The cognitive study of emotion is currently one of the most relevant approaches ro the analysis of emotional behavior. Since Schachter-Singer's theory (1962) a long way has been covered making evident the influence, if not the preeminence, of cognition over emotion. The works of Valins (1966), Lazarus (1968), Mandler (1975), Ellis (1974), Beck (1976) and the recent revisions on this subject (Clark and Fiske, 1982; Fiske and Taylor, 1984) have made clear the unequivocal influence of cognitive processes in the apparition of emotion and in its nature. Some problems and discussions have arisen from this subject. Zajonc's works and the conductist theories represent a part of the theoretical answer ro the cognitive theories of emotions. The Theory of Attribution belongs to the group of theories wich start from a pattern of man as an active searcher of information. Attribution is an important part of the social inference and, generaly speaking, of the cognitive process of world construction. The Theorie of Attribution originares in the writings of Heider (1958), Jones-Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967) and has acquired a great extension currently (Kelley-Michela, 1980; Harvery-Weary, 1984). In ir, it is usually distinnguished a part devoted to the study of the basic processes of causal inference and another one devoted ro the consequences of the attributions on the subject's behavior. It is this second part that we are directly interested in, as far as the study of emotions is concerned. The general pressupposition is that the causal attributions are an important part of the understanding hich has an important influence and determines both specific attitudes and the emotive and conductual reactions of the subject. The causal attribution would act as a causal factor of emotions. The systematization of the causes is one of the first problems connected with this type of study. The number of causes wich can be attributed to the different facts in the most varied contexts is practically endless. It is necesary to have a taxonomy giving dimensions ro the different causes and organizing their possible consequences. One dimension quickly made evident was that of internal-external. This dimension distinguished two basic kinds of causes, those wich are within the subject and outside ir. Rotter's work (1966), although from a different point of view, have shown the importance of «locus of control» in people's behavior. Weiner-Kukla (1970) pointed out that this dimension was insufficient ro categorize properly the four most habitual attributions with regard to failure and success, already mentioned by Heider: ability, effort, difficulties of the task and luck. Ir was necessary a complementary dimension wich should separate properly such attributions, so they proposed the dimension of stability. The dimensions of locus of causality and stability together were used ro discriminare properly the four causes aforementioned. Nevertheless, both dimensions seemed insufficient to discriminare between some types of causes, for example between bad mood and headache, wich are both internal and unstable but at the same time clearly different to such and extent that the attribution of a particular fact ro one or another, a failure for example, does not lack of consequences. Weiner (1979), after some hesitation about the naming of the third dimension, definitely proposed ro consider ir a dimension of controlabilityuncontrolability. The problems of the systematization of the causes do not end here. Some authors have proposed other dimensions such as the globality (Seligman and col. 1979) or evaluation (Wimer and Kelley,