Legal Burden Of Proof Research Articles

A Scoping Review of Causal Associations between Occupation and Cancer Occurrence and Legal Burden of Proof.

Occupational diseases, characterized by the gradual accumulation of work-related harmful effects over extended periods, often lack a distinct, identifiable incident causative of the disease. This ambiguity in pinpointing the work-relatedness of such diseases stems from the intricate interplay between occupational risks, workers' pathophysiological predispositions, and pre-existing health conditions, all of which evolve slowly over time. Consequently, establishing a definitive causal relationship between occupational exposure and disease manifestation becomes a pivotal, yet challenging, aspect in securing industrial accident insurance benefits. In contrast to occupational accidents, where causality is relatively more discernible, the complexity escalates in the context of occupational diseases. Typically, employers maintain the majority of data pertinent to establishing causality, but this data is frequently inadequate. Furthermore, the onus of proving the work-relatedness of a disease falls on the worker, a process that necessitates specialized medical knowledge, thereby compounding the difficulty. Imposing the burden of proof on workers in occupational disease litigation could lead to a lapse in worker protection. This paper critically explores methodologies to safeguard workers, focusing specifically on the burden of proof concerning causality in occupational diseases. This analysis aims to highlight the challenges workers face in establishing a connection between their work and disease, proposing potential legal and policy solutions to ensure more equitable and just outcomes in occupational disease claims.

Structural Analyzes of Article 18¹ of Civil Code of Georgia

n modern internet age, demand of society on using the technology is growing, however, development of technology expands possibility of private interest infringement. Accordingly, legal grounds of personal data protection, especially, in the framework of relationships between private individuals should be studied. Structural analysis of Article 18 prima of Civil Code of Georgia (hereinafter the Code) is essential from this approach. Firstly, considering the aim of the research, the scope of the term ‘personal data’ and limits of its protection should be established, where does the interest of informing the society commence and end. From this approach, in order to define correspondence between national and European approaches, main essence of public and private interest conflict should be shown in accordance with European standards. Research established that personal data is one of the parts of private life. Moreover, personal information includes data of different form and content that are directly or indirectly connected to an identified or identifiable physical person. In order to avoid private interest infringement, personal data should be processed with strict protection of regulations stipulated by the law. The law has legal gap. Accordingly, it should be determined, how should private individual protect its own interest on personal data, while the law on Personal Data Protection sets forth measures that should be used during infringement mainly having public law nature. Research has revealed that Civil Code does not include sanctions that should be used during infringement and Georgian Civil legislation is not in compliance with European standards, as the law should be clear, precise, stipulate effective, corresponding and efficient sanctions. It should be noted that if the content of personal data is connected to illicit and faulty infringement of different private goods (respect, honor, private life secrecy etc.), victim is entitled to request compensation of relevant damages. In order to protect private interests, this gap could be filled with using analogy of Article 18 and interpretation of delict responsibility under Article 992 of the Code expended for purposes of solving this problem. Different regulation exists in relation to non-material damage compensation. According to Article 413.1 of the Code, events of non-material damage compensation is narrowed and issue should be considered in the limits of teleological reduction. Article 18 prima of the Code does not indicate on damage compensation for violating rules of personal data distribution. Accordingly, on legislation level, Article 18 prima of the Code does not compensate non-material damages. It is reasonable, that the following sentence - “person is entitled to receive damage compensation for non-material damage in case of violation private information or confidentiality” should be added to Article 18 prima of the Code. At this stage, legal burden of proof is complicated for the claimant, until there is no indication on such possibility in Civil Code. If faulty and impermissible exposure of personal data results in non-material damages, in order to satisfy the claim on its compensation, the victim should prove that issuing private information was determinant of infringement of any right protected under Article 18. Accordingly, if both facts will be confirmed, non-material damage may be compensated based on Article 18.6 of Code and generalization of Article 992.

Rationalising the burden of establishing defences at criminal law in Singapore: Reconsidering Jayasena, in the wake of Eu Lim Hoklai

The reversal of the burden of proof and the imposition of a mandatory death penalty for certain offences have left the Singapore criminal justice system the subject of much rights-based criticism. Case law hints that there exists a very real possibility of wrongful conviction, should the courts apply s. 107 of the Evidence Act (‘EA’) in its literal sense and shift the legal burden to the accused, irrespective of the defence he seeks to invoke. The Singapore courts have acknowledged that the ‘evidential burden’ of proof as a distinct legal concept on numerous occasions but have not reconciled it with Lord Devlin’s interpretation of s. 3(3) EA in Jayasena, which limits proof to the ‘legal burden’. This article argues that the time has come for the Singapore courts to expressly banish the Jayasena ghost. The fairer approach would be to examine whether the defence falls within the categories of (a) mental condition defences, namely insanity, insane automatism, diminished responsibility and intoxication causing abnormality of mind, and (b) other general defences. Reliance on a defence within the former category will cause the accused to bear the legal burden of proof; he should only bear the evidential burden for the latter.

Medical Non-Disclosure and Hypothetical Consent

The difference between battery and negligence with regard to the effect of hypothetical consent and its justification by the different degrees to which the non-disclosure of information by the doctor violates the patient's autonomy is discussed. Four situations of medical non-disclosure are examined and show that hypothetical informed consent should continue to exclude liability in negligence, provided that the doctor rather than the patient bears the legal burden of proof as to causation and that causation is determined by asking what the particular claimant, not the reasonable person would have done.

The Retrospective Effect of S. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998

When the House of Lords delivered its judgment in Lambert, comment initially concerned the fact that their Lordships held that the legal burden of proof placed on defendants in s. 28 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 contravened the presumption of innocence contained in Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This was indeed a major and potentially far-reaching finding, but it was in fact obiter dicta for the House also held that a defendant who was convicted prior to s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 coming into force could not rely on that section in an appeal after the Act came into force, except in certain carefully prescribed circumstances. It is only now when subsequent case law has challenged this finding that its importance has been fully recognised. This article aims to respond to the academic neglect of this point through a careful scrutiny of the judgments in Lambert and will argue that, despite recent judicial criticism, the majority in Lambert deconstructed a complex statutory framework to expose Parliament's limited intention to ‘bring rights home’.

Burden of proof

This paper presents an analysis of the concept of burden of proof in argument. Relationship of burden of proof to three traditional informal fallacies is considered: (i) argumentum ad hominem, (ii) petitio principii, and (iii) argumentum ad ignorantiam. Other topics discussed include persuasive dialoque, pragmatic reasoning, legal burden of proof, plausible reasoning in regulated disputes, rules of dialogue, and the value of reasoned dialogue.