Abstract
In this paper we are going to characterize the idea of logical pluralism according to Beall and Restall. In order to do that, this paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, we shall define briefly what Beall and Restall’s theory is about. In the second, we shall deal with some problems with the theory and some possible answers. Finally, three objections will be raised. Keywords: logical pluralism, logical monism, Beall, Restall, Priest.
Highlights
The main idea is that there are different formal ways to understand the pre-theoretical notion of logical consequence, (V), according to which a conclusion, A, follows from premises Σ, if and only if any case in which each premise in
In this paper we are going to characterize the idea of logical pluralism according to Beall and Restall
The version of logical pluralism that we are going to discuss here is that stated by Bea l and Re a l in “Logical Pluralism” (2000)
Summary
The main idea is that there are different formal ways to understand the pre-theoretical notion of logical consequence, (V), according to which a conclusion, A, follows from premises Σ, if and only if any case in which each premise in The objection says that if we prefer a particular logic, we are not actua ly defending a logical pluralism This is why, since both logics are products of different ways of understanding the pre-theoretical notion of logical consequence, we keep on being pluralists.
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