1IKE many other observers, Karl Marx noted that from time of Peter Great Russian foreign policy showed a ^general tendency merely to expansionism, but to un power. He put this even more strongly in a speech of January 1876, when spoke of Russia's lodestar being the empire of world. Engels, too, wrote of her dreaming about universal supremacy. They were referring to any fixed plan, or wholly explicit intention, but rather to spirit and character of Russian State. The extent to which this general tendency (though, of course, with different content) still subsists, and degree to which it is expressed in actual practice, are clearly cen tral to any but a superficial estimate of Soviet foreign policy. Even under Tsars expansion was constant. There were periods of stasis, even of withdrawal. The provisions of Treaty of Paris, which limited Russian naval power in Black Sea, were repudiated until opportunity at last arose in 1871. And comparably, Soviet Union abandoned expansion for more than a decade before 1939. The assurances given that this would be permanent were various and formal. In sensitive matter of Baltic re publics, for example, a series of treaties provided against any conceivable Russian pressure. The renunciation of rights of sovereignty forever in a treaty signed (to take Lithuanian case) on July 12, 1920, was followed on September 22, 1926, by a nonaggression pact, twice renewed in thirties, guaranteeing Lithuanian sovereignty in all circumstances. This was strength ened in 1933 by a convention defining aggression, which said that no considerations of a political, military, economic or any other nature would justify it. Even when, on October 10, 1939, Lithuania signed under pressure a Mutual Assistance Pact, under which Soviet troops set up bases in country, its Article 7 guaranteed that this would not in any way affect sovereign rights of contracting parties, in particular their state organi zations, economic and social systems, military measures and, in general, principle of nonintervention in internal affairs. An nexation came following summer (and is one of Stalin ist measures repudiated by Khrushchev: he wept but
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