Liberal Voters Research Articles

Dangerous, Deserving, or Harmed: Understanding the Formation of Anti-Carceral Policy Attitudes Among Urban, Liberal Voters

Dangerous, Deserving, or Harmed: Understanding the Formation of Anti-Carceral Policy Attitudes Among Urban, Liberal Voters

What Makes Swing Voters Participate in Protests? The Effects of Voting Patterns and Election Cycles on Participation in Candlelight Protests in South Korea

This paper aims to analyze how the traits of candlelight protest participants have changed from 2004 to 2017 in South Korea. While previous studies have typically identified these traits of the candlelight protesters based on a single survey, this paper examines the change of protest participants using a multi-level analysis. This study argues that voter type and election cycles have a significant impact on an individual's decision to participate in candlelight protests. To be specific, swing voters are less likely to participate in a candlelight protest when the next election is scheduled either too soon or too far. Core liberal voters with a high degree of motivation are more likely to take part in a candlelight protest when the distance from the next election is close, while core conservative voters with a low degree of motivation are not affected by the distance from the next election. This study contributes on both sub-fields, voting behaviors and contentious politics, by combining individuals' voting patterns with political opportunity structures. Survey data (2004, 2010, 2017) conducted by the Korean Political Science Association (KPSA) and the Korean Social Science Data Center (KSSDC) provide empirical support for the arguments.

La ideología liberal y la participación electoral en España (2010-2020): el comportamiento diferencial del votante liberal

This article makes a first approximation to the electoral participation of liberals in Spain. Using the CIS monthly barometers and covering the period of a decade from 2010 to 2020, we analyze whether liberal ideology has influenced electoral participation. The logistic regression analyses employed include ideology in addition to other socioeconomic, attitudinal and conjunctural aspects as control variables. The results show that liberal voters have a lower electoral participation that is directly attributed to their ideological affiliation. For the elections studied, the differential behavior associated with liberal ideology is robustly maintained even after the self-placement on the left-right axis —namely, the metric traditionally used to approximate the effect of ideology— is included in the model. This greater abstentionism associated with liberal ideology does not seem to be entirely explained by the greater distrust in political institutions that these voters tend to show.

Social Development and Abortion Policies in the United States: State-Wise Variations

Women’s access to abortion has been facing challenges by the conservative sociopolitical agencies across the states for decades affecting women’s right to health, particularly of reproductive health. Anti-abortion groups across the states in the United States supported by conservative legislators of the state assemblies have been proposing, passing, and enacting laws designed to restrict access to abortion care threatening women’s empowerment, gender equality, health, and women’s rights. Objectives of this study are to identify major indicators of social development and evaluate their effects on variations in abortion policies across the states in United States. Utilizing the social development perspective, this study measures the cumulative effect of sociopolitical and economic variables on abortion policy scores of the states using discriminant analysis and One-way ANOVA. Independent variables of this study are the state’s 2020 presidential election outcome, teen (15–19) birth rate, prevalence of women (15–44) without health insurance, prevalence of female poverty, availability of abortion in the state, and enrollment of women in higher education. As hypothesized, the state’s endorsement in the presidential election was identified as a predictor of the state’s abortion policy attribute and the extent of abortion law being neutral, supportive, or restrictive. The study found all six independent variables statistically significant and influencing the dependent variable, abortion policy score of states placing them either in the restrictive, neutral, or supportive group. It is evident from the findings that without the support of liberal voters, change in the abortion policies through state legislatives would be difficult. Our result suggests continuing advocacy for reproductive rights particularly during the electoral campaigns to make abortion laws supportive across the states.

Income inequality, voters' support for public spending and the size of the welfare state. A simple political model.

This paper studies the effect of income inequality and voters' support for public spending on the choice of size of the welfare state. Based on new empirical findings showing that preferences for taxation depend on the nature of the policies financed with tax revenues (Barnes 2015, Ballard-Rosa 2016, Roosma 2016, and Berens 2019) I build a Downsian two-party political competition framework in which voters differ in both income (rich or poor) and ideology (liberal or conservative). Government provides two types of public services: one that increase the size of the welfare state and other that does not. Liberal (conservative) voters only care about the public service that increase (do not increase) the size of the welfare state. I find that the decisive voter and the size of the welfare state depends on both the level of income inequality and voters' support for public spending. In particular, and different from the traditional models on redistributive politics (Romer 1975, Roberts 1977, and Meltzer 1981), I obtain that an increase in pre tax income inequality may reduce the size of the welfare state chosen by majority voting.

BLACK BY GOD | The West Virginian

BLACK BY GOD | The West Virginian

Geography of the conservative-liberal cleavage and selected factors influencing the distribution of conservative and liberal voters in Slovakia

The main aim of the paper is to identify the success rate in time and space of political parties with a more conservative electorate and those with a more liberal voters in Slovakia based on the results of parliamentary elections in the last twenty years and to conduct a subsequent correlation analysis of selected socioeconomic parameters (urbanisation rate, registered unemployment rate, the share of persons over 65 years of age, the share of persons with religious faith and share of university-educated persons) and the spatial distribution of conservative or liberal voters. We identify the success rate of parties with a more conservative or more liberal electorate at the level of the Slovak Republic as a whole, as well as in its regions and districts, in the parliamentary elections from 2002 onward, while also evaluating the issue through the spatially disaggregated results of the referendum on the family (2015). Based on statistical analysis, liberal vote rs in Slovakia are more notably concentrated in urban areas, particularly in districts with a lower level of unemployment, a higher share of people with a university education and non-religious residents. On the other hand, conservative voters are more evenly distributed throughout the country, and in their case, the highest statistical association identified among the monitored socioeconomic indicators related to the share of the population professing a certain religion. The highest summary statistical dependence among the examined variables in terms of the conservative-liberal conflict line was identified for indicators of the degree of urbanisation, the share of persons without religious confession and the share of university-educated people. It seems, given the current social situation opening up the liberal or secular ideas, that in the future the conflict of conservative and liberal values represented by specific parties and a significant number of voters in political struggle will become more significant, and not only in post-socialist countries. All the more important will be such studies, e.g. also in the context of setting up appropriate political marketing and effective election campaigns of political parties.

Racial attitudes & political cross-pressures in nationalized elections: The case of the Republican coalition in the Trump era

While scholars have found that Trump was able to capitalize on the racial attitudes of white voters, it is less clear how these racial attitudes influenced vote-choice across partisan and ideological cleavages in the electorate. It is also unclear whether racial attitudes affected voting at the congressional level or electoral outcomes at the aggregate level. Using a novel measure of racial attitudes at the subnational level and survey data, we make three clear findings: (1) Trump and Republican congressional candidates benefited from conservative racial attitudes both at the aggregate level and among white voters, (2) this electoral benefit for Republicans persisted during the 2018 midterm elections, and (3) the effect of attitudes on vote-choice did not significantly vary across partisan and ideological cleavages in the white electorate. Our findings suggest that, even during the era of highly nationalized and partisan elections, racial attitudes are still a mechanism by which Republicans can win significant electoral support among Democrats and relatively liberal voters in the white electorate. These findings have implications for the growing salience of race in the Republican electoral coalition.

Consumer Sense Making of Political Front Group Messages

This study looks at how highly educated, politically literate individuals make sense of political front group advertising. Using the concepts of the persuasion knowledge model and Malmelin's model of advertising literacy, the study explores the knowledge base needed for individuals to be literate in reading these types of political ads. The study uses in-depth interviews with both self-identified liberal and conservative voters. The insights suggest that even the politically literate are not equipped to fully understand a front group ad. Suggestions for ways to enhance political advertising literacy are discussed.

Values and electoral behavior of Russian citizens at presidential elections (2012, 2018): constancy and variability

Based on the empirical data of two sociological studies conducted in accordance with the uniform methodology using the personal questionnaire method in April 2012 and May 2018 (almost immediately after the election of the President of the Russian Federation), the article analyzes the structure of values of Russian urban voters, influencing their attitude to participation in the presidential elections and to the competing candidates. The socio-economic and socio-political conditions in Russia and their influence on the structure of values of urban voters are considered in the article. The article reveals the reasons why the fewer urban voters participated in the elections and a much larger number of them voted for Vladimir Putin when the economic situation of voters deteriorated in 2012 compared to 2018.The article shows that the structure of values of urban voters remains predominantly “materialistic” (according to Ronald Inglehart). The influence of the value structure of voters on their participation in voting at the presidential election and on the support of a certain candidate is revealed. On the basis of comparing the results of the presidential elections in 2012 and 2018, it is shown that during 6 years the ideological spectrum of candidates has expanded and began to express a wider range of political views on the further development of Russian society and state — from extremely liberal, democratic to extremely conservative, totalitarian, which is essential feature of the modern Russian party and political system. The middle of this spectrum was represented by liberal conservatism of Vladimir Putin, and his support in 2018 reflects a shift in the values of urban voters from the extreme right and the extreme left to the middle, toward liberal conservatism that is becoming inherent in an increasing number of urban voters.It is revealed that within the framework of the “materialistic” value structure of urban voters, the value of material wealth does not play a significant role when voters choose the future development of Russia. The value of unselfish patriotism and family is in the first place. The difficult political conditions in Russia in 2018 gave the voters patriotism a militant character that was absent in 2012. It united Russian society around Vladimir Putin even more and was the cause of a significant increase in his support from voters. Liberal component of conservatism in the program of Vladimir Putin (the expansion of economic, political, and spiritual freedoms) led to his support from moderately liberal voters. All these factors together predetermined the great success of Vladimir Putin in the presidential elections in Russia in 2018.

Gender and Foreign Policy: Are Female Members of Congress More Dovish than Their Male Colleagues?

Research shows that female legislators tend to support liberal, pacifistic approaches to foreign policy. But it remains unclear whether they are dovish because they seek to represent the dovish values of women generally or because they tend to represent mostly liberal voters. To answer this question, we examine all foreign policy votes cast in Congress over the last five decades to estimate the ideological locations of House and Senate members on a hawk-dove dimension. Once we control for partisan and constituency effects, we find only limited evidence that female legislators are more dovish than their male counterparts are.

Reclaiming the House of the Representatives from Republicans: Case Study of Districts TX-32 and NJ-3

2018 midterm elections in the United States allowed more ethnically and racially diverse candidates to become members of the Congress. The use of social media tools helped them to reach out to their community and get out the vote, which is especially important in Democratic campaign tactics. The article, by focusing on Colin Allred's and Andy Kim's Congressional bids, focuses on how their issue-oriented campaigns helped to mobilize the liberal voters. Furthermore, by analysing the rapidly changing demographics, it tackles the crucial question: do they mean the doom of the Republican Party?

Anatomy of Party Sorting: Partisan Polarization of Voters and Party Switching

Scholars explain that the ideological divide among the political elites has heightened the homogeneity in voters' ideology within parties, thereby resulting in the appearance of ideological polarization in the American electorate today. This article postulates and tests four modes of party sorting in the United States based upon: (1) if partisan voters adjust their ideology to the preference of their party elites or switch to the ideologically proximate part; and (2) whether partisan voters respond to the ideological shifts of their own party or opposition party. The empirical results suggest that the conservative voters in the Democratic Party switched to the Republican Party in favorable response to the conservative shift of the Republican Party members in Congress in past decades, whereas the liberal voters in the Republican Party changed their partisanship to Democratic in negative reaction to the rightward shift of Republican elites.Related ArticlesGershtenson, Joseph, Brian W. Smith, and William R. Mangun. 2006. “Friends of the Earth? Partisanship, Party Control of Congress, and Environmental Legislation in Congress.” Politics & Policy 34 (1): 66‐92. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2006.00004.xGrossmann, Matt. 2014. “The Varied Effects of Policy Cues on Partisan Opinions.” Politics & Policy 42 (6): 881‐904. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12102Knuckey, Jonathan. 2009. “Explaining Partisan Change among Northeastern Whites.” Politics & Policy 37 (6): 1331‐1355. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2009.00222.x

Pack Your Politics! Assessing the Vote Choice of Latino Interstate Migrants

AbstractWhile popular narratives regarding the destiny of demographics assume Latino interstate migrants will alter destination state politics as Latinos disperse across the states, no studies directly assess the empirical validity of the underlying assumption of migrant's political preferences. Moreover, established theories of domestic migrant preferences suggest a variety of potential individual-level behaviors that often diverge from the underlying assumption of a uniform introduction of more liberal voters. Employing data from the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey, this study presents an analysis on Latino interstate migrant voting behavior, while also overcoming a variety of data limitations in existing studies. Countering some previous findings that homophily, adaptation, or even a static liberal orientation describes migrant voting behavior, the results suggest that Latino interstate migrant preferences vary by the political context of their previous state of residence. The results imply that the destiny of demographics will be conditioned, to some extent, by the migratory patterns of Latinos and the dyad of departure and destination states. When Latinos leave liberal (conservative) states, they bring more liberal (conservative) policies. In short, Latinos seem to pack their politics when moving across state lines.

The Complex Relation Between Receptivity to Pseudo-Profound Bullshit and Political Ideology.

This research systematically mapped the relationship between political ideology and receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit-that is, obscure sentences constructed to impress others rather than convey truth. Among Swedish adults (N = 985), bullshit receptivity was (a) robustly positively associated with socially conservative (vs. liberal) self-placement, resistance to change, and particularly binding moral intuitions (loyalty, authority, purity); (b) associated with centrism on preference for equality and even leftism (when controlling for other aspects of ideology) on economic ideology self-placement; and (c) lowest among right-of-center social liberal voters and highest among left-wing green voters. Most of the results held up when we controlled for the perceived profundity of genuine aphorisms, cognitive reflection, numeracy, information processing bias, gender, age, education, religiosity, and spirituality. The results are supportive of theoretical accounts that posit ideological asymmetries in cognitive orientation, while also pointing to the existence of bullshit receptivity among both right- and left-wingers.

Assured Newcomers on a Squally Sea? The Czech Pirate Party before and after the 2017 Elections

The elections to the Chamber of Deputies in October 2017 were a turning point for the Czech Pirate Party (called “Piráti”). It was the first time since establishing the party in 2009 that the Pirates entered the lower house of the Czech Parliament. They took the third place with 10.79 % votes and won 22 seats out of 200. Their main programme points came out of typical “pirate policies” like control of power and the powerful ones, simplification of the running of the state through technology, protection of citizens from bullying and defence of freedom as well as basic Pirate principles including liberalism and direct democracy. Their programme was called “New Ideas for the New Age”. From a different view, this party presented itself as a watchdog of democracy and as an alternative mostly for liberal voters. This qualitative case study will provide a complex overview of the Pirate phenomenon in the Czech Republic from their establishment to their current role of an opposition party. This article aims to show and describe how the position of the Czech Pirates has varied over time. For this purpose, open data from the Czech Statistical Office (CZSO) and the findings from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) dataset will be used. It is possible to say that the Pirates are playing the role of newcomers in the Chamber of Deputies after the 2017 elections, but they are not newcomers in the Czech party system.

Anisotropic opinion dynamics with an adaptive social rule

We consider an anisotropic opinion formation process where the set of rules $B$, that dictates what is the socially acceptable position, changes following the average voters' opinion. As in the case of a constant $B$, conservative (agreement with $B$) and liberal (agreement with neighbors) voters' attitudes are still represented by stable fixed points in the phase space of the system but with the difference that the conservative fixed point is stable for all possible values of the intervoter interaction. It has been also observed that, when the model is applied to sufficiently large populations, the time needed to consolidate a position in agreement with $B$ is finite. We observed that there is also a range of values of the interaction where the two stable points coexist, opening the door for the modeling of bistability related phenomena, such as stochastic resonance and hysteresis.

A Different Kind of Disadvantage: Candidate Race, Cognitive Complexity, and Voter Choice

Voters use heuristics to help them make decisions when they lack information about political choices. Candidate appearance operates as a powerful low-information cue. However, widely held stereotypes mean that reliance on such a heuristic can reduce support for candidates of color. We argue that racial prejudices are more likely to dominate decision making when electoral environments require voters to expend more cognitive resources—such as when they must choose multiple candidates at once. Using two experiments we find that black candidates receive less support from cognitively taxed voters than from voters who have the cognitive space to intentionally limit their prejudices when voting. We also reveal that this pattern is particularly evident among ideologically liberal voters. Respondents who profess politically liberal views support black candidates more often than white candidates when the cognitive task is simple but are less likely to do so when they are cognitively taxed.

One more left‐wing heave?

AbstractThe Labour party cannot ignore its newly acquired liberal voters if it is to win the next election

Why Won’t You Listen to Me? Measuring Receptiveness to Opposing Views

We develop an 18-item self-report measure of receptiveness to opposing views. Studies 1a and 1b present the scale and report measures of internal, convergent, and discriminant validity. The scale consists of four factors, and is distinct from related measures. In Study 2, more receptive individuals (as measured by our scale) were more willing to consume information from US Senators representing the opposing party. In Study 3, more receptive individuals reported less mind wandering when viewing a speech with which they disagreed. In Study 4, more receptive individuals evaluated supporting and opposing policy arguments more impartially. In Study 5, more receptive liberal voters were more likely to watch President Trump’s inaugural address, evaluated the address in a more balanced manner, and were willing to consider a more heterogeneous selection of relevant news coverage. We discuss the scale as a tool to investigate the role of receptiveness for conflict, decision making, and collaboration.