When there is seemingly irresolvable and faultless disagreement in philosophy, it is often natural to resort to contextualism: perhaps we are all speaking the truth, but talking past each other in some way. We might get, as Ann Whittle puts it, ‘the sense that both sides were right, at least some of the time, but neither position managed to capture it all’ (p.ix). In epistemology, this is by now a well-rehearsed and popular move: to accommodate both the philosophically persuasive arguments for scepticism and the immense plausibility of ordinary knowledge ascriptions, it is argued that we speak in different contexts, and the sceptical conclusion is true in some philosophical, but false in all or most ordinary, contexts. In the literature on free will, this kind of move seems to suggest itself with equal plausibility: to accommodate both the philosophically persuasive arguments for incompatibilism and the immense plausibility, irrespective of the question of determinism, of our ordinary ascriptions of freedom and responsibility, we might argue that we speak in different contexts, and the incompatibilist conclusion is true in some philosophical, but false in all or most ordinary, contexts. However, in the literature on free will and responsibility, this line of argument has been conspicuously near-absent. In her rich and tightly argued book, Ann Whittle fills this gap and proposes a contextualist account of freedom, control, and responsibility.