Liberal Democratic Principles Research Articles

The Muhammad cartoons and multicultural democracies

The Danish cartoon affair presents a vehicle for rethinking some of our longstanding assumptions about liberal democracy and its capacity to accommodate cultural difference. The public and academic debates have tended to frame the affair as either a clash between liberal-democratic and illiberal religious values or as a question of whose position is most consistent with liberal-democratic values. We begin, instead, from the assumption that liberal-democratic values conflict, not only between liberalism and democracy, but also within liberalism and democracy. We argue that cases such as the Muhammad cartoons controversy present liberal democracies with choices about which liberal-democratic principles and conceptions of these principles they emphasize and when. Guiding these choices should also be the pragmatic question of how best to make multicultural democracies work. We suggest that the Muhammad cartoons encompass not one, but three distinct problem areas: the violation of a religious norm in the representation of Muhammad, attacks on Islam as a religion, and attacks on Muslims as a group. We examine how liberal democratic values and multicultural citizenship relate to each of these cases, and argue that attacks on Muslims as a group are a form of racism.

Problems with a Weakly Pluralist Approach to Democratic Education

Problems with a Weakly Pluralist Approach to Democratic Education Sheron Fraser-Burgess Introduction Pluralism embodies wide acknowledgement of various forms of difference. Appeals to pluralism involve arguments for the proliferating of differences as a social and moral ideal. Rather than being a formal political regime such as with democracy or social liberalism, in the extant political philosophy literature, pluralism brings considerations of diversity and equality to bear in philosophical analysis of traditional systems of government. As a critique, pluralism falls along a continuum, which can be conceived of as iterations of the standing of particular ways of life, with respect to constraints of both equality and justice. At one end of the spectrum, all conceptions of the human good share a prima facie equality that belie overarching moral norms as a criterion of ranking. Questions about the incumbency of individual liberty motivate movement toward the opposing end, as allowing for the most just society warrants giving precedence to such values. The source of pluralism’s critical role is its inherent demand of a cogent resolution of the moral and, at times, political tension between equality and freedom. This article considers two forms of pluralism that lie near opposing extremes of the continuum and their implication for education. According to Horace Kallen’s and John Gray’s strong pluralism, the claim to the fact of differing values, cultures, etc., has primacy. As a corollary, maintaining the integrity of the social groups as holders of those values becomes central. In conflict with liberal democratic principles, however, protecting group values may occur at the expense of individual detractors within the group or may pose a threat of harm to others outside of the group who do not share these values. On the other hand, one form of weak pluralism, Amy Gutmann’s deliberative democracy, constrains pluralism on political grounds of individual [End Page 1] freedom. Deliberative democracy subsumes the holding of all values, including those shared with a social group, to the requirements of democracy. Both theories are considered as attempts to reconcile principles of treating everyone equally with not unjustly limiting individual freedom in a democracy. I raise principled and practical issues from education that call into question whether each theory satisfactorily resolves the conflicting demands of both equality and liberty. A third alternative is proposed as a salient consideration for democratic education. I begin with the pluralism of Horace Kallen and its relationship to that of John Gray. Strong Pluralism Horace Kallen’s Cultural Pluralism In this section, I discuss Horace Kallen’s seminal account of cultural pluralism from the early twentieth century, classifying it with the strong value pluralism articulated by John Gray. Gray’s and Kallen’s pluralism have in common both the sanctioning of the fullest expression of difference and difficulties with making sense of the intuitive pull toward a criterion for the ranking of values that democracy dictates. I then consider the educational implications of Kallen’s view, particularly with respect to its actual influence upon multi-cultural initiatives of the 1970s and 1980s. Kallen coined the term “cultural pluralism” in the early twentieth century (Kallen 73). At this time, America was experiencing a great deal of social upheaval because of the huge influx of European and Asian immigrants. Movements such as nativism and Americanization fueled xenophobic sentiment. In this milieu, the full acculturation of new immigrants became a priority. In education, schooling policies penalized immigrant expressions of cultural identity, such as speaking one’s native language and practicing cultural traditions (Kallen 4). Kallen was one of the voices advocating not only that new immigrants should be allowed to maintain their cultural identity but also that a formal political solution be initiated which accommodated the predilection to do so. Nathan Glazer explains that there was at that time a general blindness to the possibility that “these groups or elements within them would not want to acculturate and assimilate but would want to preserve their corporate characters and distinctiveness even if prejudice and discrimination disappeared.” According to Glazer, such was the doctrine of assimilation for the first forty years of the twentieth century (7). [End Page 2] Kallen’s pluralism is a departure from the prevailing view in...

Constituting Vanuatu: Societal, Legal and Local Perspectives

Governance in Vanuatu has been a source of concern for Australia as it forms part of Australia’s ‘Arc of Instability.’ Vanuatu has adopted a modified Westminster system as that system is often advocated as the model for constitutions and governance around the world. In various former colonies local populations were expected to simply absorb its liberal democratic principles apparently on some assumption that such principles were an innate part of human nature. Most readings of history would come to a different conclusion. Vanuatu illustrates this error and the complexities of a society that not only creates a broad challenge for governance, but undermines the credibility of simplistic, universalist approaches of liberal solutions, including institutional transplants, to these challenges. This paper asks questions about the nature and status of law in and governance of society in Vanuatu and then examines various answers, from broad social perspectives and academic sources to interviews conducted among members of the Vanuatu community. It concludes that the system fails as insufficiently attuned to the realities of the society that makes up Vanuatu. That is to say the system fails to effectively address the needs and interests of the population, and fails to sufficiently incorporate the indigenous systems in situ.

The advancement of liberty: how American democratic principles transformed the twentieth century

This book is a counterpoint to the prevailing view that the United States is an imperialist nation that has violently pursued power in the world to advance its own narrow interests. The basic theme is that at the dawn of the 20th century, there were six democracies in the world, but by century's end, democracy was ascendant. This epic historical transformation has been thanks in great measure to the vision and sacrifices made by Americans. Matthew C. Price examines the great conflicts of the 20th century, showing how American democratic principles have utterly reshaped global values and politics. The defeat of fascism and imperialism in World War II led to the Marshall Plan, the single most influential rebuilding program in human history. The fostering of democracy in Japan, the establishment of the UN, and the fall of the Soviet Union reshaped the world in unforeseen ways. America has dedicated itself to democracy in the Middle East, to democratization in China, and to the larger quest for the spread of liberal democratic principles worldwide, even when the struggle is difficult, dangerous, and ongoing. Early in the century, Woodrow Wilson said that America should make the world safe for democracy. In taking up that challenge, the United States changed human history.

Local Knowledge as Trapped Knowledge: Intellectual Property, Culture, Power and Politics

Discourses of local knowledge and categories of rights claimants thereto are embroiled in complex conceptual and analytical morass. The conceptual quandary around local knowledge is diversionary from the historically rooted hierarchies of culture, power and politics that have subjugated it. Claims to local knowledge are challenged from several dimensions, including arguments from cultural cosmopolitanism, intellectual property rights and aspects of liberal democratic principles. An interesting new site for this power play is the emergent bioprospecting framework of access and benefit sharing. In this context, sophisticated external intermediaries, who have asymmetrical power relationships with custodians of local knowledge, now constitute a new threat to the genuine aspirations of indigenous and local communities. Recently, local knowledge claims are conflated with propertization of culture raising concerns over the asphyxiation of the public domain. Making the claims or claimants to local knowledge the scapegoats of our troubled public domain undermines the source of the problem. In a way, the current anemic state of our public domain can be blamed on unwholesome expansion of intellectual property and unidirectional appropriation of local knowledge by external interests. The reality of cultural cosmopolitanism requires an intellectual property order that is responsive to the contributions of local knowledge.

Europa między demokracją i zaściankiem

In the period when ‘our natural political environment’ was provided by controlled ‘socialist democracy’ we tended to look to Europe for a model of democratic perfection. As the doctrine of human rights and the institutions guarding it became increasingly common, this conviction was yet augmented. Such a high opinion of European political practice was undoubtedly affected by the defeat of Nazism, which was commonly interpreted as a victory for democracy. The feeling of European democratic identity was further confirmed several decades later, when Communism collapsed. Thus the process of progressive European integration, which commenced soon after the end ofWorldWar II, and intensified after 1989, seemed to testify to Europe’s unanimously democratic nature. Yet a more considerate insight into the unification processes raises numerous doubts as to whether we are really facing the construction of European structures following the principles of liberal democracy.

The Illiberal Culture of E-Democracy

Abstract Efforts to create e-democracy do not necessarily enhance liberal democratic politics, tending instead toward illiberal polities because of the underlying technological culture of e-democracy. Technologies are not value-neutral artifacts but rather social practices in which values and meanings are central elements. The complex of values and meanings creates a culture to each technology that is implemented along with that technology. Implementing a technology thus moves society in the direction of the underlying culture of the technology. Electronic liberal democracy cannot be constructed by simply adapting Internet-based technologies as is because the underlying culture of those technologies, when implemented in specifically political practices, runs counter to the principles of liberal democracy. Three aspects of that culture in particular-that the Internet is a commodity, that direct democracy is the most preferable form of democracy, and that the Internet is an individualized public forumshape ...

Reassessing Support for Islam and Democracy in the Arab World?: Evidence from Egypt and Jordan

A cross the Middle East, support for democracy is striking. Regional survey data throughout the Arab world indicates that levels of support for democracy enjoy consid erable majority support.1 However, the Arab world has yet to see its first full-fledged demo cratic state. Studies examining the potential for democracy in the region often analyze institutional reforms that correspond with lib eral democratic principles. Yet, students of Middle Eastern politics understand that exist ing institutional reforms, such as parliamen tary elections and greater freedoms within civil society, have done little to enhance democracy in the region. In fact, the liberaliz ing tendencies of the 1990s have further solid ified authoritarian rule.2 Although these reforms have allowed for greater civic and political participation, they have also been accompanied by further repression and the continued monopolization of regime power. Today, democracy in the Arab world is, at best, a remote possibility. In this conundrum of democratization, where institutional liberalizing reforms have been linked to further authoritarian consolidation and

The Politics of Direct Democracy: Referendums in Global Perspective.

The Politics of Direct Democracy: Referendums in Global Perspective., Lawrence LeDuc., Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview. 2003, pp. 214.The 1980s marked a watershed in the evolution of liberal democracy. On the global front the principles of liberal democracy were successfully used as battering rams to demolish the walls erected by its powerful Cold War rival—socialism. Our side declared victory and the end of ideological conflict. And yet in its struggle with socialism liberal democracy planted the seeds for its own transformation—it was hoist with its own petard. A new consensus emerged. Our elections were also a sham, parties provided little or no meaningful choice, and legislators were unrepresentative, unresponsive and unaccountable. On major constitutional and moral issues there was gridlock. From the left came calls for “people power” and more inclusive and empowering institutions. From the right came calls for privatizing the State and reducing the autonomy of elected officials and the “special interests” who controlled it. Enter the referendum as a way of addressing this “democratic deficit.” Why not let the people decide?

The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence in Newly Democratic Regimes

The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence in Newly Democratic Regimes John E. Finn (bio) Just as it is easier to hold elections than to root liberal democratic principles in newly independent states, it is easier to export constitutions and to create courts than to install the rule of law.1 There is an important distinction between those societies that can profess legality and those that advance the rule of law more generally.2 But is the rule of law a necessary or even a desirable component of democratization? In the abstract, it is not especially difficult to imagine how the rule of law might contribute to democratization. Most understandings of the rule of law, at whatever level of normative abstraction, have at their center a concern with the accountability and principled exercise of governmental power. The rule of law, as I have argued elsewhere, is less about the imposition of limits on power than developing the sense that any exercise of public power must be defensible against a set of stable, knowable, and public norms.3 Published principles of law contribute to democratic design by providing standards of accountability against which citizens may assess the policies and principles of democratic regimes.4 In this sense, the rule of law complements principles of democratic accountability by prohibiting the exercise of arbitrary power.5 Put another way, the rule of law is a mechanism for democratizing power by disciplining power. Perhaps less obviously, the rule of law may also contribute to democratization by increasing the capacity of newly democratic regimes to govern. In many respects, rule of law values promote governmental efficiencies by ensuring the consistent and uniform application of rules, guarding against governmental corruption, and by making governmental actions transparent. In short, the rule of law can facilitate the actual process of governing. Long experience suggests that the survival and strength of nascent democracies depends in some measure on the ability of those governments to fulfill the mandates of any government: to secure order and promote the public weal. An understanding of the rule of law that sees it first as a set of limits on power obscures the ways in which the rule of law complements and enables power. It also risks making the rule of law seem less attractive to elites, who whether acting on the basis of self-interest or public purpose are unlikely to see the "limiting" aspects of the rule of law as a useful device for new regimes concerned with the creation and maintenance of stable governments. Understanding how the rule of law promotes energetic and effective governance will make it more appealing as a principle of constitutional design and as a live feature of democratic states. Related, and no less important, the rule of law can contribute to democratic stability and maintenance by shaping civic society, by reinforcing citizens' commitment to democracy itself. At the most basic level this can occur by persuading citizens that the rule of law and democratic regimes actually do promote effective governance — that such regimes can govern effectively and materially improve the quality of their citizens' lives. The rule of law can contribute to constitutional and democratic maintenance by augmenting what Linz and Stepan term the "attitudinal component of democracy," or the extent to which citizens value democracy in its own right.6 The rule of law in newly democratic regimes can thus be instrumental in the creation and maintenance of civic society.7 All of which begs the question: How do we construct the rule of law in newly democratic states? The particulars of constitutional design are a critical part of that process, but constitutional draftsmanship alone is more a promise than a guarantee. The question is not whether we can compose institutions that promote the rule of law on paper, but rather can we find ways to make them take hold in the polity. How do we give concrete expression to the rule of law? As a matter of constitutional arrangement, most of the new democracies have relied heavily on the judiciary to realize the rule of law. Indeed, many of us have been involved in the design and constitutional (re-)construction of newly independent states...

‘Citizen minus’?: indigenous Australians and the citizenship question

In Canada in the 1970s the catchcry ‘citizen plus’ expressed the aspirations of that country's Indigenous population. ‘Citizen minus’ more appropriately captures what most Australians believe should be the situation of Indigenous Australians. Australia's Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders were not included in the late-nineteenth century written Constitution—a document that makes no mention of citizenship. Australia's Indigenous people theoretically were granted citizenship in 1948 in the Nationality and Citizenship Act, but in practice, this was an ‘empty vessel’ [Peterson, N. and Sanders, W. (Eds) (1998) Citizenship and Indigenous Australians (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)]. The State subsequently restricted the rights and freedoms of Aboriginal people, arguing they had not yet demonstrated the ‘capacity’ to be fully-fledged citizens. In 1967 the ‘citizenship referendum’ gave the Commonwealth government constitutional power to make laws on behalf of the Aboriginal population. Despite major advances in the early 1990s, there has since been a strong backlash against the recognition of Aboriginal rights, the reconciliation process has stalled, and discrimination continues in numerous forms. As Australia maintains its record as a deeply racist society, ongoing claims for Indigenous self-determination pose fundamental challenges to the State and the principles of liberal democracy.

Bridging Liberalism and Multiculturalism in American Education. By Rob Reich. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. 272p. $60.00 cloth, $21.00 paper

The nineteenth-century, Protestant-led common school movement against Catholic schools, the campaign against foreign language instruction in public schools, and other xenophobic efforts to “Americanize” public education in the early twentieth century provide the historical background for Rob Reich's discussion of contemporary multicultural education in the United States. His goal is to construct a liberal theory of multicultural education that hangs together philosophically and makes practical sense in a pluralistic society whose professed liberal democratic principles are belied by this history of nativism and discrimination.

International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice’

International peacebuilding operations seek to stabilise countries that have recently experienced civil wars. In pursuing this goal, however, international peacebuilders have promulgated a particular vision of how states should organise themselves internally, based on the principles of liberal democracy and market-oriented economics. By reconstructing war-shattered states in accordance with this vision, peacebuilders have effectively ‘transmitted’ standards of appropriate behaviour from the Western-liberal core of the international system to the failed states of the periphery. From this perspective, peacebuilding resembles an updated (and more benign) version of the mission civilisatrice, or the colonial-era belief that the European imperial powers had a duty to ‘civilise’ dependent populations and territories.

COMMUNITIES OF SUPPORT OR COMMUNITIES OF SURVEILLANCE AND ENFORCEMENT IN WELFARE REFORM DEBATES

Australian Journal of Social IssuesVolume 37, Issue 3 p. 247-262 Article COMMUNITIES OF SUPPORT OR COMMUNITIES OF SURVEILLANCE AND ENFORCEMENT IN WELFARE REFORM DEBATES Bettina Cass, Bettina Cass Social Work, Social Policy and Sociology, University of SydneySearch for more papers by this authorDeborah Brennan, Deborah Brennan Government and International Relations, University of SydneySearch for more papers by this author Bettina Cass, Bettina Cass Social Work, Social Policy and Sociology, University of SydneySearch for more papers by this authorDeborah Brennan, Deborah Brennan Government and International Relations, University of SydneySearch for more papers by this author First published: 22 December 2016 https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1839-4655.2002.tb01120.xCitations: 6 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume37, Issue3August 2002Pages 247-262 RelatedInformation

Inmigración y justicia:¿A quién dejamos pasar?

This paper provides an overview of what justice requires with respect to the admission of immigrants in Europe and North America given two general assumptions: a general right of states to control immigration and a commitment to liberal democratic principles. The paper argues that states are morally constrained in the sorts of criteria they can use to exclude and select immigrants. In particular, they normally cannot use racial or ethnic criteria in selection. Furthermore, states have an obligation to admit as immigrants the immediate relatives (spouse and minor children) or current and permanent residents and an obligation to accept refugees who apply for asylum.

Feminismo e estado: desafiando a democracia liberal

Este artigo explora a trajetória do movimento feminista no Brasil abordando a mudança quanto à sua concepção de Estado e seus conflitos com a democracia liberal. O foco central de discussão é a contribuição das reivindicações feministas, embora não exclusivas, por colocar em debate as limitações dos regimes democráticos liberais, assentando com isso novos parâmetros para a democracia. Tal reordenamento é discutido a partir das demandas feministas por políticas públicas voltadas para a questão de gênero, em especial as ações afirmativas que visam compensar as desvantagens das mulheres.

Australian Democracy and Priveleged Parliamentary Speech

This article responds to recent cases of parliamentary speech which reflect the ascendancy of a totalising ‘mainstream’ approach to public discourse and a political leadership that may, at times, be overly attentive to the majority-rule dimension of democracy. These developments spark a more general discussion of the phenomenology of privileged parliamentary speech, the role of speech freedoms in liberal democratic orders and the duties of parliamentary representatives within them. I make two general conclusions. First, the ways in which we normally argue and think about free speech will not generally apply to the speech of parliamentarians because their speech rights cannot be universalised. Secondly, even if parliamentary speech could be treated as standard speech there would be no legitimate defence (from a liberal democratic point of view) for a strictly populist approach to its use since this could undermine the deliberative function of parliament and lead to the violation of other important liberal democratic principles.

The world and President Bush

The world was kind to America in the 1990s. It is unlikely, however, that the next decade will be so accommodating. Clinton administration policies on China and Iraq, inadequate defence spending and delays in building a national missile defence are intimately related failures that may well converge most unpleasantly for the Bush administration. Since the end of the Cold War, Americans have confused themselves by asking the wrong question: 'Where is the threat?' Yet the danger to be faced does not fit neatly under the heading of 'international terrorism', 'rogue states' or 'ethnic conflict'. The danger, rather, is that the United States, the world's dominant power, on which the maintenance of international peace and the support of liberal democratic principles depend, will neglect its responsibilities and allow the international order that it created and sustains to collapse.

The perils of democratization: Nationalism, markets, and human rights

Immediately after the end of the Cold War there was much talk of a"New World order, 'and even of the"end of history. "1 The general idea was that one of the two great political ideologies of the twentieth century, Marxism-Leninism, had been discredited, leaving world politics free for the triumph of its only serious rival, liberal democracy. It was widely assumed that liberal democracy consisted of three main elements: human rights, democracy, and market economics. The idea that a new world order could and would be built on this conception of liberal democracy has been undermined by the outbreak of violent ethnic conflicts, the persistence of brutal dictatorships, and by resistance to the implementation, and even to the recognition, of universalistic principles by appeals to state sovereignty, economic or political necessity, and/or cultural difference. I shall argue that the idea of a new world order was always based on false theoretical assumptions, and that clarification of these errors will contribute to more soundly-based human-rights policies. The clarification of theoretical errors does nothing, of course, to eliminate the dangerous facts of the world. It should nevertheless indicate the nature of the problems that must be solved if the ideals of liberal democracy are to be advanced. Some doubt that the principles of liberal democracy can or ought to be universally implemented, 2 but I shall assume that the principles of human rights are universally applicable, and that they entail a commitment to liberal democracy.31 shall, therefore, investigate the problems raised for the universal implementation of human rights by contemporary democratic transitions. I propose to defend the following propositions:

The Greek and Spanish civil wars: A comparison

In contemporary Europe, the complacent consensus of the victory of liberal democratic values and principles in international relations has been shattered by the tragic and bloodthirsty conflicts of ex‐Yugoslavia, which at least in part could be characterized as civil wars. Similarly, in the short timespan of 10 years at the middle of the twentieth century, and straddling the Second World War, civil conflict in Spain and Greece shattered many illusions as to how international relations could and should be conducted.