ABSTRACT Divisive politicisation of inequalities among the member states in the EU is the lowest in member states where one would expect the highest level of domestic demand for it, and it is highest in member states in which one would expect much lower demand. In this paper, we argue that the territorially fragmented structure of political representation in the EU creates the incentives for politicians to engage in blaming the other states and adopting us-vs.-them positions in the national, as well as in the EU arena. Regulatory and monetary integration among economies at different levels of development provides fertile ground for such politicisation. Yet, the ability to engage in such politicisation while ruling a peripheral country is crucially shaped by that country’s form and level of economic dependency on the economies of the European core. The consumption-led and credit-based growth model of the South is much more exposed to crises and suddenly increasing levels of dependency, whereas the FDI-based growth models in the Eastern peripheries provide for much larger room for politicising dependency and cntesting the alleged dictate of ‘foreign powers’ and EU institutions.