Likelihood Of Cooperation Research Articles

Cooperative responses in rats playing a 2 × 2 game: Effects of opponent strategy, payoff, and oxytocin

The present study tested cooperation in rats playing a 2 × 2 game (2 players, 2 responses) in an operant chamber, where players choose to cooperate or defect without knowledge of their partner's choice. We evaluated cooperative responses in rats (Subjects) playing different games [iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), Stag Hunt] with a Stooge partner utilizing different response strategies [Tit-for-tat (TFT), Win-stay, Lose-shift (WSLS), Random], and we determined the effects of oxytocin (OT). IPD trial outcomes and payoffs included mutual cooperation (reward, R, 3 sugar pellets each), mutual defection (punishment, P, 1 pellet each), or unilateral defection (temptation, T, 5 pellets) and cooperation (sucker, S, 0 pellets). Stag Hunt was similar, except that T = 2 pellets. We hypothesized that Subjects would make more cooperative responses when playing Stag Hunt vs IPD, when playing IPD with a Stooge using TFT vs WSLS or Random, and when treated with OT. At baseline, Subjects’ overall likelihood of cooperation was unaffected by the game (IPD vs SH) or by the Stooges’ response strategy (TFT, WSLS, Random). Cooperative responses earned Subjects more pellets, except when playing with a Stooge using a random strategy. Trial outcomes (R, T, S or P) also varied by game and strategy, although the mutual defection (P) was the most common. Systemic pretreatment with OT increased Subjects’ cooperative responses, resulting in fewer P and more R outcomes. In particular, IPD-Random Subjects were more cooperative, even at the expense of earning fewer pellets. These results demonstrate that OT increases cooperative behavior in rats playing 2 × 2 games.

Spatial Proximity and its Importance for Cooperation in a Tourist Region - Complementary Use of Social Network Analysis and Agglomeration Theory

Purpose. Evaluation of the importance of spatial proximity for undertaking business cooperation in a tourist region. Method. Agglomeration economy analysis was combined with the network approach (i.e. Social Network Analysis). The method of case study was used – cooperation between various entities (actors) in five tourist municipalities united in the “Beskid Five” agreement. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 225 entities selected in purposeful sampling. Additionally, using the appropriate software, based on postal address and data on GPS coordinates of the location of the interviewed entities, were obtained. To analyse the data, some parameters of network analysis were used (i.e. the degree centrality – i.e. in-out and out-degree) and multidimensional data analysis. In particular, the logistic regression method was used, i.e. binary logic regressions were carried out in order to determine the significance of spatial proximity for undertaking cooperation and its intensity in a tourist region. In addition, Moran Ii local statistics were determined in order to measure the occurrence and direction of spatial autocorrelation (spatial correlation coefficient within Local Indicators of Spatial Associations, LISA). Visualisation techniques were also implemented in the work. Findings. In the research, it has been shown that spatial proximity is an important factor affecting cooperation in a tourist region, because it increases the likelihood of cooperation, although this relationship is not linear. Research and conclusion limitations. The study did not cover all entities from the region, but only the so-called key actors in a network. The region selected for research is so specific that the obtained results cannot be considered as representative for other regions in Poland or in the world. In addition, cooperation was analysed without division into various forms, which may also have influence on the obtained results. Practical implications. Entrepreneurs wishing to gain economic benefits regarding cooperation should consider the location and spatial arrangement of connections between potential partners of this cooperation, taking its various forms into account. In addition, by stimulating cooperation between entrepreneurs, local authorities should look at their (municipality office) location in the tourist region and the resulting spatial and functional structure of links between entities, which may determine the scope, intensity and level of effectiveness of the cooperation undertaken. Originality. To show the importance of geographic proximity with reference to intensity of cooperation in a tourist region, analysis of the agglomeration economies and social networks was combined for the first time. Type of paper. An article presenting the results of empirical research.

The Economics of Supranational Bank Supervision

We document large variation in the propensity and the intensity in which countries cooperate in the supervision of banks. We show that these variations can be linked to differences in cooperation gains. Using hand-collected data on supranational agreements for 4,278 country pairs during the period 1995-2013, we find that proxies for bilateral cooperation gains a) increase the likelihood of cooperation, b) accelerate the adoption of cooperation, c) make intense forms of cooperation more likely. An analysis of regional cooperation shows that their make-up, as well as their evolution, is broadly consistent with predicted cooperation gains. Our findings suggests that a uniform approach to supranational supervision is not necessarily desirable as countries differ considerably in the extent to which theybenefit from cooperation.

Back to the basics: how feelings of anger affect cooperation

PurposeThe authors propose that angry individuals are much more likely to consider the emotional state of their partner than are neutral individuals. They then apply a lay theory dictating that anger decreases cooperation and react accordingly by lowering their own level of cooperation.Design/methodology/approachThe authors report four experiments involving different samples, manipulations, payment schemes and interfaces. The methodological approach was to capitalize on the positives of experimental research (e.g. establishing causality) while also trying to conceptually replicate the findings in different settings.FindingsThe authors found evidence for a lay theory (i.e. expectation) that anger decreases cooperation, but that actual cooperation was lowest when angry individuals were paired with other angry individuals, supporting the hypotheses.Research limitations/implicationsAnger can spill over from unrelated contexts to affect cooperation, and incidental anger by itself is not enough to decrease cooperation. However, the findings are limited to anger and cannot necessarily be used to understand the effects of other emotions.Practical implicationsBefore entering into a context that requires cooperation, such as a negotiation, be wary of the emotional state of both yourself and of your partner. This paper suggests that only if both parties are angry, then the likelihood of cooperation is low.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, they are the first researchers to address the question of how incidental anger affects single-round cooperation. By going back to the basics, the authors believe that the findings fill a gap in existing research and offer a building block for future research on anger and cooperation.

Information transparency and equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study

We experimentally investigate the role of information transparency for equilibrium selection in stag hunt coordination games. These games can be transformed from a prisoner’s dilemma game by introducing a centralized reward or punishment scheme. We aim to explore the impact of the disclosure of information on how final payoffs are derived on players’ incentive to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium. We find that such information disclosure significantly increases the tendency of players to play the payoff-dominant strategy and reduces the occurrence of coordination failure. The mechanism works directly through the positive impact of disclosure on the saliency of the payoff-dominant equilibrium, and indirectly through the positive influence of disclosure on players’ belief about the likelihood of cooperation by the opponent.

Solving the puzzle of collective action through inter-individual differences.

Models of collective action infrequently account for differences across individuals beyond a limited set of strategies, ignoring variation in endowment (e.g. physical condition, wealth, knowledge, personality, support), individual costs of effort, or expected gains from cooperation. However, behavioural research indicates these inter-individual differences can have significant effects on the dynamics of collective action. The papers contributed to this theme issue evaluate how individual differences affect the propensity to cooperate, and how they can catalyse others' likelihood of cooperation (e.g. via leadership). Many of the papers emphasize the relationship between individual decisions and socio-ecological context, particularly the effect of group size. All together, the papers in this theme issue provide a more complete picture of collective action, by embracing the reality of inter-individual variation and its multiple roles in the success or failure of collective action.

The attractiveness of humour types in personal advertisements: Affiliative and aggressive humour are differentially preferred in long-term versus short-term partners

A good sense of humour is commonly offered in written dating advertisements demon- strating that humour is an important quality to have when attracting a mate, but not all humour is the same. This study used vignettes in the style of a personal advertisement to measure the attrac- tiveness of affiliative and aggressive humour in different relationship contexts. The results dem- onstrated that affiliative humour was more attractive than aggressive humour in both relationship contexts but especially for long-term relationships. The results follow the pattern expected of af- filiative humour styles being more attractive for long-term relationships due to being linked to qualities that may be important in long-term relationships such as likelihood of cooperation, and aggressive humour styles not being favoured for long-term relationships due to being linked to qualities that may be detrimental in long-term relationships. A follow-up study confirmed that dif- ferent humour styles were associated with different perceived personality traits. Together these findings suggest that humour may be used to indicate an individual's personality and that the at- tractiveness of a good sense of humour depends on both the type of humour and the type of rela- tionship being sought.

Cooperation in criminal organizations: Kinship and violence as credible commitments

The paper argues that kinship ties and sharing information on violent acts can be interpreted as forms of ‘hostage-taking’ likely to increase cooperation among co-offenders. The paper tests this hypothesis among members of two criminal groups, a Camorra clan based just outside Naples, and a Russian Mafia group that moved to Rome in the mid-1990s. The data consist of the transcripts of phone intercepts conducted on both groups by the Italian police over several months. After turning the data into a series of network matrices, we use Multivariate Quadratic Assignment Procedure to test the hypothesis. We conclude that the likelihood of cooperation is higher among members who have shared information about violent acts. Violence has a stronger effect than kinship in predicting tie formation and thus cooperation. When non-kinship-based mechanisms fostering cooperation exist, criminal groups are likely to resort to them.

287(g) and the Politics of Interior Immigration Control in the United States: Explaining Local Cooperation with Federal Immigration Authorities

This paper aims to improve our understanding of emerging patterns of interior immigration control in the United States by examining local law enforcement cooperation with federal immigration authorities under the 287(g) Program. While several recent studies have drawn attention to the shifting terrain of immigration enforcement away from borders into the interior, few have attempted to systematically explain reasons for this shift. Using a county-level dataset of all counties in the United States, this study finds that, despite the purported links between the 287(g) Program and public safety, county crime rates are not significantly related to local cooperation with federal immigration authorities. Rather, the results indicate that local decisions to engage in immigration control efforts are driven by political factors, particularly a county's partisan composition, and demographic pressures related to increases in the Hispanic/Latino population. Demography is not, however, destiny, as new immigration in localities with established foreign-born populations does not significantly increase the likelihood of cooperation under 287(g). This suggests that the partisan composition of the places where immigrants settle mediates the extent to which the demand for tighter immigration enforcement exceeds the political influence immigrant communities have in their efforts to contest restrictive immigration control policies.

Competitive Embeddedness and the Emergence of Interfirm Cooperation

How does a history of competition between two economic actors affect their willingness and ability to work together for mutual benefit? Existing theory and research offer mixed predictions and answers. The competitive embeddedness hypothesis suggested here postulates that the likelihood of cooperation between two firms is positively related to the intensity of competition between these firms in the preceding period. The likely mechanisms leading to this are familiarity and knowledge-based trust, both of which are greater between competitors than between non-competitors or two randomly selected actors. Analysis of investment syndicates in venture capital industry supports the competitive embeddedness hypothesis. The hypothesis holds independently of business culture and of the industry's development stage.

Information, Cooperation and Trust in Strategic Service Delivery Partnerships

Strategic service-delivery partnerships (SSPs) are a new method of contracting for the delivery of local government services. They are rapidly becoming an important feature of local government in Britain. Negotiating and operating such partnerships successfully is a difficult challenge. They require the development and maintenance of a strongly cooperative relationship between the local authority and the strategic partner. This does not always work and there are examples where SSPs have been terminated. This article analyses SSPs in a transactions cost framework and identifies the contracting problems that can work against the success of SSPs and possible solutions to these problems provided by the development of trust. The likelihood of cooperation being based on trust can be signalled by the gifts both sides make during the procurement process in the form of negotiations, factfinding and preparation of the bid. However, procurement regulations may work to discourage a local authority from attaching a sufficiently high weighting to a factor as intangible as trust in the procurement decision.

Asymmetric Power Among Agents and the Generation and Maintenance of Cooperation in International Relations

The question addressed in this analysis is whether endowing agents with various forms of asymmetric power makes cooperation more likely across a variety of structural settings of conflict and cooperation present in international relations. To address this question, an agent-based model incorporating asymmetric power among agents in a set of (2×2) games that represent different forms of conflict and cooperation prevalent in international relations (Chicken, Stag, Assurance, Deadlock, and Prisoner's Dilemma) is developed and analyzed via simulation. Simulation results indicate that the introduction of asymmetric power substantially increases the chances that both cooperative agents survive and cooperative worlds evolve. This is particularly the case when agents are endowed with the ability to selectively interact with other agents. Also, anticipated variations in outcomes across the game structures regarding the likelihood of cooperation are supported.

Relative Gains Concerns when the Number of States in the International System Increases

Realists argue that relative gains concerns make cooperation more difficult than liberal institutionalists expect. In response, Duncan Snidal has argued that when the number of states increases, the problem of relative gains concerns is generally attenuated. The author contends that current analysis of the impact of increasing the number of states is contingent on two implicit and inaccurate assumptions. Relative gains concerns, rather than being relative “absolute” gains concerns, are relative “percentage” gains concerns, and currently, an increase in the number of states is caused by the breakup of a state. Using these new assumptions, the author shows that when the number of states increases, the negative impact of relative gains concerns can continue under many conditions to inhibit cooperation. The results have specific predictions about changes in the likelihood of cooperation due to state breakup, such as the Soviet Union, and state merging, such as the European Union.

Behavioural Decision Theory and the Gains Debate in International Politics

The temptation to free ride and the fear of exploitation are traditionally offered as factors explaining individuals' choices under conditions of social dilemma. In two experimental studies of prisoner's dilemma behaviour we demonstrate that the ratio-differences of payoffs are as important as the absolute differences in affecting the likelihood of cooperation. The implications of this additional structural determinant of dilemma choice are developed and applied to the stalled gains debate in international relations theory. By incorporating ratio-differences into the analysis ‘realist’ and ‘liberal’ theories of state behaviour may be reconciled.

ARNON SOFFER, Rivers of Fire: The Conflict over Water in the Middle East (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999). Pp. 311. $69.00 cloth, $34.95 paper.

Arnon Soffer has written a comprehensive study covering the geo-politics of water conflict in the Middle East. Soffer's major contention is that the region is rapidly heading in the direction of environmental disaster because it is running out of water. Although he believes that regional cooperation, combined with the development of new water resources through nonconventional means—particularly desalination—is a possible solution to the problem, he is pessimistic about the likelihood of cooperation because of historical distrust among the nations involved in each basin conflict.

Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation

I consider the influence of domestic political institutions on the ability of leaders to establish bilateral cooperation in the international system. Leaders operating in different domestic institutional environments have differing abilities to commit credibly to future courses of action, to accept the costs of policy failures, and to adjust to changes in the international environment. Using game theory, I deduce hypotheses about the effects of domestic institutional structures on the likelihood of cooperation. My model suggests that jointly democratic dyads and jointly autocratic dyads will cooperate more readily than dyads composed of one democracy and one autocracy. Analysis of COPDAB events data reveals evidence commensurate with these hypotheses. This research suggests that international cooperation theory will benefit from consideration of the influence of domestic politics on leaders' decisions, but that this influence can only be fully understood in the context of strategic behavior in the international system.

The Influence of Relative Power and Locus of Control on Channel Cooperation

This study examines the effects of power imbalances in a dyadic channel relationship and an individual's locus of control orientation on a transaction-specific decision. Both manifest and latent relative power are independently manipulated in favor of either the manufacturer or distributor in an experimental setting. The primary dependent measure is the likelihood of cooperation by the distributor. Results indicate a strong effect along the manifest dimension, perceived direct influence over the transaction. A moderate effect is observed along the latent dimension, a vast imbalance in company size. The direction of these effects on cooperation is dependent upon which party possesses the relative power advanatage. An exploratory path analysis reveals an indirect causal relationship between locus of control and cooperation.