Legislature Size Research Articles

Senedd Reform: From Aspiration to Cold‐Headed Reality?

AbstractIn May 2024, the Senedd Cymru (Members and Elections) Bill completed its legislative journey through the Senedd Cymru/Welsh Parliament. The bill marks the latest chapter in the Senedd's evolution from an assembly established with no formally separated executive branch and no primary legislative powers into a lawmaking and tax‐raising parliament. It also marks the culmination of a long‐running debate about the size of the Welsh legislature. For at least twenty years there had appeared to be a broad agreement that the Senedd was too small, its capacity too thinly spread and that a larger membership of at least eighty, but closer to ninety or 100, members was required. In those respects, the Senedd Cymru (Members and Elections) Bill can be seen as the culmination of that long‐established consensus. However, as this article will explore, in one key area—the choice of electoral system—the bill marks a key point of departure.

Legislature size and welfare: Evidence from Brazil

AbstractHow does legislature size impact public service provision? Despite the importance of institutional design for democratic governance, the effect of legislative features on citizen welfare remains little understood. In this article, we use a formal model to show that increasing legislature size improves public goods delivery. We argue that changes in bargaining costs depend on whether additional legislators share the executive's party affiliation: More opposition members reduce the equilibrium public goods provision, while more government‐aligned members increase it. We test this theory by exploiting sharp discontinuities in city‐council size in Brazil. We show that an additional city councilor has a 91% chance of belonging to the mayoral coalition, and this significantly improves primary school enrollment and infant mortality rates. To explore possible mechanisms, we surveyed 174 former city councilors and analyzed 346,553 bills proposed between 2005 and 2008. This article has implications for the design of representative institutions.

Unveiling the Impact: How Legislature Size Moderates Budget Forecast Errors

The Province of Aceh has recently gained attention as one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia. This situation is partly attributed to the failure to maximize the utilization of budget allocations, resulting in the loss of the intended benefits of the Regional Budget (APBD) for the public. Therefore, this research aims to investigate and analyze the influence of local revenue growth and expenditure growth on budget forecast errors, as well as the role of legislature size in moderating the relationship between local revenue growth and expenditure growth on budget forecast errors. The research employed a census method, covering the entire population, which consists of 23 regencies and cities in the Province of Aceh from 2018 to 2022. The study utilized Structural Equation Model-Partial Least Square (SEM-PLS) analysis with WarpPLS version 7.0. The findings indicate that local revenue growth has a positive impact on budget forecast errors, while expenditure growth has a negative impact. Furthermore, legislative size moderates the relationship between local revenue growth and expenditure growth concerning budget forecast errors. The study suggests that local governments should create clear and proportionate plans for regional revenue and expenditure budgets based on the region’s capacity. They should also optimize and expedite budget realization to ensure the implementation of all government programs and activities. Both local government leaders and the Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD) also should establish comprehensive and transparent regional regulations regarding the DPRD’s Pokir proposal mechanism, from the planning process to accountability.

The Effect of Fiscal Stress on Changes in Social Aid Shopping with Legislature Size as Moderating Empirical Evidence from Regency/City Governments in Sumatra

This study aims to examine the effect of fiscal stress (FS) on changes in social assistance expenditure budget (BBS) with legislature size (LS) as a moderator in local governments on the island of Sumatra. The sample used is 154 districts/cities with purposive sampling technique. Secondary data is taken from local government financial reports which have been audited by the Supreme Audit Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK RI). The analytical method used in this research is Moderated Regression Analysis. The results of this study prove that FS affects changes in BBS and LS has an effect on changes in BBS. However, the LS does not moderate the effect of fiscal stress on changes in BBS.Keywords: surplus/deficit, regional budget politics, stewardship theory, special autonomy, social assistance spending

A number most convenient? The representational consequences of legislative size

This paper explores the political representational consequences of the size of democratic legislatures, which it makes the case for viewing as a feature of the electoral system. Focusing on descriptive representation, we argue that larger legislatures facilitate the descriptive representation of traditionally underrepresented groups, and that this effect should be stronger in majoritarian electoral systems. We find support for the hypothesis about the greater impact of legislative (assembly) size in majoritarian systems using a cross-national analysis of women's representation. We then employ a within-case empirical analysis of the descriptive representation of several racial and ethnic minorities and women in (majoritarian) U.S. state legislatures. Support for the hypothesis about the effects of relative legislative size (the ratio of seats to persons) is found for most minorities and women. More mixed but still somewhat supportive findings emerge about absolute legislative size (the raw number of seats).

The Effect of Legislature Size on Public Spending: A Meta-Analysis

AbstractIn path-breaking work, Weingast et al. argue that there is a positive relationship between legislature size and inefficiency in public expenditures. Their proposition is currently known as the ‘law of 1/n’ and has been widely debated in political science and public administration. However, recent studies have questioned the validity of the theory. In this letter, we conduct the first meta-analysis that assesses the generality of the ‘law of 1/n’. Based on a sample of thirty articles, we find no robust evidence suggesting that legislature size has either a positive or a negative effect on government budgets. Yet, the aggregate results mask considerable heterogeneity. Our findings provide moderate support for the ‘law of 1/n’ in unicameral legislatures and in upper houses, but they also indicate that studies using panel/fixed-effects models or regression-discontinuity designs report negative public spending estimates. We find only limited evidence that electoral systems impact public spending, which suggests that proportional representation systems may not be more prone to overspending than majoritarian ones.

On the optimal size of legislatures: An illustrated literature review

Several countries have voted reforms in order to reduce the number of national representatives and many others have debated about that possibility. There is, however, no commonly accepted rule for assessing the optimal number of seats in parliament. This article offers a review of the state-of-the-art, presenting the main contributions in political economy and related fields about the question of legislature sizes, their determinants and their impact. Based on a cross-sectional comparison of 139 countries, the review is accompanied with a set of figures and tables that illustrates a set of stylized facts.

Determinan Manipulasi Akrual Dalam Pelaporan Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah

This study aims to determine the effects of government size, fiscal capacity, fiscal distress, and legislature size on accrual manipulation in local government financial reporting. The study was conducted on 23 local governments in Aceh with data analysis using multiple linear regressions. The data is extracted from audited financial reports of the local governments for the period 2016-2020. This study uses the Modified Jones Model to measure the manipulation of accruals. The results show that the government size and fiscal distress have a negative effect on accrual manipulation, legislature size has a positive effect on accrual manipulation, and fiscal capacity have no effect on accrual manipulation. These results indicate that the accrual manipulation in financial reporting can occur due to discretionary policies carried out by local government officials with the aim of making their financial performance look good.

The Politics of Legislative Expansion in Africa

The number of seats in national legislatures around the world rarely changes. Yet, in Africa, a substantial number of countries have regularly increased the size of their legislatures, and these increases have become more common in recent years. Previous research on political offices in Africa’s electoral autocracies has suggested that their numbers and increases are largely motivated by patronage and clientelist considerations. Is this also the case for national legislatures? Curiously, very little political science scholarship exists on legislature size, either in Africa or the rest of the world. Using a mixture of descriptive statistics to present a new database, as well as econometrics and three case studies, we find that legislative expansion can be linked to executive branch manipulation. Presidents have found it politically useful to expand the size of African legislatures to weaken and/or control it.

Legislature Size and Interest Mobilization: The Effects of Institutional Change

Little is known about how legislature size affects the political mobilization of societal interests. I propose that legislative downsizing events increase the cost of campaigns, and thereby spur additional lobbying by organized interests that corral monetary resources efficiently. I examine how numbers of organizations with registered lobbyists changed in response to legislative downsizing events in three states. Using synthetic control analyses, I find that downsizing did not affect organization totals in Massachusetts or Rhode Island, but that Illinois’ Cutback Amendment precipitated a 25-percent increase in organized interests. Further tests disconfirm that monetary-based interests were most likely to mobilize anew after the Amendment’s implementation. In general, these mixed findings imply that changes in legislature size alone are insufficient for affecting interest mobilization but that other kinds of legislative reforms, such as the transition from cumulative to plurality voting that accompanied Illinois’ downsizing, may affect mobilization rates.

INFLUENCE OF FISCAL STRESS AND LEGISLATURE SIZE ON EXPENDITURE CHANGE

The study aims to examine and analyze the effect of fiscal stress and legislative size on expenditure change in the district or city of West Java Province. The research method used is descriptive method and verification method. Data collection techniques are carried out through secondary data obtained from Supreme Audit Istitution (BPK). The population of this study is all regencies and cities in West Java Province in the 2016-2018 fiscal year. The number of regencies and cities in West Java Province in the 2016-2018 fiscal year was 27. This research sample selection method uses Non Probability Sampling using saturated sampling with a total of 81 districts and cities. The results showed that fiscal stress negatively affected expenditure change, while the influence of the legislature size had a positive effect on expenditure change.

Corruption and legislature size: Evidence from Brazil

This paper studies whether and how legislatures affect political corruption. Using a regression discontinuity design in the context of Brazilian municipalities, we find a positive causal impact of council size on corruption levels, as detected by random federal audits. This indicates that an extra councilor represents an additional political actor potentially interested in diverting public resources, which we define as a rent extraction effect. However, we find further evidence that, in some contexts, larger councils enhance the representation of opposition parties and effectively increase monitoring over the executive, attenuating the rent extraction effect. Namely, in municipalities where opposition parties are typically underrepresented, the additional seat in the council is absorbed by the opposition and corruption outcomes do not worsen. In addition, only in such context, mayors are more commonly sentenced for misconduct in office by judicial authorities, whose investigations anecdotally often originates from councilors denouncing mayors to local courts. Overall, our findings show that legislature size is detrimental to corruption outcomes but less so where the representation of opposition parties improves with the enlargement of the legislature.

Which ones are more important: characteristics or complexities? A study of the disclosure in local government financial reports

Local Government Financial Report (LGFR) is one form of local government transparency in financial reporting for a period. The study aims to determine the effect of characteristics as proxied by the assets and size of local government, and complexity as proxied by the number of LGFRs and size of Legislature on the extent of financial report disclosure of local government. The data employed in this study are Local Government Financial Reports from 9 Municipal Governments and 18 Regencial Governments in West Java for the period 2014-2017. The results of this study suggest that the asset and size of local government have a positive effect on the degree of financial report disclosure of local government. On the other hand, the number of LGFR and legislature size has no effect on financial report disclosure of local government.

The Effect of Local Government Characteristics on Performance of Local Government Administration

This study aimed to obtain empirical evidence of the level of regional wealth, the level of dependence to the central government, capital expenditure contribution and legislature size on the performance of local government administration. This research used a purposive sampling method. The study sample consisted of 293 LKPD provinces, districts, municipalities in Indonesia in 2015 which have been audited by the Supreme Audit Board. The result of the research shown that the variables of legislative size had a positive and significant effect on the performance of local government administration while the level of regional wealth, dependency level to the central government and capital expenditure contribution had no significant effect on the performance of the local government. Keywords : Performance of local government, administration, level of regional wealth, dependency level to the central government, capital expenditure contribution, legislature size. *Accounting Department - Institute of Economic Science of Al-Madani, Jalan Kavling Raya Pramuka Rajabasa, Bandar Lampung, 35144, Indonesia **Accounting Department - University of Lampung, Jl. Prof. Dr. Sumantri Brojonegoro No. 1, Bandar Lampung, 35145, Indonesia. https://doi.org/10.21632/irjbs.12.2.197-208

The Law of 1/n Revisited: Distributive Politics, Legislature Size, and the Costs of Collective Action

The foundational model of distributive politics predicts a positive relationship between the number of legislative districts and the level of inefficiency of projects approved by the legislature—Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen's “Law of 1/n.” This relationship has been tested extensively in the empirical literature, with mixed results. This article presents a model wherein passing the omnibus legislation typical of distributive politics is a costly process. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between legislature size and spending as increasing the size of the legislature also increases the costs of collective action. Results from an empirical exercise based on U.S. state legislatures (1962–2014) are consistent with the proposed model, showing a 1/n effect which diminishes at the margin as the legislature's size increases, especially in the lower chamber.

Legislature Size, Local Government Expenditure and Taxation, and Public Service Access in Indonesia

This study examines the impact of legislature size on local public finance and service outcomes in Indonesia. The investigation employs both continuity- and randomization-based regression discontinuity methods to accommodate the endogeneity of council size and to identify its causal effects on local government spending, service delivery, and own-source revenue mobilization. Many studies have examined the influence of increasing legislature size on expenditures, but no consensus has emerged on the direction of impacts. Moreover, interpretation of the efficiency of derived spending effects has remained elusive and reliant on ad hoc theorizing. This is the first study to examine the causal impact of council size on service outcomes, thereby facilitating an empirically based understanding of efficiency effects. The study finds that increasing legislature size negatively affects local government total and capital spending. The investigation also shows that rising legislature size has a negative influence on citizen access to public services. Finally, the examination offers evidence to suggest that an increasing number of legislators have no impact on local own-source revenues. Taken together the results imply a decline in local efficiency: residents pay the same amount in taxes but receive fewer services. The findings in this investigation contradict recent theoretical predictions and empirical results from other research.

Legend of the Pork Barrel? The Causal Effect of Legislature Size on Public Spending

This paper investigates pork-barrel spending, the inefficient effect of legislature size on public spending, in at-large electoral systems. Using a rich panel data set on German municipalities whose councils are elected at-large, we employ a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of legislature size of public spending. The empirical results indicate that the pork-barrel effect in at-large electoral systems is of very small economic magnitude. This finding is in line with the theoretical prediction of a zero effect, however, in sharp contrast to previously published estimates in the literature that commonly support a positive pork-barrel spending effect.

Legend of the Pork Barrel? The Causal Effect of Legislature Size on Public Spending

Legend of the Pork Barrel? The Causal Effect of Legislature Size on Public Spending

Endogenous district magnitude and political party fragmentation in subnational Indonesia: A research note

This note examines the impact of district magnitude on political party fragmentation in subnational Indonesia. The analysis employs regression discontinuity methods to accommodate the endogeneity of legislature size and identify its causal effect on the number of political parties represented in the local council. While the potential endogeneity of district magnitude has long been recognized in the literature, this appears to be the first study in which it has been empirically modelled as endogenous. The examination finds that rising endogenous district magnitude leads to an increase in the number of political parties in the legislature, as standard theory predicts. More significantly, the investigation determines that the positive impact of legislature size on party fragmentation is most pronounced for those local administrative units that have been recently established and whose governance environments are particularly fragile, suggesting that the broader institutional context is especially important in conditioning district magnitude effects.

Legend of the Pork-Barrel? The Causal Effect of Legislature Size on Public Spending

This paper investigates pork-barrel spending, the inefficient effect of legislature size on public spending, in at-large electoral systems. Using a rich panel data set on German municipalities whose councils are elected at-large, we employ a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of legislature size of public spending. The empirical results indicate that the pork-barrel effect in at-large electoral systems is of very small economic magnitude. This finding is in line with the theoretical prediction of a zero effect, however, in sharp contrast to previously published estimates in the literature that commonly support a positive pork-barrel spending effect.