Libertarian Arguments Research Articles

The Case against compulsory vaccination: the failed arguments from risk imposition, tax evasion, ‘social liberty’, and the priority of life

Arguments for mandatory or compulsory vaccination must justify the coercive infringement of bodily integrity via the injection of chemicals that permanently affect a body’s inner constitution. Four arguments are considered. The allegedly libertarian argument declares unvaccinated persons a threat; accordingly, vaccination could take the form of justifiable defence of self and others. This argument conflates material and statistical threats. The harsh coercive measures permissible in defence against the former are not permissible in prevention of the latter. The argument from tax evasion claims that people can be permissibly coerced into bearing their fair financial burdens of community life and likens this to sharing burdens in the face of a viral threat. The argument fails to demonstrate that vaccination would be fair, permissible in spite of potential lethal side-effects, and sufficiently similar to taxation despite the categorical difference between temporary deprivation of money and permanent deprivation of one’s original inner bodily constitution. The argument from ‘social liberty’ claims that the loss of freedom due to mandatory vaccination is only apparent, namely outweighed by corresponding gains in freedom. This argument conflates freedom as the absence of coercion with freedom as the presence of options for action. It fails to give the former its due weight and to demonstrate that persons may be coerced into increasing the options of others. The argument from the priority of life elevates the protection of life to an absolute value. This is unwarranted and leads to counterintuitive implications. Without better arguments, mandatory vaccination must be rejected.

Mixing Labor, Taking Possession, and Libertarianism: Response to Walter Block

In his recent rejoinder to my paper Walter Block argues that only the Lockean labor-mixing theory of first acquisition is compatible with libertarianism. Block’s claim is in turn directed against a position held by me in the said paper that it is the first possession theory of original appropriation that is a better fit for libertarianism. Upon reading Block’s rejoinder and thinking intensely about this issue, in the present paper I agree with Block and disagree with my former self, accepting the view that it isindeed the Lockean labor-mixing theory that should be embraced by libertarians. This verdict is mainly motivated by the following arguments that I develop in detail in the paper: (1) no libertarian arguments against the labor-mixing theory seem to work, (2) the first possession theory is unable (contrary to the labor-mixing theory) to accommodate the idea of original appropriation tracking objective links between actors andthings; (3) the labor-mixing theory better fits our intuitions about justice in property acquisition. However, in order not to make things too easy for Block, I also argue that there are some surprising and problematic consequences of adopting the labor-mixing account. I am fully prepared to accept them. The question is whether so is Block.

The Freedom Front and the welfare state counter revolution

ABSTRACT This essay examines the Swedish Freedom Front, created in 1989 by libertarians from the editorial committee of the Nyliberalen magazine. It argues that in its emphasis on cultural, sexual, religious and political freedoms, libertarianism contained a different ideological repertoire from neoliberalism. It compares the construction of a canon of translated neoconservative and neoliberal texts with a popular and vernacular register in youth culture, consumption, and media technologies. Finally, it argues that the ascendance of neoliberalism in the early 1990s fractured libertarian arguments.

Responsibility in Universal Healthcare

Responsibility in Universal Healthcare

Responsibility in Universal Healthcare

Responsibility in Universal Healthcare

The Ethics of Climate Change

Massive consumption of fossil energy since the Industrial Revolution has contributed to carbon dioxide emissions and accumulation. That, in turn, has led to global climate change, which is mainly characterized by warming. The necessity of immediate climate action can be justified from both moral and self-interest perspectives. Achieving the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change goal of getting the world to net-zero carbon by 2050 depends on undermining the libertarian and self-interested arguments that opponents have against trying to reach this goal. First, from an ethical perspective, these opponents wrongly set the free market against the welfare state and individual property rights against the redistribution of social wealth, ignoring the possibility that their own ideal of liberty might require a welfare system. Second, it is also possible to show that morality and self-interest go together here, requiring us to reduce carbon use right now.

The need for publicly funded research on therapeutic use of psychedelic drugs.

The need for publicly funded research on therapeutic use of psychedelic drugs.

Social Justice : Cognition on Libertarian Perspective

Francis Fukuyama needed to be more modest. A new spectre with cloak of ‘Social Justice’ came back and now rules over every socio-economic policies. Distribution by government is being identified with Social Justice. This paper extracts the Libertarian justice theories andstudies on notions of intellectuals on Libertarian justice arguments of Friedrich A. Hayek and Robert Nozick. Hayek’s justice arguments were categorized into 6 premises: Ontology, Epistemology, Personification, Desert Norm, Atavism. Nozick’s justice arguments as 6 premises: Just Acquisition, Just Transfer, Rectification of Injustice, Limitation of Holding, Minimal State, Natural Asset. Cognitions of those justice were measured among 3 groups: A(Students with some exposures to Libertarian classes), B(Ordinary, non-libertarian professors), C(Libertarian_professors). By MANOVA(multivariate analysis of variance), their cognition on Libertarian justice were tested. First, existing intuitive and qualitative analyses on Hayek and Nozick can be tested, supplemented and reinforced by the quantitative analysis. Second, Libertarian justice cognition is disproportionately revealed according to 3 groups. Third, Libertarian_professors show the highest cognition than Students and Ordinary_professors. Fourth, they have relatively more various views on Hayek than on Nozick. Fifth, among A, B and C groups, there are robust pattern of degree of cognition on Libertarian justice: B≤A<C. Sixth, for all groups Nozick’s justice premises are more perceived than Hayek’s. This research has some caveats. First, sample sizes need to be enlarged. Second, MANOVA’s ideal assumption of homogeneity of variances of dependent variables were not fully satisfied. Third, justice arguments from Hayek and Nozick may not be sufficient, leaving room for validity problem of scales. Finally, one thing seems to loom clear. Libertarian justice theory suggests that if anything like justice in true meaning exists, never it would be one which a political entity arbitrarily impose as justice for their political consideration. It is time to turn from dogmatic distributionist’s justice to other ones like libertarian notion of justice. What’s most important is not ‘Social Justice’, but ‘Just Justice’.

Аргумент от чувства свободы и отчаянный компатибилизм

The argument from the sense of freedom, unlike many other libertarian arguments, doesn’t question the compatibility of free will and determinism, but is aimed against the belief that determinism is true. The endorsement of determinism undermines the sense of freedom and thereby excludes the possibility of rational choice. And since its possibility is a necessary condition for free will, the belief that determinism is true excludes it as well, the argument concludes. In the first part of the article, I outline how the sense of freedom can be understood and what are the reasons to admit its existence. For it is possible that the sense of freedom is misleading, in the second part I consider why we should think that it doesn’t deceive us, and what are the reasons against skepticism about it. In the third part, I formulate the argument from the sense of freedom; I also examine standard compatibilist defence strategies against such kind of arguments and demonstrate their inefficiency against the argument from the sense of freedom. In conclusion, I argue that the argument from the sense of freedom, supplemented by the antiseptic thesis, reveals vulnerabilities of all but the most desperate compatibilist theories.

A Proletariat of One: Libertarianism and the Psychosis of Authority

Abstract Libertarianism has a problem, perhaps an insurmountable one, and its problem lies squarely in the domain from which it is sourced: the intellectual and political elite of the West. As such, it rests on an ontological viewpoint far outside the purview and experience of quotidian man. Furthermore, it rests on an epistemology of the person as sovereign, Natural Law, which requires a concomitant education or understanding of the Classics, or at least self-awareness and the ability to think logically. Many non-intellectuals are either uninterested or incapable of following the Libertarian arguments of personal sovereignty and instead submit. This unconscious submission to the authority of a government, father figure, or other self-appointed “authority” relieves the individual of the psychological pain of breaking out of the herd. C. G. Jung (1875-1961) was adamant that to be an individual is a radical act: “To develop one’s own personality is indeed an unpopular undertaking, a deviation that is highly uncongenial to the herd, an eccentricity smelling of the cenobite, as it seems to the outsider [11, Para. 298]. Further, Alexander Hamilton (1755 or 1747-1804) noted that the elite are more than happy to have the masses submit to their authority without question as it advances their control: “a fondness for power is implanted in most men, and it is natural to abuse it when acquired” [9]. The rest of this article explores this psychosis of authority and how Libertarianism suffers in popularity as a result.

The limits of libertarianism in debates over euthanasia and the application of moral fictionalism in bioethics

Abstract This text focuses on selected basic arguments of libertarianism that could be found in certain debates on the moral issues of euthanasia and the application of moral fictionalism in bioethics. Firstly, I devote my article to the criticism of libertarian arguments (as one of the dominant discourses related to the debate over euthanasia) in a wider perspective of moral philosophy. The article is based on an approach that understands morality as a kind of social practice and the primary goal is to grasp the key theoretical concepts which are included in the mechanism for identifying and assessing our moral intuitions. This text is primarily an analysis of selected arguments of current normative theories of libertarianism on two levels: first it examines the idea of self-ownership in connection with certain debates over euthanasia, while the latter part of the article concerns an analysis of the critique of libertarian arguments and a comparison of the alternative arguments of moral fictionalism. The last part of this text, focusing on moral fictionalism and its general application in bioethics, is the core of the article.

Reply to 'How Foot Voting Enhances Political Freedom'

The author comments on and critiques a paper by Ilya Somin in favor of more or less unconstrained immigration. The author disputes Somin's libertarian arguments for big scale immigration both on economic and other normative bases.

IS TAXATION FORCED LABOUR?

Libertarians frequently complain that when a government taxes some of its citizens in order to help others, it is forcing them to behave altruistically. And obviously, we are meant to think, that use of force is morally objectionable. But what exactly makes taxation objectionable? One answer that many libertarians supply is that forcing some people to benefit others is wrong because it involves forced labour. The underlying thought seems to be that there is something morally troubling about making some people work for others. In this article I scrutinize this thought. After describing two different kinds of taxation, I show how the libertarian argument about taxes depends on a distinction between posing a threat to other people and failing to help them. This brings us to the moral bedrock of the argument that taxation is forced labour, namely the idea that no one has a right to force you to do something unless you pose a threat to other people. The bulk of my article is devoted to showing (1) that this idea cannot deliver the conclusion that libertarians want because it conflicts with other things that libertarians believe; and (2) once you give up on that idea, it turns out that taxation to benefit others is not necessarily wrong by libertarian standards.

(Re)embracing social responsibility theory as a basis for media speech: shifting the normative paradigm for a modern media

Dave Egger’s fictional book The Circle tells the story of an all-powerful new media company of the same name that seeks to totally monopolise its market and remake the world in its image. To achieve this The Circle advocates the unregulated sharing of all information, at all times, regardless of its source and irrespective of the consequences for individuals, society and the state. Although the dystopian view of reality presented by the book is perhaps slightly extreme, it does not take any great leap of faith to see how we could all end up as ‘Circlers’, particularly because the underlying normative rationale that drives The Circle is what currently underpins online speech in reality. Libertarianism and the inherently libertarian arguments from truth and the marketplace of ideas have historically underpinned the notion of the Fourth Estate and have a ‘hold’ on First Amendment jurisprudence. In recent years, libertarianism has emerged as the de facto normative paradigm for internet and social media speech worldwide. Although the theory’s dominant position fits with the perceived ethos of social media platforms such as Facebook, its philosophical foundations are based on nineteenth and early twentieth-century means of communication. Consequently, as illustrated by issues such as filter bubbles and Facebook’s reaction to fake news (bringing in a third-party fact-checking company) which conflicts with the platform’s libertarian ideology, as well as the European Court of Human Rights consistently placing the argument from democracy at the heart of its Article 10 ECHR jurisprudence, rather than the argument from truth and marketplace of ideas, this normative framework is idealistic as opposed to being realistic. Therefore, it is not suitable for twenty-first-century free speech and the modern media, of which social media is no longer an outlier, but a central component. Thus, this paper advances the argument that a normative and philosophical framework for media speech, based on social responsibility theory and the argument from democratic self-governance, is more suitable for the modern media than libertarianism. Further, it justifies a coercive regulatory regime that also preserves media freedom.

Prostitution, Essential and Incidental Aspects: A Libertarian Argument for Legalization

AbstractProstitution is often depicted as an aggressive and coercive activity. We have convincing empirical evidence that sometimes this is indeed the case. However, this is not sufficient to make it illegal. We argue that an activity should be outlawed if and only if it is essentially aggressive and/or coercive. But prostitution is not inherently violent, only incidentally. Indeed, prostitution could be defined as “the act of rendering, from the client’s point of view, non-reproductive sex against payment” (Edlund and Korn, 2002). No aggression and/or coercion necessarily enters this all-inclusive definition. This is why prostitution should be legalized laws to the contrary repealed.

Testing a Beckerian-Arrowian Model of Political Orientation Discrimination on the U.S. Law Professor Labor Market: Measuring the 'Rank Gap,' 2001-2010

There are comparatively few conservative and libertarian law professors on U.S. law school faculties. Why is this? One possible explanation is discrimination based on political orientation. This paper tests this using a model of discrimination based on the work of Nobel Prize-winning economists Gary Becker and Kenneth Arrow in order to measure the “rank gap” — the difference in the ranking of a hiring law school based on one’s political orientation after controlling for other predictors of that ranking (clerkships, publications, the law school one graduated from, etc.). The paper, using matching statistical methods, finds that upon comparing conservative/libertarian law professors hired from 2001-2010 with equally-credentialed liberal law professors, conservatives/libertarians end up, on average, at a law school ranked 12-13 spots lower (i.e., less prestigious). (See pages 36-37.) This rank gap is not uniform, being more moderate with the top 75 schools, non-existent with schools 76-100, and the largest with the lowest-ranked schools. (See page 40.) The paper finds a similar “rank gap” for law professors whose political orientation was unknown or moderate compared to their liberal peers. Thus, while there may be other mechanisms causing the dearth of conservative/libertarian law professors in the legal academy, those who do make it in the door appear to experience discrimination based on political orientation. The paper also discusses the harms that a lack of conservative/libertarian law professors causes. Namely, legal scholarship suffers from an echo chamber; law students, particularly liberal ones, may not sufficiently learn how to make or counter conservative and libertarian arguments; and law and policy is not as strong as it could be without conservative/libertarian critiques and perspectives. (See part I.A, pages 5-11.)

Rhetoric and Economics, Analysis and History

Rhetoric and Economics, Analysis and History

Dwa argumenty na rzecz libertarianizmu w teorii prawa naturalnego Murraya Rothbarda

The purpose of the presented paper is the presentation and critical assesment of the two arguments for the principle of self-ownership raised by the founding father of libertarianism – an economist and political philosopher Murray Newton Rothbard (1926-1995). As author points out, both arguments are rooted in the theory of natural law and natural rights. He argues that this theory, in addition to being untenable per se, is incompatbile with the ethics of libertarianism and therefore every libertarian argument set on its stone must inevitably fail. However, according to the author, Rothbard’s second argument – that is, the argumentum a contrario, is logically indipendent of the natural law theory and, thus, can be defended on different philosophical grounds, although Rothbard himself derived it from the erroneous natural law premises.

The case against libertarian arguments for compulsory vaccination

In a recent paper in this journal, Jason Brennan correctly notes that libertarians struggle to justify a policy of compulsory vaccination. The most straightforward argument that justifies compulsory vaccination is...

Organ Markets and Disrespectful Demands

There is a libertarian argument for live donor organ markets, according to which live donor organ markets would be permitted if we simply refrained from imposing any substantive and controversial moral assumptions on people who reasonably disagree about morality and justice. I argue that, to the contrary, this endorsement of live donor organ markets depends upon the libertarians’ adoption of a substantive and deeply controversial conception of strong, extensive property rights. This is shown by the fact that these rights would prevent states intervening in cases of preventable and intuitively impermissible wronging of others that can arise when free individuals engage in voluntary offers and exchanges. I outline two forms of such wronging: discrimination and disrespectful demands. I argue that although these types of acts are morally impermissible, the policy question of whether and how they should be regulated by states is non-trivial. I then argue that there is good reason to think that organ markets would rely on disrespectful demands. This may help explain the widespread moral repugnance people feel toward organ trading. It also provides a , though not decisive, case for states to prohibit such markets.