Logic Of Deterrence Research Articles

Book Reviews

John J. Donohue of Yale University reviews “When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment” by Mark A. R. Kleiman,. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins “Considers a consequence-focused approach to crime control in the United States and whether it would work better than the current brute force-based method. Discusses how the United States moved from low-crime, low-punishment to higher crime and punishment rates in the last fifty years; thinking about crime control; hope; tipping, dynamic concentration, and the logic of deterrence; crime despite punishment; designing enforcement strategies; crime control without punishment; guns and gun control; drug policy for crime control; what could go wrong; and an agenda for crime control. Kleiman is Professor of Public Policy at the University of California, Los Angeles. Bibliography; index.”

Do Small Arsenals Deter?

Ward Wilson’s article “The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima” provides a startling explanation for the end of World War II in East Asia.1 Wilson argues that, contrary to established wisdom, Japan’s decision to surrender stemmed not from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but from the Soviet Union’s declaration of war against Japan on August 8, 1945. He bases his argument on the following propositions: (1) in the context of the massive destruction caused by the conventional bombing of Japanese cities at the time, the atomic bomb was not qualitatively different; (2) the havoc caused by these attacks did not undermine Japan’s determination to press on with the war in hopes of obtaining favorable terms of surrender; (3) the Japanese leadership’s reaction to the devastation of Hiroshima does not reoect a perception that the atomic bomb was decisive in its effects; and (4) in contrast, the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, by eliminating available options for a favorable end, compelled Japan to surrender quickly. Wilson’s analysis concludes that small nuclear arsenals may not deter aggressors. Whereas large nuclear forces may have such a capability (200 weapons is where the author draws the line), “the logic of deterrence may be different where small arsenals are concerned. If destroying one or two cities does not coerce an opponent, then perhaps the threat of limited nuclear retaliation does not deter when the stakes are high enough” (p. 179). In short, small nuclear powers are inherently unstable and, logically (though the author does not state this explicitly), such states can achieve deterrence stability only if they expand their armories. Wilson’s basic argument about the Japanese decision is a plausible one, drawing considerable evidence from archival sources, though it is thin with respect to the Soviet factor, as only a single source is cited (pp. 174–175). I question, however, his inference regarding the requirements of deterrence today. Contrary to Wilson’s claim, the size of a nuclear arsenal does not matter, and more speciacally, small arsenals are adequate for obtaining deterrence. A review of how nuclear powers behave when war is nigh demonstrates that the concept of “assured second-strike capability” based on the capacity to inoict casualties into the millions is a mythical notion that does not accord with histori-

Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: U.S. National Security Policy after 9/11

Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: U.S. National Security Policy after 9/11. By James H. Lebovic. New York: Routledge, 2007. 240p. 37.95 paper.Recent literature on terrorism and so-called “rogue” proliferation states is vast, and James Lebovic's book stands out among the very finest for its original arguments, richly documented presentation, and engaging and thought-provoking discussion. Overall, it is critical of the post-9/11 view dominant in U.S. strategic thinking that the main adversaries are undeterrable. It shows that terrorists and leaders of renegade regimes are neither mindless nor irrational, but rather are often sensitive to the costs of punishment and thus susceptible to the logic of deterrence. Deterrence doctrines should therefore not be abandoned as Cold War relics, and the book makes a remarkable contribution toward bridging the doctrinal issues and debates from the Cold War (nuclear deterrence) past to the current problems of antiproliferation and counterterrorism.

A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence

We present a unified theory and test of extended immediate deterrence—unified in the sense that we employ our theoretical deterrence model as our statistical model in the empirical analysis. The theoretical model is a straightforward formalization of the deterrence logic in Huth (1988) and Huth and Russett (1984), coupled with private information concerning utilities. Our statistical analysis suggests that the attacker and defender's decisions are influenced by the balance of forces, nuclear weapons, defender‐protege military alliances, arms transfers, and trade, as well as the regime types of those involved. Many of these findings contradict previous research by Huth (1988) and Huth and Russett (1988). We find that many of the variables involved in the deterrence calculus are nonmonotonically linked to the probability of deterrence success or war. We illustrate the results with case studies of the Soviet‐Japanese dispute over Manchukuo (1937–1938) and the Berlin Blockade (1948).

Unraveling the Northeast Asian Regional Security Complex: Old Patterns and New Insights

Abstract The concept of the regional security complex has recently been introduced in order to elucidate a region's security dynamics, independent of the international system. We apply the security complex concept to the Northeast Asian region, and draw several interesting observations. First, the Northeast Asian security complex is still governed by the logic of the traditional Westphalian sovereignty. Old actors such as nation-states are still dominant, whereas new non-state transnational actors are limited in power and influence. Second, profound structural reconfiguration among units has not yet taken place in the region. Uni-polycentrism, in which the United States still enjoys the hegemonic position, while other actors, China, Japan, and Russia, compete in the second-tier. Third, despite the advent of the post-Cold War era and the globalization drive, military issues still top the hierarchy of national security concerns. Countries in the region appear to be preoccupied with traditional military security issues. Fourth, realist, liberal, and constructivist visions can cohabit in the ideational terrain of security discourse. The continuing co-existence of blind power-seekers, optimistic liberal pacifists, and fervent identity protectors deepens the security dilemma of the region. Finally, the best way to manage the security dilemma and to ensure a stable peace in the region is to cultivate a community of security by going beyond the logic of deterrence, fostering liberal transition, and healing past scars and resisting the temptation of parochial nationalism.

Learning to live with uncertainty: The strategic implications of North Korea's nuclear weapons capability

This article challenges the popular assumption that North Korea's nuclear weapons capability poses a dire threat to international security. It argues that the adverse impact of North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons has been exaggerated and that pessimistic accounts of the strategic implications of this capability have overlooked the strong status quo bias inherent in North Korea's worldview. These accounts have also glossed over the primarily defensive motives underpinning Pyongyang's quest for nuclear weapons. There are dangers attached to North Korea's nuclear capability, especially the possible transfer of fissile material to terrorist groups or rogue states, and the effect it may have in spurring regional neighbours to reassess their non-nuclear status. Contrary to common assumptions, however, the idea that a nuclear-armed North Korea is determined to foment regional instability and challenge the strategic status quo in East Asia is not supported by a close reading of Pyongyang's motives and worldview. The behaviour and statements of the regime suggest that the DPRK is predisposed to accept the logic of deterrence in its relationship with the US. As long as Washington maintains an active and robust posture of extended strategic deterrence on the Korean peninsula, the regime in Pyongyang will continue to be dissuaded from initiating the use of nuclear weapons against other regional states.

American Crime Prevention: Trends and New Frontiers

American crime prevention is at a crossroads. After decades of successful efforts, the concept of prevention has been embedded in the American lexicon and prevention strategies are becoming a part of public policy. Even so, there is great uncertainty about the form, function, and emphasis of prevention programs. Historically, prevention efforts have used techniques of surveillance and incapacitation and focused primarily on guns, gangs, and drugs. Over the past 10 years, more progressive forms of prevention have been incorporated into public policy. However, the current conservative climate, combined with the fear of terrorism and declining sources of revenue, has precipitated a renewed emphasis on surveillance and incapacitation. Because the United States does not have a specific agency responsible for crime prevention, or even a national crime prevention agenda, much American crime prevention is incident driven. At present, the themes of information integration systems and prevention technology, law enforcement partnerships, and targeted interventions dominate the discourse on American crime prevention. However, it is unlikely that current crime trends will continue. Despite the impressive body of evidence accumulated over the last several decades on the importance of evidence-based crime prevention efforts, there is still enormous pressure to go back to the old-fashioned logic of deterrence and punishment.

Imaging terror: logos, pathos and ethos

As verb, code and historical method, terrorism has consistently been understood as an act of symbolically intimidating and, if deemed necessary, violently eradicating a personal, political, social, ethnic, religious, ideological or otherwise radically differentiated foe. Yet, as noun, message and catch-all political signifier, the meaning of terrorism has proven more elusive. After the Cold War terror mutated from a logic of deterrence based on a nuclear balance of terror into a new imbalance of terror based on a mimetic fear and an asymmetrical willingness and capacity to destroy the other without the formalities of war. This imbalance is furthered by the multiple media, which transmit powerful images as well as triggering pathological responses to the terrorist event. Thanks to the immediacy of television, the internet and other networked information technology, we see terrorism everywhere in real time, all the time. In turn, terrorism has taken on an iconic, fetishised and, most significantly, highly optical character.

Scared smart or bored straight? Testing deterrence logic in an evaluation of police-led truancy intervention

Student truancy in secondary schools has increasingly been identified as an issue that merits the attention of the criminal and juvenile justice systems. This paper presents evaluation results from a recent study of a truancy intervention collaborative initiated and administered by a local sheriff's department in a large urban county in the southeastern United States. Findings provide a provisional test of a deterrence approach to truancy intervention. Implications are considered in the context of expanded criminal justice boundaries and an increasingly dominant role for law enforcement in what has traditionally been considered the informal responsibility of public educators.

Barrett Watten's Bad History : A Counter-Epic of the Gulf War

Barrett Watten’s Bad History: A Counter-Epic of the Gulf War Philip Metres (bio) Abstract This essay situates Barrett Watten’s book-length poem Bad History against the debate between Jean Baudrillard and Christopher Norris regarding the proper position of the intellectual during the Persian Gulf War. Bad History provides a provisional third way, mobilizing both the paranoiac postmodernity of Baudrillard and the hyperrationality of Norris, in a poetry that refuses to extract itself from its own subjective position, a resistance that speaks beyond the limits of its own political group. Watten’s poem is the most sophisticated attempt to grapple with the Gulf War in part because it situates itself in the cultural milieu that enabled the war itself to take place: what Paul Virilio calls “Pure War”—that state of society whereby the real war is the constant preparation for war. By invoking and countering the epic mode through a poetics of interference, a subjectivity vacillating between complicity and resistance, and formal innovations (including use of footers, newspaper-like columns, and a hefty appendix), Bad History stands out as perhaps the most important poetry to emerge out of the Persian Gulf War. —pm More than a decade has passed since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, a war that offered up an “instant history” that effaced the histories of colonialism and empire in the Middle East, thanks to saturation media coverage that covered up far more than it revealed.1 There is little doubt now that mass media sources, from CNN to the local news, acted principally as an extension of the military effort. This media saturation has led critics like Jed Rasula in The American Poetry Wax Museum to suggest that the only proper way to resist the war was to refuse to watch television (376).2 Yet Western intellectuals who opposed this war could reach no consensus about how to resist, or even about the very possibility of resistance within the centers of empire; the war seemed to evacuate the very notion of “centers,” as television coverage of Pentagon news briefings infiltrated homes throughout the world. The crisis of oppositionality appeared most visibly in the impasse between Jean Baudrillard’s postmodern analysis of the war (captured in the provocative title of his book, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place) and Christopher Norris’s Chomsky-inflected critique (no less provocative in the directness of its attack on what he terms Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War).3 Neither articulates a completely convincing reading of the war, and each, in light of the other, feels somewhat one-dimensional. To overcome the seeming impasse presented by these contrary paradigms requires an analysis flexible enough to value both the productive paranoia of Baudrillard and the hyperrationality of Chomsky. The Baudrillardian mode impels us to: 1) question not only mass media coverage, but information itself, insofar as it becomes indistinguishable from propaganda in times of war, particularly in what Baudrillard calls “the profound immorality of images”; 2) recognize the way in which war itself has become virtualized, simulacral, and based upon the logic of deterrence; 3) describe the war as a Western civilian experiences it, where the media and military use of optical technology merge to a single aim; and 4) pursue a risky rhetorical strategy that mimics the dominant narrative in order to subvert it. The Chomskyan mode, on the other hand, provides us a model that helps to: 1) deconstruct U.S. media coverage of the war by producing an historical narrative of U.S. foreign policy that emphasizes its complicity in the situation it aims to solve by war and by producing an alternative narrative of war resistance, both at the center of empire and in the Third World; 2) investigate the effects of war on the ground in Iraq (not to mention in the United States, where thousands of veterans suffer from Gulf War Syndrome); and 3) suspend the (postmodern?) illusion that just because something is not covered by the press does not mean that it’s not real. Each paradigm seems to supply the perspectives that are absent from the other, and yet something is missing from both. Neither critic manages to capture...

Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Tests: Necessity, Sufficiency, and Deterrence Logic

The critique of rational deterrence constitutes one of the most comprehensive and sustained attacks on a “theory” in the field of international relations, a theory that many still believe is a sound, parsimonious, policy-relevant explanation of both human-social and military-strategic behavior. The attempt to identify the theoretical problems that plague the theory's behavioral assumptions,1 the methodological errors embedded within a great deal of deterrence literature,2 and the practical problems associated with implementing deterrence as a strategy3 encompass the main thrusts of the critique. As Fischoff (1987:73) claims in his summary of the findings from this body of work, “deterrence emerges as a shabby parody of a scientific theory. Its fundamental behavioral assumptions are wrong. Its basic terms are ill-defined. It is used in inconsistent and contradictory ways. Commonly cited examples of effective deterrence are often based on flawed readings of history, sometimes reflecting ignorance, sometimes deliberate misrepresentation.” Like Fischoff, many remain convinced that these findings provide more than enough evidence to discard deterrence as a weak, if not irrelevant, theory of crisis management behavior. In this article I highlight several fundamental problems with the logic and evidence cited by critics to draw these conclusions. The argument develops in five stages. The first outlines the elements of the main “necessary” condition hypothesis most frequently cited, tested, and rejected by critics of deterrence theory. The second section describes nine additional deterrence hypotheses derived from the logic of necessity and sufficiency, and specifies the relationship between these core hypotheses and the empirical evidence required to support and/or refute them. The third introduces the methodology used to test each hypothesis. It is followed by the fourth stage: discussion of data and findings. I conclude my argument with a few observations about the status and future of deterrence theory and testing.

The Logic of Deterrence

This article deals with rules and paradoxes of the modern deterrence system and with its transformation into language. It has always been possible to interpret military activities as a body-language of states, as a show of force with which to threaten or convince an opponent. The development of nuclear forces has made this communicative aspect essential for military activities, because war and preparations for war are now less a question of defeating the opponent, and more a power conversation at the brink of the apocalypse. This has been illustrated by the Cuban Missile Crisis in the 1960s and the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the 1980s. It is a dialogue or dispute: doctrine versus doctrine and strategy versus strategy using steel and electronics. Furthermore, there is no unified point of reference for this conversation. The paradoxes of the modern deterrence system exclude a defined `reality' that this conversation would refer to. Missiles can be developed with ambiguous interpretations referring to both the possible and the impossible war, to the uncertainty of escalation, but this point of reference has no real meaning outside the discourse of the Flexible Response doctrine. The system of deterrence has become self-referring - a communicative sphere - a reality of its own with specified rules from which nobody is prepared to escape. The only possibility seems to be to redefine some of these rules, giving them another meaning.

The Logic of Deterrence by Anthony Kenny

The Logic of Deterrence by Anthony Kenny

The Logic of Deterrence

Abstract This article describes the important structural characteristics of a recently developed game-theoretic model of deterrence, summarizes the major deductions drown from it, and discusses its implications for both the theory of deterrence and the current strategic relationship of the superpowers. The model shows that a credible threat and a power advantage are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for stable deterrence. It also suggests that, even under ideal conditions, deterrence is an intricate and fundamentally fragile relationship that rests, ultimately, upon the preferences and perceptions of key decision-makers rather than upon the nature and composition of each side’s strategic arsenal.

Nonstrategic Nuclear ThinkingThe Logic of Deterrence. Anthony KennyNuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions. Avner Cohen , Steven Lee

Previous articleNext article No AccessReview EssayNonstrategic Nuclear Thinking The Logic of Deterrence. Anthony Kenny Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions. Avner Cohen , Steven Lee Thomas DonaldsonThomas Donaldson Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 97, Number 3Apr., 1987 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/292871 Views: 1Total views on this site Copyright 1987 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Ethics and deterrence

The Bishops and Nuclear Weapons: The Catholic Pastoral Letter on War and Peace By James E. Dougherty. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1984. 225 pp. £21.60. Morality and the Bomb By David Fisher. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985, 136 pp. £15.95. Nuclear Deterrence: Ethics and Strategy Edited by Russell Hardin. Chicago, Il and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985. 395 pp. £9.25 pbk. The Logic of Deterrence By Anthony Kenny. London: Firethorn Press, 1985. 103 pp. £4.95. Nuclear Arms: Ethics, Strategy, Politics Edited by R. James Woolsey. San Francisco, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984. 289 pp. £22.95.

The Logic of Deterrence by Anthony Kenny, Firethorn Press, London, 1985. p. x + 103. £4.95.

Book reviewed in this article:THE LOGIC OF DETERRENCE by Anthony KennySAINT AUGUSTINE ON SLAVERY, STUDIA EPHEMEREDIS ‘AUGUSTINIANUM’THE THREAD OF LIFE by Richard Wollheim.A PLACE IN THE SUN: AN INTRODUCTION TO LIBERATION THEOLOGY IN THE THIRD WORLD by Theo Witvliet.THE CONCEPT OF PURITY AT QUMRAN AND IN THE LEITERS OF PAUL by Michael Newton.PHILOSOPHY FOR UNDERSTANDING THEOLOGY by Diogenes Allen.IMAGES OF CHRIST: AN INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTOLOGY.UTILITY AND RIGHTS, edited by F.G. Frey.

LITERATURE REVIEWS

Book Review Essay URBAN POLICY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CITIES: GENTRIFICATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATIONJ. John Palen and Bruce London, eds., Gentrification, displacement and Neighborhood RevitalizationMichael H. Schill and Richard P. Nathan, Revitalizing America's CitiesPaul E. Peterson, ed., The New Urban RealityAddo, Herb, et al. Development as Social Transformation: Reflections on the Global ProblematiqueArian, Asher. Politics in Israel: The Second GenerationBean, Philip, John Ferris and David Whynes, (eds.). In Defense of WelfareBedichek, Wendell M., and Neal Tannahill. Public Policy in TexasBowman, William, Roger Little and G. Thomas sicilia. The All‐Volunteer Force After a Decade: Retrospedt and ProspectCongressional quarterly Editorial Staff, Energy and Environment: Unfinished BusinessDahrendorf, Ralf. Law and OrderDillon, K. Burke, et al., and Khan, Mohsin S., et al. Recent Developments in External Debt RestructuringEditors of congressional Quarterly. U.S. Foreign Policy: The Reagan imprintEdwards, George C., 111, Steven A. Shull and Norman C. Thomas, (eds.). The Presidency and Public Policy MakingFoell, Earl, and Richard Henneman, (eds.). How Peace Came to the WordGrant, Wyn (ed.). The Political economy of CorporatismGrindle, Merilee S. State and Countryside: Development Policy and Agrarian Politics in Latin AmericaHardin, Russell, John J. Mearsheimer, Gerald Dworkin and Robert E. Goodin, (eds.). Nuclear Deterrence: ethics and StrategyHershey, Marjorie Randon. Running for Office: The Political Education of CampaignersHough, Jerry F. The Struggle for the third World: Soviet Debates and American OptionsKamieniecki, sheldon, Robert O'Brien and Michael Clark (eds.). Controversies in environmental PolicyKaufman, Herbert. Time, Chance and Organizations: Natural Selection in a Perilous EnvironmentKenny, Anthouny. The Logic of Deterrence: A Philosopher Looks at the Arguments For and Against Nuclear DisarmamentLal, Deepak. The Poverty of ‘Development Economics’Mehran, Hassanali (ed.). External Debt ManagementRees, Gareth and John Lambert. Cities in Crisis: The Political Economy of Urban Development in Post‐War BritainRipley, Randal B., and Grace A. Franklin. Policy Implementation and BureaucracySavoie, Donald J. Regional Economic Development: Canada's Search for SolutionsSawhill, John C., and Richard Cotton (eds.). Energy Conservation‐Successes and FailuresSchmandt, Jurgen, and Hilliard Roderick (eds.). Acid Rain and Friendly Neighbors: The Policy Dispute Between Canada and the United StatesSundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective GovernmentVincent, C. Paul. The Politics of Hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany 1915‐1919Witt, Elder. A Different Justice: Reagan and the Supreme CourtWright, Kevin. The Great American Crime Myth

The logic of deterrence

The logic of deterrence

Coercive Force and Military Strategy: Deterrence Logic and the Cost-Benefit Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare

F ROM the standpoint of military strategy, the American involvement in Vietnam presents the interested analyst with several complex and perplexing military issues. One such issue is the American counterinsurgency strategy of 1965-68. While various tracts have been written on American military policies in Southeast Asia, the 1965-68 strategy goes beyond the traditional military concepts of seizing and holding, disarming and confining, penetrating and obstructing. Schelling notes that in addition to such factors, there is another way military force can be employed that has received less attention in Western military strategy.' According to Schelling: