Logical Character Research Articles

Syllogistic and Its Extensions by Otto Bird, A Modern Formal Logic by Milton Fisk

530 BOOK REVIEWS Syllogistic and Its Extensions. By OTTO BIRD. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. xii and 116. A Modern Formal Logic. By MILTON FrsK. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. xi and 116. These two monographs are the first to appear in the Prentice-Hall Fundamentals of Logic Series. The five authors wrote or are writing these monographs while members of the faculty of the University of Notre Dame. The other titles and authors in this series are: Language and Logic by Ernan McMullin, Method in the Sciences: An Introduction by Harry Nielsen, and History of Logic by Ivo Thomas, 0. P. The series, under the general editorship of Ernan McMullin, is intended to present to the teacher and the student the general principles, scope, and development of logic. Though there are many and varied texts in the field of logic, this series has merit in that many authors are able to treat subjects best known to them. These first two monographs deal with logic as a formal system. Otto Bird in Syllogistic and Its Extensions treats syllogistic in the first two chapters and he reserves the last three chapters for the extensions of basic syllogistic. Since his concern is syllogistic, he does not proceed in the same manner as the authors of traditional texts on logic in which the treatment of logic is divided into the three acts of the mind. Rather, Bird begins his study of syllogistic with an introduction of all the necessary elements of syllogistic argumentation. The notion of syllogism itself is introduced by way of description and analysis and its definition remains for a later section. Syllogistic in the first part of the book is restricted to general, affirmative and referential names. Since Bird stresses the formal character of logic, he does not discuss concrete statements but functors and variables. For functors he uses the traditional symbols A, I, E, and 0. The subject and predicate are replaced by name-variables b and a. In explaining the laws of the square of opposition Bird uses Euler circles and a truth table. Having defined syllogism in Aristotle's terms, Bird discusses validity. Validity does not depend on the truth or falsity of the premises. A valid syllogism occurs if the premises are true, then the conclusion will be true. If from true premises one infers a false conclusion, then that argument is invalid. Using these as criteria Bird analyzes validity in the various figures and moods of syllogistic arguments. In explaining the valid moods he uses Venn diagrams and the traditional verse containing all the valid moods. Realizing that syllogistic laws are numerous and difficult to handle, Bird in the second chapter discusses the systematizing of syllogistics. There is a short treatment of Aristotle's reduction to the first figure. The notion of indirect reduction is used as a bridge to introduce antilogism which applies the law of compound transposition. The remainder of the chapter is concerned with logic as a formal axiomatic system. The expressions, rules, axioms, and definitions of system CS, categorical syllogism, are enumerated BOOK REVIEWS 531 and explained. Employing this system Bird derives all the traditional laws of basic syllogistic. The final part of this chapter deals with the properties of a formal deductive syStem: the independence of its axioms, its consistency , and its completeness. System CS can not handle negative terms. And in his explanation of negative terms Bird mentions the difficulties that arise in using transcendental terms and terms that mutually exclude everything else in the universe. However, with the introduction of negative terms more operations are possible: contraposition, obversion, and inversion. Employing these operations and the octagon of opposition, Bird shows that negative terms can be reduced to affirmative terms and with some restrictions on system CS, system CS (n) is introduced. Syllogistic with nonreferential terms is the subject for the fourth chapter. Empty terms in system CS (n) make some of its operations invalid. In explaining the admission of empty terms Bird uses Venn diagrams and Boolean algebra. In this chapter there is a detailed discussion of the notion of existential import. The final chapter contains short discussions on four...

Formal Logic: Logical Positivism and the Concept of "Existence"

In everyday speech, expressions of the type "that thing exists" are frequently employed. What do they mean? They must be dealt with at the logical level where we seek greater precision. Also at the philosophical level, the predicate "exists" stands in need of analysis, inasmuch as its meanings are associated in one way or another with the meanings of the term "reality." It might also be stated that every entity, to the degree that it is "real" in one sense or another, exists in a manner distinctive to it. In this sense, one might say that this is a problem of cognition of the history of an object, and its results are set forth in various existential judgments. Nevertheless, analysis of "existence" precisely as a predicate is necessary. It bears a specifically logical character and, moreover, is related in a lesser degree to the purely linguistic side of things than in the case of analysis of the meanings of the predicate "to be."

Thrasymachus' Definition of Justice in Plato's Republic

T HE PROBLEM of interpreting Thrasymachus' theory of (tb 8LxoLov) in Republic i, 338c-347e, is well known and can be stated simply. He makes two assertions about the nature of or right action, each of which appears at first glance as a definition: i. Justice is serving the interest of the stronger.' 2. Just action is obedience to the laws of one's state. But, as Socrates quickly points out (3 39b-e), these two assertions cannot both be true as definitions, because their two predicates conflict in certain instances; for obedience to the laws by the subjects is occasionally not in the interest of the rulers. Thus the only way in which Thrasymachus' position can be maintained without inconsistency is if one of his assertions is not seriously meant by him as a definition. Assuming, then, as a working hypothesis that he has a consistent position, we must look in the text for answers to the questions, which assertion does he mean seriously as a definition? and what is the logical character of the other assertion? We shall then be able to see the relation of the two assertions to each other in his argument. The obvious answer to the first question, and the one that generally remains in our memory of Thrasymachus, is that he defines justice (a loose word for just action) as doing what is in the interest of the stronger. This answer also seems to be supported by Thrasymachus' own deliberate choice in face of the contradiction shown by Socrates, for he then says that is the real interest of the stronger, not what they think to be their interest as shown in the laws they make (34oc34ia). Nevertheless I believe there are good reasons for the other view, that Thrasymachus' intended definition of is obedience to law (conventionalism or legalism). This view is not new it has been held by Grote, Gomperz, Lindsay, Bosanquet, Winspear and others but it needs to be justified by a closer examination of the text than has yet been made for this purpose. The present article attempts to do this, and to answer objections raised by Professor G. B. Kerferd in an article publish-

On Simplicity in Empirical Hypotheses

The title of this symposium, “Formal Simplicity as a Weight in the Acceptability of Scientific Theories,” to some people might seem to suggest that we are to be making positive proposals about how the concept of simplicity could be defined for formalized languages, defined so as to figure in a formalized theory of confirmation. I must confess at the start that I do not have any such ambitious object in view. I now feel, indeed, that premature formalizations have little power to illuminate the philosophically interesting questions which cluster round the problem of the role of simplicity in scientific thinking. So in this short paper I wish merely to present some elementary considerations, not very novel ones, concerning the role which simplicity seems to me to play in our non-demonstrative reasoning about matters of empirical fact. Although many writers have sought to analyze the logical character of such reasoning, little unanimity has been attained in their over-all views; thus it is that though the considerations which I wish to present are elementary, they are not wholly uncontroversial. But because these matters are elementary in nature, I do feel it appropriate in discussing them to use homely examples of uncomplicated kinds, rather than elaborate examples drawn from the more sophisticated reaches of scientific theory; in doing so, I am taking it for granted that scientific inference as regards its logical character is fundamentally a refinement of everyday thinking, rather than a procedure of some essentially different nature.

The Nature and Limits of Logic

THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF LOGIC LGIC, as logic, does not investigate its own nature. Epistemology does this for logic. However, there is no one for whom the epistemological knowledge of the nature and scope of logic is more significant than for the man who happens to be a logician. Yet it is clear from an examination of our treatises and textbooks in logic that the men who author them disagree, sometimes rather significantly, on the epistemological character of logic. In the face of sometimes contradictory opinions about the nature of logic, it is clear that some of our logicians rather thoroughly misevaluate the significance of logic. Because logic is universally and necessarily propaedeutic to any scientific effort, it is not surprising that this misunderstanding on the nature of logic has serious consequences for all the academic disciplines. It is easy to allow more to logic than logic deserves, and the history of philosophy yields more than one example of over-extended logicism. It is easy too, in reaction to this, to allow less to logic than logic deserves. Thus some would make of logic a highly restricted instrument of the intellect for a very limited area of scientific discourse. In truth, logic is not a universal science embracing all other sciences (or any other science) either as integral or as subjective parts, and yet it remains universally an instrument of the reason for all scientific discourse. The intention of this paper is to initiate an investigation into the nature of logic which will make these points clear. This study will not be exhaustive, and yet it will be developed in the light of those distinctions in terms of which any exhaustive study should be made. This paper is at best a preliminary work, yet it is determinately in conflict with many current notions about the nature and limits of logic. . The occasion for this paper is the widespread disagreement on the nature and importance of logic. The immediate inspira47 48 EDWARD D. SIMMONS tion for it is a footnote suggested by the translators of The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas.1 The footnote arises in the context of a discussion on the speculative, but " useful," character of logic. In the footnote the translators broaden the discussion and suggest "that the ideal noetic treatment (of logic) would correlate these four frequently made distinctions and divisions within logic: science and art, doctrinal and in use, formal and material, and dialectical and judicative or demonstrative." In our opinion, these are the fundamental distinctions in terms of which logic must be epistemologically understood. This paper will attempt to meet the challenge implicit in the footnote just quoted. It will be an attempt to correlate these distinctions in order to lay at least the groundwork of an adequate investigation into the nature of logic. Logic is both an art and a science. It is a strange kind of art, and it is a unique type of science. It is an art without being practical, and it is a science which is speculative, despite the fact that its value lies only in its use. And it is one discipline which is simultaneously both an art and a science. It seems that almost every textbook in logic distinguishes between the art of logic and the science of logic. But not all of them agree precisely on the character of logic as an art and logic as a science. To begin with, some would allow logic to be treated either as a science or as an art, despite the fact that logic is indivisibly art and science. Further, in most , 1 The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas, translated by Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, and G. Donald Hollenhorst (Chicago, 1955), pp. 598-594, note 85. Although it is this particular footnote which has proximately inspired this essay, we readily and gratefully acknowledge a larger debt both to John of St. Thomas and to his translators. Perhaps the most helpful primary source for this study has been John's analysis of the nature of logic in. the first two questions of the second part of his Ara Logica. Certainly nothing could have been...

The Logical Character of Resurrection-belief

The Logical Character of Resurrection-belief

Philosophy of Law in the Scandinavian Countries

10 A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT, most of the nations of the Western world are concerned with the same legal-philosophical problems. debate that took place in the last generations in the Scandinavian countries, to my mind, may be of interest also outside the confines of this area. This has involved the methodological problems as well as the now current discussion of the logical character of law and legal thinking. In both these areas, there are, in the Scandinavian countries, problematic issues and tendencies which have interesting parallels in American legal philosophy. principles of legal thinking-the methodological rules of legal science-in most presentations are regarded as normative-that is, as directives for correct legal reasoning. So it is everywhere. In Swedish national law, there even is a constitutional provision which gives such a directive for the legal interpretation of the Constitution. It is provided in the Swedish Form of Government of 1809, 84, that The Constitutional Laws ought, in all cases, to be literally applied. Even the axioms of the legal publicists stating the principles for interpreting and applying the laws and the Constitution, have, according to their intention, such a normative or guiding character. In the short summary of the developments in legal methods and teachings in Scandinavia which I shall give first, I do not intend to argue for one legal methodology or another. I shall confine myself to pointing out the tendencies that in reality have asserted themselves, and the alterations which have taken place in legal theory during recent generations, in the Scandinavian countries. so-called Historical School in the science of law had its revival in Germany in the first half of the 19th century as a reaction against the natural rights way of reasoning. It was characteristic of the Historical School in Germany, as is wellknown, that attention was fastened on the historically determined,

Medieval Logic: An Outline of Its Development from 1250 to ca. 1400 by Philotheus Boehner, O. F. M., and: De Puritate Artis Logicae by Walter Burleigh

258 BOOK REVIEWS Medieval Logic: An Outline of Its Development from 11250 to ca. 1400. By PHILOTHEUS BoEHNER, 0. F. M. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 195~. Pp. 148. $3.00. De Puritate Artis Logicae. By WALTER BuRLEIGH. Edited by Philotheus Boehner, 0. F. M. St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute and Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1951. Pp. 131. $1.50. The first work is a booklet designed to promote harmony and understanding between scholastic and modern logicians. It is the author's contention that many modern scholastics do not have a genuinely scholastic logic since they do not consider logic as an essentially formal science. And the reason for this is that they are not acquainted with their own tradition, namely, genuine scholastic logic of the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries wherein there is found a logic containing many elements of a strictly formal logic, so much so, that these elements appear to be definite anticipations, if not the exact doctrines, of modern logic. Avoiding the vague phrases, "traditional logic" and "classical logic," Fr. Boehner indicates precisely what he means by " nco-scholastic logic," " Aristotelian logic " and " modem logic," before stating and substantiating his conclusions. This is done in the Introduction. The body of the work is divided into three parts; Part One: Elements of Scholastic Logic; Part Two: Important Contributions of Scholastic Logic; and Part Three: Systems of Scholastic Logic. Part One is divided into two chapters: I, The Legacy of Scholastic Logic, and II, New Elements of Scholastic Logic. For the legacy of scholastic logic he has chosen Albert the Great's logical works as his source. There are eleven works cited, paraphrases on the six works of the Organon plus paraphrases on Boethius's works on division, categorical syllogisms, and hypothetical syllogisms. The other two works are Albert's treatment of the material found in Porphyry's Isagoge and Gilbert de la Poree's Six Principles. These works are merely listed and summarily described with regard to their contents. The new elements which Fr. Boehner lists in chapter two are the small tracts added by later scholastics which he divides into five groups: 1. De Syncategorematibus, ~- De proprietatibus terminorum , 3. De insolubili, 4. De obligatione, 5. De consequentiis. Part Two contains three chapters: I, The Syncategoremata As Logical Constants; II, The Theory of Supposition; and III, The Theory of Consequences . In the first chapter. Fr. Boehner indicates clearly the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic words and the significative and suppositional dependence of the latter upon the former. He sees in this distinction a definite parallelism with the modern distinction between the constants and variables of logical discourse. A splendid quotation from Albert of Saxony shows that the latter considered the syncategoremata as formal elements which do not change. This is another indication of the BOOK REVIEWS ~59 formalized· character of medieval logic. In the second chapter Fr. Boehner briefly schematizes the theories of Peter of Spain, William Ockham, and Walter Burleigh on supposition. He likens the theory of supposition to the modern functional calculus. In chapter three the author treats of the notion and division of consequences according to William Ockham and Albert of Saxony. He also gives a brief survey of the consequential rules found in Ockham which have corresponding theorems of the propositional calculus. He gives the rule in translation, followed by the Latin text; then he explains and gives an instance of the rule; finally, he places it in symbolization. Part Three contains only one chapter in which the author merely indicates the content of five medieval logicians' works by schematizing a division of their most important logical opus. The five logicians summarized in this manner are Peter of Spain, William Ockham, John Buridan, Walter Burleigh, and Albert of Saxony. Two appendices contain a few sophismata of Albert of Saxony as well as a major portion of his rules of supposition. The second work is believed to be the first edited text of the shorter of two texts bearing the name De Puritate Artis Logicae. It contains Burleigh 's treatment of the general rules of consequences and a much longer discussion (eighty per cent of the text) on the syncategoremata. The publication of this text...

Of the Logical Character of the Monetary Economy

Of the Logical Character of the Monetary Economy

The Semiotic Status of Commands

The large number of writers who have in recent years attacked the problem of the logical nature of commands appear generally in agreement in accepting the distinction of common grammar between imperative and declarative sentences as representing, albeit in no clear one-to-one manner, some real difference in the logical character of the two types of expression, and possibly in the psychological sign-functioning mechanism itself. The crucial logical difference adduced is that commands can apparently rot be classified as true or false. One is then, however, confronted with the problem of interpreting arguments involving imperatives which appear syllogistic in form, such as:Keep your promises!You promised to pay on Wednesday.Pay on Wednesday!

A Primer of Formal Logic by John C. Cooley, Ph. D. (review)

204 FRANCISCAN STUDIES There are a few corrections to be made in Dr. Tozzer’s notes. (1 ) It is not only irrelevant but also irreverent to say (p. 16, note 93) that "God also provided Cortés with a mistress.” (2 ) Cifuéntes, the Spanish town where Landa was born and buried, is said (p. 44, note 44) to be in the province of Toledo, whereas this town is in the Alcarria, a desolate and mountainous region in the province of Guadalajara. (3) Landa was the fifth, not the fourth Bishop of Yucatan; Tozzer evidently did not take into ac­ count the first bishop, Father Julian Garcés, O. P., 1519. (4) Tozzer errs in stating (p. 84, note 352) that the professorship of Scotus at the Spanish University of Alcalá "was probably in honor of Michael Scot, who had posthumous fame as an author on alchemy, astrology, and other occult sci­ ences. He died about 1291." Tozzer has confused Michael with John Duns Scotiis. The Chair of Scotus at the great University founded in Spain bv the Franciscan Cardinal Ximénez de Cisneros was for the study and teaching of the works of John Duns Scotus, the great Franciscan Scholastic (12651308 ). The Michael Scott to whom Tozzer refers was a Scottish mathe­ matician, scientist, and philosopher, born about 1175, died probably in 1235, who lived some years in Toledo, Spain, where he translated some works of Aristotle, Avicena, and Averroes into Latin from the Arabic. He was a cleric, but not a friar, and he was offered nominations to become Archbishoo of Cashel, Ireland, and of Canterbury, England. His fame as a medieval scientist became legendary, and he figures as a "magician” in Dante’s Inferno, Boccaccio’s Decatnerone, and in Sir Walter Scott’s Lay of the Last Minstrel. (5 )We also note the omission in Tozzer’s Bibliography of the important work by the great Spanish historian, Manuel Serrano y Sanz, entitled: Vida y escritos de Fr. Diego de Landa, published first in the Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos. 3a época, I (1897), 54-60, 109-117. There is no doubt that this eighth edition of Landa’s Relación de las Cosas de Yucatan by Dr. Tozzer will henceforth be considered the definitive edition, a most important contribution in the field of Hispanic-American History, a source-book of information concerning Maya studies, and á treasure-store of data for some future Franciscan history of the Americas. R oderick W h eeler , O. F. M. Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure College, St. Bonaventure, N .Y . A Primer of Formal Logic. By John C. Cooley, Ph.D. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. Pp. xii+378.) The highly abstract and formalistic character of modern logic usually has a negative effect even on many of those who are not a priori opposed to it. To those the Primer of Formal Logic offers a comparatively easy, and in any case more "natural,” way of getting acquainted with modern sym­ bolic logic— or, to be exact, with that logic which is developed in the Principia Mathematica by Whitehead and Russell. The book is primarily conceived as a classroom textbook, but it seems to provide a suitable basis for private study as well. For it explains every step and every symbol to such an extent that further explanations by a teacher may be dispensed with- BOOK REVIEWS 205 Thus Cooley has succeeded in writing an introduction to Symbolic Logic which will earn him the gratitude of those who try to learn or to teach the mysteries of modern Formalism. The book can be divided into four parts. The first part is meant only as an introduction to the notion of formality and the symbolism of modern logic. It starts with a discussion of conditional syllogisms, and then leads (gradually adding, and step by step explaining, new symbolism) to a nondeductive treatment of the prepositional calculus (Chapters II and III), to the lower functional calculus (quantification theory), and even to a very elementary theory of classes and relations (Chapters IV and V ). The second part recapitulates the whole matter discussed in the previous chapters, but develops it as an elementary deductive system (or...

Sigmund Koch. The logical character of the motivation concept. Psychological review, vol. 48 (1941), pp. 15–38, 127–154.

Sigmund Koch. The logical character of the motivation concept. Psychological review, vol. 48 (1941), pp. 15–38, 127–154.

The logical character of the motivation concept. I.

The logical character of the motivation concept. I.

The logical character of the motivation concept. II.

The logical character of the motivation concept. II.

The Mystery of Scientific Discovery

The extent to which the scientific method has yielded to analysis in recent years serves only to emphasize by contrast the presence within that method of an irrational element. For it is becoming increasingly evident that whatever one may say of the logical and psychological character of the pre-inductive operations, of the formal processes involved in deducing the consequences of a given theory, of the technique of experimental corroboration, and of certain other aspects of the scientific method, there is one phase of the movement which remains a surd. This is the act of the creative imagination through which hypotheses and theories are called into being. Its mysterious character is exhibited in the terminology which is employed in describing it, in the variety and inconstancy of the conditions which give rise to it, in the apparent impossibility of controlling it, and in the impossibility of recognizing completely the adequacy of its results when it does occur. It is variously described as an act of intuition, mystic revelation, divine insight, a flash of understanding; it arises out of the greatest variety of conditions: acute and prolonged attention to the data in the confinement of the laboratory, or the complete relaxation of a walk in the country, or the intense mental effort upon a problem in a wholly unrelated field; it forbids direction, in fact it seems to arise most readily when the element of effort and control is conspicuously absent; it cannot even be certainly identified, for many supposed acts of discovery prove later to have produced only groundless fancies and absurd creations of the unguided imagination.

The Logical Character of the Principle of Induction

The purpose of this paper is to make clear (1) that the widely recognized formulations of the principle of induction do not express the most fundamental rule of induction; (2) that the current view concerning the probability of induction must be revised in terms of a frequency theory of probability; (3) that on this basis the problem of induction in its traditional form is a pseudo-problem; and (4) that the principle of induction must be interpreted as a pragmatic or operational maxim.

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce

THE authorities of Harvard University are to be congratulated for their publication of the papers and notes left by Charles Sanders Peirce. A master mind and a pioneer in philosophical inquiry, Peirce had never an occasion of publishing a standard work embodying his views. So that the editing of his papers is in itself a feat which deserves the praise and gratitude of all scholars. We would do little justice to the philosophical vision of Peirce in estimating his work on the strength of the first two volumes, out of a series of ten, which are to be published. It will suffice at present to indicate the wide range of topics touched upon in the present volumes: the method of science, the classification of the sciences, the logic of mathematics, the categories, the character of logic, speculative grammar, critical logic, and the theory of probable inference. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Charles Hartshorne Paul Weiss Edited by. Vol. 1: Principles of Philosophy. Pp. xvi + 393. 21s. net. Vol. 2: Elements of Logic. Pp. xii + 535. 31s. net. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1932.)

The Origin of Variations

ARTICLES in NATURE have the advantage that they are addressed not merely to experts in the same line of work as their writer—these have to be placated rather than informed—nor are they specially addressed to the school-educated general public, who are more likely to recognise the etymo logical character of the terms used than to ap preciate their physical or biological significance. Articles in these pages are, I suppose, primarily intended to reach workers in other branches of science, thereby putting them into touch with modes of thought differing from but akin to their own. Our relations with each other are somewhat like those of politicians in alien countries: the problems are different, the methods dissimilar, but the general aims are alike.

Societies and Academies

LONDON. Aristotelian Society, June 7.—Prof. Wildon Carr, vice-president, in the chair.—Rev. A. E. Davies: Anselm's problem of truth and existence. The famous proof of the existence of God is not purely ontological, but rather the verification of a specific mode of experience termed “faith.” In Anselm's words, it is “faith seeking understanding,” and by “faith” is meant a mode of immediate apprehension, awareness of God. Two stages are distinguishable in the reasoning. The first seeks to prove that we must think of ultimate reality in terms of existence. Here the appeal is to logical thought. In the second stage Anselm proves that this ultimate reality is his personal God. Here the appeal is to experience. The argument implies that truth and existence are two ultimate forms of reality: existence is the reality of things, truth the validity of thought-contents. Hence truth must be soug-ht in terms of validity. This is the logical character of the “proof.” We can “only know as perfectly as possible.” We know existent reality only as our thinking is valid, and we cannot think validly that God is non-existent. Between these two ultimate forms of reality is presupposed a fundamental agreement, such that the relations of thought validly represent the real relations of things. For Anselm such agreement has its ground in God. A second implication is that when thinking is valid it starts from existence, in the same sense that its contents are occasioned by existent reality. So that without experience we cannot know. The ethical character of the basic conception of God proves it to be no mere thought-product—that is, knowledge presupposes a mode of reality dissimilar from itself.

The Meaning of Neutrality

The subject of American neutrality and the European war is one intimately and vitally connected with the history and policy of the United States. One hundred and twenty-two years ago, or less than five years after the federal constitution was established, the government of the United States was required to make a momentous decision. The wars growing out of the French Revolution were well under way and the circle of conflict had just been rounded out by the entrance of the power which then held and has since continued to hold the world's naval supremacy. Those who speak in awe-struck whispers of the problems, grave though they be, that confront us today, perhaps are not always acquainted with the appalling uncertainties and awful responsibilities that rested upon the statesmen of an earlier day, who furnished us with the chart and compass by which we have since sailed. Regarding Europe as having a set of primary interests in which the United States, with its geographical and political detachment, had no direct concern, the administration of Washington announced to the world that the United States would pursue a neutral course. The history of American diplomacy during the twenty-two years that followed, down to the close of the Napoleonic wars, is chiefly concerned with the efforts of the United States to perform the duties and maintain the rights appertaining to it as an independent and neutral nation. This period of storm and stress has well been denominated the struggle for neutrality, and in it were formulated the fundamental principles on which the modern system of neutrality is based. In the task of formulation, the chief part was borne by Thomas Jefferson, whose philosophic discernment, keen intelligence, and extended learning enabled him to give to his work a peculiar logical and original character. What we call neutrality