Limited Property Rights Research Articles

Antitrust Policy and Intellectual Property Rights Protection in Emerging Markets

The article considers the problem of correspondence between antitrust policy and intellectual property rights protection in terms of their goals, methods and mutual influence. This question provokes discussions: on the one hand, innovative development requires strong intellectual property rights protection to stimulate entrepreneurs, even if it leads to anti-competitive consequences. On the other hand, maintenance of market competition requires limiting property rights. The context of the problem changes significantly when emerging markets economies are concerned. Basing on the formal model, the authors analyze possible hostile effects of antitrust policies under the conditions of poor intellectual property rights protection, which is typical for some developing countries, and propose ways of overcoming the unfavorable situation. The research shows that antitrust policy needs careful consideration of the existing institutional environment.

Study on the Problems and Countermeasures of “Limited Property Rights Houses”

In parts of the “historic village renovation”, “urban village renovation”, “combining the countries and matching nature villages”, “new rural construction”, “improving the living conditions of villagers”, by the way of “land - renting instead of expropriating”, the development of “limited property rights houses” in China has existed for a long time, and it has shown a trend of difficult to contain. The article analyzes the status of “limited property rights houses”, reveals its drawbacks, explores the reasons for its existence and finally proposes countermeasures.

Inefficiencies and Inequities of Capitalism - And How They Can Be Reduced

Perpetual property rights to land, structures, corporations and money allows investors to be overpaid to create inefficiencies and inequities in a way not measured by accountants and little noticed by economists. All intellectual property rights have limited life. Most assets depreciate over time except modern forms of stable money, collectables and land in developing urban areas. Private ownership of urban land creates inequities and inefficiencies from the windfall gains generated by external investment from either the private and/or private sectors. The Old Testament describes limited life land tenure that today could be used to make urban development self-financing, efficient and equitable. To illustrate the inequities, inefficiencies and un-sustainability of modern capitalism the paper describes an alternative system of property rights for owning realty, corporations and money. Ancient forms of money incurred a storage cost that Proudhon proposed for modern money as promoted by Gesell (1919). Keynes (1936: Chapter 23, part VI) and Fisher (1933) supported the introduction of cost carrying money that invigorated many communities during the Great Depression. Cell phone money, used in developing countries to democratize finance, proves that cost-carrying money is practical today. Investors obtained limited life property rights in all early business associations and corporations. Ownership of privately financed US toll roads, bridges and other public assets had to be transferred to community ownership after their payback period. Ownership transfer is still used today by governments to finance public infrastructure like power stations and tunnels. The paper makes a case for a tax incentive to encourage all private sector corporations to create a stakeholder class of shares to facilitate the transfer of their ownership to employees, suppliers, distributors, agents and customers resident in the host community. Localizing control provides a basis for residents to protect their environment on a self-financing basis that can attract more alien investment without undermining democracy. A dividend income can then be provided to all citizens to provide universal prosperity without: growth, pensions, welfare, more taxes and bigger governments while democratizing the wealth of host communities and nations on an environmentally sustainable basis.

Words and Worlds: The Supreme Court in Rapanos and Carabell

This paper explores the expression of competing worldviews in the opinions of Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. An “ecological” worldview identified with modern environmentalism appears in Justice Steven’s dissent and in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in these cases. An opposed “atomistic” worldview is evidenced in Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion. These competing worldviews reflect different beliefs and values held by the justices affecting environmental regulatory cases such as Rapanos. The atomistic worldview is consistent with values of individual autonomy and mastery of the physical environment for economic advancement, the ecological worldview with values of individual restraint in support of a common good and fitting harmoniously into the natural and social environment. These competing worldviews, and their associated values, have contrary implications for law. Justices embracing the ecological worldview tend to favor a broad scope of federal regulatory power, limited property rights, and general interpretations of environmental regulatory authority. Justices resisting this worldview tend to have contrary views on these issues. The paper also argues that the same values that animate the substantive differences of the justices in cases such as Rapanos also may affect the justices’ preferences for interpretational approaches. That is, the values that lead justices to be more or less accepting of the ecological model are also among the values that may influence justices to be textualists or intentionalists.

Concurrence of Ownership and Limited Property Rights

Abstract: In Comparative and European Property law, there is a clear need for studies into the fundamental basis of the legal systems in Europe. One part of this fundamental basis is the creation and extinction of property rights. One of the most interesting elements of this subject and the reason for this article is the idea of concurrence of the right of ownership and a limited property right burdening that same right of ownership held by the same person. This possibility is not recognized in every legal system. In the discussion on the development of a European property law, this fundamental question and the differing treatments it receives in various European legal systems are very vital. Very interestingly, the argumentation used in German, French, Dutch and English law is very similar but reaches different results. The possibility of holding a property right and ownership over the same object is recognized in German law, but generally not in Dutch, French and English law. Only when the position of third parties is taken into account some convergence between the various approaches to this problem can be reached. The European Commission, when working on property law proposals such as a possible right of Euro-Mortgage, other property security rights, but also in the area of EU consumer law, should therefore take these doctrinal differences and similarities between these four Member States into account. Résumé: Il existe en droit comparé et en droit européen de la propriété un besoin évident d’approfondir les bases fondamentales des systèmes de droit en Europe. Une partie de cette base fondamentale concerne l’acquisition et l’extinction des droits réels. L’un des éléments les plus intéressants sur ce sujet, objet de cet article, est l’idée de concours entre le droit de propriété (right of ownership) et un droit réel limité (limited property right) grevant ce même droit de propriété, détenus par la même personne. Cette possibilité n’est pas reconnue dans tous les systèmes de droit. Dans la discussion sur le développement d’un droit européen de la propriété, cette question fondamentale, ainsi que les différents traitements reçus dans les divers systèmes de droit sont d’une extrême importance. Il est très intéressant de constater que l’argumentation utilisée en droit allemand, français, néerlandais et anglais est très similaire, mais aboutit à des résultats différents. La possibilité de détenir un droit réel (holding a property right) et un droit de propriété (ownership) sur le même objet est reconnue en droit allemand, mais généralement pas en droit néerlandais, français et anglais. C’est seulement lors de la prise en compte de la position des tiers que certaines convergences apparaissent entre les différentes approches de ce problème. La Commission européenne, lorsqu’elle travaille sur des propositions concernant le droit de la propriété tel qu’une éventuelle euro-hypothèque, d’autres droits de sûretés, mais aussi le droit européen de la consommation, devrait donc prendre en considération les différences et similitudes doctrinales entre ces quatre États Membres.

Housing of Limited Property Rights: A Paradox Inside and Outside Chinese Cities

This paper develops a prototypal theoretical framework for analyzing property inalienability and applies it to housing of limited property rights in China, which includes so-called ‘small-property-rights housing’ in the countryside (SLPR housing) and the affordable housing programme in the city (ALPR housing). The integrated analysis of ALPR and SLPR housing focuses on inalienability restrictions to ownership entitlement. By preserving current property use, inalienability can address externality, public good and even macro-economic problems that arise from property sales. Both ALPR and SLPR provide good empirical support for the theoretical hypotheses. Moreover, they demonstrate some important functions of inalienability in a transitional economy, including helping to maintain macro stability as well as being an important tool for implementing partial reform strategy. Inalienability is also a second-best tool to protect private property rights against the intervention of local political forces. However, various problems with ALPR and SLPR housing show that inalienability is also a rough tool that needs to be improved or replaced in order to achieve micro-economic efficiency.

Soviet legacies in post-Soviet Russia: insights from crisis management

This paper singles out elements of continuity in the Russian path to development and growth after transformation to market under the assumption that Soviet legacies have a bearing on current policies and provide some insights as to how the Russian market system may develop in the future. Drawing from the development and the specifics of the financial crisis in Russia, the paper focuses on the frame of mind, behaviour, goals and means of Russian policy-makers that are reminiscent of Soviet formal and informal institutions and may have an impact on post-crisis developments and structures. A sui generis corporate state is emerging, the basic features of which range from the complex of the great power and belief in the state as a driver of growth to secrecy, mutual distrust, lack of transparency and accountability, and efforts to increase command on resources. The seeds of a Russian-style corporate state that emerged in the early 2000s with the creation of goskorporatsii are reinforced by economic slow-down and Russia-specific market failures. Competition for power – the President versus the Premier – may help strengthen the demand from below for a stronger state and limited property rights. Retrenchment from competition, openness to Foreign Direct Investment and commitment to entry into the WTO expose the country to the risk of prolonged technological backwardness and possible regression to a society where private elite organisations are closely tied to the state and institutions are subservient to the leadership: a framework highly unsuitable for modernisation and growth.

SUSTAINING THE GOOSE THAT LAYS THE GOLDEN EGG: A CONTINUOUS TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFER

ABSTRACTThis paper proposes a simple model of the trade‐offs perceived by innovating firms when investing in countries with limited intellectual property rights (IPR). The model allows for a continuous treatment of technology transfer and production cost gains occurring through FDI. While it does not consider possible changes in rates of innovation caused by changes in IPR in developing countries, it allows one to uncover a potentially non‐monotonic relationship between welfare and IPR in the recipient country.

Housing of Limited Property Rights: A Paradox Inside and Outside Chinese Cities

Housing of limited property rights, including so-called small-property-rights in the countryside (SLPR housing) and affordable housing program in the city (ALPR housing), is an important feature of China's housing policy. This paper presents an integrated analysis of ALPR and SLPR housing, focusing on the inalienability and other restrictions on ownership entitlement. We find inconsistency in current ALPR and SLPR housing from equity perspective. The most important function of the inalienability of LPR housing is to help maintain macro stability in economic reform. In this sense, inalienability rules can be an important tool for implementing partial reform strategy. More important, nation-wide application of inalienability rules can be a second-best tool to protect private property rights from the intervention of local political forces. However, various problems with ALPR and SLPR housing show that inalienability rules are also a rough tool that needs to be improved or replaced in order to achieve microeconomic efficiency.

Limited property rights in umbilical cord blood for transplantation and research.

Limited property rights in umbilical cord blood for transplantation and research.

Should Ownership Last Forever?

This paper investigates the utility of all intellectual property rights being time limited with no limits required for real assets and corporate shares. Ownership rights evolved from hereditary rulers seeking to maintain political power and wealth in perpetuity. This objective is no longer relevant with rulers elected for a fixed time. Neither are perpetual rights consistent with economic justice, efficiency and sustainability. A review of modern techniques of investment analysis reveals that unlimited life property rights are not required and that they can result in investors obtaining benefits in excess of the incentive required to bring forth their investment. Tax incentives provide a voluntary way to introduce time limited property rights to improve equity and efficiency by transferring the ownership of realty or firms to their operational/strategic stakeholders. In this way the wealth of nations could be both democratized and localized to build a more sustainable and just society.

Industrial location and residential disamenity: a case study of the chemical industry in Castleford, England

Despite their location near residential populations, limited disamenity property rights have been granted to chemical firms in accordance with Government legislation in most developed countries. These include rights to produce limited harmless odours, noise and visual intrusion, and, as long as restrictions to the property rights are not breached, no compensation will be payable. With these considerations in mind it is essential that the magnitude of these residential amenities are evaluated before granting the relevant property rights for the local environment. This study presents a relatively novel approach to monetary estimation of such disamenity using local knowledge of the housing market. Monetary estimates are provided for the cost of residential disamenities received and the relative importance of the different types of externality associated with permitting chemical works to be located near to residential areas. The results suggest that although such property-right decisions can be efficient in economic terms, local residents may still have to shoulder sizeable wealth reductions. Even for a long-time established chemical industry, the results suggest the main causes of disamenity for local residents to be from their perceived health risk rather than visual or distance amenity.1998 Academic Press

Should ownership last forever?

This paper investigates the utility of all intellectual property rights being time limited with no limits required for real assets and corporate shares. Ownership rights evolved from hereditary rulers seeking to maintain political power and wealth in perpetuity. This objective is no longer relevant with rulers elected for a fixed time. Neither are perpetual rights consistent with economic justice, efficiency and sustainability. A review of modern techniques of investment analysis reveals that unlimited life property rights are not required and that they can result in investors obtaining benefits in excess of the incentive required to bring forth their investment. Tax incentives provide a voluntary way to introduce time limited property rights to improve equity and efficiency by transferring the ownership of realty or firms to their operational/strategic stakeholders. In this way the wealth of nations could be both democratized and localized to build a more sustainable and just society.

A Deceptive Cadence: Nineteenth-Century Property Law and Popular Culture's Perception of The Piano

AbstractThe tale presented in the film The Piano is placed in mid-19th-century New Zealand and has been heralded by critics as a timeless love story, and described as erotic and romantic. A legal historical review of this time period, however, demonstrates that, upon marriage, women had very limited property rights and were entirely dependent upon men, whether their fathers, their husbands, or otherwise. In particular, personal objects such as a piano would become the property of the husband upon marriage. Hence, a married woman's access to the ability to express herself in this manner was not her own. The actions of the characters in this film are consistent with the law applicable to this time period. Ultimately, from this persective, the movie is about the abuses of this kind of culture and its inability to suppress the human spirit—the piano being a symbol of exactly that struggle. This paper compares the “modern” perception of this film to its historical context, with the objective of determining what this says about our present society and culture.

Governing Sincience: Patents and Public Sector Research

The Argumentwhile reconizing that public sector research has long been managed by a wide variety of practices and techniques, this paper concentrates on the increasingly important role that patents are playing in the management and regulation of public sector research. It argues that as a specific form of technology, patents play a significant and growing role in facilitating the management of the scientific object and can also be seen as a particular instance of governmentality. More specifically, it argues that patents have had an important impact on the culture and political ecomomy of science. In this sence patents can be seen not only as a legal regime that provides limited property rights over technical information but also as a sophisticated tool of discipline and control that is used to regulate and manage public sector research. The paper suggests that with the increasing use of patents as a means of governing science, we are witnessing the growing juridification of science, the intervention of the law into an arena it hitherto largely ignored.

Pastoral Lease Tenure in Australia: Historical Relic or Useful Contemporary Tool?

Pastoral leasehold has evolved as the vehicle for the flexible award of property rights and duties in Australia's rangelands capable of serving as an effective public policy instrument while meeting the needs of titleholders. These capabilities were most clearly revealed during the interventionist phase of planned closer settlement. With the loss of policy momentum directed towards further pastoral development and closer settlement, leasehold tenure appeared to be in danger of becoming a bureaucratic anachronism. More recently, however, the sharply escalating revival of public interest in the rangelands is forcing a re- examination of property rights, with renewed interest in lease tenures as policy instruments, within a context of multiple values and uses, many not being readily tied to private land title. We examine the theoretical arguments as well as the pragmatic case for retaining a distinctive regime of limited property rights in Australia's rangelands, focusing on the following issues: matching property rights with resource contexts; balancing internalities and externalities; timing the award of property rights; specificity and flexibility; coordinated administration; and perceptions and expectations. We conclude by identifying the core attributes of an effective property-rights regime based on lease title. These attributes are: clear specification of the property rights of the lessee, designed to meet the resource needs of the enterprise; performance standards with increasing emphasis on sustainable use; capacity to award additional rights, where additional resources can be internalised effectively; specification of the rights of other interest-groups; powers of resumption for more intensive uses; powers to revise lease conditions; and payment of an annual rent. We foresee the revival of the leasehold system as a mechanism for defining property rights and duties precisely, and as an instrument for delivering policies on a wide range of issues concerning the management and use of the rangelands.

Privatization Versus Groundwater Central Management

AbstractA group of free market natural resource economists argue that the current system of limited property rights for groundwater users should be replaced by a new system of freely transferable property rights This, they contend, would provide the more efficient allocation of groundwater resources and help alleviate the water scarcity problem in the United States Their case for privatization is critically appraised Groundwater hydrology, common property, contamination, and other third party effects are examined to determine the set of circumstances under which privatization would work best The following alternatives to the full privatization plan are also examined central management, legal reform, and “French style” privatized management of water systems

Equilibrium and efficiency with property rights and local consumption externalities

There is no mechanism that guarantees existence and Pareto optimality of equilibrium in all situations if each individual has limited property rights and a utility function that depends upon his neighbour's consumption. This is true under virtually any assumption about coalition formation. Therefore, Sen's paradox of the Paretian liberal is confirmed in an economic exchange setting with limited externalitities, and Coase's conjecture on the efficiency of bargaining with complete information is denied.

The common property resource problem and the creation of limited property rights

Fish resources are generally considered common property and open to any user. This, the assumption goes, makes them susceptible to the “tragedy of the commons” in which selfish users are both the villains and the victims. While it is true that wild fish populations cannot readily be privatized, it hardly follows that they are completely open-access. In addition to social controls found in many traditional fishing communities, amply documented by anthropologists, many administrative controls in contemporary fisheries management also create limited property rights over fishery resources. This study focuses on Great Lakes fisheries of Ontario in Lakes Erie and St. Clair, and the kinds and diversity of limited property rights instituted in these areas: the formal and informal allocation of fishing areas, and the allocation of quantitative fishing rights (quotas), all of which serve as mechanisms to solve the common property resource problem. The Great Lakes fisheries suggest certain generalizations about the management of common property resources. The paper offers a “life-cycle” model of living resources use.