Leibniz's Views Research Articles

Why Simples?

analysis of the composition of bodies and arrive, in different ways, at the conclusion that there must be incorporeal simple substances everywhere in matter. I argued that it is the extension of the principles of unity argument that constitutes the actual basis for Leibniz's doctrine of the simplicity of substance, in that it is both what leads Leibniz to the doctrine and what justifies the doctrine within his metaphysics. In his new article, Donald Rutherford offers a third, quite different possibility. 2 He proposes that the theory of monads as simple substances owes most of to Leibniz's views about soul-body union and pre-established harmony. Like my own account, Rutherford's is developmental. He sees Leibniz as moving away from a theory that includes composite corporeal substances and to a theory of monads alone in order to resolve a basic tension between the idea that the soul and body together form a and the idea that their union consists in nothing more than harmony. Harmony is not sufficient for the true or per se unity required for substances, and once this is taken fully into account a choice has to be made between irreconcilable elements in Leibniz's thought. Leibniz's choice, as Rutherford sees it, is to jettison a commitment to composite, corporeal substances as per se unities: there will be only the monads. In contrast to the more narrowly focused arguments for simples addressed in Levey 2007, Rutherford stresses the holistic character of the support offered to a theory of monads on his reading. An ontology of monads is justified not primarily by a targeted proof of the existence of simple substances as such but by its being the ontology that fits best with the greater constellation of Leibniz's philosophical and theological commitments. Even more sharply in contrast to my account is Rutherford's claim that all along Leibniz recognizes the soul as a substance—and necessarily, given its immateriality, a simple substance (215). Thus the changes in Leibniz's position concerning the ontology of do not involve adopting a new category of being so much as abandoning an old one.

God's problem of multiple choice

A question that has been largely overlooked by philosophers of religion is how God would be able to effect a rational choice between two worlds of unsurpassable goodness. To answer this question, I draw a parallel with the paradigm cases of indifferent choice, including Buridan's ass, and argue that such cases can be satisfactorily resolved provided that the protagonists employ what Otto Neurath calls an ‘auxiliary motive’. I supply rational grounds for the employment of such a motive, and then argue against the views of Leibniz and Nicholas Rescher to show that this solution would also work for God.

Was Leibniz Confused about Confusion?

Leibniz's physicalism about colors and other sensible qualities commits him to two theses about our knowledge of those qualities: first, that we can acquire ideas of sensible qualities apart from any direct acquaintance with qualities themselves; second, that we can acquire distinct (i.e., non-confused) ideas of such qualities through development of physical-theoretical accounts. According to some commentators, however, Leibniz frequently denies both claims. His views on subject are muddled and incoherent, they say, both because he is ambivalent about nature of sensible qualities, and because he gets confused about confusion, losing sight of his own distinction between confusion proper to perceptions and that proper to ideas. In opposition to this, I argue that critics have misunderstood Leibniz's views, which are both consistent over time and coherent. The key to understanding his position is to appreciate what he characterizes as a kind of redundancy in our ideas of sensible qualities, a crucial feature of his view overlooked by critics. 1. Two Inconsistencies I n his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume identifies as of modern philosophy the opinion concerning colors, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold; which it asserts to be nothing but impressions in mind, derived from operation of external objects, and without any resemblance to qualities of objects (I, iv, §4). This opinion, or something very like it, can be found explicitly in writings of such early modern luminaries as Descartes, Boyle, Locke, and many others.! It is therefore testimony to distinctiveness ofLeibniz's thought that he rejects this fundamental principle in its entirety. In first place, he insists that our sensations (and ideas) of sensible qualities do resemble qualities of external objects. Reviewing Franc;ois Lamy's De La Connoissance de Soi-meme, he explains: I do not agree with opinion accepted by many today, and followed by our author, that there is no resemblance or relation between our sensations and

Leibniz on Estimating the Uncertain

Leibniz's De incerti aestimatione, which contains his solution to the divi­ sion problem, has not received much attention, let alone much appreciation. This is surprising because it is in this work that the definition of probability in terms of equally possible cases appears for the first time. The division prob­ lem is used to establish and test probability theory; it can be stated as follows: if two players agree to playa game in which one has to win a certain number of rounds in order to win the pool, but if they break the game off before ei­ ther of them has won the required number of rounds, how should the pool be distributed? Our article has two aims: it provides the readers with the first published English translation of De incerti aestimatione, and it also gives them a brief commentary that explains Leibniz's philosophical and mathematical concepts necessary in order to understand this work. The translation is as literal as possible throughout; it shows how Leibniz struggled at times to find a solu­ tion to the division problem and how he approached it from different angles. The commentary discusses Leibniz's views on four key concepts: fairness, hope, authority and possibility. The commentary then outlines how Leibniz attempted to solve the problem of division.

Leibniz's non-tensed theory of time

Leibniz's philosophy of time, often seen as a precursor to current forms of relationalism and causal theories of time, has rightly earned the admiration of his more recent counterparts in the philosophy of science. In this article, I examine Leibniz's philosophy of time from a new perspective: the role that tense and non-tensed temporal properties/relations play in it. Specifically, I argue that Leibniz's philosophy of time is best (and non-anachronistically) construed as a non-tensed theory of time, one that dispenses with tensed temporal properties such as past, present, and future. In arguing for this thesis, I focus on the three facets of Leibniz's philosophy most relevant for evaluating his commitment to a B-theory of time: (1) the nature of change, (2) the reality of the future, and (3) the truth-conditions for tensed temporal statements. Despite prima facie evidence to the contrary, I show that a close examination of Leibniz's views on these topics provides compelling evidence for interpreting his philosophy of time as a B-theory of time.

Two caricatures, II: Leibniz's best world

Leibniz's best-of-all-possible worlds solution to the problem of evil is defended. Enlightenment misrepresentations are removed. The apparent obviousness of the possib- ility of better worlds is undermined by the much better understanding achieved in modern mathematical sciences of how global structure constrains local possibilities. It is argued that alternative views, especially standard materialism, fail to make sense of the problem of evil, by implying that evil does not matter, absolutely speaking. Finally, it is shown how ordinary religious thinking incorporates the essentials of Leibniz's view. When Leibniz maintained that the solution to the problem of evil was that this was the Best of All Possible Worlds, the almost universal reaction was that his theory combined the lack of rationality exhibited by Pascal's Wager with a repulsive failure of compassion possible only in an unfeeling Enlight- enment mathematician. It was argued in an earlier article 1 that Pascal's Wager had been widely caricatured, that it had merit, and that it was a central part of thinking about faith. The present article argues that the same is true of Leibniz's best-world theory. Where Pascal's argument motivates the first step in the journey to faith, Leibniz's argument comes into play at the last. We should imagine the seeker having examined the claims of religion with a suitable combination of sympathy and scepticism, and found them of some force. Perhaps he has found the traditional arguments for the existence of God satisfying (assuming they have been cleared of the barnacles of travesty, accreted over the centuries through the untiring efforts of the Enlightened). Or some particular religion has seemed a sound candidate for an argument to the best explanation, being a coherent explanation of all facts (including moral ones) superior to alterna- tives. Or perhaps the logical tension has just become too great between a materialistic view of the world which implies that humans do not matter, and moral statements, which imply they do. Or maybe God's grace has acted directly in the manner Pascal promised. The last hurdle is then the problem of evil. Leibniz's Theodicy offers a simple solution to the problem of evil: that this is the best of all possible worlds.

Leibniz on Knowledge and God

Scholars have long noted that, for Leibniz, the attributes or Ideas of are the ultimate objects of human knowledge. In this paper, I go beyond these discussions to analyze Leibniz's views about the nature and limitations of such knowledge. As with so many other aspects of his thought, Leibniz's position on this issue—what I will call his divine epistemology—is both radi- cal and conservative. It is also not what we might expect, given other tenets of his system. For Leibniz, God is the easiest and the hardest being to know. is the easiest to know, in that to grasp some property of an essence is to attain a of the divine essence, but is also the most difficult to know, in that knowledge of the divine essence is not available to finite beings. There is an enormous gap between the easy and the real of God, but for Leibniz, this gap is a good thing, since the very slowness of our epistemological journey prepares us morally for its end.

A Note on Leibniz's Supposed Flirtation with Occasionalism in the 1669 Letter to Thomasius

In his article Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy, Daniel Garber asserts that the early Leibniz was mechanist and believed that only God has the ability to move by continually recreating them in different places..... Garber believes that these views, which Leibniz explicitly holds in the 1669 letter to Thomasius, support his claim that Leibniz accepted version of occasionalism in that letter. Garber's case is strong one, for the letter to Thomas ius develops ideas that are quite suggest ive of occasionalism. Nonetheless, this paper argues that Leibniz does not hold an occasionalistic notion of causation in the 1669 letter to Thomasius. Garber mistakenly ascribes occasionalism to the early Leibniz because he interprets Leibniz's views within Cartesian framework. Only by understanding how Leibniz's Aristotelian concept of substance in the 1669 letter to Thomasius leads to metaphysics quite distinct from Cartesianism 3 will it be clear why the ideas developed in that letter do not amount to occasionalism. Leibniz makes at least four claims in the letter to Thomasius that are remarkably similar to claims made by Descartes. First, Leibniz accepts the signature feature of mechanical philosophy that only magnitude, figure, and motion are to be used in explaining corporeal properties . Second, Leibniz rejects the scholastic notion of substantial forms in which a kind of immaterial being, though insensible in bodies...spontaneously imparts motion to body...without the help of an external thing . Third, matter cannot cause motion in itself, nor can motion arise out of matter spontaneously (i.e., without an external cause). Leibniz argues that because we can assume nothing in which does not follow from the definition of extension and antitypy [the attributes of matter,]...there is no motion, strictly speaking, as real entity in bodies . Finally, motion is explained by God's constantly creating things ex nihilo .

Leibniz on the unicorn and various other curiosities.

I discuss some of Leibniz's pronouncements about fringe phenomena--various monsters; talking dogs; genies and prophets; unicorns, glossopetrae, and other games of nature--in order to understand better Leibniz's views on science and the role these curiosities play in his plans for scientific academies and societies. However, given that Leibniz's sincerity has been called into question in twentieth-century secondary literature, I begin with a few historiographical remarks so as to situate these pronouncements within the Leibnizian corpus. What emerges is an image of Leibniz as a sober, cautious interpreter, a skeptic one might say but one who is prepared to concede the possibility of many strange phenomena. Leibniz expects these fringe phenomena to take their place among the natural curiosities catalogued as part of a hoped for empirical database intended as means toward the perfection of the sciences.

Immanuel Kant among the Tenejapans: Anthropology as Empirical Philosophy

The great 18th-century philosopher Immanuel Kant held a complex sequence of views about the fundamental nature of space. At first he seems to have hoped to reconcile Newton's views about space as an 'absolute' (a sort of 'ethereal stuff), independent of and prior to any of the objects in it, with Leibniz's celebrated 'relativist' view of space where space is nothing but the system of relations between things (or rather 'monads'). Twenty years later in 1768 he published a pamphlet (Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume, On the First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space) that seemed to establish the Newtonian view and to force the rejection of Leibniz's views; it is the ideas sketched there that are the focus of this article. Later, though, he came to reject the Newtonian view as well, claiming that space is neither a set of relations between things nor an 'ethereal stuff, but a subjec-

Space and Relativity in Newton and Leibniz

In this paper I challenge the usual interpretations of Newton's and Leibniz's views on the nature of space and the relativity of motion. Newton's ‘relative space’ is not a reference frame; and Leibniz did not regard space as defined with respect to actual enduring bodies. Newton did not subscribe to the relativity of intertial motions; whereas Leibniz believed no body to be at rest, and Newton's absolute motion to be a useful fiction. A more accurate rendering of the opposition between them, I argue, leads to a wholly different understanding of Leibniz's theory of space, one which is not susceptible to the objections Newton had raised against Descartes regarding the representation of motion. This in turn suggests a new approach for contemporary theory of space, one which neither hypostatizes space nor tries to reduce it to relations among actual things.

David Hume's Theory of Mind (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 141 apperception, consciousness, and reflective knowledge amount to the same thing. Both these authors, Kulstad claims, fail to take into consideration, among other things, that the apperception of external things cannot be self-consciousness (145-49)The final chapter ("Apperception in the Principles of Nature and of Grace') provides an interesting discussion of Leibniz's wavering on the topic of animal apperception in the various drafts of that work (x56-66). The chapter ends with an attempt to explore the reasons behind Leibniz's vacillations. Kulstad points out how Leibniz is torn between two conflicting intuitions. On the one hand, throughout his maturity he holds, contra Descartes, that animals do feel pain and pleasure and are in fact conscious. On the other, he wants to safeguard the gap between beasts and humans in order to deny personhood to the former. But, for him, consciousness involves at least simple reflection and, Kulstad claims, the step from simple reflection to full-blown focused reflection , which involves personhood, seems rather small, a mere matter of narrowing of focus. The result is that Leibniz does not quite know what to do and wavers between attributing apperception to animals, as in the New Essays,and denying it to them, as in the Principles of Nature and of Grace. Kulstad's discussion throughout the book is well-documented and generally persuasive . There are, however, some aspects of Leibniz's views on reflection which are important and which Kulstad could, and in my opinion should, clarify. For example, in the New Essays, II, ~7, 13, Leibniz claims that "the consciousness or reflection which accompanies inner activity cannot naturally deceive us." Here we have an epistemological claim which is intrinsically interesting and which presumably Leibniz believes to have significant metaphysical relevance as well, occurring as it does in the midst of his complex discussion of personal identity.' One would expect Kulstad to address such a topic or at least provide some reason for not addressing it. Kulstad's book is clearly written and a few typographical errors, e.g., on page 164, do not mar the good quality of the printing. The book's rather steep price is partially justified by its sturdy binding and good quality paper. In sum, this is a valuable book which will make a significant addition to the library of any Leibniz scholar. Ezlo VAILATI Southern Illinois University,Edwardsville Daniel E. Flage. David Hume's Theory of Mind. New York: Routledge, 199o. Pp. ix + 197. Cloth $65.oo. This book sets out to solve one of the puzzles which have been so much a part of Hume scholarship, viz., What is the conflict that leads Hume to lament the failure of his theory of mind in his famous confession in the Appendix of the Treatise? On Flage's stated view, in fact, "the first book of the Treatiseis an attempt to establish that the mind For an initial analysis of Leibniz's claim and some Leibnizian arguments for it, see my "Leibniz on Reflection and Its Natural Veridicality," JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy25 (1987): 247-6~. 142 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 31:1 JANUARY i993 'is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity '" (~). As someone who has tried to construct a way out of Hume's "labyrinth," I was intrigued by a book offering this as its focal point. But Flage's claim is to some extent disingenuous. His attention to the "bundle" theory of mind is roughly proportional to the attention that Hume gave to it. Like Hume, he succeeds in clarifying many things without reference to this theory. There are insights about Hume's method, and about Hume's views on abstraction, substance, dualism, necessary connection, force, and vivacity. There is an account of Hume's "relative ideas" which is utilized to make sense of the discovery of a missing shade of blue and the possibility of the concept of an external world of objects. Few of these are dependent in any obvious way upon the bundle theory. DoxasticPathology: It is one of the virtues of Flage's work that...

Leibniz's Phenomenalisms

ocke's Essay is like a mail-order catalogue, writes P. T. Geach, you buy what suits you. To switch to a communicationtheory metaphor, the trouble is to make out which part is message and which is noise.' Something similar might be said of the Leibnizian corpus. It is large and diverse and rich-so rich that there are within it tensions or outright contradictions. These force the commentator to choose which items to purchase and which to let well alone. Message and noise are alarmingly often set side by side in texts from the same or closely neighboring periods of time, in different drafts of the same essay, and sometimes in the very same draft. When one turns to Leibniz's views of matter, one is confronted with an astonishing collection of distinct accounts. One must adopt either (i) the so-called Athenian approach, drumming out all of the incompatibility and presenting a single overarching inclusive account, or else (ii) the Darwinian strategy, saying his views of

Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence (review)

494 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:3 jULY 199a man. Only a few can do this sort of work, and because of their concerns, they are generous, and no threat to a sovereign. This Hobbesian conclusion, according to Herbert, anticipates our current situation in which political power and moral authority rest in modern technological sciences rather than in political institutions. Today we can see the dangers in this outcome, as well as its antecedents and benefits. Of course Hobbes could not have foreseen our situation, but it is enough of a claim for this study, Herbert concludes, if it "reintegrates Hobbes into the philosophical, scientific and political history of his own time," as a systematic philosopher in the great tradition of that noble endeavor. There is much here to chew, reread, and discuss. One might question Prof. Herbert 's interpretation of what Hobbes meant by "imitate the creation," or his notion of "opposition" in characterizing conatus to the exclusion of Hobbes's concepts of act, cause, and power--and perhaps other issues as well. What needs to be emphasized, however, is that he has given us a careful reading of virtually all of Hobbes's philosophical works, a fair consideration of the secondary literature, and an overall account of Hobbes's system, emphasizing the unifying threads. Readers interested in either the particulars or the whole of Hobbes's work will benefit by study and discussion of this much-needed and often eloquent work. CRAIG WALTON University of Nevada, Las Vegas R. C. Sleigh, jr. Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence. New Haven: Yale University Press, t99o. Pp. xv + 237. Cloth, $~8.5o. The exchange of letters between Leibniz and Antoine Arnauld in 1686-87 is one of the great intellectual events of the seventeenth century. In the correspondence we find two of the most brilliant minds of the period discussing pressing philosophical and theological issues, such as freedom, providence, causation, substance, and miracles. Thus it is somewhat surprising that until now there has been no extended and detailed treatment of the correspondence itself (although it certainly surfaces in more general discussions of Leibniz's philosophy). Sleigh's book, then, is a welcome and longoverdue addition to the literature on Leibniz and on early modern philosophy. His main concern is with an analysis of the letters constituting the correspondence--which was initiated by Leibniz's soliciting Arnauld's comments on a summary of the Discourse on Metaphysics--insofar as they may clarify doctrines held by Leibniz at the time. But Sleigh approaches the correspondence in the context of, and thus also illuminates, both Leibniz's broader system(s) (the correspondence plays a crucial role in the development of Leibniz's later metaphysics) and the philosophical and theological climate (including Cartesianism, occasionalism, Scholasticism, Jansenism, etc.). Two introductory chapters provide some background for understanding the correspondence , particularly regarding Leibniz's ecumenical project of reconciling the Catholic and Protestant churches. To this end, he sought from Arnauld, a Catholic theologian, confirmation that Leibniz's views on certain fundamental but disputed BOOK REVIEWS 495 questions wcrc not heretical from the Catholic point of view. Unfortunately, Arnauld was not so obliging, and immediately accused Lcibniz of undermining God's freedom and providence. In Chapter 4, Sleigh examines Arnauld's objections and then defends Lcibniz against the charge of heresy. The question, in brief, is whether Leibniz's conception of an individual substance is inconsistent with God's freedom. This turns on the issue of whether or not Leibniz's acceptance of"superintrinsicalness"--the view that all of an individual's properties are intrinsic--commits him as well to "superesscntialism ," or the view that for every property of an individual, it is metaphysically impossible for that individual to exist and yet lack that property (or, in other words, that every property of an individual is a metaphysically necessary property). Arnauld reasons that if Lcibniz holds the former doctrine, then he also holds thc latter. Hence, whatever properties an individual has it has necessarily--and this claim, for Arnauld, implies that if God creates that individual then God is not free with respect to the properties possessed by it or the consequences that follow...

Reasoning and computation in leibniz

Leibniz's overall view of the relationship between reasoning and computation is discussed on the basis of two broad claims that one finds in his writings, concerning respectively the nature of huma...

Cum Deus calculat — God's evaluation of possible worlds and logical calculus

"Cum Deus calculat et cogitationem exercet, fit mundus." This sentence, added in the margin of the short Dialogus dated 1677, 2 has long been one of the most debated passages of Leibniz's works. Undoubtedly the fact that Louis Couturat chose a shortened form of it ("Cum Deus calculat . . . fit mundus") as the opening motto for his fundamental text on Leibniz's logic 3 contributed to this. Ever since then, Leibniz's sentence has often been referred to and variously interpreted, both in support of and in opposition to the 'logicist' interpretation of the Leibnizian philosophical system, depending on whether the stress is placed on 'calculare' or 'cogitationem exercere'. The following pages are a brief discussion of some aspects of the Leibnizian conception of God's evaluation of possible worlds. The first part will consider the definition of perfection, as applied to possible worlds, the second part will investigate the possibility of using some texts on logical calculus to improve our understanding of the nature and functioning of God's calculus. Though some aspects of Couturat's interpretation are taken up, it is not the aim of this paper to repropose the opposition between 'logicist' and 'antilogicist' readings of Leibnizian philosophy. This opposition seems now to have become superceded in the critical debate. The possibility of approaching Leibniz's thought from different angles and perspectives is a direct consequence of the very articulation of this thought, and one of its major merits. We shall take as our starting point for this study some fundamental theses that, in our opinion, seem to stem directly from Leibniz's views on God's calculus, and we shall make a preliminary mention of them below. (1) First and foremost, the term 'calculus', as used by Leibniz, is to be understood in its strong sense. The subsequent reference to God's 'cogitare' is not to be seen as casting doubts on this: Leibniz often uses 'calculare' and 'cogitare' or 'ratiocinare' as synonyms, 4 he approvingly cites Hobbes' idea of thought as a form of calculus, s and clearly shows that he considers the direct relation between calculating and reasoning to be the basis for the construction of highly 'technical' systems of logical calculus. 6 (2) Moreover, Leibniz furnishes elements that, as well as being further proof of the 'strong' interpretation of God's calculus, also outline its specific nature: a calculus of maximization.

Leibnizian Relationalism and the Problem of Inertia

I consider the contrast between Leibniz's relational concept of spacetime and Einstein's special and general theories of relativity. I suggest that there are two interpretations of Leibniz's view, which I call L1 and L2. L1 amounts to saying that there is no real inertial structure to spacetime, whereas in general relativity the inertial structure is dynamical or real in Lande's sense (see Popper, 46); i.e., it can be ‘kicked’ and ‘kicks back,’ causing gravitational effects. If there is no real inertial structure to space-time then, as Weyl points out (Weyl, 105), the concept of the relative motive of several bodies has no more foundation than the concept of absolute motion for a single body. Thus, L1 seems to be untenable. L2 is a more sophisticated view which rejects the geometrical aspect of Newtonian space-time as a container for events, but accepts the existence of a real structure which determines the inertial properties of matter.

A GENERAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF SPATIAL SYSTEMS;I. The Relational Representation of Measurable Attributes

In this, the First part of a two part work, a general model of spatial organization is introduced. Following a brief synopsis of some of Spinoza's and Leibniz's views regarding natural structure, an extension of the Spinozian model is presented in which the attribute spatial extension is portrayed as a relational system that implicitly underlies the differentiation of sensible space into “modifications” (“natural systems”) and the latter's subdifferentiation into “modes” On the basis of this model, all instances of modal differentiation are understood to take place in a manner explained by this relational structure, the existence (but not the specific characteristics) of which is initially assumed. The nature of the structure is then deduced according to a “most-probable-state” kind of logic; next, it is demonstrated via simulation that the resulting aspatial model of internal relations has a corresponding spatial interpretation (and therefore, in theory, that sensible space structures can be supported by...

Leibniz and Locke: A Study of the New Essays on Human Understanding.

This is the first modern interpretation of Leibniz's comprehensive critique of Locke, the New Essays on Human Understanding. Arguing that the New Essays is controlled by the overriding purpose of refuting Locke's alleged materialism, Jolley establishes the metaphysical and theological motivation of the work on the basis of unpublished correspondence and manuscript material. He also shows the relevance of Leibniz's views to contemporary debates over innate ideas, personal identity, and natural kinds.

Voltaire, Hume, and the Problem of Evil

Peter Kivy VOLTAIRE, HUME, AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL Voltaire's Candide is subtitled Optimism. It is about an impossibly naive young man who suffers incredible misfortune, while counselled by his teacher, Pangloss, to perceive the hidden benefits that this merely "apparent" misfortune and misery produce. Pangloss' speeches in this regard are well-larded with phrases and terms coined or made famous by Leibniz, and, so as not to leave the connection merely hinted at, the name of the philosopher himself is also invoked, as for example, where Voltaire has Pangloss say: "I still hold my original views, for I am still a philosopher. It would not be proper for me to recant, especially as Leibniz cannot be wrong; and besides, the pre-established harmony, together with the plenum and the materia subtilis, is the most beautiful thing in the world." Pangloss' various "explanations" and "arguments" are, of course, laughable and absurd. They are, on that account, the very soul of the book. And on that account, too, they, and the book, have been taken to be a devastating reductio ad absurdum of the Leibnizian optimism alluded to in the subtitle. One of the literary values of Candide, then, is supposed to be a philosophical one: its "refutation" of Leibniz; and it is to some considerable degree, at least, because of this philosophical value that Candide has maintained its reputation as a "classic" of modern European literature. This traditional "textbook" view of Candide might be thought of as a conjunction of the following assertions: (1)Voltaire intended to "refute" Leibnizian optimism in Candide. (2)Pangloss faithfully represents Leibniz's position. (3)The combination of Candide's misadventures and Pangloss' laughable "arguments" constitutes a successful reductio ad absurdum of Leibniz's view. (4)The author's intention is realized. (5)The philosophical success of Candide is one, if not the chief, reason for placing a high value on the work. 211 212Philosophy and Literature But, clearly, nothing that happens or is said in the book succeeds in logically "refuting" the Leibnizian. So if Voltaire really did intend to "refute" Leibniz, he failed in his intention. Therefore, whatever its virtues, Candide is bad philosophy, and cannot be justly admired for any philosophical merit. In some crucial way, then, the "textbook" view of Candide must be defective. In what way (or ways)? Erich Auerbach writes in Mimesis that "The novel Candide contains a polemic attack upon the metaphysical optimism of Leibniz' idea of the best of all possible worlds," and adds: ". . . Voltaire in no way does justice to Leibniz' argument and in general to the idea of a metaphysical harmony of the universe, especially since so entertaining a piece as Voltaire's novel finds many more readers than the difficult essays of his philosophical opponents, which cannot be understood without serious study." Two possible views are suggested by Auerbach's remarks. The first, what might be called a "frontal attack," can be summarized as follows: (1)Voltaire intended to "refute" Leibnizian optimism in Candide. (2)Pangloss faithfully represents Leibniz's position. (3a) The combination of Candide's misadventures and Pangloss' laughable "arguments" does not constitute a successful reductio ad absurdum of Leibniz's view. (4a) The author's intention is not realized. (5a) The work is a philosophical failure, and, on that account, the philosophical content of Candide cannot be a reason for placing a high value on the work. But a second view is also suggested, charging Voltaire not only with bad arguments but with serious misrepresentation of Leibnizian optimism . This "two-pronged" attack might go something like this: (1) Voltaire intended to "refute" Leibnizian optimism in Candide. (2a) Pangloss does not faithfully represent Leibniz's position. (3b) The combination of Candide's misadventures and Pangloss' laughable "arguments" constitutes a successful reductio ad absurdum of Pangloss' weak form of optimism, but not Leibniz's stronger and more sophisticated one. (4a) The author's intention is not realized. (5b) The philosophical success of Candide is a rather limited, trivial one, and cannot, on that account, be a reason for placing a very high value on the work. The second of these attacks suggests a riposte: that Voltaire really had no intention of "refuting...