Literal Phrases Research Articles

Processing of Idiomatic Expressions: Evidence for a New Hybrid View

Is the format of semantic representation for idiomatic expressions different from that for words or literal phrases? Do the semantic characteristics of idiomatic expressions influence their processing? This study examined the influence of the composi-tionality dimension on the processing of idiomatic expressions. It was hypothesized that decomposable and nondecomposable idiomatic expressions are represented differently in memory and that this difference affects the processing time of idiomatic expressions. In 2 experiments, participants read sentences containing decomposable idioms, nondecomposable idioms, or control expressions and performed a lexical decision task on figurative targets presented 0 msec, 350 msec, or 500 msec after reading. Results demonstrated a clear effect of compositionality on the activation of figurative meaning: decomposable idiomatic expressions were processed sooner than nondecomposable idiomatic ones. These results are discussed in the framework of the hybrid model (Titone & Connine, 1999) and the construction–integration (CI) model (Kintsch, 1998).

Congruent Embodied Representations for Visually Presented Actions and Linguistic Phrases Describing Actions

The thesis of embodied semantics holds that conceptual representations accessed during linguistic processing are, in part, equivalent to the sensory-motor representations required for the enactment of the concepts described . Here, using fMRI, we tested the hypothesis that areas in human premotor cortex that respond both to the execution and observation of actions-mirror neuron areas -are key neural structures in these processes. Participants observed actions and read phrases relating to foot, hand, or mouth actions. In the premotor cortex of the left hemisphere, a clear congruence was found between effector-specific activations of visually presented actions and of actions described by literal phrases. These results suggest a key role of mirror neuron areas in the re-enactment of sensory-motor representations during conceptual processing of actions invoked by linguistic stimuli.

Lexical access during the production of idiomatic phrases

In three experiments we test the assumption that idioms have their own lexical entry, which is linked to its constituent lemmas ( Cutting & Bock, 1997). Speakers produced idioms or literal phrases (Experiment 1), completed idioms (Experiment 2), or switched between idiom completion and naming (Experiment 3). The results of Experiment 1 show that identity priming speeds up idiom production more effectively than literal phrase production, indicating a hybrid representation of idioms. In Experiment 2, we find effects of both phonological and semantic priming. Thus, elements of an idiom can not only be primed via their wordform, but also via the conceptual level. The results of Experiment 3 show that preparing the last word of an idiom primes naming of both phonologically and semantically related targets, indicating that literal word meanings become active during idiom production. The results are discussed within the framework of the hybrid model of idiom representation.

Dissociation between syntactic and semantic processing during idiom comprehension.

Syntactic and semantic processing of literal and idiomatic phrases were investigated with a priming procedure. In 3 experiments, participants named targets that were syntactically appropriate or inappropriate completions for semantically unrelated sentence contexts. Sentences ended with incomplete idioms (kick the...) and were biased for either a literal (ball) or an idiomatic (bucket) completion. Syntactically appropriate targets were named more quickly than inappropriate ones for both contextual biases, suggesting that syntactic analysis occurs for idioms. In a final experiment, targets were either concrete (expected) or abstract (unexpected) nouns. For literal sentences, the abstract targets were named more slowly than the concrete targets. In contrast, there was no concreteness effect for idiomatic sentences, suggesting that the literal meaning of the idiom is not processed. Overall, the results provide evidence for dissociation between syntactic and semantic processing.

Schoolhouses, Jailhouses and the House of Being: The Tragedy of Philosophy’s Metaphors

As a rule, there is nothing in the words themselves to mark off metaphors from literal language. If a boundary could somehow be drawn, it would be in constant need of re‐adjustment as metaphors become entrenched, idiomatic, and finally literal, and literal phrases are put to figurative or hyperbolic, and then metaphorical uses. Further, there is no algorithmic recovery of the intended meaning of a metaphor from the meanings of its components, no function that takes literal meanings as its arguments and has metaphorical meaning as its output. That is, metaphors are syntactically invisible, pragmatically unstable, and semantically under‐determined. Their creation, use, and interpretation are almost impenetrable mysteries. As if to spite semantic theorists, they are also linguistic commonplaces, present in every kind of discourse.The discourse of philosophy is no exception to this rule, availing itself of the various stylistic, heuristic, and explanatory roles metaphors can play. Philosophy also produces metaphors of another sort, metaphors that differ in important ways from the metaphors of art and literature, as well as the metaphors of the natural and social sciences. These “grand“ metaphors are lasting monuments to the triumphs of philosophical discourse, even as they are also testimony to the failures of philosophical theorizing. This is because philosophy’s grand metaphors were never intended that way. They are better read as structural hypotheses that have become metaphors only after failing as literal truths. Ironically, it is precisely as metaphors that these images are integrated into our ways of thinking. In the end, thought itself is re‐structured, and these failures as descriptive truths succeed in becoming “constitutive truths” of a new reality.

Event-related potential correlates of linguistic information processing in schizophrenics

Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded from adult schizophrenics and age- and education-matched normal controls during performance of an idiom recognition task involving judgments of the meaningfulness of idiomatic, literal, and nonsense phrases. Schizophrenics produced more errors and had prolonged reaction times while attempting to correctly differentiate meaningful from meaningless phrases. An ERP correlate of that deficit was a larger than normal N400 to idioms and literals, with no difference in N400 amplitude to nonsense phrases. This result was interpreted as evidence that the influence of the linguistic context provided by the first word of two-word idiomatic and literal phrases is reduced in schizophrenia. Schizophrenics also showed reduced amplitude P300.

Familiar Phrases as Peripheral Persuasion Cues

Three experiments compare the effects of familiar phrases (e.g., “don't put all your eggs in one basket”) to literal phrases conveying the same meaning (i.e., “don't risk everything on a single venture”) on attitude formation. It is argued that the meaning and value of familiar phrases are quickly and easily understood. It is further argued that such phrases tend to be most frequently used in limited-thinking situations and should be effective as peripheral persuasion cues when utilized in the context of a commercial message. All three experiments support this expectation of peripheral-cue effectiveness. Familiar, relative to literal, phrases resulted in more favorable attitudes under low (but not high) involvement conditions (Experiment 1), under conditions of message distraction (Experiment 2), and for persons with a low (but not high) need for cognition (Experiment 3). The results of all three experiments are discussed as being consistent with the predictions of the elaboration likelihood model.

What do idioms really mean?

The “dead” metaphor view of idiomaticity suggests that idioms were once metaphoric but have lost their metaphoricity over time and now are equivalent to simple literal phrases such that blow your stack = “to get very angry,” crack the whip = “to exert authority,” and spill the beans = “to reveal a secret.” The purpose of the present studies was to demonstrate that idioms are not dead metaphors but have more complex meanings that are motivated by conceptual metaphors linking idiom phrases with their figurative interpretations. Six experiments are reported that examine the difference between idioms and their literal paraphrases. A first study examined people's intuitions about different knowledge domains to illustrate that the meanings of idioms are consistent with the source-to-target domain mappings of the conceptual metaphors that motivate these phrases' figurative meanings. The data from Experiments 2 and 3 indicate that people view idioms as having more complex meanings than do their roughly, equivalent literal paraphrases. Experiments 4 through 6 show that idioms are most appropriate to use and easiest to comprehend when they are encountered in discourse situations that are consistent with the entailments of the conceptual metaphors that motivate these phrases' idiomatic meanings. The findings from these studies suggest that idioms are not dead metaphors with simple figurative interpretations. Instead, idioms have complex meanings that are motivated by independently existing conceptual metaphors that are partly constitutive of everyday thought.

Idioms and mental imagery: The metaphorical motivation for idiomatic meaning

We conducted three experiments to investigate the mental images associated with idiomatic phrases in English. Our hypothesis was that people should have strong conventional images for many idioms and that the regularity in people's knowledge of their images for idioms is due to the conceptual methaphors motivating the figurative meanings of idioms. In the first study, subjects were asked to form and describe their mental images for different idiomatic expressions. Subjects were then asked a series of detailed questions about their images regarding the causes and effects of different events within their images. We found high consistency in subjects' images of idioms with similar figurative meanings despite differences in their surface forms (e.g., spill the beans and let the cat out of the bag). Subjects' responses to detailed questions about their images also showed a high degree of similarity in their answers. Further examination of subjects' imagery protocols supports the idea that the conventional images and knowledge associated with idioms are constrained by the conceptual methaphors (e.g., the MIND IS A CONTAINER and IDEAS ARE ENTITIES) which motivate the figurative meanings of idioms. The results of two control studies showed that the conventional images associated with idioms are not solely based on their figurative meanings (Experiment 2) and that the images associated with literal phrases (e.g., spill the peas) were quite varied and unlikely to be constrained by conceptual metaphor (Experiment 3). These findings support the view that idioms are not “dead” metaphors with their meanings being arbitrarily determined. Rather, the meanings of many idioms are motivated by speakers' tacit knowledge of the conceptual metaphors underlying the meanings of these figurative phrases.

Metaphor, Idiom, and Figuration

Metaphor, specifically, and figurative language, generally, have been of interest to philosophers and literary theorists since Aristotle's Poetics. Yet we still lack clear criteria for what it means for an expression to be figurative, and how this is to be distinguished from literal usage. We argue here that this question has remained unanswered, in part, because it has been misconceived. One important source of misunderstanding has been the almost universal tendency to view metaphors and other tropes as comprising two discrete meanings, one that is literal, and one that is figurative. Rather, we propose that metaphorical and literal phrases are both understood by drawing on denotative and connotative associations of their terms in an interactive fashion, and that assessments of adequacy for an interpretation--whether literal or figurative--refer to the same basic criteria. Metaphors are phrases with a high degree of tolerance for such interpretation, literals much less so, and idioms even less. Interpreting idioms depends more on the retrieval of a specific and conventional meaning. In this sense, idioms are hardly "figurative" at all.