Legal Defense Fund Research Articles

Preparing Scholastic Press Advisers for Roles after Hazelwood Decision

Supreme Court in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988) allowed school officials to set journalistic standards higher than those demanded by some newspaper publishers ... in the 'real' world (at 272) and to exercise prior restraint on publications that are not open forums by policy or practice if the action reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns (at 273). Eveslage (1995) noted that the decision essentially challenged publications advisers to teach rights and responsibilities, but implied the direction to take when it identified professionalism as the (p. 3). question of what publication advisers are teaching about student rights and professionalism of the scholastic press of importance to college educators, who are responsible for preparing students to become knowledgeable school journalism teachers and advisers. Public forum Justice Byron White used a public forum analysis from Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (1985) and Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association (1983) as the basis of his majority opinion in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier. Traditional forums are those that have long been open to all expression. Limited forums are created by government designation of a place or channel of communication for use by the at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects, and the government must open a non-traditional forum for discourse (Cornelius at 802). At both traditional and limited forums, government restrictions must be narrowly drawn and serve a compelling state interest. Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are allowed if they are content-neutral and narrowly drawn and leave open alternative channels of communication (Perry at 45-46). A non-public forum one that is not by tradition or designation a forum for communication, and any government regulation in a non-public forum must be only reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral (Cornelius at 806). Hazelwood majority determined that schools are not traditional forums and that the Hazelwood East Spectrum was not a limited forum in practice. It stated: The government does not create a forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a non-traditional forum for discourse (Hazelwood at 267, quoting Cornelius, 1985, at 802). However, when the forum rationale had previously been used by courts in regard to a student publication (see Zucker v. Panitz, 1969, and Gambino v. Fairfax County School Board, 1977), the newspapers were found to be limited forums for student expression. Justice William Brennan, author of the minority position in Hazelwood, stated that the school's control over the content of school-sponsored publications should be limited. He concluded that an earlier Supreme Court case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), should be the standard for scholastic press freedom cases. Prior to Hazelwood, the Tinkerstandard was the `compelling reason' by which their (school officials') censoring actions would be measured (SPLC, 1994, p. 36). Tinker stated that restrictions can be put on student speech only if the speech materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others (Tinker at 513). Until Hazelwood, courts had not ruled on whether prior restraint of scholastic publications for other types of content, such as libel and obscenity, was permissible (SPLC, 1985, p. 23). Though Brennan stated that the Court was deviating from precedent, he agreed with the Hazelwood majority that an educator may constitutionally censor material that ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced or material that does not meet high standards for . …

W. Haywood Burns: To Be of Use

t J.D., Columbia Law School, 1970. Michael Ratner first met Haywood Burns as a law student working at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in 1968. Mr. Ratner followed Mr. Burns as clerk to Judge Constance Baker Motley, and was legal director of the Center for Constitutional Rights, where Haywood Burns was Vice President; both were board members. Mr. Ratner also preceded Mr. Burns as president of the National Lawyers Guild, and last year became of counsel to Burns's new Harlem-based law firm, Van Lierop, Burns & Schaap. tt J.D., CUNY Law School, 1986. Eleanor Stein is an administrative law judge specializing in environmental and telecommunications law. Judge Stein, a longtime participant with Mr. Burns in the civil rights movement, serves on CUNY Law School's Board of Visitors. Judge Stein is also a close friend of Haywood Burns's widow, Jennifer Dohrn. We both knew and worked with Haywood for many years. Writing this Essay affected us deeply and made us realize the void he leaves in our lives and the lives of so many others. Of course, we miss his physical presence, his gentle smile lighting up a room, his bear hugs, the halo of grey hair he likened?characteristically?to both Karl Marx and Frederick Douglass. In this Essay, we have hardly begun to capture the richness of Haywood's life and work, and have barely tapped those whose lives he influenced. Haywood was a complex man with many dimensions?poet and motorcyclist, basketball player and dancer, angler and wit. Exploring his life and writings, and collecting his speeches and publications, will undoubtedly occupy academics and activists for a long time to come. In this effort we are grateful for conversations with Daniel Alterman, Penny Andrews, Mildred Aristide, Derrick Bell, Sue Bryant, Margaret Burnham, Naomi Burns, Guido Calabresi, Leroy D. Clark, Rhonda Copelon, Michael Deutsch, David Dinkins, Jennifer Dohrn, Barbara Dudley, Brian Glick, Victor M. Goode, Jeff Jones, Leora Mosston, John Payton, Herman Schwartz, Eric Sirotkin, Frank Big Black Smith, Robert Van Lierop, Patricia Williams, and Peter Zimroth. 1. Marge Piercy, To Be of Use, in Marge Piercy, Circles on the Water 106 (1982). For twenty years this poem, which Haywood often described as his favorite, hung on the wall of his office. He frequently recited it in speeches. Used by permission of the author and Alfred A. Knopf Inc.

On best behavior: the Clinton administration and ethics in government

This book is the first comprehensive study of the various ethics issues that have beset the Clinton administration. It is written by a legal analyst uniquely positioned to understand the maze of ethics considerations in the current federal government. The author examines the existing system of ethics laws and standards, and evaluates the Clinton administration's pledge to comply with higher standards of ethical conduct than previous administrations. On Best Behavior uncovers the meaning behind the investigations, headlines, and editorials, analyzing fourteen separate ethics controversies. These include the First Lady's health care interests, the president's unusual use of informal advisers, the White House Travel Office firings, the Washington aspects of the Whitewater and Madison Guaranty matters, the Clintons' legal defense fund, and the allegations against several members of the Clinton Cabinet, including Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros, and former Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy. The book also examines the current scheme of ethics laws and standards for the Executive Branch, providing an in-depth, critical look at today's bewildering web of revolving-door restrictions. It includes a list of thirteen principles future administrations can use to avoid the mistakes of the current and previous administrations, and contains a set of recommendations to Congress, the White House, and the Office of Government Ethics for legislative, regulatory, and policy changes.

Sex on the Docket: Reports of State Task Forces on Gender Bias

Women have fought many political and legal battles against bias in the United States, winning the right to vote, access to jobs and occupations formerly dominated by men, and legal prohibitions against sex-based discrimination. Remarkable progress has been made during the past 30 years on many fronts. But one of the most durable fortresses of patriarchy and bias against women is also perhaps the most important in terms of both symbol and substance. The courts, the legal profession, and other aspects of the national and state judicial systems are critically linked to political and economic power. So long as women do not receive fair and equal treatment under the law and in the halls of justice, their struggle remains bittersweet and incomplete. However, since the early 1980s, 39 states, the District of Columbia, and nine of the 13 federal circuits have established task forces on gender bias in the judiciary. Charged with investigating gender bias, documenting its existence, issuing recommendations to eliminate it, and creating organizations and processes to oversee Its destruction, the task forces have produced an extraordinary series of reports that are taking a toll on gender bias in its myriad forms. Thirty-four final reports and many implementation and follow-up reports are now in print. This article is based on an examination of the 34 final state reports and numerous related documents (see Appendix). We describe and summarize the origins of the gender bias movement and the content of the reports, including methodology, findings and recommendations, and efforts to implement change. We conclude with a discussion of the reports' implications. As a collection, the reports present a rich source of empirical and anecdotal data and afford a unique opportunity to examine gender bias in a once-neglected yet critically important public administration setting. Origins of the Gender Bias Movement Historically, women were excluded from making, interpreting, studying, and practicing the law. As recently as the early 1970s, women comprised only 15 percent of attorneys and 4 percent of judges. Sexual bias in the practice and administration of the law and against women as lawyers, litigants, and court employees was pervasive. As women entered the legal profession in much greater numbers, they began sharing their experiences--both formally and informally--in conferences, workshops, professional meetings, and conversations. Empirical studies of gender bias began appearing in scholarly and legal research. Fragmented activities coalesced in 1980, when the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and the newly-formed National Association of Women Judges created the National Judicial Education Program to Promote Equality for Women and Men in the Courts (NJEP), with the purpose of educating the judiciary on gender bias. NJEP efforts were quickly endorsed by several prominent judicial organizations. NJEP activities encountered a substantial amount of disbelief, denial, and resistance. It became apparent that the attack on gender bias would require concrete data and evidence from the states (Wikler, 1990). New Jersey took the lead in elevating gender bias from obscurity to prominence with a presentation to state judges in 1982, followed by publication of the first gender bias task force report in 1983. New York, Rhode Island, and Arizona established task forces the next year, followed by Massachusetts and Utah in 1986. The topic of gender bias in the courts won a spot on the educational program of the Conference of Chief Justices in 1986. Two years later, the Conference adopted a resolution urging each state chief justice to establish a gender bias task force. Nine additional states appointed task forces in 1989. As of January 1996, only Alabama, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wyoming had failed to climb on the bandwagon. Even a brief scan of a handful of the reports leads to the ineluctable conclusion that the state task forces benefited from cross pollination. …

Judge Marshall and Company

There's a crazy lady down in Judge Clark's chambers, Thurgood Marshall told his law clerk. It was 1961. Marshall, newly appointed to the federal bench in New York City, had gone to have his picture taken with his colleagues. Before he arrived, the photographer's lights had blown the fuses. A secretary called an electrician. When I went in, the lady there said, 'You must be the electrician to fix the fuses.' A more personally sensitive judge might have been offended; another might have been amused. Marshall simply thought the woman out of her mind. She'd have to be crazy to think that I could be a member of the electrician's union in New York! (p. 4). Like Abraham Lincoln, Marshall left behind a rich legacy of similar anecdotes. Sandra Day O'Connor remembered in her own early months on the Supreme Court looking forward to Marshall's stories diversions from the heavy, often troublesome, task of deciding the complex legal issues before us. But over time, I realized that behind most of the anecdotes was a relevant legal point.' Marshall had a profound grasp of the heavy and troublesome complexities of American society. His anecdotes, as Justice O'Connor suggested, could be seen as diversions, but to a careful listener they conveyed the serious business he was in. He had a tremendous respect for the law, and was able to use the law to lift the heavy burdens of history. Mark Tushnet's study of Marshall and the Supreme Court foregoes the anecdotes. Instead, the reader is presented with Marshall the legal strategist. Marshall deserves this treatment. He was a great lawyer. As chief counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF), Marshall not only defended individual African Americans, he guided the legal campaign against segregation. Tushnet shows how inter-related all of Marshall's (and the LDF's) work was. The rights of the accused, the comparative salaries of black and white teachers, private agreements which forbade white home-owners to sell to blacks, primaries, or political clubs opened only to whites, universities and graduate schools which would not admit qualified blacks were all

Accuracy and Ambiguity in the Application of State Child Support Guidelines

In an effort to standardize the calculation of monthly child support awards, the federal government requires states to use preestablished formulas to determine the amount of awards. This study utilizes survey data from 20 states to determine the extent to which individuals who regularly calculate child support awards using these state formulas do so accurately. We find that individuals who regularly calculate child support awards often arrive at different support award amounts because of the complexity of the state guidelines, human error, differences in their experience and training, and lack of computerization. Adopting simpler formulas would reduce errors; this should be a priority even if child support officials use computers to calculate award amounts. Efforts to further the training and education of personnel who calculate awards would also help, and child support offices should revise their formulas to cover high-income cases. The Child Support Enforcement amendments of 1984 (P.L. 98-378) required states to develop specific numeric formulas for determining the amount of child support that should be paid to children by absent parents. This legislation was enacted because child support awards were typically too low (Beller & Graham, 1986, 1993; Oellerich, Garfinkel, & Robins, 1991; Williams, 1987), there was substantial variation in the amount owed by individuals in similar economic circumstances (White & Stone, 1976; Yee, 1979), and case-by-case award setting had resulted in administrative inefficiencies and had aggravated problems for interstate cases (Thompson & Paikin, 1985; Williams, 1987). The 1984 legislation, however, provided states with minimal direction in how to frame the content of the guidelines. Sensing this problem, Congress postponed the original implementation deadline from October 1985 to October 1987 (Brackney, 1988). The original 1987 state guidelines were based on three models that are known as the percentage of income, income shares, and Melson models. Including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, there are 54 unique variations of the three basic child support models today. When introduced in 1987, the state guidelines were advisory, meaning that individuals calculating child support awards could have used, but were not required to use, their state's guideline. The National Advisory Panel on Child Support Guidelines first recommended that state guidelines become presumptive rather than advisory in 1987. That is, the amount of a child support award calculated using each state's guidelines is presumed to be the correct amount of child support unless good cause for deviating from the guidelines can be established. The advisory panel urged the use of presumptive guidelines, citing the same reasons used to adopt guidelines in the first place: to further improve the adequacy of awards, to ensure greater equity for litigants, and to facilitate the adjudication of cases (Advisory Panel on Child Support Guidelines, 1987). The statewide application of child support guidelines became presumptive with the passage of the 1988 Family Support Act (P.L. 100-485). More recently, the U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support (1992) recommended that Congress appoint a National Child Support Guidelines Commission no later than January 1995 to determine if the United States should move to a single, national child support guideline. This commission asserted that very different amounts of child support are required of obligors, depending on which of the 54 state guidelines is used and that this variation results in an inequitable interstate system. A federal child support guideline also is viewed as an essential component of a reformed child support system by Ayuda, Clinica Legal Latina, the Center for Law and Social Policy, the Children's Defense Fund, the National Women's Law Center, the United States Catholic Conference, and the Women's Legal Defense Fund (1994). …

De Jure Revolution?

At first glance, Crusaders in the Courts: How a Dedicated Band of Lawyers Fought for the Civil Rights Revolution, by Jack Greenberg,' and Failed Revolutions: Social Reform and the Limits of Legal Imagination, by Richard Delgado2 and Jean Stefancic,3 appear to have little in common. Certainly, they are vastly different in genre, subject matter, scope, perspective, and tone. Greenberg, the former Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund also known as the Inc. Fund, or simply LDF offers Crusaders in the Courts both as a detailed history of LDF's preeminent role in the creation of twentieth-century civil rights law and as a personal memoir of his thirty-five years there as a litigator and organizational leader. Consistent with the structure and style of many historical and personal reminiscences, Crusaders in the Courts relies heavily on a straightforward chronological narrative peppered with colorful and riveting anecdotes of its protagonists' legendary deeds; in Greenberg's book, the heroes include Thur-

Making civil rights law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936-1961

From the 1930s to the early 1960s civil rights law was made primarily through constitutional litigation. Before Rosa Parks could ignite a Montgomery Bus Boycott, the Supreme Court had to strike down the Alabama law which made segregated bus service required by law; before Martin Luther King could march on Selma to register voters, the Supreme Court had to find unconstitutional the Southern Democratic Party's exclusion of African-Americans; and before the March on Washington and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme Court had to strike down the laws allowing for the segregation of public graduate schools, colleges, high schools, and grade schools. Making Civil Rights Law provides a chronological narrative history of the legal struggle, led by Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, that preceded the political battles for civil rights. Drawing on interviews with Thurgood Marshall and other NAACP lawyers, as well as new information about the private deliberations of the Supreme Court, Tushnet tells the dramatic story of how the NAACP Legal Defense Fund led the Court to use the Constitution as an instrument of liberty and justice for all African-Americans. He also offers new insights into how the justices argued among themselves about the historic changes they were to make in American society. Making Civil Rights Law provides an overall picture of the forces involved in civil rights litigation, bringing clarity to the legal reasoning that animated this Constitutional revolution, and showing how the slow development of doctrine and precedent reflected the overall legal strategy of Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP.

Liability Insurance for Design Professionals: Can't Live with It, Can't Live without It?

Professional liability insurance can be beneficial, as well as problematic. This article presents two hypothetical situations that demonstrate the problems typically created by a decision to procure, or not to procure professional liability insurance. The author maintains that the choice to buy or not buy insurance is both a personal and a business one. Almost all large firms today operate with professional liability insurance. But for the mid size and smaller firms, there are both pros and cons. The pros are that a firm's practice will not be limited by clients' requiring insurance coverage and the firm's principals may simply be able to rest easier knowing they're insured. Conversely, coverage is costly, it may not be cost effective or necessary for the type of practice in question, and coverage can sometimes act as a “lightening rod,” attracting claims and law suits. Finally, firms not purchasing insurance may want to establish a legal defense fund with the money saved.

The NAACP-Inc. Fund Alliance: Its Strategy, Power, and Destruction

INTRODUCTIONForty years after Marshall's righteous persuasion placed judicial jewel of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas (1954) in NAACP-Inc. Fund's crown, even middle-class Blacks consider themselves be victimized by racism (Cose, 1993). Marshall saw paradox coming, and in 1978 he sounded an alarm in a speech given at Howard University Law School:Today we have reached point where people say, We've come a long way. But so have other people come a long way....Has gap gotten smaller? It's getting bigger....People say we are better off today. Better [off] than what? (quoted in Bell, 1987, p. 63)Anticipating a predictable response, Marshall added: am amazed at people who say that, 'the poorest Negro kid in South better off than kid in South Africa.' So what! We are not in South Africa. We are here (quoted in Bell, 1987, p. 63).The most meaningful measurement of Black well-being in America results not from Black-to-Black comparisons made over time but from White-to-Black comparisons made both over time and by rate of achievement. The idea, according Fein (1970), to take account of a frequent and significant phenomenon: nonwhite moving up more slowly than white did when, many years ago, white stood where nonwhite now is (pp. 103-104). Because even a narrow improvement in well-being can mislead analysts, Fein used a simple but informative measure in his comparison of White-Black well-being. As he explains:Where data permit, I calculate a time-lag statistic: how many years earlier did white American--with full range of opportunity open him--attain particular level (say, of health, education, income) that Negro--so long denied that opportunity--has reached only today. I also ask whether this gap (in years) greater or less than at earlier times (that is, was Negro more years behind in some earlier period). I thus compare relative speed of movement over same range of experience. The change in length of gap depends upon relative rates of change of white and Negro indicators over time...(p. 104)His conclusion:The results are disturbing: in a number of cases time gap has been widening rather than narrowing. Today Negro further behind white (in years) than he once was. (p. 104)No single sufficient explanation for this discrepancy existed in 1965 or 1978; nor there any in 1994. There is, however, an overarching judicial explanation: separate-but-equal doctrine promulgated in 1896 by Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson--the doctrine that lawyer Marshall persuaded Supreme Court overturn in Brown--still pumps its venom of racism through body politic of White America.Brown seemed at first an answer African Americans' prayers for effective, equitable public education. Those prayers explained why Marshall and his comrades chose make the big legal push (as William Henry Hastie called it) on that front (Carter, 1946c; Hastie, 1946b; Marshall, 1947c; Wilkins, 1948). When Supreme Court spoke in Brown, many Blacks heard ringing of a freedom bell. They rejoiced and recalled words of African American spiritual, How I Got Over (Cobbs & Morris, 1977). Many Whites, on other hand, heard a battle cry and set out not only sabotage Court's decision but destroy noble alliance that had forged it (Greenberg, 1962a).THE NOBLE ALLIANCE(1)The alliance that focus of this article consisted of National Association for Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and its progeny: NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., commonly called Fund. Their tangled associations would be direct causal factors in alliance's rise and demise over course of almost a generation, one made historic largely because of Inc. Fund's functioning under Thurgood Marshall's direction. …

Improved standards for laboratory animals?

In February 1993, Judge Charles R. Richey of the United States District Court issued a summary judgment in the case of Animal Legal Defense Fund, et al. v. The Secretary of Agriculture, et al. The decision, which was in favor of the Animal Legal Defense Fund, requires the U.S. Department of Agriculture to withdraw its current regulations governing exercise for dogs and the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates used for biomedical research and to issue new regulations containing only minimum, measurable standards. Both plaintiffs and defendants contended that they were seeking the best interests of the laboratory animals. The issue at stake is whether animals are better protected if the government establishes limited minimal standards or is allowed to require institutions to provide additional standards, which will be judged on the basis of their effectiveness in maintaining healthy animals. The Court avoided this dispute, however, by placing primary emphasis on applying the Administrative Procedures Act and stating that it was merely interpreting the "plain meaning" of the Animal Welfare Act, as amended. In this article, arguments are presented for interpreting the law in a far more flexible way than Judge Richey did. The conclusion is also reached that there were no winners in the Animal Legal Defense Fund case and that the real losers are the laboratory animals.

Book Review

AbstractThe aim of the book is to "capture the movement's moral vision and sense of mission, with sensitivity to its concerns but also an awareness of some of its excesses" (book jacket). It is a brave book in its attempt to provide a dispassionate account of what has become (along with abortion) one of the most passionate controversies of our era. The authors are two sociologists currently at New York University, with long and prolific careers writing about the interface of science and social values. Jasper has written widely on nuclearism, technology, and social change, and Nelkin on genetic engineering, biotechnology, AIDS, nuclearism, ecology, and job safety. Regarding animals, apparently their only two prior studies were co-authored presentations at recent sociology meetings (Jasper & Poulsen, 1989; Jasper, Nelkin, & Poulsen, 1990). Seven of the 12 chapters analyze the nature of the movement. Over the centuries, several social forces (urbanization, industrialization, democratization) have caused a shift in humans' view of animals, from instruments to be used for food, clothing, and farm work to companions to be cherished - pets given a name and family status. It has led to what the authors term "sentimental anthropomorphism," people's attribution to animals of human sentiments such as the abilities to feel emotions and communicate, and to form social relationships. Borrowing tactics from other reformist movements, animal advocates have become more effective in several ways - protests, litigation, boycotts, lobbying, and public relations. Since the 1970s, philosophers like Peter Singer and Tom Regan have honed a notion of "animal rights," providing an important ideological base that has further accelerated the movement. The remaining five chapters focus on five specific themes of the crusade: Regarding "animals in the wild," strong protests have been mounted against large-scale seal hunts, dolphin-safe tuna, trapping, and hunting. "From rabbits to petri dishes" describes the dramatic drop in industrial testing of cosmetics, drugs and toiletries since 1980, to the point where the once-routine Draize and LD-50 tests are now viewed by many as obsolete. "Test tubes with legs" documents the dramatic rise in biomedical research after World War II, and the effectiveness of protests challenging this- reportedly more easily at some labs (Cornell, Berkeley, Museum of Natural History) than at others (New York University, Stanford). "Animals as commodities" concludes that the crusade has persuasively made moral issues of factory farming, humane slaughter, and fur production (both wild and ranch). Finally, in "Animals on display," earlier protests against pit bull and cock fighting have now expanded to rodeos, circuses, Hollywood films, zoos, and animal shows, with only partial impact. Jasper and Nelkin present an overview of the evolution of the animal rights movement by dividing the movement into three parts: (1) Since the 1860s, the original SPCA "welfarists" were part of a larger humanitarian tradition of helping others; (2) Since the 1970s, more assertive "pragmatists" like Henry Spira have demanded "animal rights," using stronger methods in order to force negotiation with those who violate these rights; (3) Since the 1980s, "fundamentalists" like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) have sought to protect animal rights without "hobnobbing in the halls with our enemy" (p. 154) or compromising. Even in the 1990s, welfarist groups like the HSUS and SPCA remain the largest in both membership and funding. Yet there has been a meteoric rise of the crusader factions, eclipsing the welfarists - pragmatists like Spira's Animal Rights International, Joyce Tischler's Animal Legal Defense Fund, Cleveland Amory's Fund for Animals, as well as fundamentalists like PETA, Trans-Species Unlimited, and the Animal Liberation Front. Moreover, the achievements of the crusader groups are telling. For instance PETA grew from its two founders in 1980 to 300,000 in 1990 (p. 31), and between 1980-87 much of the cosmetics industry had come to pledge an end to all animal testing and allocated $5,000,000 for research on alternatives (p. 2). Some of this strength comes from alliance with parallel movements against pollution, racism, sexism, nuclearism, agribusiness, even cholesterol.

Wild By Law: The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and the Places It Has Saved. By Tom Turner, with photographs by Carr Clifton. San Francisco, California: Sierra Club Books, 1990. xx + 156 pp. Illustrations, maps, appendixes. $50.00

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsWild By Law: The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and the Places It Has Saved. By Tom Turner, with photographs by Carr Clifton. San Francisco, California: Sierra Club Books, 1990. xx + 156 pp. Illustrations, maps, appendixes. $50.00A. E. Keir NashA. E. Keir Nash Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Volume 36, Number 2April 1992 Published for the American Society for Environmental History and the Forest History Society Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/3983765 Journal History This article was published in Forest & Conservation History (1990-1995), which is continued by Environmental History (1996-present). © 1992 Forest History Society, Inc. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

The NEA "Compromise"

OK, so the NEA was reauthorized. The question of obscenity was left to the courts. But remember that to defend oneself against a charge costs plenty-ask the people in Cincinnati. So the chill is definitely on. Is anybody up to starting a legal defense fund? The other outcome of the new law is that more money will go to state arts councils, less to individual artists. This will mean an increase in grants to large organizations. Little groups and individuals will be worse off. Let's hear some suggestions about how to fight back. e. In my workshops, I realized (not for the first time) tha artists and iques will, given half a chance, happily cr ss boundaries without sports or ide logical stamps of approval.

Achieving Social Justice: An Examination of Oklahoma's Response to Adams v. Richardson

The U.S. Supreme Court set the standard for minority access to education when it ruled in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) that admission to public educational institutions could not be denied on the basis of race. Since that decision, legal concepts and definitions have increased the responsibilities of governments and universities by looking beyond admission to recruiting and retaining minority students. Questions of legal standards and educational policy became intertwined in the 1970s when affirmative action programs were launched to increase minority enrollments. These actions were partly in response to the mandates of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits federal support to educational and other institutions that practice segregation and discrimination, but they were also in recognition of the educational needs of previously underrepresented minority groups. The controversy over desegregation overlapped with plans for affirmative action in the 1970s. However, desegregation efforts followed a more tortuous legal course and involved a more institutional approach to the underlying education issues. Even after the Brown decision, Black students continued to be underrepresented in traditionally White institutions. The lawsuit brought by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund in Adams v. Richardson (1970) attacked the vestiges of segregation. This action compelled the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a system of public secondary and higher education whose enrollment patterns reflected a segregated system.

Scott, R. S., Jr. (1981). Black achievement and desegregation: A research synthesis. Alexandria, VA: American Education Legal Defense Fund, 156 pp., no price listed

Scott, R. S., Jr. (1981). Black achievement and desegregation: A research synthesis. Alexandria, VA: American Education Legal Defense Fund, 156 pp., no price listed

AGAINST JOINT CUSTODY: A DISSENT TO THE GENERAL BULLMOOSE THEORY

With the exception of the opening section, which is all my own, this article has been written in a kind of collaboration with authors from whose works and reports I have borrowed liberally, with permission. These include the majority report of the 1987–88 Executive Committee of the Child Custody Committee, Family Law Section of the American Bar Association, Professor Carol S. Bruch of the Martin Luther King, Jr. School of Law, University of California, Davis: Joanne Schulman, a gifted attorney who has researched, written and spoken extensively on the subject and the report of the Women's Legal Defense Fund on Joint Custody. Others are cited in footnotes.

Webster and Women's Equality

The National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) and the Women's Legal Defense Fund (WLDF) co-authored an amicus curiae brief submitted to the United States Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. The brief was authored on behalf of seventyseven organizations committed to women's equality. The brief argued that continued constitutional protection of a woman's fundamental right to choose abortion is guaranteed by the liberty-based right to privacy. Further, we argued that this right is essential to women's ability to achieve sexual equality. In order to participate in society as equals, women must be afforded the opportunity to make decisions concerning childbearing. Women's unique reproductive capabilities have long served as a principal justification for their unequal and disadvantageous treatment by the state. Restrictive abortion laws continue “our Nation['s] … long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination” by depriving women of the freedom to control the course of their lives.

On Excellence and Equity in Higher Education

There is something wrong about the excellence movement in education in the United States today. Fundamentally, it is concerned with how to exclude rather than with how to include. The democratic nation to which we pledge allegiance has as its goal liberty and justice for all. This is an inclusive, not an exclusive, goal. In this age when only one-third of high school graduates go on to college, and only one-fourth of all students in higher education are studying at the doctoral level, the National Commission on Excellence in Education recommended that standardized tests should be used in evaluating students, that such tests should be given annually to all graduating students, and that colleges and universities should raise their standards (presumably to increase their excluding tendencies).' A recipe for self-destruction is for schools of good learning, including graduate schools, to drive away students who are hungry for learning. We know on the basis of evidence that standardized aptitude tests disproportionately exclude minorities. Some years ago, the University of California system proposed to give more weight to standardized aptitude tests in its admissions decisions. Fortunately at that time, Vilma Martinez, then director of the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, was a regent. She requested that the University of California study the impact of this proposal on students already enrolled, since most had taken standardized aptitude tests anyway, although not required. The new admissions standard would have excluded 10 percent of Hispanics, 9 percent of blacks, and only 2

A Comment on the Nondiscrimination Principle in a "Nation of Minorities"

The last time I was asked to comment on changes in race law since Brown' was in 1983 at the Legal Defense Fund's annual celebration of the Brown decision. There, in response to Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynold's invocation of the nondiscrimination principle-the principle of colorblindness-as the basis for the Civil Rights Division's current opposition to many remedial programs, I said in part: