Libertarian Conception Research Articles

Modern Concepts of Coercion in the Theory of Law

Introduction. This article analyzes the modern concepts of coercion in the theory of law. The impact on the understanding of coercion was provided through political and legal views on the essence of the state and law. In the libertarian understanding, law is an institution within which coercion ensures freedom, and is also able to protect freedom from violations of it. In the libertarian concept, law is understood as the formal equality of free individuals and is presented as a universal form of people's freedom. And, from a psychological point of view, Hale's concept of coercion is defined as a mechanism for artifi- cially restricting choice options in order to force the chooser to make certain and undesirable choices.Materials and methods. The methodological basis of the study was the following general scientific and special methods of cognition of legal phenomena and processes in the theory of law and comparative law.Research results. As a result, state coercion is defined as a mechanism that puts a person in front of the need to choose, where each of the alternatives is not favourable from the point of view of the goals and interests of the person making the choice.Discussion and conclusion. It has been established that the phenomenon of state coercion in modern discourse is considered in comparison with freedom. Attention is paid to the concepts of coercion by V.A. Chetvernin, as well as by A.S. Puchnin. In addition, the article attempts to apply the views of R. Hale to the analysis of state coercion.

Divine Simplicity and The Myth of Modal Collapse

This paper responds to the modal collapse argument against divine simplicity or classical theism offered by neo-classical or complex theists. The modal collapse argument claims that if God is both absolutely simple and absolutely necessary, then God’s act of creation is absolutely necessary, and therefore, the existence of the created world is also absolutely necessary. This means that God and His creation collapse into a single modal category of absolute necessity without any contingent beings. My response is grounded in the Islamic Neoplatonic philosophy of Ibn Sina and the Ismaili tradition. I offer four arguments that allow a Muslim Neoplatonist to absorb a modal collapse in a possible worlds modality while negating modal collapse within an Avicennian modality: First, the modal collapse objection is based on a possible worlds framework whose concept of necessity is overly broad; this framework fails to distinguish between God as ontologically necessary in Himself, created being as dependently necessary through another, and mere logical necessity, all of which are recognized by Ibn Sina and Islamic thinkers. Second, modal collapse arguments only demonstrate that creation is necessary through another but fails to prove that creation has ontological necessity or aseity––which only pertains to God; thus, no consequential modal collapse ensues when one’s modality recognizes creation as a “dependent necessary being” despite being modally necessary. Third, Islamic philosophers have a non- libertarian concept of God’s will and freedom that is immune to modal collapse objections. Finally, I argue that all classical and neo-classical theists must embrace a modally necessary creation because libertarian models of God’s will entail uncaused and brutely contingent effects.

“New Private Law Theory” as a Mosaic: What Can Hold (Most of) It Together?

AbstractStefan Grundmann, Hans Micklitz, and Moritz Renner’s New Private Law Theory: A Pluralist Approach is a wide-ranging, ambitious, and fascinating project. In this article I offer one way to read the NPLT as a mosaic, rather than a patchwork, by first taking seriously the idea of legal theory as the core of NPLT’s methodological commitments, and second taking seriously its subject matter of private law as the source of its substantive underpinnings.Legal theory, I argue (much in line with GMR’s rich text), is distinctive from other discourses about law given its acute awareness to law’s normative filter, which furthermore implies a synthetic commitment that these other discourses do not share. But legal theory should also, I claim, be attentive to the constitutive role law plays in constructing the building-blocks of many of our interpersonal interactions, and it should thus be particularly cautious from relying on philosophical or social scientific inquiries that take contingent configurations of property or of contract as a given. This lesson, in turn, is crucial for contemporary discussions of private law obligations that go beyond the libertarian duty of non-interference. Rather than reifying the libertarian conceptions of property and contract and resorting to exogenous justifications for our interpersonal obligations of non-discrimination and accommodation, private law theory can—and indeed should—rely on happier conceptions of these core legal institutions, which vindicate the freestanding significance of these obligations and thus also validate their transnational applicability.

Causal responsibility for addiction

Addictive behavior sometimes involves harmful moral transgressions for which the addicted individual may be blamed. However, blame may motivate addiction stigma, which has its own harmful consequences, including failures to provide or seek out treatment and recovery resources. Minimizing blame and stigma, while acknowledging the moral dimension of addictive behavior, thus recommends itself as a worthy public health objective. The disease and choice models of addiction both face difficulties in reducing stigma, the latter because harmful choices are considered culpable. By challenging the widely held libertarian conception of human agency, an explicitly deterministic understanding of the genesis and expression of addiction, including voluntary choices, can help keep reactive attitudes to wrongdoing in check. This will mitigate the perceived blameworthiness of addicted individuals, thus reducing stigma and increasing the chances of finding compassionate and effective care. Such an approach to addiction will recognize the need for moral accountability but not include punitive attitudes and policies justified by belief in libertarian agency.

ПУБЛІЧНИЙ ІНТЕРЕС У ПУБЛІЧНОМУ УПРАВЛІННІ: ВИХІДНІ ПОЗИЦІЇ ДОКТРИНАЛЬНОГО РОЗУМІННЯ І ПРАКТИЧНОГО ЗАСТОСУВАННЯ (ЗА ЗАКОНОДАВСТВОМ УКРАЇНИ ТА КАЗАХСТАНУ)

Purpose. The article’s purpose is an attempt to analyse the category of “public interest” in terms of doctrinal understanding and practical application in the sphere of public administration. Methods. The research methodology consists of various methods of scientific cognition, including comparative and legal, systematic and structural, analysis, synthesis and others that make it possible to systematically and consistently to solve scientific problems, to study and compare the points of view of scholars, provisions of legal acts of the corresponding countries, caselaw and to formulate the author’s conclusions. Results. The author of the article considers the public interest through the historical prism and concludes that this category was used as a “convenient screen” in Soviet times in order to restrict the rights of individuals, which does not allow us to refer to previously obtained scientific results to substantiate current tendencies in this field. Considerable attention of the work is focused on searching the universal definition of the category of “public interest”. The author criticizes the existing approaches to this issue, especially emphasizing that the quantitative indicators of the bearers of a particular interest cannot be a sufficient ground for classifying any of them as the public interest. Among other things the author of the article emphasizes that the system of public interests cannot be constant and unchanging. It is formed under the influence of various factors and therefore, it has to be revised from time to time. However, the state must be concerned about the stability of public interests and prevent their unjustified narrowing and / or expansion. The author also pays attention to the issue of alternative points of view on the scope of public interests within modern countries, while appealing to the authors of the libertarian concept of the state. This concept, in his view, is to some extent used by judicial authorities, who decide cases of competition between human rights and the public interest that confirms its viability. The author of the paper also emphasizes that the public interest is a constitutional value that allows it to compete with other constitutional values (for example, fundamental human rights and freedoms) and to have priority over values that are enshrined in laws and by-laws. Conclusions. An important aspect of the paper is to formulate the conditions, when restrictions on human rights and freedoms are allowed, with the reference to the need to ensure the public interest, which, in the author’s opinion, is the “secondary” value in a modern democratic and rule of law country.

From the tyranny of the neoliberal individual to neoliberal populism

ABSTRACT Neoliberalism relies on a libertarian conception of both the individual and liberty. It is grounded in a conservative understanding of the extra-social source of political order and a tendency to situate individuals in concrete groups. Crucially, it views public restrictions on individual liberty – issuing from a collective, homogeneous person (‘the people’) – as inherently despotic. Neoliberalism thus excludes the concept of ‘the people’ from its ideological corpus and prioritizes individual personal interests. In this article, I argue that individual liberty does not prevent the political tyranny of the individual and is in fact compatible with the concept of the people. As I show, neoliberal populism retains ‘the people’ as a core concept while cloaking its members in the neoliberal conception of the individual, while liberalism understands the people as a collection of individuals who associate their personal well-being with that of others, pursued under freely willed public laws.

CHOOSING FOR NO REASON? AN OLD OBJECTION TO FREEDOM OF INDIFFERENCE

AbstractI present a historical solution to the so-called Arbitrariness Objection (AO). The AO has been leveled against contemporary libertarian conceptions of free will and says that freedom of the will, conceived as freedom of indifference, implies that choices can be made for no reason. If successful, the AO would undermine the rationality of libertarian views, which is why a rebuttal of it is of systematic interest. I discuss the attempt of Christian August Crusius (1715–75) in order to explain that Crusius rejects the AO by showing that there is no choice without a reason.

THE HEART OF LIBERTARIANISM: FUNDAMENTALITY AND THE WILL

Abstract:It is often claimed that libertarianism offers an unattractive conception of free will and moral responsibility because it renders free agency inexplicable and irrational. This essay aims, first, to show that the soundness of these objections turns on more basic disagreements concerning the ideals of free agency and, second, to develop and motivate a truly libertarian conception of the ideals of free agency. The central contention of the essay is that the heart of libertarians’ ideal of free agency is the ideal of agential fundamentality.

АНАРХИСТСКАЯ ОНТОЛОГИЯ ТЕЛА: МЕЖДУ УГНЕТЕНИЕМ И СВОБОДОЙ

This article focuses on the outlines and specificity of the anarchist ontology of the body from the libertarian perspective, which is opposed to the Marxist tradition, on the one hand, and to the traditions of the right-wing discourse on the other hand. Within the context of the mentioned issues, the article attempts to reinterpret such phenomena as oppression, emancipation, body and subjectivity. Thus, it makes possible the reflection about the basic emancipation practices, which already exist in culture (for example, the ‘body positivity’ concept). In order to identify an optimal way to elaborate the specified issues, the article performs the inter-discourse analysis of the body philosophy in general (basing on Y. Mishima’s essay Sun and Steel , which conceptually constitutes a contrasting background for clarifying libertarian conceptions).

The deep error of political libertarianism: self-ownership, choice, and what’s really valuable in life

ABSTRACT Contemporary versions of natural rights libertarianism trace their locus classicus to Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia. But although there have been many criticisms of the version of political libertarianism put forward by Nozick, many of these objections fail to meet basic methodological desiderata. Thus, Nozick’s libertarianism deserves to be re-examined. In this paper I develop a new argument which meets these desiderata. Specifically, I argue that the libertarian conception of self-ownership, the view’s foundation, implies what I call the Asymmetrical Value Claim: a dubious claim about the importance of choice relative to other valuable capacities. I argue that this misunderstands what is really valuable in life, and show how it causes libertarianism to generate counterintuitive public policy recommendations.

Promotion of Innovative Technologies: Alternative Projects and Practices Perspectives

Crowdfunding and crowdsourcing are examined as the means of overcoming innovative economy development issues. The article shows that innovative economy model transition requires rethinking of the regular patterns. Redistributive relationship between authorities and monopolies provokes the emergence of shadow schemes and corruption. Another issue is applying the neoclassic model to Russian economy. That requires the existence of perfect market and competition. This model supposes competing companies isolation, no coalitions between them, free information circulation between manufacturers and consumers and excepting exclusivity. In our opinion, such an approach is hardly applicable. However an opposite approach suggested by Nicole Biggart is considered as the most productive. Continuing Max Weber's tradition she shits focus to the social side of the economic relations. In our opinion, providing alternative means of innovative technologies support and market entry can assist in innovative economy development. Among these are the crowd-based and open source technologies provided by social interaction and described in the terms of libertarian concept. The possibilities of the open source technologies in dealing with patent system setbacks and innovation transfer are also researched. That is performed by analyzing and comparing the corresponding Russian and US practice. The current situation with innovative technology introduction, realization and production application in Russia is represented.

Anarchism in Culture. Reassessing the Influence of a Manifold Libertarian Concept on European Modernity (1820s–1930s)

Anarchism in Culture. Reassessing the Influence of a Manifold Libertarian Concept on European Modernity (1820s–1930s)

Uma proposta de ensino de inglês nas salas de aula do IFSC em tempos de globalização e Bilinguismo

This article discusses, departing from Critical Applied Linguistics perspectives, English language teaching in the classrooms of the Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia de Santa Catarina – IFSC (Federal Institute of Education, Science and Technology of Santa Catarina) – more specifically about high school courses integrated to technical teaching, a discussion also useful to other institutions and schools. In the article, the role of IFSC is critically discussed regarding English teaching in the present globalization/globalism era with its demands for bilingualism. A reflection about what kind of English teaching is desirable for IFSC is presented, trying to answer the following question: Which approach of English teaching could be applied to IFSC in the current context? The understanding in the article is that nowadays teaching of English should not be performed any more as a mere study of a language, but that that teaching may occur through a libertarian conception, which, besides preparing the students to the world of work, gives them the possibility to grow as critical citizens, engaged in the organization for a more humane and just world. Keywords: globalization; bilingualism; English teaching.

Libertariańska koncepcja podmiotu moralnego w świetle sporu liberałów z komunitarystami

The following paper seeks for a reconstruction of the libertarian concept of moral subject. According to author, libertarianism – defined in a narrow meaning as an absolutism of private property rights linked with natural law theory, austrian school of economics teachings and anarcho-individualist tradition – comprises two main anthropological aspects. First of them, which stems from the methodological individualism and subjectivism of austrian school, has already been clearly described in the scientific literature. However, as author points out, there is also another ingredient of the libertarian views on human nature, that has not been grasped neither by interpreters, nor by libertarians themselves. Namely, in order to provide tenability for their moral claims, a communitarian aspect of a self needs to be endorsed by libertarian thinkers. In author’s judgement such a conlusion follows from the dispute between Rawls, Nozick, MacIntyre, Taylor, Sandel, Walzer and other protagonists of the liberalcommunitarian debate. In particular, a question of so called „natural assets” provides interesting clue about communitarian presumptions of the libertarian anthropology. A widespread opinion regarding libertarianism and communitarianism polar opposites on every fieldof philosophical inquiry should thereforebe overcome. In addition to that, author briefly summarises numerous divergences that make libertarian and communitarian perspectives contradictory to each other. Undouptedly, their approaches towards ethics and – subsequently – politics cannot be reconcealed whatsoever. Libertarianism remains morally individualist and politically anarchist, while communitarians are collectivists and basically statists. Nonetheless, these differences do not embrace the concept of self. At this angle proponents of those influential streams of the contemporary political thought turn out way more akin that one may suppose at glance.

Libertarianism, slavery and just taxation

Purpose– The paper addresses the question as to what kind of a redistribution of wealth created within a society is righteous. It aims to show that philosophically motivated libertarian economic conceptions of justice designed to rationalize the unacceptability of progressive taxation – in particular conceptions of the Nozick type – are built on questionable bases because their proponents neglect facts that play a key role in the socio-economic reality of modern Western societies.Design/methodology/approach– The paper presents critical evaluation of one of the cornerstones of the libertarian conception of economical justice. It makes use of a model example.Findings– The scholars who approve of the regime of limited responsibility for the consequences of economic failure and yet make a claim for the unlimited fruit of one’s economic success adopt a problematic position that is internally incoherent.Originality/value– The argumentation against the Nozick type arguments against progressive taxation is, as far as the author knows, original.

G. A. Cohen and Marxism

Abstract The philosopher Gerald A. Cohen died on the 5th of August 2009. His contributions were at first based on Marx’s thought. He really appeared on the intellectual stage in 1978 with his Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence. Later on, he gradually departed from Marx’s theory. He discussed the libertarian concept of self-ownership and the; possibility of associating it. with a Marxist approach, before entering into the normative debate around Rawls’s Theory of Justice, while his Marxism was withering away. Based on Kantian philosophy, his critique of Rawls was that he allowed too little autonomy to individual choices. This paper discusses the; consistency of Jerry Cohen’s intellectual journey with regards to his Relation with Marx’s work.

Relational conceptions of paternalism: a way to rebut nanny-state accusations and evaluate public health interventions

Objectives‘Nanny-state’ accusations can function as powerful rhetorical weapons against interventions intended to promote public health. Public health advocates often lack effective rebuttals to these criticisms. Nanny-state accusations are largely accusations of paternalism. They conjure up emotive concern about undue governmental interference undermining peoples' autonomy. But autonomy can be understood in various ways. We outline three main conceptions of autonomy, argue that these that can underpin three different conceptions of paternalism, and consider implications for responses to nanny-state accusations and the assessment of public health interventions. Study design and methodsDetailed conceptual analysis. ResultsThe conceptions of paternalism implicit in nanny-state accusations generally depend on libertarian conceptions of autonomy. These reflect unrealistic views of personal independence and do not discriminate sufficiently between trivial and important freedoms. Decisional conceptions of paternalism, like their underlying decisional conceptions of autonomy, have limited applicability in public health contexts. Relational conceptions of paternalism incorporate relational conceptions of autonomy, so recognize that personal autonomy depends on socially shaped skills, self-identities and self-evaluations as well as externally structured opportunities. They encourage attention to the various ways that social interactions and relationships, including disrespect, stigmatization and oppression, can undermine potential for autonomy. While nanny-state accusations target any interference with negative freedom, however trivial, relational conceptions direct concerns to those infringements of negative freedom, or absences of positive freedom, serious enough to undermine self-determination, self-governance and/or self-authorization. ConclusionRelational conceptions of autonomy and paternalism offer public health policymakers and practitioners a means for rebutting nanny-state accusations, and can support more nuanced and more appropriately demanding appraisals of public health interventions.

Efficiency in the Multinational Federal Republic

The paper is divided in three sections. In the first section, I question the use of the statist redistributive paradigm in federalism. In the second section, I argue that efficiency is a moral principle and that it has a strong normative appeal, especially in contexts of diversity. I show that adopting efficiency as a guiding principle to think of the role of the state, especially in contexts of pluralism, as in MNF, allows us to consider the division of competences in a way that is yet unexplored in political philosophy. Furthermore, I argue that embracing efficiency allows us to avoid the moral problems that other moral approaches encounter, especially as I will defend a non-utilitarian conception of efficiency. That also allows me to show that if one opts for the view that pictures federalism as an efficiency maximizing enterprise, it does not lead to a libertarian conception of federalism. Finally, I try to briefly sketch a possible connection between the principle of efficiency and republican ideal of ‘non-domination’ (Pettit 2012). More specifically I suggest that the pursuit of ‘non-domination’ is totally compatible with the pursuit of efficiency in MNF. In other words, the federal government can interfere to resolve government failures at the sub-unit level, for instance externalities, without being or becoming a dominating agent. The ideal of non-domination supports the sort of strong government interventions defended by egalitarians without having to compromise on the autonomy of federated entities. The combination of efficiency and non-domination ends with a defense of asymmetrical federal arrangements, without sacrificing the equality that states ought to preserve.

Freedom of speech and racial vilification in Australia: ‘The Bolt case’ in public discourse

This article examines the public discourse that emerged in the aftermath of the 2011 decision of the Federal Court of Australia in Eatock v Bolt. We characterise the narrative of ‘the Bolt case’ as a ‘mobilising discourse’ that countered rather than echoed the decision itself. This discourse had three main messages: encouraging scepticism about the authenticity of fair-skinned Aboriginal persons and judgment by non-Aboriginal persons about the legitimacy of Aboriginal identity according to skin colour; questioning the legitimacy of racial vilification laws and strengthening a libertarian conception of freedom of speech. We explain how such a contrary discourse became dominant in the wake of a successful racial vilification action and consider the implications of these events.本文研究了2011年澳大利亚联邦法庭就伊脱克诉博尔特案做出判决后的公众议论。博尔特案的叙事属于“动员话语”，是对判决的反弹而非反响。该话语主要包括三个信息：鼓励对浅肤色原住人士的真实性的质疑，鼓励由非原住人士根据肤色判定原住民身份的合法性；质疑种族诽谤法的合理性；支持言论自由的观念。笔者解释了何以这种矛盾的话语盛行于一次成功的种族诽谤行动之后，并讨论了这些事件的影响。

Metamorphosis: The Making of Daniel Guérin, 1904–1930

This article explores the early years of Daniel Guérin (1904–88), who from the 1930s onwards became known as a leading revolutionary socialist and campaigner for decolonisation, antimilitarism and homosexual liberation. It examines the ‘making of Daniel Guérin’ in two senses: (i) his transformation from a son of the grande bourgeoisie into a workerist revolutionary and anti-imperialist; and (ii) Guérin's own retrospective representation of his early years through his autobiographical works, as well as interviews. Based on a close reading of these sources, his two novels as well as his private papers and other archival material including police reports, it provides fresh insights into the formative influences on his ideological development. Rather than focusing exclusively on the influence of his liberal, Dreyfusard family, or the impact of his relationships with working-class men or his experiences of colonial realities, it brings to light the influence on him of Tolstoy and of Gandhi, an influence which would inform a strong ethical core in his libertarian conception of socialism. The article also argues that despite the apparently protean nature of his political itinerary, there was in fact always an underlying ideological consistency to Guérin's libertarian Marxism.