Innovative industries need efficient markets for technology (MFTs). One determinant of MFT efficiency neglected until now is licensing level—that is, the level in the value chain where patents are licensed. Patents may be licensed upstream, to firms that put the patented knowledge into practice. I refer to this as integrated licensing. Alternatively, patents may be licensed further downstream in the value chain, in particular to makers of final devices. I call this bifurcated licensing since it separates intellectual property rights from the technical knowledge they cover. I study the licensing level of essential patents on communication standards such as LTE and Wi-Fi in relation to the Internet of Things (IoT). The choice of licensing level in this context is currently a hotly debated topic. To show how bifurcated licensing affects MFT efficiency, I present empirical evidence from a qualitative study comprising interviews with 30 individuals from 22 diverse firms, focusing on startups. IoT device makers clearly find the uncertainty regarding infringement, patent validity, and the licensing process hinders efficient licensing, which is compounded by the large number of IoT device makers and, for SMEs and startups, by resource constraints. As a theory contribution, I show that a patent's licensing level need not correspond with the implementation level of the patented knowledge—in other words, licensing may be bifurcated rather than integrated. I develop a model of how licensing level affects MFT efficiency. Implications for practice are that device-level licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs), if broadly implemented, would have a negative effect on innovation and entrepreneurship in the IoT. Policymakers should ensure that SEP licensing is simplified.