FARM prices affect producers' incomes and influence production and consumption. Farm price policy has been in large measure a tug of war between the desire to use prices to improve farmers' incomes and the necessity of recognizing the allocative powers of price. This necessity is argued formally by numerous economists and, perhaps more effectively, by the realities of the market. The conflict between income objectives and resource allocation objectives has been so clear that it is common among economists to say that price may be used for either but not for both. Despite this, we as a nation continue to try to devise a price program that supports farm income and handles production and consumption problems well enough to be administratively feasible and politically acceptable. The emphasis on the incompatibility of income support and resource allocation as objectives of price policy may have diverted economists' attention from possibilities of achieving the compromise that is so widely sought. This paper investigates one such possibility. A basic assumption of the paper, believed to be generally supported by theory and research on the behavior of supply in agriculture, is that the importance of prices in allocating resources depends mainly upon their significance for marginal revenue rather than upon their relation to the absolute level of total income. That is, the inducement for a farmer to cut down on one enterprise and to substitute or expand another, or to increase or decrease total output, depends on the changes in income expected to result much more than on the level of income. This is hardly a startling conclusion, but it has been given very little recognition in actual or proposed price programs. Uusually it is assumed that if price is to be used to support farm income, the farmer must be paid a price that overvalues his marginal production. Or, the other way round, it has been assumed that if price is to guide farmers in making adjustments along the margin, then the whole of their income must be determined by the value of the marginal product. The result has been farm programs that call for support of prices at above equilibrium levels, that overvalue farmers' marginal production, and that necessitate controls on production, diversion to storage, and subsidies for expansion of markets to make them work. Moreover, it is not clear that they do work except in times of persistent inflation. An alternative program would have to be cumbersome indeed to cause more direct and indirect complications than are now before us.