The Retrospective Effect of S. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998

Abstract

When the House of Lords delivered its judgment in Lambert, comment initially concerned the fact that their Lordships held that the legal burden of proof placed on defendants in s. 28 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 contravened the presumption of innocence contained in Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This was indeed a major and potentially far-reaching finding, but it was in fact obiter dicta for the House also held that a defendant who was convicted prior to s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 coming into force could not rely on that section in an appeal after the Act came into force, except in certain carefully prescribed circumstances. It is only now when subsequent case law has challenged this finding that its importance has been fully recognised. This article aims to respond to the academic neglect of this point through a careful scrutiny of the judgments in Lambert and will argue that, despite recent judicial criticism, the majority in Lambert deconstructed a complex statutory framework to expose Parliament's limited intention to ‘bring rights home’.