Terisa Turner seeks to explain the instability of the Nigerian state. Stability and instability is not just a matter of vulnerability to forcible changes of regime. A stable state is one in which authorized individuals make, apply and enforce legal imperatives and public policies. To say that the Nigerian state lacks coherence is to say that it has not become separate from, dominant over, or capable of regulating society. Nigeria continues to have a predominantly import‐export economy, but one in which the state itself provides the main market for many commodities, and controls access to the supply of and market for others. Because of the key role of the state, its officials play a central part in Nigeria's commercial system. Foreign firms compete with one another for a share of the lucrative Nigerian market by offering inducements to local middlemen and state officials. Bribes are the basis of competitive advantage. State officials and Nigerian businessmen are compradors because they organize the access of foreign firms to local markets and raw materials. At the same time, the state is also expected to provide administrative and infrastructural services, to promote economic development, and to increase national control over the economy. This requires the appointment of technically‐qualified staff committed to the application of technocratic criteria to the determination of policy‐making, which brings them into conflict with the dominant comprador faction in the administration. Terisa Turner's paper analyzes such operations of foreign capital in Nigeria, and the way in which they undermine the stability of the state. In the second part of her paper she shows how conflicts over oil policy were crucial to the overthrow of the Gowon regime, conflicts which are not likely to be resolved by its successor.
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