Likelihood Judgments Research Articles

Effects of urban street vegetation on judgments of restoration likelihood

Knowledge of how to increase the restorative quality of residential streetscapes may help to offset problems entailed by urban densification. The present study considered the effects of trees, grass, and flower beds on ratings of restoration likelihood for streetscapes. We used digital-imaging techniques to systematically vary these natural elements in images of residential streets with different architectural characteristics. Using a web-based procedure, 103 images were rated by independent groups of Icelandic adults (N=188) on either restoration likelihood, preference, being away, or fascination. Group mean scores on the psychological variables were calculated for each image, and the images were then used as the units of analysis in regression analyses. Ratings of restoration likelihood increased with increase in the number of street trees and the presence of flower beds. These effects were apparently mediated by perceptions of being away and fascination. The architectural characteristics of buildings along the streets had a strong independent effect on restoration likelihood ratings, but they did not moderate the positive effects of vegetation on restoration likelihood ratings. The results provide guidance for the design of more psychologically sustainable urban residential environments.

Sample size bias in judgments of perceptual averages.

Previous research has shown that people exhibit a sample size bias when judging the average of a set of stimuli on a single dimension. The more stimuli there are in the set, the greater people judge the average to be. This effect has been demonstrated reliably for judgments of the average likelihood that groups of people will experience negative, positive, and neutral events (Price, 2001; Price, Smith, & Lench, 2006) and also for estimates of the mean of sets of numbers (Smith & Price, 2010). The present research focuses on whether this effect is observed for judgments of average on a perceptual dimension. In 5 experiments we show that people's judgments of the average size of the squares in a set increase as the number of squares in the set increases. This effect occurs regardless of whether the squares in each set are presented simultaneously or sequentially; whether the squares in each set are different sizes or all the same size; and whether the response is a rating of size, an estimate of area, or a comparative judgment. These results are consistent with a priming account of the sample size bias, in which the sample size activates a representation of magnitude that directly biases the judgment of average.

Corpus-based estimates of word association predict biases in judgment of word co-occurrence likelihood

This paper draws a connection between statistical word association measures used in linguistics and confirmation measures from epistemology. Having theoretically established the connection, we replicate, in the new context of the judgments of word co-occurrence, an intriguing finding from the psychology of reasoning, namely that confirmation values affect intuitions about likelihood. We show that the effect, despite being based in this case on very subtle statistical insights about thousands of words, is stable across three different experimental settings. Our theoretical and empirical results suggest that factors affecting traditional reasoning tasks are also at play when linguistic knowledge is probed, and they provide further evidence for the importance of confirmation in a new domain.

Judgment of Likelihood of Risky Events and Hindsight Bias: The effects of expectation-outcome inconsistency in hypothetical design

Judgment of Likelihood of Risky Events and Hindsight Bias: The effects of expectation-outcome inconsistency in hypothetical design

An incentive compatible scoring rule for ordinal judgments of expected utility maximizers

This note introduces a scoring rule for ordinal likelihood judgments based on the linear scoring rule. If the ordinal judgments are strict, the scoring rule is incentive compatible for expected utility maximizers as long utility is increasing in wealth. When allowing for non-strict judgments, the scoring rule is no longer incentive compatible for all expected utility maximizers, but still incentive compatible for expected value maximizers. In both cases the scoring rule fulfills the Relevance Principle and is thus simple to implement experimentally.

Judgments about Felony‐Murder in Hindsight

SummaryThe purpose of this research was to investigate the role of hindsight bias in application of the felony‐murder law, a controversial rule stating that felons can be held responsible for any foreseeable deaths that occur as a result of their felony. Some versions of the rule involve notions of proximate cause requiring legal decision makers to determine foreseeability and assess case evidence. Those judgments may be biased by outcome information and the process of cognitive sense‐making. Jury eligible participants read a crime vignette modeled on an actual felony‐murder case manipulated with regard to outcome information and relevant case facts. They made likelihood judgments and rated felons on intent and culpability. Results indicated that outcome information biased death likelihood ratings in hindsight but did not significantly affect assessments of case evidence. Implications for further applied cognitive research regarding the felony‐murder rule are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Influence of environmental preference and environment type congruence on judgments of restoration potential

This study (N=120) explored whether congruence between environmental preference and environment type influenced judgments of likelihood for directed attention restoration. The study differs from previous research by operationally defining preference as a representation of place identity from environmental psychology rather than as the attractiveness of the location. Preference was also treated as an influence on judgments of restoration potential instead of a consequence of directed attention fatigue. Persons experiencing images congruent with their environmental preference were expected to rate similar locations highest in restoration potential compared to incongruent images; however, this was not fully supported. Those with a nature preference perceived congruent environments as the most potentially restorative, but this was higher than, rather than equal to, the restoration expectations of those in the urban congruent condition. As expected, nature preferences influenced judgments of urban settings; this incongruence was rated least restorative. Persons with an urban preference perceived both nature and urban environments equal in restoration potential; this may explain circumstances when environment choice appears inconsistent to cognitive restoration goals. Water quality in the settings also influenced restoration judgments; pleasant waterscapes resulted in the best expectations. The findings illustrate the potential contribution of place identity from environmental psychology to the study of attention restoration outcomes and further support the growing literature endorsing the positive potential of urban settings.

Savings, subgoals, and reference points

AbstractDecision makers often save money for a specific goal by forgoing discretionary consumption and instead putting the money toward the savings goal. We hypothesized that reference points can be exploited to enhance this type of saving. In two hypothetical scenario studies, subjects made judgments of their likelihood to forgo a small expenditure in order to put the money toward the savings goal. In Experiment 1, judgments were higher if the savings goal was presented as composed of weekly subgoals (e.g., save $60 per week to buy a $180 iPod). Experiment 2 replicated this finding and demonstrated that the subgoal manipulation increased judgments of likelihood to save money only when the money saved from the foregone consumption would allow the decision maker to meet the weekly subgoal exactly (not under or overshoot it). These results suggest a reference point mechanism and point to ways that behavioral decision research can be harnessed to improve economic behaviors.

Why so confident? The influence of outcome desirability on selective exposure and likelihood judgment

Previous studies that have directly manipulated outcome desirability have often found little effect on likelihood judgments (i.e., no desirability bias or wishful thinking). The present studies tested whether selections of new information about outcomes would be impacted by outcome desirability, thereby biasing likelihood judgments. In Study 1, participants made predictions about novel outcomes and then selected additional information to read from a buffet. They favored information supporting their prediction, and this fueled an increase in confidence. Studies 2 and 3 directly manipulated outcome desirability through monetary means. If a target outcome (randomly preselected) was made especially desirable, then participants tended to select information that supported the outcome. If made undesirable, less supporting information was selected. Selection bias was again linked to subsequent likelihood judgments. These results constitute novel evidence for the role of selective exposure in cases of overconfidence and desirability bias in likelihood judgments.

Architectural variation, building height, and the restorative quality of urban residential streetscapes

With increasing urban densification, built environments that can promote restoration will become more important. Well-designed residential streetscapes might support restoration, but little research has considered the physical attributes that matter in this context. Taking guidance from research on environmental preferences, the present study considers the effects of entropy (aggregate architectural variation) and building height on judgments of restoration likelihood for urban residential streetscapes. Physical attributes of buildings (roofline silhouette, surface ornamentation, number of floors) were systematically manipulated in 145 computer-generated images of residential streetscapes. In a web-based procedure, participants (N = 263) in each of several independent groups rated the streetscapes on one of several psychological variables, including being away, fascination, restoration likelihood and preference. Multiple mediation analysis used the images as units of analysis, with the respective group mean scores on the psychological variables as the data for the images. The effect of entropy on restoration likelihood was positive, whereas the effect of building height was negative. Being away and fascination together fully mediated the effects of entropy on judgments of restoration likelihood. The effect of building height was only partially mediated, and then by being away and not fascination. The results provide guidance for the design of more psychologically sustainable urban residential environments.

Protective Measures, Personal Experience, and the Affective Psychology of Time

We examined the role of time and affect in intentions to purchase a risk-protective measure (Studies 1 and 2) and explored participant abilities to factor time into the likelihood judgments that presumably underlie such intentions (Study 3). Participants worried more about losing their possessions and were more likely to purchase a protective measure given a longer term lease than a short-term lease, but only if their belongings were described in affect-poor terms. If described instead as being particularly special and affect-rich, participants neglected time and were about equally likely to purchase a risk-protective measure for shorter and longer term leases. However, and consistent with prior literature, the cognitive mechanism underlying this time-neglect-with-affect-richness effect seemed to be the greater use of the affect heuristic in the shorter term than the longer term. Study 2 results demonstrated that prior experience with having been burglarized amplified the interactive effect of time and affect. Greater deliberation did not attenuate this effect as hypothesized whether deliberation was measured through numeracy or manipulated through instructions. The results of Study 3 indicated that few participants are able to calculate correctly the risk numbers necessary to take time into account. Two possible solutions to encourage more purchases of protective measures in the long term are discussed.

Depressed people are not less motivated by personal goals but are more pessimistic about attaining them.

Despite its theoretical importance, personal goal motivation has rarely been examined in clinical depression. Here we investigate whether clinically depressed persons (n = 23) differ from never-depressed persons (n = 26) on number of freely generated approach and avoidance goals, appraisals of these goals, and reasons why these goals would and would not be achieved. Participants listed approach and avoidance goals separately and generated explanations for why they would (pro) and would not (con) achieve their most important approach and avoidance goals, before rating the importance, likelihood, and perceived control of goal outcomes. Counter to hypothesis, depressed persons did not differ from never-depressed controls on number of approach or avoidance goals, or on the perceived importance of these goals. However, compared to never-depressed controls, depressed individuals gave lower likelihood judgments for desirable approach goal outcomes, tended to give higher likelihood judgments for undesirable to-be-avoided goal outcomes, and gave lower ratings of their control over goal outcomes. Furthermore, although controls generated significantly more pro than con reasons for goal achievement, depressed participants did not. These results suggest that depressed persons do not lack valued goals but are more pessimistic about their likelihood, controllability, and reasons for successful goal attainment.

Role of Context in Risk-Based Reasoning

In this article we report the influence of contextual factors on mathematics and science teachers' reasoning in risk-based decision-making. We examine previous research that presents judgments of risk as being subjectively influenced by contextual factors and other research that explores the role of context in mathematical problem-solving. Our own approach has been to develop carefully designed software tools that support the user to empathize with a hypothetical person, Deborah, who suffers from a medical condition. The tools were used by a group of teachers who were asked to help Deborah decide whether to have an operation that could cure the condition but which carries particular risks. In order to make this decision, the teachers were required to model the risks of the operation and also the lifestyle decisions that Deborah might make. We trace the teachers' efforts to coordinate judgments of likelihood and impact. The data emphasize the sensitivity of reasoning to matters of context; we set out in detail the various ways in which the process was affected by context.

Indicators of acute deterioration in adult patients nursed in acute wards: a factorial survey

The primary objective of the study was to determine which professional, situational and patient characteristics predict nurses' judgements of patient acuity and likelihood of referral for further review. A secondary aim was to test the feasibility of the factorial survey method in an acute area. There is increasing recognition that indicators of deterioration in acutely unwell adults are being missed and referrals delayed. The reasons for this are unclear and require exploration. Assessing nurses' clinical decision-making or judgements in a 'real-world' situation is problematic. The study used a factorial survey design where participants completed randomly generated paper-based vignettes on one occasion. The dependent variables were assessment of patient acuity and likelihood of referral. Independent variables consisted of a number of patient characteristics, i.e. heart rate, blood pressure, nurse characteristics, i.e. clinical experience, and situational characteristics i.e. staffing. Participants were registered nurses working in acute areas excluding intensive care and theatre. Ninety-nine participants responded resulting in 1940 completed vignettes. An early warning score was the single most significant predictor of referral behaviour accounting for 9.6% of the variance. When this was not included in the vignette, nurses used physiological characteristics e.g. respiratory rate, urine output, neurological status. These explained 12% of the variance in the model predicting assessment of patient acuity and 9.4% or the variance predicting likelihood of referral. When given a series of vignettes, nurses appear to use appropriate physiological parameters to make decisions about patient acuity and need for referral. Our results support the use of early warning scoring systems. Education and professional development should focus more on developing and maximising clinical experience and expertise rather than knowledge acquisition alone. A factorial survey method is feasible to explore decision-making in this area. This study has several implications for practice. The emergence of an early warning scoring system as a significant individual predictor supports the use of such systems. However, the small amount of explained variance suggests that there are other influences on nurses' assessment of patient acuity and referral decisions that were not measured by the factorial survey approach. Educational provision might focus not just on knowledge acquisition but include educational delivery methods that incorporate or mimic real-ward settings.

Assessing probabilities of unique events: Calibrating qualitative likelihood judgments into a probability distribution

Assessing probabilities of unique events: Calibrating qualitative likelihood judgments into a probability distribution

5.3.2 Risk Cube Data Biases

AbstractRisk cubes, actually a 5times5 matrix, used in industry characterize particular risks in terms of the likelihood of occurrence, and the consequence of the actualized risk. Human cognitive bias research led by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky exposed systematic translations of objective probability and value as judged by human subjects. An examination of industry‐generated risk cube data reveals evidence of biases in the judgment of likelihood and consequence. In addition, other biases – including a ‘diagonal bias’ – are revealed in the risk cube data. The evidence presented could improve risk cube based risk analysis.

ABCs of principal–agent interactions: Accurate predictions, biased processes, and contrasts between working and delegating

We experimentally investigate people’s evaluations of incentive pay contracts and people’s predictions of others’ evaluations of incentive pay contracts. We emphasize that the construction of evaluations and predictions often includes two substeps, involving likelihood judgment and likelihood weighting. Predictors appear to be biased at both substeps but in opposing directions. Accurate overall predictions thus sometimes reflect two errors that are of the same magnitude and thereby offset. Moreover, predictions can become more inaccurate if one step is debiased but the other is left untouched. Importantly, principals deciding whether to delegate a task are susceptible to just one of the biases. Delegation assessments are thus often flawed, reflecting a single error that is not offset.

How prevalent is wishful thinking? Misattribution of arousal causes optimism and pessimism in subjective probabilities.

People appear to be unrealistically optimistic about their future prospects, as reflected by theory and research in the fields of psychology, organizational behavior, behavioral economics, and behavioral finance. Many real-world examples (e.g., consumer behavior during economic recessions), however, suggest that people are not always overly optimistic. I suggest that people can be both overly optimistic and pessimistic in their beliefs about future events, depending on whether they focus on success or on failure. More specifically, people judge the likelihood of desirable and undesirable events to be higher than similar neutral events because they misattribute the arousal those events evoke to their greater perceived likelihood. I demonstrated this stake-likelihood effect in 4 studies. In Study 1, arousal was shown to increase likelihood judgments. Study 2 demonstrated that such elevated likelihood judgments are due to misattribution of the arousal from having a stake in the outcome. Study 3 demonstrated that such misattribution of arousal occurs for desirable and undesirable events. Study 4 showed the effects of optimism and pessimism on likelihood judgments in a field setting with soccer fans. Together, the findings suggest that wishful thinking might be less prevalent than previously believed. Pessimism might be as likely as optimism in subjective probabilities.

From group diffusion to ratio bias: Effects of denominator and numerator salience on intuitive risk and likelihood judgments

AbstractThe group-diffusion effect is the tendency for people to judge themselves to be less likely to experience a negative outcome as the total number of people exposed to the threat increases — even when the probability of the outcome is explicitly presented (Yamaguchi, 1998). In Experiment 1 we replicated this effect for two health threat scenarios using a variant of Yamaguchi’s original experimental paradigm. In Experiment 2, we showed that people also judge themselves to be less likely to be selected in a lottery as the number of people playing the lottery increases. In Experiment 3, we showed that explicitly presenting the number of people expected to be selected eliminates the group-diffusion effect, and in Experiment 4 we showed that presenting the number expected to be affected by a health threat without presenting the total number exposed to the threat produces a reverse effect. We propose, therefore, that the group-diffusion effect is related to the ratio bias. Both effects occur when people make risk or likelihood judgments based on information presented as a ratio. The difference is that the group-diffusion effect occurs when the denominator of the relevant ratio is more salient than the numerator, while the ratio bias occurs when the numerator is more salient than the denominator.

Personality, threat identification and emotional processing

Individual differences in threat identification moderate the associations of personality with emotional experience and behaviour. The present two studies examined whether adeptness at threat identification also moderates the associations between personality and emotional processing. Participants completed personality scales, different emotional processing measures and a threat versus non‐threat categorization task. Adeptness at threat identification moderated the relations between agreeableness and negative interpretation of ambiguous stimuli, negative reactivity and positive likelihood judgments, and the relation between neuroticism and negative recall. The results supported the view that agreeableness and adeptness at threat identification together form a self‐regulation system. The results may have important implications for trait and health psychology. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.