Legislative Professionalism Research Articles

Campaign War Chests and Challenger Emergence in State Legislative Elections

Recent studies examining the role of money in state legislative campaigns focus on questions related to the amounts raised, the sources of the funds, and the effects of spending on election outcomes. Little attention, however, has been given to the possible impact of money on other aspects of the electoral process-namely candidacy decisions. Political practitioners often assert that money has an important influence when incumbents collect large campaign treasuries or “war chests” for the purpose of warding off potential challengers. While several studies address the validity of this proposition in the congressional setting, few have examined it closely in state legislative races. This study considers this possibility in an analysis of incumbent funding in primary and general elections in eight states. Findings indicate that incumbents often amass war chests and these sums negatively impact challenger emergence; however, this effect is partially mitigated by legislative professionalism. The dampening effect of campaign treasuries is found to be more potent in states having the least professional legislatures.

State Felon Disenfranchisement Policy

Objective. Felon disenfranchisement policies impose restrictions on a felon's right to vote. Since these policies disproportionately affect minority citizens, legal scholars and others argue that felon disenfranchisement is a result of racial politics, aimed primarily at undermining the electoral power of black and Latino citizens. This study evaluates these claims in a rigorous empirical analysis. Methods. The study uses cross‐sectional data on current state felon disenfranchisement policies in an order probit regression analysis to examine race‐based explanations in light of competing hypotheses. Results. The findings demonstrate that the size of the minority population, parity in incarceration rates, and the degree of legislative professionalism are the primary explanatory factors of this policy. Conclusions. Given the continued rise in minority incarceration rates relative to those for whites and the link between the racial composition of a state and the severity of felon disenfranchisement laws, the study raises important questions regarding the future of minority participation in the democratic process.

Legislative Professionalism and the Demand for Groups: The Institutional Context of Interest Population Density

Do state interest group systems develop independently of the legislatures they lobby? The Energy-Stability-Area model developed by Gray and Lowery (1996) implicitly suggests they do. I argue that legislative professionalism conditions how group systems respond to environmental factors. As legislatures professionalize, their demand for information from lobbyists decreases. Groups are in this and other ways less effective in professional legislatures and more likely to exit a crowded group system. I model interest density with professionalism as a contextual variable. The results have implications for the number and mix of interests, the impact of lobbying regulations, and the consequences of legislative de-institutionalization.

LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM AND INFLUENCE ON STATE AGENCIES

This research focuses on the relationship between state legislative professionalism and legislative influence in state agencies. Principal‐agent theory, which provides the theoretical underpinning for this research, suggests that there should be a positive relationship between legislative professionalism and legislative influence. King's (2000) legislative professionalism measure, along with a 1995 survey of state administrators in 15 states, are used to test this theory. The results of this analysis show that while there is a statistically significant relationship between legislative professionalism and legislative influence in agencies, the relationship is not in the expected direction. Additionally, legislative professionalism is not the strongest of the examined predictors of legislative influence. While the increased legislative capability of more professionalized legislatures may make them better able to influence agencies, based on these findings they do not appear to be particularly interested in exerting more influence over agencies. Potential reasons for which are discussed.

On the Outside Looking In: Lobbyists' Perspectives on the Effects of State Legislative Term Limits

AbstractTerm limit laws for state legislators now exist in 19 states. While these laws were passed as early as 1990, they have only recently actually forced legislators from office. Prior to the 2000 elections, only two states (California and Maine) had experienced virtually complete legislative turnover in at least one chamber as a result of term limits. Nine other states have had at least one cohort of legislators forced out of office. Now that a significant portion of these legislative bodies has been replaced by term limits, we can begin to examine the consequences of this reform. We report findings from a survey of lobbyists in five term-limits states. We find strong consensus among these lobbyists that term limits have caused the state political influence structure to shift away from the legislature and toward the governor, administrative agencies, and interest groups. With regard to the impact on internal operations and procedures of the legislature, we discover considerable variation across states, variation that, in part, is related to legislative professionalism.

Legislative Professionalism and Incumbent Reelection: The Development of Institutional Boundaries

It is well established that legislators from highly professionalized bodies are more likely to win reelection than members of less professionalized legislatures. We find that the effect of professionalization on incumbent electoral success is far more pervasive. As the level of professionalism of a legislature increases, the effects of external political and economic forces (such as coattails from higher level elections and national economic conditions) on a legislator's chances for reelection diminish in strength. This implies that legislative professionalization promotes institutionalization by establishing boundaries that insulate members from external shocks. We reach these conclusions by specifying and testing a district-level model of state legislative election outcomes, using as dependent variable the probability that an incumbent will win reelection. The model is estimated with probit using data for more than 42,000 state legislators from 1970 to 1989.

Legislative Professionalism and Government Spending: Do Citizen Legislators Really Spend Less?

In this article, the authors consider the effect of legislative professionalism on state government spending. Arguments are examined for why citizen legislatures should have systematically different spending patterns than professional ones. Using data from the U.S. states, the authors find that state government expenditure per capita is significantly lower the less professionalized the state legislature. They conclude that reducing legislative professionalism is one of the instruments citizens may use to contain the growth of government.

Further Evidence of the Partisan Consequences of Legislative Professionalism

In an earlier article I hypothesized that the professionalization of American state legislatures enhanced the electoral fortunes of the Democratic Party. While the statistical analyses reported in that article were consistent with the hypothesis, there has been lingering concern that the finding may be spurious. Specifically, if voter preferences within states increasingly supported both professionalization and Democratic candidates, the link between professionalization and Democratic success would reflect these underlying unmeasured preferences. Recently, state-specific time series measures of voter ideology were reported in an AJPS Workshop article. Incorporating these into the earlier analysis shows that shifts in voter ideology have a significant relationship to Democratic success, but the original relationship between professionalization and Democratic success is unaffected.

Determinants of Collaborative Leadership: Civic Engagement, Gender or Organizational Norms?

This analysis attempts to unravel competing explanations of collaborative leadership styles of state legislative committee chairs. Specifically, the paper considers the influence of community or volunteer experience, gender, and institutional variables. The data show that women chairs are more likely than their male peers to cite as valuable the leadership skills and experiences that they gain through community and volunteer experience. Compared to their male colleagues, women committee chairs on average also report a greater reliance on collaborative strategies in the management of their committees. Prior community or volunteer experience has little or no direct effect on collaborative styles. In contrast, institutional factors have a much stronger and countervailing influence. Legislative professionalization produces a strong negative effect on collaborative style. Results suggest that conformity to institutional norms may be a more compelling influence than prior community experience. The analysis also points to the gendered nature of organizational leadership with men's and women's styles showing different associations to style depending on the number and power of women in a legislature.

Another Look at Legislative Professionalization and Divided Government in the States

Another Look at Legislative Professionalization and Divided Government in the States

Trends in the Partisan Composition of State Legislatures: A Response to Fiorina

The percentage of state legislative seats won by Democrats in nonsouthern states has increased steadily since World War II. Fiorina (1994) argues that this is because of the professionalization of state legislatures: Legislatures now meet longer and pay higher salaries; legislative positions which require more time are less attractive to Republicans, who can make more money elsewhere; higher salaries attract Democrats, who make less in the private sector. That analysis has several serious flaws. First, nonsouthern states have gradually become more Democratic at all levels as part of a long-term regional political realignment. The rise in Democrats in legislatures outside the South is due more to this realignment than to legislative professionalization. Second, trends in southern states contradict his hypothesis. Professionalization has increased, but state legislatures are becoming more Republican. Finally, Fiorina's analysis is worth careful reconsideration because it suggests that there is little connection between constituencies and partisan outcomes.

PLANNING LEGISLATIVE CAREERS UNDER TERM LIMITS

This research note examines the hypothesis that the impact of state legislative term limits on legislators' career planning varies by political context. A comparison of the career planning of legislative candidates from Michigan, a state with relatively restrictive term limits and a high degree of legislative professionalism, with candidates from Oklahoma, a state with less restrictive term limits and somewhat less professionalism, support this view. In addition, the data reveal substantial differences between supporters and opponents of term limits with respect to institutional loyalty and zdesiredcareer patterns.

State Legislative Development: Observations from Three Perspectives

Political scientists have viewed modern state legislatures from three perspectives: legislative reform in the 1960s and 1970s, legislative professionalization in the 1980s, and most recently legislative institutionalization. Institutionalization is best indicated by the boundedness of the legislature from the environment, as specified by personnel differentiation, normative structure, and managerial autonomy. When various indicators are taken into account, legislatures appear to be moving in the direction of deinstitutionalization.

State Legislative Professionalism and Gubernatorial Effectiveness, 1978-1991

State Legislative Professionalism and Gubernatorial Effectiveness, 1978-1991

New Party or Campaign Bank Account? Explaining the Rise of State Legislative Campaign Committees

State legislative caucus campaign committees have emerged in the 1980s as an important party adaptation in state politics. This study explores the factors associated with the existence of these new party organizations and with their levels of contributions to party candidates. To explain these phenomena, five hypotheses are investigated concerning the strength of state parties, the cost of state campaigns, the level of legislative professionalism, the degree of party competition, and the regulation of campaign contributions in states where these committees have emerged. Legislative professionalism and party competition are associated with the existence of the caucus committees. Legislative professionalization, party competition, and laws restricting campaign contributions are powerful explanations of the level of expenditure of these committees. Leadership stability and spending by the opposing party also help explain the activity of caucus campaign committees.

Citizens, Structures, and Sister States: Influences on State Legislative Professionalism

U.S. state legislatures vary substantially in the degree to which they are professional institutions. Drawing on the state policy literature, this study identifies three general categories of potential influence on this variation: the characteristics of a state's population, its governmental structures, and the level of legislative professionalism in its peer group states. Using four measures of professionalism from different periods, the author tests hypotheses about several such variables in cross-sectional and panel analyses. He finds that each of these categories of influence has significant, independent effects on legislative professionalism, and that taken together these influences account for most of the observed variation in professionalism across the states.

The Development of State Legislative Campaign Committees: A Second Look

One of the most important recent developments in state politics has been the rapid emergence of legislative campaign committees (LCCs), now found in 40 states. A persistent theme in the literature is that the growth of these new organizations has been directly linked to party decline. More specifically, as traditional party organizations failed to respond to changing environmental conditions. LCCs were created. The analysis presented here rejects the functionalist perspective and argues that their development has occurred independent of party dynamics, and perhaps as a response to strengthening state party committees. Legislative professionalization is found to be the most telling exogenous variable, suggesting a good deal about LCC activities and goals. Contrary to expectations, these powerful organizations may not be interested in or capable of performing many of the functions historically undertaken by traditional party organizations.

Divided Government in the American States: A Byproduct of Legislative Professionalism?

Since World War II, divided government has become increasingly common in the American states. A significant component of the increase is the deterioration of Republican fortunes in state legislatures: after the 1990 and 1992 elections, for example, only five state legislatures were controlled by the Republicans. I shall examine the hypothesis that the professionalization of state legislatures makes legislative service more attractive to Democratic candidates and less attractive to Republican candidates, because full-time legislative service is incompatible with another career, and Democrats, on average, have less lucrative career opportunities than Republicans. Statistical analysis of post-World War II legislative elections outside the South is consistent with the argument: other things being equal, every ten-thousand-dollar increase in real biennial legislative compensation is associated with approximately a 1% increase in Democratic legislators.

The Effect of U. S. State Legislative Term Limits Revisited

Research on how state legislative term limits affect legislative organization and policy is primarily conjectural, since these limits have been in place for only a short period. However, the effects of retroactive term limits can be analyzed and can yield, with some certainty, the impact of these limits on tenure. Using an earlier study as a model, I develop a cohort analysis to assess how many state legislators currently serving would be affected by a retroactive eight-year term limit. I find that a majority of state legislators both in states that have not adopted term limits and in the 15 states that have adopted limits would be forced out of office. Variation in retention rates is related to chamber, to Squire's opportunity type, and to legislative professionalism, although the last factor does not come into play as heavily in states where term limits already exist.

Professionalization and Public Opinion of State Legislatures

Using a seven-state survey I examine how closely people follow the activities of the state legislature, how much contact they have with its members, and how they evaluate its performance. In particular, I investigate whether legislative professionalization level or district size influences how people see their legislature. Professionalization has a positive relationship with contact but has a negative relationship with attention level and performance rating. Constituency size exhibits little influence except on contacts.