ABSTRACTPersistent armed conflicts and humanitarian crises require an improved United Nations (UN) peacekeeping capability in the 21st century. One aspect of such capability is the effectiveness of its command and control (C2) structures, which is highly dependent on proper intelligence support. In order to critically evaluate such claims, this article analyzes the case of United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Both the organization of the mission-related intelligence structures (G2, JMAC, and JOC) and their practices are brought to light by interviews with MONUSCO staff, a visit to mission’s headquarters in Goma, UN reports and documents, and specialized literature. The findings indicate that intelligence contributed to improve C2 at MONUSCO by playing a critical role at the tactical (neutralizing armed groups) and operational (sharing information and providing mission-wide situational awareness) levels. Nonetheless, it had a lesser impact at the strategic level, due to a persistent gap between the UN structures in New York and the field mission.