Sense Of Legitimacy Research Articles

On Accepting First Principles

My purpose in this essay is to examine the authority of first principles. The first principles I shall discuss may not have the full stature, the all-around primacy usually associated with this term. Indeed some of them would be taken by many to belong to a much lower order, if they are accepted as 'principles' at all. But principles they are, I shall argue, and, in a legitimate sense, 'first.' It is clear that a first principle does not gain its authority by having been derived from premises for the simple reason that, if it did, they and not it would be 'first.' On the other hand, a first principle must have authority. It is as rational beings that we accept them; it is reasonable to accept them. But what kind of reasonableness might first principles have? And how can they be shown to have it? Now the idea of showing or establishing that it is reasonable to accept a first principle suggests that there is such a thing as reasoning of the following kind

The Rule of the Clerics in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Direct rule by Islamic clerics in Iran is an important new phenomenon in Middle Eastern politics. The legitimacy of clerical rule is based on an ideology developed from Shiite thought by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his neofundamentalist followers. This ideology is embodied in the Iranian Constitution, which institutionalizes rule by Islamic clerics. Their sense of legitimacy has been reinforced by Khomeini's commitment to maintaining clerical rule, by his claim to leadership on the basis of a divine calling, and by a monopolization of the interpretation of the sacred law. The principal themes of clerical rule include grandiosity, an insistence on unity, ascription of hostile motives to the actions of other states, a preference for military solutions to political problems, and a belief in ultimate victory. Replication of the Iranian pattern of clerical rule elsewhere in the Middle East will be problematic without the emergence of a figure like Khomeini or the assistance of Iran.

LEADERSHIP TRAINING IN ELITE AMERICAN BOARDING SCHOOLS: RECONCILING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT IS TAUGHT AND WHAT IS LEARNED

Power without authority is fragile; to be effective, leaders must appear to deserve their positions. This sense of legitimacy is the most important end product of going through Prep school. This sense of legitimacy is magnified by the sense of collective identity that Prep schools generate among their students, and much of the bonding process essential to upper‐class solidarity begins in this institution. This is the social glove that holds together the privileged classes, often at the expense of individuality but to the long‐term gain of upper‐class hegemony.

Strawson, Hume, and the Unity of Consciousness

a substantive question. In arguing for his conclusion that states of consciousness are, in the first instance, to be ascribed to persons, who are both mental and physical, Strawson first claims that states of consciousness must be ascribed to something and then asserts that they cannot be ascribed to Cartesian egos. The premiss that states of consciousness must be ascribed to something is established by consideration of what Strawson calls the 'no-ownership' theory of the self. He tentatively ascribes this doctrine to Schlick. The no-ownership theorist points to the special role a particular body plays in our experience. I feel pain only when my body is injured and see things only when the eyes of my body are open. Now it is a contingent fact that one particular body has this special role; I could feel pain when another body is injured or see when another body's eyes are open. Suppose that I feel pain when another body is hurt, then does it mean that I feel someone else's pain as well as my own? Normally we would say that I do not feel someone else's pain, since it is a necessary truth that I only feel my pains. The no-ownership theorist denies that there is a legitimate sense in which I own my pains apart from the contingent fact that my pains are dependent on my body. The contingent fact that all my experiences are causally dependent on one body is confused with the supposedly necessary truth that the ego owns all my experiences, according to the no-ownership theorist. Things, it is argued, can only be owned if they can be transferred from one owner to another. Since the ego is only posited as the owner, in the non-transferable sense, of experiences, and since experiences are not owned in this sense, since there is no such sense of 'own', we must reject the idea that there is any ego owning experiences. Experiences are not owned; they are merely dependent upon bodies. There is no owner of experiences. Strawson points out that this no-ownership theory is incoherent. The fact, which the no-ownership theorist believes leads to the illegitimate positing of the ego, namely that all my experiences are dependent on body B, relies upon the sense of ownership which the no-ownership theorist rejects.

Attitudes De Dicto and De Se

If I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat. If I heard such a patter in another house, I might expect a cat but no particular cat. What I expect then seems to be a Meinongian incomplete cat. I expect winter, expect stormy weather, expect to shovel snow, expect fatigue-a season, a phenomenon, an activity, a state. I expect that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. This time what I expect is a state of affairs. If we let surface grammar be our guide, the objects of expectation seem quite a miscellany. The same goes for belief, since expectation is one kind of belief. The same goes for desire: I could want Bruce, want a cat but no particular cat, want winter, want stormy weather, want to shovel snow, want fatigue, or want that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. The same goes for other attitudes to the extent that they consist partly of beliefs or desires or lacks thereof. But the seeming diversity of objects might be an illusion. Perhaps the objects of attitudes are uniform in category, and it is our ways of speaking elliptically about these uniform objects that are diverse. That indeed is our consensus. We mostly think that the attitudes uniformly have propositions as their objects. That is why we speak habitually of attitudes. When I hear a patter and expect Bruce, for instance, there may or may not be some legitimate sense in which Bruce the cat is an object of my attitude. But, be that as it may, according to received opinion my expectation has a propositional object. It is directed upon a proposition to the effect that Bruce is about to turn up. If instead I expect a cat but no particular cat, then the object of my expectation is a different proposition to the effect that some cat or other is about to turn up. Likewise for our other examples. The case of expecting a cat shows one advantage of our policy of uniformly assigning propositional objects. If we do not need a Meinongian incomplete cat as object of this attitude, then

Dilemmas Confronting Christianity in India

IN THIS article I am using the term dilemma, not in the more formal logical sense, but in the equally legitimate sense of a difficult choice or problem. Perhaps it would be more clear to state the subject as Some Problems Confronting Christianity in India, for the church in India at the present time is faced with an unusually large number of perplexing situations. First of all, there is the relationship between church and mission. For many years missions have been talking about devolution-the placing of more responsibility upon the shoulders of the Indian church. But just what is to be devolved? As missions are set up at present, they are operating churches, schools, social service institutions, hospitals, farms, and even industrial establishments. Now it is obvious that the Indian

The Valveless Balloon Voyage

When the astronomers next announce an exceptionally brilliant display of the Leonids, for the sake of the balloonists who make elaborate and costly preparations, it is to be hoped they will be more accurate in their calculations. The spectacle of seven shooting stars is in itself scarcely worth such a risk to life and limb as the Eev. J. M. Bacon experienced in his ascent in search of the meteors. But the scientific observer gains fresh experience from every journey he makes into the upper strata of the atmosphere, and probably Mr. Bacon has accumulated a sufficient number of facts to repay him for the suspense and discomfort endured. The ascent was made under exceptional circumstances. Mr. Bacon, his courageous daughter, and Mr. Stanley Spencer, entrusted themselves to a valveless balloon; for if we accept the term valve in its legitimate sense, the arrangement provided for ripping open the top of the balloon and letting the gas out once and for all cannot be called a valve.

“A New Sect of Hero-Worshippers”

“A New Sect of Hero-Worshippers”