the integrity of the French morphological system—contrary opinions of some pundits notwithstanding—but rather corresponds to a well-circumscribed subsystem consistent with French usage. Secondly, though increasingly profuse, most journalistic Anglicisms, whether words or phrases, are actually fleeting devices for purposes of local-color allusions, style, stance, or humor, usually time-sensitive, leaving only a very small minority destined to have any permanence. Those that do will inevitably take on a life of their own in French due to differing sociocultural context and creative departures. Serving as a poster-Anglicism is people (117–20, 140, 168–69). A probable reduction of English the beautiful people, the now frequent people, sometimes graphologically assimilated (pipeule, pipole), has filled an available lexical slot in French to indicate celebrities of notoriety in the heavily mediatized world of entertainment gossip. Unlike English, French people can be used not only as a cumulative or plural reference but also to designate one individual, and lends itself to improvised derivations (pipeulaire, peoplisation, peoplelisé). Though a noun, it can be recruited to function adjectivally (la presse people). This last example, [End Page 205] however, points to a growing phenomenon of considerable import that has not been developed by Saugera and that compromises somewhat the assurances that English is having no lasting morphosyntactic impact on French. It can be demonstrated that such [noun + noun] constructions, incorporating an ellipsis of the representation of subordination joining the two nouns, have been given a boost, in part, by virtue of contact with English (Anglicisms, Neologisms and Dynamic French, Picone, 1996). This one lacuna notwithstanding, Saugera reasons insightfully to decode the behavior of Anglicisms. Indeed, in a globalized environment thick with Anglicisms, some knowledge of their use is now essential for any educated consumer of French culture, and this is one of the reasons that this book can be recommended to a wide spectrum of readers, both professionals and casual observers, interested in the contemporary profile and future trajectory of the French lexicon. At the same time, Saugera has presented hard data to demonstrate that French journalists are adept at using Anglicisms to advantage without undermining the morphological integrity of the language. Any language must either totally isolate itself or else successfully adapt to its changing environment in order to survive. The former is now virtually impossible, particularly for a global language like French; the latter is the only viable way forward, and Saugera has provided compelling evidence that journalistic handlers of French have successfully embarked upon it. Michael D. Picone University of Alabama Copyright © 2018 American Association of Teachers of French

The coordination of plural logics of action and its consequences: Evidence from plural medical systems.

Drawing on the theory of social action in organizational and institutional sociology, this paper examines the behavioral consequences of plural logics of action. It addresses the question based on the empirical case of plural medical systems that are composed of both biomedicine and alternative medicine. Applying mixed methods of a cross-national panel data analysis and a content analysis of medical journal articles, it finds that plural systems affect health outcomes negatively when tensions between biomedicine and alternative medicine are unaddressed. In contrast, plural systems produce tangible health benefits when biomedicine and alternative medicine are coordinated through government policies or by health care organizations/professionals. This paper proposes plurality coordination as an important mechanism that modifies the behavioral consequences of plural logics. This proposition contributes to providing theoretical answers to the sociological puzzle that plural logics of action produce inconsistent behavioral consequences.

Logical space and the origins of pluralism in logic

The fact that there is a plurality of systems that we call logics makes it requisite to attempt an explanation and thorough evaluation of the role of logic. I exploit the analogical development towards the pluralism of geometry to show that both disciplines are about some kinds of space which they explicate and that we can choose with some freedom the tools for engaging in an enterprise of these disciplines. After revisiting the development of non-classical (i.e. non-Euclidian) geometries, I present logical expressivism, as coined by Robert Brandom, and, returning again to geometry, show that an analogous doctrine of geometrical expressivism can also provide a viable account of the nature and purpose of the discipline and the reasons for plurality of both geometries and logics.

Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective

ABSTRACTThis paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of the connectives or the best logic outside of a specified context are not legitimate questions.

Logical pluralism, indeterminacy and the normativity of logic

According to the form of logical pluralism elaborated by Beall and Restall there is more than one relation of logical consequence. Since they take the relation of logical consequence to reside at the very heart of a logical system, different relations of logical consequence yield different logics. In this paper, we are especially interested in understanding what are the consequences of endorsing Beall and Restall’s version of logical pluralism vis-à-vis the normative guidance that logic is taken to provide to reasoners. In particular, the aim of this paper is threefold. First, in Sections 2 and 3, we offer an exegesis of Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism as a thesis of semantic indeterminacy of our concept of logical consequence – i.e. understood as indeterminacy logical pluralism. Second, in Sections 4 and 5, we elaborate and critically scrutinize three models of semantic indeterminacy that we think are fit to capture Beall and Restall’s indeterminacy logical pluralism. Third, in Section 6, following Beall and Restall’s assumption that the notion of logical consequence has normative significance for deductive reasoning, we raise a series of normative problems for indeterminacy logical pluralism. The overall conclusion that we aim to establish is that Beall and Restall’s indeterminate logical pluralism cannot offer an adequate account of the normative guidance that logic is taken to provide us with in ordinary contexts of reasoning.

Restrictions on complement anaphora

This paper discusses the semantic status and the restrictions on complement anaphora, i.e. pronouns that are anaphorically related to quantifiers and seem to refer to the `complement set' of the latter -- the set of those individuals that are in the restrictor but not in the nuclear scope of the quantifier. Our main empirical point, motivated by data from German, is that contrary to the claims in the literature, true complement set reference is not exclusively determined by the logical properties of the quantifier but also by its the syntactic context. Based on this observation, we argue that plural quantifiers provide anaphoric antecendents by a particular inference mechanism, which is sensitive to syntactic information: We submit that speakers employ verifying strategies for sentences with plural quantifiers where a `test' discourse referent is inserted in the `syntactic slot' the plural quantifier originally occurs in. If a discourse referent, when inserted in this slot, yields truth-conditions for the resulting sentence that are equivalent to those of the original sentence, it can be used as an antecendent for anaphora.

Are there any collective nouns among lexical plurals in English?

AbstractThe grammatical tradition has excluded lexical plurals from the category of collective nouns on the sole basis of their morphology (no discrepancy between singular form and so-called plural reference); but this criterion has led to hesitations, some linguists including, for instance,cattleorpeople. This study therefore considers other, semantic, criteria to establish more convincingly whether lexical plurals that denote pluralities of entities may be collective nouns. Relying on distinctions between meronymy and (non-taxonomic) hyperonymy, collectiveness and cohesion, and(a) crew(collective sense) /(several) crew(uninflected plural), it concludes that they are definitely not collective nouns, but aggregate nouns (or senses of nouns). Two sets are established. Some, mainly denoting humans, typically originate in the collective sense of the noun through a coercion mechanism; the others, mainly denoting objects, result from an operation of abstraction. For some of these, the notion of “hyperonyms of plural classes” is put forward.

Rigid and Flexible Quantification in Plural Predicate Logic

Noun phrases with overt determiners, such as some apples or a quantity of milk, differ from bare noun phrases like apples or milk in their contribution to aspectual composition. While this has been attributed to syntactic or algebraic properties of these noun phrases, such accounts have explanatory shortcomings. We suggest instead that the relevant property that distinguishes between the two classes of noun phrases derives from two modes of existential quantification, one of which holds the values of a variable fixed throughout a quantificational context while the other allows them to vary. Inspired by Dynamic Plural Logic and Dependence Logic, we propose Plural Predicate Logic as an extension of Predicate Logic to formalize this difference. We suggest that temporal for-adverbials are sensitive to aspect because of the way they manipulate quantificational contexts, and that analogous manipulations occur with spatial for-adverbials, habituals, and the quantifier all.