Left-wing Voters Research Articles

How Do Coronavirus Attitudes Fit into Britain's Ideological Landscape?

Coronavirus has upended British politics in 2020 but where does it fit into the ideological map of party competition? Recent British elections have seen a shift from economic left-right competition between the major parties to competition on the cultural (liberal-authoritarian) dimension, most notably in terms of the issues of immigration and membership of the European Union. Using British Election Study data from June 2020, we find that coronavirus attitudes fall primarily onto the traditional economic left-right dimension, with left wing voters more willing to make economic sacrifices of various types to reduce infections. However, more draconian coronavirus measures (such as fining or imprisoning those who violate the coronavirus rules) are most supported by voters who score high on authoritarianism. We show that the structure of coronavirus attitudes puts the Conservative government in a difficult position where many steps it takes to reduce infections risk alienating its core economic right wing vote.

The left returns to Polish Parliament: a change of people’s hearts? Determinants of right and left identification on the individual level

ABSTRACT The article examines the individual-level durability of left-right political identification and verifies hypotheses about the persistence of absence of the economic dimension in its formation. We determined an asymmetry between the left- and the right wing voters, in that the latter are more stable in their identity. As regards the substantive meaning of the right and left, the cultural-ideological axis remains the strongest determinant. The economic axis differentiates society, but irrespective of the left-right axis: the extreme statist persons (notionally potential left wing voters) are on average non-ideological. We explain these factors by the founding event that determined the structure of political conflict in many Central and East European countries: the peaceful revolution of 1989. We verify the hypotheses with a panel survey conducted in 2015 and 2019, immediately after parliamentary elections. Altogether, 628 respondents participated in both waves.

Exploring the Effect of Cooperation in Reducing Implicit Racial Bias and Its Relationship With Dispositional Empathy and Political Attitudes.

Previous research using immersive virtual reality (VR) has shown that after a short period of embodiment by White people in a Black virtual body, their implicit racial bias against Black people diminishes. Here we tested the effects of some socio-cognitive variables that could contribute to enhancing or reducing the implicit racial bias. The first aim of the study was to assess the beneficial effects of cooperation within a VR scenario, the second aim was to provide preliminary testing of the hypothesis that empathy and political attitudes could contribute to implicit bias about race, while the third aim was to explore the relationship between political attitudes and empathy. We had (Caucasian) participants embodied in a Black virtual body and engaged either in a cooperative (Coop group) or in a non-cooperative (Neutral group) activity with a confederate experimenter embodying another Black avatar. Before and after VR, we measured participants’ implicit racial bias by means of Implicit Association Test (IAT) and their perceived closeness toward the confederate experimenter. Before VR we also assessed participants’ political attitudes and empathy traits. Results revealed that, as compared to the Neutral group, the Coop group showed lower IAT scores after the social interaction. Interestingly, in the Neutral but not the Coop group the perceived closeness toward the confederate experimenter was associated with the initial racial bias: the more the participants reduced their distance, the more they reduced their IAT score. Moreover, reported traits of empathy and political attitudes significantly explained the variance observed in the initial implicit bias, with perspective-taking, empathic concern, and personal distress being significant predictors of the IAT scores. Finally, there was a relationship between political attitudes and empathy: the more participants considered themselves as left-wing voters, the higher their perspective-taking and empathic concern scores. We discuss these findings within the neuroscientific and social cognition field and encourage scholars from different domains to further explore whether and under which conditions a given manipulation for reducing racial bias could be efficiently transposed in VR.

Ambitious Women: Gender and Voter Perceptions of Candidate Ambition

Are ambitious women punished in politics? Building on literature from negotiation, we argue that women candidates who are perceived to be ambitious are more likely to face social backlash. We first explore what the term ‘ambitious’ means to voters, developing and testing a new multidimensional concept of perceived ambition, from desire to run for higher office to scope of agenda. We then test the link between these ‘ambitious’ traits and voter support for candidates using five conjoint experiments in two countries, the U.S. and the U.K. Our results show that while ambitious women are not penalized overall, the aggregate results hide differences in taste for ambitious women across parties. We find that in the U.S. left-wing voters are more likely to support women with progressive ambition than right-wing voters (difference of 7% points), while in the U.K. parties are not as divided. Our results suggest that ambitious women candidates in the U.S. face bias particularly in the context of non-partisan races (like primaries and local elections), when voters cannot rely on party labels to make decisions.

Spatial Realignment of German Voters and Germany’s Regional Cleavage

This article seeks to explain the increase in the German Green party votes in 2019 European elections through the East-West cleavage. Using the 2018 German General Social Survey data, it identifies and compares the Green Party electorate in both regions in terms of conventional and supposed determinants of Green voting. Results of the multivariate analysis equally support both models, indicating left-wing voters as the main source of the Greens’ electoral gains across Germany. However, while in the East the Greens were supported primarily by the electorate of the Social Democratic party dissatisfied with the activity of this party, Western Germans exhibited a trend of left-leaning voters’ backlash against the rise of the radical right party Alternative for Germany through Green voting. This realignment is explicated by the persistent specifics of German regional party politics combined with intrinsic value distinctions of their dwellers, and recent shifts in party-voters ties.

Correction: How does symbolic success affect redistribution in left-wing voters? A focus on the 2017 French presidential election.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0229096.].

How does symbolic success affect redistribution in left-wing voters? A focus on the 2017 French presidential election.

Redistribution preferences depend on factors such as self-interest and political views. Recently, Deffains et al. (2016) reported that redistributive behavior is also sensitive to the actual experience of success or failure in a real effort task. While successful participants ('overachievers') are more likely to attribute their success to their effort rather than luck and opt for less redistribution, unsuccessful participants ('underachievers') tend to attribute their failure to external factors and opt for more redistribution. The aim of the present study was to test how the experience of success (symbolic success) and political views interact in producing redistributive behavior in an experimental setting. The study was conducted during the 2017 French presidential election. Our sample was biased towards left-wing, and most participants reported voting for Mélenchon, Hamon or Macron. Our findings reveal that 1) Macron voters redistribute less than Hamon voters who themselves redistribute less than Mélenchon voters, 2) overachievers redistribute less than underachievers only among Mélenchon voters. This suggests that redistributive behavior is governed primarily by political opinions, and that influence by exogenous manipulation of symbolic success is not homogenous across left-wing political groups.

Brief Report: Can Political Orientation Explain Mental Health in the Time of a Global Pandemic? Voting Patterns, Personal and National Coping Resources, and Mental Health During the Coronavirus Crisis

Introduction: The purpose of this study was to examine mental health during the coronavirus pandemic crisis and its explanation by personal and national level coping resources. This question was examined in the midst of a political crisis in Israel among voters from two different political orientations. Method: Questionnaires were delivered to a sample of 396 Israeli Jews, of them 180 (45.5%) right-wing and 216 (54.5%) left-wing voters. Right-wing voters presented higher levels of mental health during the crisis as compared to left-wing voters. Results: Right-wing voters also reported stronger levels of national coping resources such as sense of national coherence and trust in governmental institutions. Moreover, mental health was predicted only by personal resources among left-wing voters, while among the right-wing participants national resources were significant as well. Discussion: The results highlight the role of political orientation and low trust in the government as a possible risk factor for mental health even in times of global pandemic crisis.

Rainy day politics. An instrumental variables approach to the effect of parties on political outcomes

Scholars have grappled with the question of how parties affect policy. Here I propose and test an instrumental variable approach using rainfall. In Norwegian municipal elections, potential left wing voters are likely to abstain from voting with election day rain, whereas the opposite holds for right-wingers. Then rainfall provides an exogenous source of variation, and hence an instrument, for the party composition of the municipal council. A strengthening of the right wing parties due to rainfall shifts expenditures toward education, but reduces total spending. This also shows that political competition does not drive party platforms to converge.

Bound to the group and blinded by the leader: ideological leader-follower dynamics in a trust economic game.

Understanding the dynamics of trustworthiness in ideological contexts could influence human societies, affect electoral campaigns and ultimately impact democracy. We tested trust behaviour towards political leaders in a sample of 121 opposing/supporting voters assigned as trustors in an iterative trust game (TG). In two experiments, a famous Italian conservative leader (i.e. Silvio Berlusconi) or a famous non-politician were used as trustees in a predefined un/trustworthy TG, while trustors believed that mathematical algorithms reproduced trustee’s real behaviour. Results revealed that depending on the group, voters either relied on the situation and adjusted to the behaviour of the out-group leader (in our case left-wing voters), or on their disposition for group-loyalty with respect for authority, thus failing to adjust to the behaviour of the in-group leader (in our case right-wing voters). Our findings suggest that: (i) complex voter–leader relations in politics are reflected in the simple trustor–trustee financial interactions from behavioural economics, and (ii) being bound to one’s group and one’s leader may affect the trust economic decisions of the followers.

Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Political Affiliation, and Group Size

The main objective of this paper is to strengthen the knowledge about the relationship between cooperation and political affiliation. For this purpose, I carry out an incentivized N-person prisoner’s dilemma experiment. I find that left-wing voters cooperate more than right-wing voters in 3-person prisoner’s dilemmas. However, this difference in cooperation tapers off with group size due to a heterogeneous response to larger decision groups. While leftists cooperate less as the group size increases, I find no significant group size effect for rightists. These findings can partly be explained by differences in beliefs about the cooperativeness of others, but a substantial part remains unexplained.

Aligning Preferences for Redistribution of Right and Left Wing Voters by Correcting Their Beliefs about Inequality: Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment in Australia

Are differences in preferences for redistribution between right and left wing voters amplified because of misperceptions of inequality? To answer this question, we conduct a nationally representative, randomized survey experiment of 2,584 Australians in which respondents either received information about the level of national inequality and economic mobility, their position in the national income distribution, or no information. We show that both types of information about inequality lead to convergence in preferences for redistribution and charitable giving between right and left wing voters. The effect from the treatments are predominantly due to right wing voters becoming more progressive in their views.

Populist Twitter Posts in News Stories

ABSTRACTResearch in information processing suggests that the journalistic practice of embedding right-wing populist Twitter posts in news may stimulate political polarization. To test this notion, we conducted an online experiment (N = 379). We investigated how highlighted right-wing populist statements affected individuals from different ideological stances and whether potential effects were determined by Twitter-specific characteristics (Twitter frame, profile picture). We exposed participants to two articles, each including a statement by a politician of the Austrian Freedom Party. In the first group, the statements were not highlighted (control group). In the second and third group, the statements appeared as conventional block quotes either without (G2) or with (G3) a picture of the politician. In the fourth and fifth group, the statements were highlighted as Twitter posts, again either without (G4) or with (G5) a picture of the politician. Results revealed that all highlighting conditions increased statement recognition among left-wing individuals. However, the full Twitter post condition exerted the strongest effect. Higher recognition then decreased left-wing individuals’ anti-immigrant attitudes and sympathy toward the right-wing populist candidate. Thus, embedding right-wing populists’ Twitter posts may induce disconfirmation bias among left-wing voters and trigger a process in which they strengthen their initial attitudes.

Family or state responsibility? Elderly- and childcare policy preferences in Spain

PurposeSpain is typically considered a familialistic country where the family is the main responsible for individuals’ well-being. Recent demographic, socioeconomic and policy changes raise the question to what extent familialism is regarded as the preferred care arrangement in society or whether more state support is considered legitimate. The purpose of this paper is to analyse individual preferences among Spanish residents regarding care responsibility for pre-school children and the frail elderly, and the factors that influence such preferences.Design/methodology/approachRepresentative data from the 2012 International Social Survey Programme are used (n=1419). Six patterns of care responsibility that capture preferences regarding who, between the family or the state, should provide and pay for the care of pre-school children and the frail elderly are identified. Logistic regressions are performed on each care responsibility pattern to analyse the factors influencing individuals’ preferences.FindingsMultiple preferences coexist and state responsibility is often preferred over family responsibility, especially for elderly-care. It suggests that the tendency to rely on the family in Spain is due to insufficient support rather than to familialistic values. Individuals who usually bear most care work responsibilities, such as women and individuals in caring ages, or those with a poor health, high care load or low income consider there should be extra-family support. Individuals’ values also matter: the least religious, the most supportive of maternal employment and left-wing voters are most likely to reject traditional care arrangements.Originality/valueThis is the first study to analyse both elderly- and childcare policy preferences in one single study. It shows that childcare is more often seen as a family responsibility than elderly care.

Motives behind voting and the perception of the motives: paradox of voting in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The prosperity of developing countries highly depends on the voting outcomes, as they represent the key to economic and social progress. However, there is limited evidence on what motivates people to vote. Moreover, their reasons for voting go beyond material self-interest, which is the conventional assumption. As the expected benefit from voting is rather small compared to the time cost and effort, there has been a need for better understanding of the phenomenon. Thus, the theory of expressive voting provides an alternative to the rational voter hypothesis. Due to its complex political system, Bosnia and Herzegovina is an interesting example of a developing country, which is why it was chosen for this study. The latest local elections were organized in 2016 and the present paper examines the perception of voters and tries to answer the question of why people voted the way they did, and why they think others voted as they did. A convenient sample of 406 citizens from Bosnia and Herzegovina completed the survey. Although there is little chance that one vote would influence the election, the strongest reason for voting was to affect the results. The reasons “it is a democratic obligation to vote” and “to express the political view by voting” were also mostly considered as important or very important. People perceived not voting as unethical. This perception was stronger among left-wing voters. The results also showed that people generally believe that they vote less selfishly than others. The majority of the respondents considered selfish voting as unethical or very unethical. The study also describes the influence of sociodemographic variables on the reasons and motives for voting and on the perception of selfish voting and not voting. The method was replicated from a study conducted in Sweden by Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010). The results of both studies are compared.

The electoral advantage of the left in times of fiscal adjustment

Despite widely held views on fiscal adjustment as a political minefield for government parties, the empirical literature on the issue has been surprisingly inconclusive. A crucial variable that has been often overlooked in the debate is partisan politics. Building on the micro-logic of Albert Hirschman’s ‘exit, voice, and loyalty’ framework, this article offers a novel theoretical perspective on the conditioning impact of partisan government in the electoral arena. Due to their more limited exit options at their disposal, left-wing voters are less likely to inflict electoral punishment on their parties, offering the latter an electoral advantage over their right-wing rivals. Relying on the largest cross-national data set to date on the evolution of close to 100 parties’ popularity ratings in 21 democracies, time-series–cross-section results confirm this electoral advantage. Somewhat paradoxically, while center-right government parties systematically lose popularity in years of fiscal adjustment, no such regularity is found for left-leaning incumbents.

Manifestos and public opinion: testing the relevance of spatial models to explain salience choices

According to Downs’ spatial model of electoral competition, in two-party systems, political parties move closer to the median voter’s preferences, while in multiparty democracies, party platforms target their own electorate. This model has been used to predict parties’ policy positions, but never to explain their salience choices. Based on data from political manifestos and public opinion in 23 European countries from 2004 to 2012, we show that the Downsian model can be applied to salience strategies when issue attention is different among left-wing and right-wing voters. In line with the spatial theory, parties choose to place emphasis on different issues in their manifestos depending on the importance attached to each of these issues by either the median voter or their partisan voters, depending on their size and the characteristics of the party system.

Agenda setting and the political economy of fear: How crime news influences voters’ beliefs

In this article, we analyse the mechanisms of agenda setting by focusing on the determinants of individual attitudes towards crime and investigating the role played by the media. After a brief literature review supporting the relevance of the selected topic of inquiry and the presentation of our analytical framework, we study the persuasion effects of mass media. More specifically, we investigate how TV exposure can shape individual perceptions of specific issues such as crime, and then focus on the effects of exposure to crime news on voting decisions. Using the Italian 2001 general election as an important case study of TV power concentration, we provide evidence that media-induced agenda setting enhanced the salience of the crime issue in voters’ minds during the 2001 Italian general election and contributed to the victory of the coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi. Interestingly, our results are partially driven by the switch of previous left-wing voters to voting for the centre right because of exposure to crime news.

The Breakdown of the Spanish Two-Party System: The Upsurge of Podemos and Ciudadanos in the 2015 General Election

The 2015 general election marked the end of the two-party system that had existed in Spain since the restoration of democracy. Two new parties, ‘Podemos’ and ‘Ciudadanos’, entered the national arena for the first time and together obtained 34.6 per cent of the vote. This paper describes this election’s context and electoral results by analysing the individual determinants behind the change to the Spanish party system. The results indicate that economic factors predominantly explain the votes for the traditional parties, the PP and PSOE. On the other hand, political factors help distinguish why some voters remained ‘loyal’ to the traditional parties and others switched to the new formations. While Podemos switchers were mainly politically disaffected left-wing voters, electoral support for Ciudadanos came from younger and ideologically moderate voters who had lower levels of political trust.

The Electoral Advantage of the Left in Times of Fiscal Adjustment

Despite widely held views on fiscal adjustment as a political minefield for incumbents, the empirical literature on the issue has been surprisingly inconclusive. A crucial variable that has been often overlooked in the debate is partisan politics. Building on the micro-logic of Albert Hirschman’s “exit, voice and loyalty” framework, this article offers a novel theoretical perspective on the conditioning impact of partisanship in the electoral arena. Due to their more limited exit options at their disposal, left-wing voters are less likely to inflict electoral punishment on their parties, offering the latter an electoral advantage over their right-wing rivals. Relying on the largest cross-national dataset to date on the evolution of close to 100 parties’ popularity rating in 21 democracies, time-series-cross-section results confirm this electoral advantage.