Level Of Polarization Research Articles

Affective polarization and strategic voting in Britain

ABSTRACT Do affective attitudes determine voting behavior? As a part of this broad question, we examine how third-party supporters’ affective attitudes decide their strategic voting behavior. Using seven waves of the British Election Study (2015, 2017, and 2019), we find that third-party supporters whose affective attitudes toward the two principal political parties in their constituency are more polarized are more inclined to vote strategically. The results imply that voting behavior is shaped by both feelings toward as well as cognitive evaluations of political parties. They also imply that British voters may increasingly engage in strategic voting if the level of affective polarization continues to rise. Lastly, and more generally, the results imply that all political parties should pay attention to voter “feelings” if they are to maximize their electoral support.

The Rule of Law in Red and Blue: Affective Polarization and Support for Legal Institutions in the United States

A defining feature of democracies is an independent legal system, where elites and the public alike accept the broader legitimacy of its actions, even if they run counter to political preferences. Existing scholarship suggests that public support for rule of law institutions is rooted in perceptions of procedural fairness. However, amid increasing levels of affective polarization, we posit a partisan presidential heuristic wherein citizens’ views of legal institutions are influenced by their partisanship and signals from the president. Through multiple experiments, we demonstrate that support for two key institutions—the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice—is substantially derived from the intersection of one’s partisan identity and their partisan proximity to the president. These effects are strongest among respondents exhibiting high levels of affective partisanship. Our results suggest that in forming perceptions of the rule of law, partisan politics is increasingly competing with perceptions of procedural fairness, thereby subverting support for legal institutions in the United States.

Divisive Issues, Polarization, and Users’ Reactions on Facebook: Comparing Campaigning in Latin America

Economic, social, and health crises have shaken and polarized contemporary politics. An element fueling this polarization is the dissemination of divisive topics on social media platforms. While these polarizing social media tendencies are increasingly studied, research exploring digital political communication in South America remains scarce. This study aims to analyze the electoral campaigns in Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Peru to define the features that trigger polarized emotional reactions on Facebook. The corpus comprises a sample of 2,930 posts published by candidates and political parties during the first round of the presidential elections held in these countries between 2021 and 2022. We hypothesize that users are more likely to react in a polarized way to content focused on divisive issues. In addition, we examine how these patterns differ across countries and the influence of the level of political polarization. Finally, the role played by party-level characteristics in the emotional reactions of users is also analyzed. By means of quantitative content analysis, these questions are addressed using multilevel negative binomial regressions to identify what predicts Love and Angry reactions. The bandwagon effect seems to work positively on users’ moods since the most popular political actors receive significantly more Love reactions, irrespective of the post’s subject. In more polarized countries, there is a tendency to react more negatively to certain divisive issues, generating greater visibility of these issues on social networks and thus promoting more polarization. These findings expand knowledge about the dynamics of digital political communication in the Global South.

The polarizing content warning: how the media can reduce affective polarization

Abstract Past research suggests that journalists can (unintentionally) exacerbate affective polarization when reporting on growing levels of polarization in society. However, is there a way for journalists to report on the realities of growing political polarization without dividing people further? In our research with five pre-registered experimental studies (N = 3,414), we develop the polarizing content warning which, based on inoculation theory, warns readers that scientific research suggests reading news content about political polarization may drive further affective polarization. Results indicate that the polarizing content warning can be used both with online news articles and on social media sites, and is able to indirectly reduce affective polarization of readers. Additionally, the polarizing content warning is beneficial both when presented alongside news content and beforehand, and reduces readers’ perceptions of societal polarization, in turn reducing affective polarization. This warning allows journalists to report on societal polarization without further dividing people.

A tale of two crises: affective polarization in Greece

Affective polarization, the strong feeling of animosity toward the supporters of the opposite party is rising in Europe. Several studies have examined the impact of ideological extremity and partisanship as a social identity on the rise of affective polarization. However, the impact of policy preferences on affective polarization remains relatively unexplored. I am at filling this gap by examining how preferences towards measures taken at addressing both the economic and the health crises impact affective polarization. Using newly collected data from Greece, a country with historically high levels of affective polarization, the analysis reveals that both policies have an impact of affective polarization but there are asymmetries on how policy preferences influence it. For the supporters of the governing conservative party, affective polarization appears to be policy-driven, whereas for the supporters of the opposition, the populist left-wing party SYRIZA, it is predominantly ideology-driven. Interestingly, the supporters of the governing party continue to align with the pro-memorandum stance even in the absence of an actual memorandum.

Who Believes in Fraud in the 2006 Mexican Presidential Election? Election Denialism, Partisan Motivated Reasoning, and Affective Polarization

Abstract Why do some voters believe that there is electoral fraud when this belief contradicts the best available evidence? While the literature on public opinion has explored misperceptions’ pervasiveness and the factors that contribute to them in advanced industrial democracies, the present study analyzes motivated reasoning among voters in a young democracy, Mexico. This study highlights the important role that partisanship plays in voters’ likelihood to believe the allegations of electoral fraud in the 2006 presidential election in Mexico, which continues polarizing both political elites and the electorate even today. To understand the mechanisms at work, this research finds that it is not voters lacking information but rather voters with high levels of affective polarization and conspiratorial thinking who are more likely to believe that there was electoral fraud. The study also includes a survey experiment that fact-checked the belief in the alleged electoral fraud. Consistent with motivated reasoning theory, MORENA partisans resisted efforts to reduce their misperception. The findings of this study contribute to our understanding of the conditions that make some voters hold misperceptions in young democracies.

Political turmoil and parliamentary response – the constitutional crisis in Bolivia 2019

ABSTRACT In recent times, many political theorists have warned on the many signs around the world of democratic backsliding, experienced not only in emerging democracies but also in established ones. One of the areas of concern is the aggrandisement of the executive at the expense of parliaments, which erodes not only checks and balances but also the credibility and legitimacy of state institutions. Analysts are also concerned with damaging effects of political polarisation on democracy. Despite these challenges, parliaments are still seen as safeguard mechanisms during times of crises and have the potential to serve as another democratic line of defence. The severe political crisis in Bolivia in 2019 provides an example to study this role of parliament. Protests and intense social unrest erupted in response to a questionable electoral process in which President Evo Morales attempted to run for office disregarding constitutional term limits. This crisis, however, was also the result of a longstanding process of institutional capture were parliament played a key role supporting the efforts of the executive to extend its control to the rest of the state, aggravated by high levels of polarisation. Following the resignation of higher authorities including the President, the Bolivian state was practically paralysed and parliament became the centre of political negotiations, aimed at restoring constitutional order. After the initial shock, Bolivia’s Plurinational Assembly was eventually able to fulfil its constitutional role with the appointment of an interim president. This article describes salient elements of the role of parliament prior and during the crisis, highlighting some of the personalistic elements of politics in this country. It focuses on the parliamentary response to the crisis and the lessons learned, underlining that despite adversity parliaments can help restore order and provide much needed democratic continuity in times of uncertainty.

What polarizes citizens? An explorative analysis of 817 attitudinal items from a non-random online panel in Germany.

Various studies point to the lack of evidence of distributive opinion polarization in Europe. As most studies analyse the same item batteries from international social surveys, this lack of polarization might be due to an item's issue (e.g., the nature or substance of an item) or item formulation characteristics used to measure polarization. Based on a unique sample of 817 political attitudinal items asked in 2022 by respondents of a non-random online panel in Germany, we empirically assess the item characteristics most likely to lead to distributive opinion polarization-measured with the Van der Eijk agreement index. Our results show that only 20% of the items in our sample have some-at most moderate-level of opinion polarization. Moreover, an item's salience in the news media before the survey data collection, whether an item measures attitudes toward individual financial and non-financial costs, and the implicit level of knowledge required to answer an item (level of technicality) are significantly associated with higher opinion polarization. By contrast, items measuring a cultural issue (such as issues on gender, LGTBQI+, and ethnic minorities) and items with a high level of abstraction are significantly associated with a lower level of polarization. Our study highlights the importance of reflecting on the potential influence of an item's issue and item formulation characteristics on the empirical assessment of distributive opinion polarization.

A Threat to Cohesion: Intragroup Affective Polarization in the Context of Intractable Intergroup Conflict

Growing affective polarization, or animosity between competing ideological groups, threatens to tear apart democratic societies worldwide. In nations that are facing external conflicts, the threat arising from these conflicts may boost internal cohesion and potentially reduce the internal threat of fragmentation. However, in the current study, we analyze survey datasets from two societies embedded in intractable conflicts, South Korea ( N = 897) and Israel ( N = 504), and demonstrate that gaps in the perception of the external threat between competing ideological groups are related to higher levels of affective polarization within these societies. We also find support for a mechanism that explains this trend: an internal threat from the ideological outgroup. We discuss the implications of our findings for the study of conflicts' impact on intragroup processes, specifically affective polarization, and for the understanding of how such processes might perpetuate the conflict itself.

Design, Synthesis, and Biological Evaluation of Newly Synthesized Cinnamide-Fluorinated Containing Compounds as Bioactive Anticancer Agents.

A new series of cinnamide-fluorinated derivatives has been synthesized and characterized by using different spectroscopic and elemental microanalyses methods. All of the prepared p-fluorocinnamide derivatives were evaluated for their cytotoxic activity against the HepG2 liver cancerous cell line. The imidazolone derivative 6, which bears N-(N-pyrimidin-2-ylbenzenesulphamoyl) moiety, displayed antiproliferative activity against HepG2 liver cancerous cells with an IC50 value of 4.23 μM as compared to staurosporin (STU) (IC50 = 5.59 μM). In addition, compound 6 experienced epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR) inhibitory activity comparable to palatinib. The cell cycle analysis by flow cytometry indicated that compound 6 arrested the cellular cycle of HepG2 cells at the G1 phase. Additionally, as demonstrated by the fluorescence-activated cell sorting (FACS) technique, compound 6 increased both early and late apoptotic ratios compared to control untreated HepG2 cells. Moreover, imidazolone compound 6 induced apoptosis via the intrinsic apoptotic pathway by decreasing the level of mitochondrial membrane polarization (MMP) compared to untreated HepG2 cells. Therefore, the new N-(N-pyrimidin-2-ylbenzenesulphamoyl)imidazolone derivative 6 could be considered a potential platform for further optimizing an antitumor agent against hepatocellular carcinoma.

Polarized Populists: Dark Campaigns, Affective Polarization, and the Moderating Role of Populist Attitudes

We investigate the antecedents of affective polarization in the American public, and focus specifically on the driving role of exposure to darker forms of campaign communication (negativity, incivility, populist rhetoric) and the intervening role of individual populist attitudes. Experimental evidence was gathered among a sample of US respondents (MTurk, N = 1,081); respondents were randomly exposed to a campaign message from a fictive candidate framed either positively or negatively, and afterwards asked to express their attitudes towards Democrats and Republicans. Results show that exposure to harsher forms of campaign negativity (character attacks associated with political incivility and populist messages) drives affective polarization upwards when compared to exposure to positive messages. We also show both a direct and moderating effect of populist attitudes: populist individuals are more likely to “like” negative campaign messages (they find them more amusing and fairer) and report higher levels of affective polarization. Furthermore, exposure to negative messages is associated with greater affective polarization particularly among respondents high in populist attitudes.

Who cooperates with whom? The role of day-to-day partisan cooperation on affective polarization

Recent research has shown that partisan cooperation in the form of coalitional government in parliamentary democracies can mitigate partisans’ negative feelings toward opposing parties. However, little is known regarding the influence of informal cooperation beyond coalition arrangements on citizens’ affection towards the out-parties. To address this, I combine survey data from 11 Western Democracies with a measure of parties’ public relationships as reported by the media to examine the extent to which partisans’ affection towards opposing parties aligns with the changing portrayal of interactions between the parties as reported in the news. The findings demonstrate that voters’ affection towards opposing parties do indeed correspond with the actual pattern of interactions as depicted by the media. However, the reduction in the levels of affective polarization varies across individuals with different levels of political knowledge. This finding shows that affective polarization is also influenced by the short-term nature of cooperative or conflictual events beyond its policy-based or institutional underpinnings.

County-level political group density, partisan polarization, and individual-level mortality among adults in the United States: A lagged multilevel study

ObjectiveTo investigate the associations between county-level political group density, partisan polarization, and individual-level mortality from all causes and from coronary heart disease (CHD) in the United States. MethodsUsing data from five survey waves (1998–2006) of the General Social Survey-National Death Index dataset and the County Presidential Election Return 2000 dataset, we fit weighted Cox proportional hazards models to estimate the associations between (1) political group density and (2) partisan polarization measured at the county level in 2000 (n = 313 counties) categorized into quartiles with individual-level mortality (n = 14,983 participants) from all causes and CHD, controlling for individual- and county-level factors. Maximum follow-up was from one year after the survey up until 2014. We conducted these analyses using two separate measures based on county-level vote share differences and party affiliation ideological extremes. ResultsIn the overall sample, we found no evidence of associations between county-level political group density and individual-level mortality from all causes. There was evidence of a 13% higher risk of dying from heart disease in the highest quartile of county-level polarization (hazards ratio, HR = 1.13; 95% CI = 0.74–1.71). We observed heterogeneity of effects based on individual-level political affiliation. Among those identifying as Democrats, residing in counties with high (vs. low) levels of polarization appeared to be protective against mortality, with an associated 18% lower risk of dying from all causes (HR = 0.82, 95% CI = 0.71–0.94). This association was strongest in areas with the highest concentrations of Democrats. ConclusionsAmong all study participants, political group density and polarization at the county level in 2000 were not linked to individual-level mortality. At the same time, we found that Democratic party affiliation may be protective against the adverse effects of high polarization, particularly in counties with high concentrations of Democrats. Future research should further explore these associations to potentially identify new structural interventions to address political determinants of population health.

Uncommon and nonpartisan: Antidemocratic attitudes in the American public

Democratic regimes flourish only when there is broad acceptance of an extensive set of norms and values. In the United States, fundamental democratic norms have recently come under threat from prominent Republican officials. We investigate whether this antidemocratic posture has spread from the elite level to rank-and-file partisans. Exploiting data from a massive repeated cross-sectional and panel survey ([Formula: see text] = 45,095 and 5,231 respectively), we find that overwhelming majorities of the public oppose violations of democratic norms, and virtually nobody supports partisan violence. This bipartisan consensus remains unchanged over time despite high levels of affective polarization and exposure to divisive elite rhetoric during the 2022 political campaign. Additionally, we find no evidence that elected officials' practice of election denialism encourages their constituents to express antidemocratic attitudes. Overall, these results suggest that the clear and present threat to American democracy comes from unilateral actions by political elites that stand in contrast to the views of their constituents. In closing, we consider the implications of the stark disconnect between the behavior of Republican elites and the attitudes of Republican voters.

Asymmetric games on networks: Mapping to Ising models and bounded rationality

We investigate the dynamics of coordination and consensus in an agent population. Considering agents endowed with bounded rationality, we study asymmetric coordination games using a mapping to random field Ising models. In doing so, we investigate the relationship between group coordination and agent rationality. Analytical calculations and numerical simulations of the proposed model lead to novel insight into opinion dynamics. For instance, we find that bounded rationality and preference intensity can determine a series of possible scenarios with different levels of opinion polarization. To conclude, we deem our investigation opens a new avenue for studying game dynamics through methods of statistical physics.

The Personal is Political: Political Attitudes, Affective Polarization and Fertility Preferences in Hong Kong

This study examines the relationship between political attitudes, affective polarization, and fertility preferences among married couples in Hong Kong. Using dyadic data from a representative household survey (N = 1586 heterosexually married adults), we investigate how individuals’ attitudes toward democracy and levels of affective polarization are associated with their fertility preferences. We also explore the influence of spouses’ political attitudes and affective polarization on one's fertility preferences. We found that individuals with stronger support for democracy have lower fertility preferences. This negative association between political attitudes and fertility preferences is further amplified by one’s level of affective polarization. The findings of this study contribute to our understanding of how political factors shape fertility patterns in the context of dramatic political transitions. This study provides valuable insights into the complex dynamics between political attitudes, affective polarization, and family formation decisions in Hong Kong, which have both theoretical, policy and political implications.

Polarization of gender role attitudes across Europe

ABSTRACT Value polarization is one of the key factors in societal development. This research focuses on whether opinions concerning gender roles in the domestic and public spheres are polarized in European societies, a topic still under-investigated. Based on the fifth wave of European Values Study data (2017–2020), the study shows that gender role attitudes in the domestic sphere are more polarized than those in the public sphere. Polarization by education, level of income, migration background, and degree of religiosity is stronger for gender role attitudes in the domestic sphere, whereas polarization by gender is stronger for gender role attitudes in the public sphere. Both gender role attitudes in the public and domestic spheres are most strongly polarized by education. At the same time, belonging to a social group with higher education, higher income, and lower religiosity can promote more progressive views towards gender roles. Opinions in Eastern European countries tend to seem more polarized than in Western European countries, even if with some exceptions. In countries with a higher level of gender equality, the level of polarization is a bit lower, while in countries where there is a remarkable rise of anti-gender narratives, opponent and conflictual views are higher.

What explains elite affective polarization? Evidence from Canadian politicians

AbstractConcerns about affective polarization are on the rise globally, and it has been associated with negative outcomes such as diminished trust in government and discrimination against out‐partisans. While elected politicians are typically thought to be a major source of mass‐level affective polarization, and despite the policy and representation consequences of heightened partisan hostility in legislatures, existing research has focused almost exclusively on the measurement and explanation of affective polarization among citizens. As a result, we know far less about the magnitude and sources of elite affective polarization. Here, we take a step towards addressing this gap using an original survey of hundreds of Canadian local politicians, a setting uniquely situated for addressing the role of a host of individual‐level and institutional‐level predictors of affective polarization. We find that Canadian local politicians are, on average, less affectively polarized than the citizens they represent. However, levels of affective polarization among these politicians vary considerably, with higher levels of affective polarization among politicians who are ideologues, partisans, and who harbor strong progressive ambition. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for research on affective polarization and describe the need for comparative studies of affective polarization among political elites.

Cross-Platform Partisan Positioning in Congressional Speech

Legislative activity—whether votes or communications—is often represented in a single partisan or ideological dimension. But as lawmakers communicate in various venues (e.g., traditional, direct, or social media), the extent to which these estimates are interchangeable—reflecting a common underlying dimension—is unclear. We estimate a partisan dimension in members’ tweets, Facebook posts, e-newsletters, press releases, and one-minute House floor speeches for the 116th U.S. Congress and test the extent to which representations remain consistent across different venues. We find that while Democrats are consistently separable from Republicans, members’ relative intra-party positions frequently shift between venues. This is likely driven by differences in the affordances and audiences present in each venue, as venues with more nationalized audiences (such as social media) show higher levels of rhetorical polarization than venues with more local audiences (e-newsletters). These results suggest that the level of polarization we observe depends on where we look, and that the scholars of congressional communication should explicitly consider the input they use to measure partisanship.

Does Populism Fuel Affective Polarization? An Individual-Level Panel Data Analysis

Populism and affective polarization speak of a bisected society, and scholars have linked them at the party level. While the relationship between populism and affective polarization can be reciprocal, this article leverages panel data to delve into the causal relationship between populism and affective polarization. First, I posit individuals who become identified with populist parties will hold higher levels of affective polarization. Second, I expect increases in levels of populist attitudes to heighten affective polarization, and this is explained by both the increase of affect towards the ingroup and the decrease of affect towards the outgroup. Using nine waves of a panel survey, results show the importance of differentiating between measures of populism at the individual level, as the increase in populist attitudes appears to fuel affective polarization, symmetrically increasing affect towards the ingroup and decreasing affect towards the outgroup, while the effect of becoming a populist party supporter is more nuanced, as it is different for populist left and right parties.