Levels Of Internal Conflict Research Articles

Explaining the directionality of gang violence with court records

PurposeStudies of gang violence typically use police reports to investigate the structure of gang conflict, but overreliance on a singular data source could impede crime control efforts. Extending networked criminology, this study aims to explore what court records reveal about the directionality of gang conflicts.Design/methodology/approachControlling for the presence of a civil gang injunction (CGI), the authors use multivariate quadratic assignment procedure regression models to disentangle factors thought to account for structural patterns of gang violence mapped from 933 prosecutions involving 307 gangs associated with violent conflict affecting the City of Los Angeles (1998–2013). Specifically, the authors compare competitive advantage to the explanatory power of turf proximity.FindingsOne measure of turf proximity outperforms all other explanatory factors – gangs with turf centrally positioned in a turf adjacency matrix are significantly more likely to launch attacks, be victimized and exhibit the highest levels of imbalance in their violent involvements. Regarding competitive advantage, the number of cliques and level of internal conflict are significant. Finally, being subject to a CGI is associated with initiating violence.Originality/valueCourt cases offer a feasible alternative to police data when investigating patterns of intergroup street gang violence.

Internal conflict, market uniformity, and transparency in price competition between teams

The way profits are divided within successful teams imposes different degrees of internal conflict. We experimentally examine how the level of internal conflict, and whether such conflict is transparent to other teams, affects teams' ability to compete vis-à-vis each other, and, consequently, market outcomes. Participants took part in a repeated Bertrand duopoly game between three-player teams which had either the same or different levels of internal conflict (uniform vs. mixed). Profit division was either private-pay (high conflict; each member received her own asking price) or equal-pay (low conflict; profits were divided equally). We find that internal conflict leads to (tacit) coordination on high prices in uniform private-pay duopolies, but places private-pay teams at a competitive disadvantage in mixed duopolies. Competition is softened by transparency in uniform markets, but intensified in mixed markets. We propose an explanation of the results and discuss implications for managers and policy makers. (D43, L22, C92)

Internal Conflict, Market Uniformity, and Transparency in Price Competition between Teams

The way profits are divided within successful teams imposes different degrees of internal conflict. We experimentally examine how the level of internal conflict, and whether such conflict is transparent to other teams, affects teams' ability to compete vis-a-vis each other, and, consequently, market outcomes. Participants took part in a repeated Bertrand duopoly game between three-player teams which had either the same or different level of internal conflict (uniform vs. mixed). Profit division was either private-pay (high conflict; each member received her own asking price) or equal-pay (low conflict; profits were divided equally). We find that internal conflict leads to (tacit) coordination on high prices in uniform private-pay duopolies, but places private-pay teams at a competitive disadvantage in mixed duopolies. Competition is softened by transparency in uniform markets, but intensified in mixed markets. We propose an explanation of the results and discuss implications for managers and policy makers.

Joint ventures between US MNCs and foreign governments

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to determine the initial stock price reaction and long‐run returns for joint venture announcements between US MNCs and foreign governments as well as the firm characteristics and political risk factors of the foreign governments that affect the abnormal returns. In addition we determine changes in total and systematic risk following the joint venture.Design/methodology/approachAnnouncement abnormal returns are calculated using event study cumulative abnormal returns. Long‐run returns use a buy and hold methodology. Cross section regressions are performed on both the announcement and long run returns.FindingsAnnouncement abnormal returns are a positive 0.37 percent; however, the long‐run returns are a significant −3.99 percent the end of the first year. Both short‐run and long‐run returns are higher when the level of internal conflict is low, and surprisingly when the level of corruption is high. Also, surprisingly, short‐run returns are higher when ethnic violence is higher, but, as expected, long‐run returns are higher when there is higher democratic stability.Research limitations/implicationsOne implication is that when US managers are confronted by foreign government corruption, there may be a conflict between the success of the project and the ethical/legal requirements of the company.Originality/valueThe paper focuses on joint ventures with foreign governments rather than the usual foreign companies. Also, unlike previous papers that have used only one measure of political risk, this paper uses five of the PRS categories of political risk.

The Conflict Interactions of the People's Republic of China, 1950-1970

China scholars believe that increases in the levels of internal conflict have historically led the Chinese to seek foreign policies conflict. Until now, this generalization has not been empirically challenged. Data were collected on nine measures of domestic conflict and twelve measures of foreign conflict, over a 21-year period, 1950-1970. The results were mixed. While the principal finding of a moderate relationship did lend some support to the historical generalizations relating foreign and domestic conflict in the People's Republic of China, a second finding-foreign conflict predicted better to domestic conflict-was contrary to our hypothesized expectations. Thus, on the basis of the tentative findings, we would be justified in reformulating the traditional conflict model and proposing that the key toward understanding the relationship between foreign and domestic conflict in the PRC is not only its domestic conflict, but also the foreign conflict initiated by or directed toward the Chinese.