Logical Monism Research Articles

Pluralism and Logical Monism, Relativism and Linguistic Determinism: How do Logic and Language Influence our thinking?

Este trabajo pretende relacionar dos debates emparentados sobre cómo la lógica y el lenguaje influyen sobre el pensamiento. Existe un eje de discusión en relación a si hay una pluralidad de lógicas o un único sistema lógico como criterio de evaluación para cualquier contexto de razonamiento. En lingüística, el debate surgido a partir de las interpretaciones fuertes y débiles de la hipótesis Sapir-Whorf ha centralizado la discusión en torno al grado de influencia o determinación del lenguaje sobre el pensamiento. Desde perspectivas y marcos teórico-conceptuales diferentes, lógica y lingüística delimitan y problematizan un campo de indagación y reflexión. El artículo, desde una mirada transdisciplinar, pretende dar cuenta y postular vasos comunicantes entre estos debates atendiendo a los matices de cada enfoque, así como proponer una hipótesis propia sobre la problemática planteada.

Logical Pluralism and Paradoxical Assertions in the Philosophy of Religion

AbstractMany authors show how useful logic can be as a tool for building theories that can account for problems in the philosophy of religion, such as paradoxical assertions. As a consequence, one's philosophy of logic is crucial as well, since it determines which logics, from the set of available and constructible logics, one can use to build a theory. In this paper, we present the relatively recent debate between logical pluralism and monism because the positions in this debate determine which logic(s) can, with justification, be applied to build a theory that addresses problems in the philosophy of religion. We begin by presenting the problem of paradoxical assertions and the debate over logical pluralism that bears on the addressing paradoxical assertions. We then canvass strategies for arguing in favor of logical monism, and pluralism; ultimately, we conclude that the Western tradition has reached a stalemate on this issue. We then turn our attention to the potential for Indian religious traditions to contribute to the debate. We present the five‐step‐syllogism from Nyāya‐Hindu philosophy, the four corners of reasoning from Buddhist philosophy, and the seven‐fold theory of predication from Jaina philosophy. The upshot of our presentation is to lay the groundwork for cross‐traditional logical debate by identifying the ways in which Indian discussions of debate and dialogue relate to modern approaches to logic and the philosophy of logic.

Does Logic Have a History at All?

AbstractTo believe that logic has no history might at first seem peculiar today. But since the early 20th century, this position has been repeatedly conflated with logical monism of Kantian provenance. This logical monism asserts that only one logic is authoritative, thereby rendering all other research in the field marginal and negating the possibility of acknowledging a history of logic. In this paper, I will show how this and many related issues have developed, and that they are founded on only one prominent statement by Kant. I will argue, however, that this statement takes on a very different meaning in a broader context of the history and philosophy of science, and that Kant and his supporters never advocated the logical monism that they are still said to hold today.

Challenging Logical Monism

Challenging Logical Monism

The collapse of logical contextualism

ABSTRACT The most serious objection to Beall and Restall’s case-based logical pluralism is the so-called collapse argument. According to the collapse argument, logical pluralism is not genuinely pluralistic and collapses into a single privileged relation of logical consequence. In response, Caret offered an account of logical contextualism that supposedly maintains the merits of Beall and Restall’s case-based logical pluralism while circumventing the collapse argument. In this paper, I first point out a gap in the collapse argument in that it does not affect pluralists who assume that there is no uniquely strongest admissible consequence relation. This gap, then, is closed by an improved version of the collapse argument, which makes use of Eklund’s classification of types of pluralism. Finally, I discuss how Caret’s logical contextualism cannot hold up against this new formulation of the collapse argument unless implausible assumptions about the contents of normative operators are made. Moreover, by reformulating the collapse argument, I determine the extent to which logical monism and pluralism oppose each other, paving the way for fruitful future discussion.

Logical Realism and Ezumezu Logic

This paper examines the metaphysical status of Ezumezu logic in the direction of logical realism. While presenting Ezumezu logic as a prototype of African logic, Chimakonam makes statements that somewhat entail logical monism. Using the method of critical analysis of related literature, the paper argues that presenting Ezumezu logic as one of the prototypes of African logic while at the same time making claims that elevate it to a hegemonic status, gives rise to what is regarded in the paper as the monist-pluralist paradox. Drawing lessons from Abakedi’s ID paradox, the paper argues that a monist logical foundation for African logic cannot be consistently defended without paradoxes. The paper proposes that different African philosophies should be grounded by different African logics such that one need not be trained in one particular prototype such as Ezumezu logic or argue in conformity to it to qualify as an African professional or scholar.

On Moderate Pluralism About Truth and Logic

According to moderate truth pluralism, truth is both One and Many. There is a single truth property that applies across all truth‐apt domains of discourse, but instances of this property are grounded in different ways. Propositions concerning medium‐sized dry goods might be true in virtue of corresponding with reality while propositions pertaining to the law might be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law. Moderate truth pluralists must answer two questions concerning logic: (Q1) Which logic governs inferences concerning each truth‐apt domain considered separately? (Q2) Which logic governs inferences that involve several truth‐apt domains? This paper has three objectives. The first objective is to present and explain the moderate pluralist’s answers to (Q1) and (Q2). The second objective is to argue that there is a tension between these answers. The answer to (Q1) involves a commitment to a form of logical pluralism. However, reflection on the moderate truth pluralist’s answer to (Q2) shows that they are committed to taking logic to be topic neutrality. This, in turn, forces a commitment to logical monism. It would seem that the moderate truth pluralist cannot have it both ways. The third objective is constructive in nature. I offer an account of what moderate truth pluralists should say about logic and how they might resolve the tension in their view. I suggest that, just like moderate truth pluralists distinguish truth proper and “quasi‐truth,” they should endorse a distinction between logic proper and “quasi‐logic.” Quasi‐truth is truth‐like in the sense that instances of quasi‐truth ground instances of truth. Quasi‐logic is logic‐like in the sense that it concerns arguments that are necessarily truth‐preserving but are not generally so in a topic neutral way. I suggest that moderate truth pluralists should be monists about truth proper and logic proper but pluralists about quasi‐truth and quasi‐logic. This allows them to say that logic proper is topic neutral while still accommodating the idea that, for different domains, different arguments may be necessarily truth‐preserving.

Beyond Logical Pluralism and Logical Monism

Logical pluralism as a thesis that more than one logic is correct seems very plausible for two basic reasons. First, there are so many logical systems on the market today. And it is unclear how we should decide which of them gets the logical rules right. On the other hand, logical monism as the opposite thesis still seems plausible, as well, because of normativity of logic. An approach which would manage to bring a synthesis of both logical pluralism and logical monism is called for. I review the possible forms of logical pluralism and render them more plausible. I thus arrive at logical dynamism, a synthesis of various pluralisms and monism focused on how logic develops.

The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has been Greatly Exaggerated

According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. Some critics argue that logical pluralism suffers from what I call the collapse problem: that despite its intention to articulate a radically pluralistic doctrine about logic, the view unintentionally collapses into logical monism. In this paper, I propose a contextualist resolution of the collapse problem. This clarifies the mechanism responsible for a plurality of logics and handles the motivating data better than the original view. It is a major improvement that should be embraced by all logical pluralists.

A note on logical pluralism

In this paper we are going to characterize the idea of logical pluralism according to Beall and Restall. In order to do that, this paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, we shall define briefly what Beall and Restall’s theory is about. In the second, we shall deal with some problems with the theory and some possible answers. Finally, three objections will be raised. Keywords: logical pluralism, logical monism, Beall, Restall, Priest.

Contra el pluralismo lógico modalista

In this paper, I argue against the modalist logical pluralism of Bueno and Shalkowski (2009). In the first part, I show that it is not well motivated, at least if its motivation comes from the objections they raise against the approach of Beall and Restall (2006). I defend the position of Beall and Restall against these objections, resorting to the requisites of necessity and normativity, which were misunderstood by Bueno and Shalkowski. In the second part, I analyze the modalist position and provide some arguments against it. I show that the examples offered by Bueno and Shalkowski do not justify a logical pluralism, but rather a logical monism based on classical logic where some inferential contexts can be internalized. I show that these internalizations are very plausible for the two examples the authors provide: database management and the analysis of epistemic concepts.

Should Anti-Realists be Anti-Realists About Anti-Realism?

On the Dummettian understanding, anti-realism regarding a particular discourse amounts to (or at the very least, involves) a refusal to accept the determinacy of the subject matter of that discourse and a corresponding refusal to assert at least some instances of excluded middle (which can be understood as expressing this determinacy of subject matter). In short: one is an anti-realist about a discourse if and only if one accepts intuitionistic logic as correct for that discourse. On careful examination, the strongest Dummettian arguments for anti-realism of this sort fail to secure intuitionistic logic as the single, correct logic for anti-realist discourses. Instead, antirealists are placed in a situation where they fail to be justified in asserting monism (that intuitionistic logic is the unique correct logic). Thus, antirealists seem forced either to accept pluralism (i.e. one or more intermediate logic is at least as `correct’ as intuitionistic logic–an option I take to be unattractive from the anti-realist perspective), or they must be anti-realists about the realism/anti-realism debate (and, in particular, must refuse to assert the instance of excluded middle equivalent to logical monism or logical pluralism).

On the Meaning of Connectives (Apropos of a Non-Necessitarianist Challenge)

According to logical non-necessitarianism, every inference may fail in some situation. In his defense of logical monism, Graham Priest has put forward an argument against non-necessitarianism based on the meaning of connectives. According to him, as long as the meanings of connectives are fixed, some inferences have to hold in all situations. Hence, in order to accept the non-necessitarianist thesis one would have to dispose arbitrarily of those meanings. I want to show here that non-necessitarianism can stand, without disposing arbitrarily of the meanings of connectives, based on a minimalist view on the meanings of connectives.

LOGICAL PLURALISM AND SEMANTIC INFORMATION

Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we explore.